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Preface 
Writing the preface of this thesis gives me both a sense of fulfillment and 
dissatisfaction. Fulfillment because of finishing a job I which proved to be more lasting 
and absorbing than I could ever have imagined. Dissatisfaction because it is not easy to 
part with a work that has become so much an element of my everyday life. I realize 
that this thesis embodies an intellectual journey characterized by unending attempts to 
make sense of a multitude of conversations, situations and events I experienced, while 
conducting field research' in the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica. 
Regarding the writing process I must say that I have become convinced of the 
fact that theories are highly powerful in making some aspects of social life invisible, 
thereby making us - social scientists - potentially connivant in the production of a 
discourse which may serve to repress the aspirations and commitments of those we 
write about. In that sense theorjgs mighj^y^ein^^ojs^wh]ch^can be used in ways 
wJTjcjxjun against_QULviews. One way to avoid this, I think, is to interweave into the 
ac^fflTT?m^~üö:ntra^trng~views and interpretations of the people who have to cope with 
our researcFTpTöTteml^ ^ fthink, is thé rrïaih contribution of an 
actor-orientê^lfp^öa^rLeTm¥gTv% a short example. 
When attempting to develop a model about feice-to-face relationships between 
farmers and bureaucrats I once visited a peasant leader with a self-made theory about 
the effects of certain types of relationships between farmers and extensionists upon 
the quality of extension. He listened patiently, then laughed and asked me whether I 
really believed in that explanation. Sensing that I v/as imposing some kind of self-
serving logic upon an evidently very conflictive social reality I responded that naturally 
relationships between bureaucrats and farmers were underpinned by a long history of 
struggles in which a various social actors, such as thei fruit multinationals and a variety 
of institutions and agencies, played a role, and that I was aware that this relationship 
had been characterized by considerable violence and repression. Upon hearing this 
comment the peasant leader responded that he liked this explanation much better and 
that he had been surprised to hear me talk in the language of bureaucrats. 
Thus, applying some extension model to a complex social reality would not only 
have meant concealing the 'darker sides' of state-peasant relations but also becoming 
an accomplice in attempts to depoliticize what in reality are fundamentally political 
struggles. The objective of the thesis, then, is not that of engaging in a discussion on 
how to improve the practice of intervention, nor to make 'scientific' judgements about 
the efficacy of intervention or the relationship between planning models and 
implementation structures. Rather this thesis attompts to shed light upon the 
relationship between certain types of intervention thinking and institutional practices of 
social control. Indeed, I hope that it will be easier for practitioners to recognize their 
own dilemma's in an ethnographic work rather than in an approach which is intent on 
developing methodologies for 'managing' participation. 
In this thesis state-peasant relations are studied by analysing the social strategies 
bureaucrats and farmers deploy when dealing witn state intervention. I did field 
research in two settlements in a colonization and banana plantation area at the 
'frontier'. Yet, the thesis is not about life in the frontier, although I hope that through 
the ethnography appearing in this book some idea of it will be conveyed. Also, little 
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mention is made of household structure and community life. But these were not my 
research themes. I am aware that women are under-represented in this study. 
However, introducing gender in the analysis would have required a fundamental critique 
of the male-centred character of most intervention thinking. This I think is a very 
promising area for future research. 
I owe much to many people in writing this thesis. To begin with I wish to thank 
the officials of the Neguev settlement in the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica for putting up 
with nie for such a long period (june 1987 through december 1988). On the side of the 
settlers I encountered admirable persons. The moral courage and strength of Rigo 
Gutiérrez, Juan Hernández and Juan José Herrera inspired me during the writing up of 
the thesis. Ricardo Hall was not only highly perceptive but also a caring friend. He 
probably does not agree with my analysis. They and many others played a formative 
role.during the writing of the thesis.1 
I am very grateful to Abelardo Delgado, Walter Robinson, José Salazar Navarrete 
and Marco Vinicio Cordero who introduced me to the intricacies of the IDA. David 
Kauck was a fine and hospitable friend. Monique and I shared with Leila, Angel and 
Alan many pleasant moments drinking cuba libre on the terrace of their house, where 
we lived. 
The Programa Zona Atlántica of CATIE/AUW/MAG provided me with financial and 
logistical support during the fieldwork period. I wish to thank Dr. Jan Wienk and Henk 
Waayenberg for their support. I guess that Jan was right when arguing that Ph.D. 
students develop egocentric features. Dr. Louk Box in his capacity of representative of 
the sociology department and chairman of the Costa Rica Werkgroep was most helpful. 
Without Fernando and Olga life in Guápiles would have been much more difficult. 
Monique and Annette Selten did a wonderful research job in distant frontier 
communities. They opened windows on the everyday reality of men and women there. 
Jeroen Huizing and Willemien Brooymans were witnesses of many of our anxieties and 
joys in Costa Rica. 
The support of other Ph.D. students here in Holland was important. The advanced 
seminars organised by Professor Norman Long provided a useful arena for discussing 
theoretical issues. The discussions with Dr. Alberto Arce and Gerard Verschoor 
provided me with plenty of fuel for going on with writing. Gerard and Horacia Fajardo 
were most helpful in the last, and most hectic, stage of the research. Dr. Philip Quarles 
van Ufford made a number of important editorial remarks. Jan Kees van Donge and Dr. 
Michael Drinkwater were kind enough to comment on the ethnography. Nannie Brink 
and Jos Michel provided crucial administrative and personal support. Ann Long did a 
great job correcting. She also made numerous editorial and substantial comments in the 
subtle and gentle way only she knows. From Norman Long, my supervisor I learnt that 
theory is vacuous without a sound ethnographic basis. 
I wonder whether I would have brought this job to completion without the 
constant help and encouragement of Monique, my wife. She had to put up with my 
recurrent frustrations, especially the last months. Without her exhaustive commentaries 
the work would have been rather less consistent. This has been largely a joint 
endeavour in which we explored new theoretical paths. 
The most beautiful event, and certainly the most energetic one, that happened to 
us during this period was the birth of our twin daughters, Liliana and Alicia in San José. 
We then could experience the kindness of the ticos towards children. 
I doubt whether we could have coped without the help of our parents. 
'It should be remarked that the names of the actors appearing in the text have been changed. 
CHAPTER 1 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO STATE-
PEASANT RELATIONS 
1.1 Introduction 
In this book state-peasant relations in a colonization area in the Atlantic Zone of Costa 
are studied from the perspective of the actors - bureaucrats and peasants - involved. 
The approach I propose here differs from the more customary perspectives on the 
theme of state-peasant relations, inasmuch as I focus on the struggles surrounding 
particular types of state intervention and not on a regional peasant movement. I do not 
address issues concerning the structural (in)-capacity of the state to transform the 
livelihood conditions of peasants, but focus instead on the social practices by which 
state intervention is sustained, resisted or appropriated. One major argument of this 
book is that state intervention includes institutional models about how to deal with 
farmers, tactics for dealing with 'recalcitrant' and 'uncooperative' farmers, and 
strategies by which farmers cope with the state bureaucracy. It is also argued that 
these models, strategies and tactics are shaped in concrete and often conflictive, 
situations in which farmers and bureaucrats develop rhetorical and organisational skills. 
Thus, instead of probing into the manifest or 'hidden' rationale of state intervention, I 
pay attention to the discursive practices by which notions of state authority are 
fashioned in struggles between farmers and bureaucrats. 
In this book I concentrate on how bureaucrats engage in a variety of practices for 
handling institutional problematics and for dealing with various groups of beneficiaries. 
In addition I examine the ways in which farmers deal with intervention b 
y penetrating, obstructing and subverting the state bureacracy and by forcing state 
representatives to negotiate the authority of the state. In short, I am interested in the 
following type of questions: How does a social worker of the land reform institute deal 
with a peasant leader who insists in blaming him, as a representative of the state; for 
the fact that the development programme he helped to initiate led to the indebtedness 
of a majority of the beneficiaries? How does a settler convince a credit assistant that 
the loss of his maize harvest was due to the rains and not because he spent the credit 
on consumer goods, or in the local canteen? 
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This brings us to the central issue of this thesis: that of agency and its interrelations 
with power.1 I do not simply assume that bureaucrats and farmers differ in that they 
have unequal access to (state) power, but I attempt to show how capacities to act are 
produced, reduced and obliterated by farmers and bureaucrats who deploy certain 
tactics, strategies and models. Agency, in this account, is not merely a characteristic of 
the individual but the outcome of social struggles in which some actors attempt to 
enroll others in their 'social projects'.3 
Various sets of social actors appear throughout the book as I discuss the 
contrasting ways in which intervention issues are strategically handled. It should be 
stressed, however, that this does not mean that they represent a given class, category 
or professional group. Their appearance in the text responds to a different line of 
argumentation: that of showing the kaleidoscope of bureaucrats practices of 
intervention and farmers' strategies for coping with intervention by accomodating, 
resisting or accomodating to it. What the protagonists of this study have in comon is 
that they were involved, as implementors or (would-be) beneficiaries, in the attempts of 
the Costa Rican Land Development Institute (IDA) to carry out a colonization 
programme in the Atlantic zone. By that token they became participants within wider 
political and administrative struggles concerning the nature, aims, and efficacy of 
planned state intervention. 
In short, let me first explain what this work does not endeavour. It does not 
attempt to contribute to the discussion on why, when and in what ways which sectors 
of the peasantry indulge in forms of revolutionary or collective action.3 Neither am I 
interested in proposing better, or improved modes of state intervention based on 
'scientific' knowledge. In focusing on the real-life dynamics of intervention and its 
appropriation by farmers I intend to contribute to a critique of normative models of 
intervention which are so popular in the academic literature. 
More concretely my research aims were: 
1. To produce an ethnography in which the models, strategies and tactics comprising 
practices of state intervention and farmers' intervention-coping are central.4 
2. To develop an alternative theoretical approach to the study of state-peasant 
relations, viewed in terms of the social practices by which various sets of social actors 
1See for innovative views on 'agency' Strathern (1987), Fardon (1985), Inden (1990). It seems that 
'agency' is becoming an important analytical theme in the social sciences. Thus Strathern argues that 
'agency refers to the manner in which people allocate causality and responsibility to one another, and thus 
sources of influence and directions of power" (1987,-23). Whereas Strathern chooses to study differences 
in cultural conceptions of agency Fardon focuses on its representation in anthropology and Inden on the 
construction of complex agents such as the state. 
2See Clegg (1989) for a cogent discussion of the conceptualization of power in various theorical 
approaches. Callon, Law and Latour draw upon recent post-structuralist views on power when developing 
a 'sociology of translation or enrollment' (see Callon, Law and Rip 1986, and book edited by Law 1986). 
3Existing studies on state-peasant relations have given rise to highly theoretical frameworks and 
sweeping generalizations as to how, why and under which historical conditions peasants rebel (see Paige 
1975, Wolf 1969, Hobsbawn 1965, Harrington Moore 1969 and Scott 1976; for an interesting critique of 
the logic of causality implied in these theories see Knight 1990). I took the view, however, that focusing 
on everyday situations and events does not yield less dramatic material for understanding state-peasant 
relations than the study of large peasant movements. 
*By practices of intervention I mean the techniques and theoretical tools used for conceptualizing and 
measuring 'development problems', for institutionalizing intervention activities, and for targeting, reaching 
and servicing intervention subjects such as "peasants', the 'poor", etc. When talking about intervention-
coping strategies I refer to strategies designed by farmers/beneficiaries in order to deal with state 
intervention, such as accommodation, resistance and manipulation. 
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(such as institutional managers, farmers, front-line workers and interested outsiders) 
shape, appropriate and transform state intervention. 
Next I provide the regional and institutional setting of the research. Thereafter a 
number of experiences in the field are discussed. Then, in the last part of this chapter I 
will outline the conceptual framework of the book. 
1.2 The Regional and Institutional Setting 
Since colonial times the Atlantic zone has been of geo-political importance since it 
belonged to an area of conflict between the colonial powers over control in the 
Caribbean (Sandner 1985). From the eighteenth century onwards an economy 
emerged, based on the production of cocoa, which developed in a typical boom and 
bust fashion. After Independence the Costa Rican government wished to establish a 
transport corridor between the coffee-producing Central Valley and the Atlantic in order 
to reduce freight costs of coffee and a port was established near the cocoa producing 
area of Matina, which would give rise to the city of Limón. In 1870, the building of the 
San José-Limón railroad started. During its construction, the railroad company 
experimented with the exploitation of tropical fruits, among them bananas, for export 
to North America and Europe. When bananas proved to be profitable, foreigners, as 
well as local small producers started to grow them. Production was sold to a USA 
based trading company, which would later become the United Fruit Company (UFCO). 
The banana industry has remained such an important element in the Atlantic zone that 
a short historical review is in place here. Attention is also given to colonisation 
processes and their consequences for land tenure. 
During the first banana cycle (1890-1940) production was highly concentrated in 
the hands of one foreign company, the UFCO. The national producers were largely 
cornered into a marginal position because they lacked access to the best land and 
depended entirely on the UFCO for the marketing of their crops. For this first banana 
cycle, a rather simple social structure could be pictured, with the UFCO at the apex, 
exerting control over all activities in the area. Below the UFCO there existed a class of 
medium-scale banana producers (often foreigners). Interspersed between the plantation 
areas there were small banana producers. Lastly, an urban/rural proletariat existed, 
involved in port and plantation activities. 
After 1942, the UFCO abandoned the plantations due to the devastations caused 
by the Sigatoka and Panama diseases (Hall 1983). This led to a collapse of the regional 
economy. Part of the rural population compensated for the subsequent loss in 
employment by starting agricultural activities. The UFCO stimulated this process by 
leasing plantation land to ex-plantation workers in return for symbolic payments. It also 
leased or sold land to national entrepreneurs who established cattle ranches of low 
productivity. This redivision of land laid the basis for the development of a new agrarian 
structure. 
When the state decided to organize a resurgence of the export sector in the 
Atlantic zone, a second banana cycle (1970 -) started. The difference from the first 
banana cycle was the heavy involvement of the state during this second cycle. The 
state provided not only capital for the establishment of plantations (through the Plan de 
Fomento Bananero) but also to improve the infrastructure. The latter was done through 
the nationalization and modernization of the railroads, the building of new highways 
and electricity plants and the installation of urban services. This would increase export 
4 Chapter 1 
earnings and tax revenues. While the state became more involved in the banana 
industry, the transnationals (besides the UFCO, two other companies had entered the 
banana-industry) became less involved. They adopted a strategy of backing out from 
production in areas where labour militancy, smallholder mobilizations and diminishing 
soil fertility narrowed their profit margins. In that case they sold their plantations to 
national producers and concentrated on the most fertile areas. The regional structure 
became characterized by a tight alliance between state, transnationals and national 
banana producers. The latter were accorded a cushioning function between labour 
organisations and plantation interests. The national planters, after an initially successful 
attempt to operate autonomously in the international market, once again became 
dependent on the transnationals for the marketing of their product. In fact, the 
introduction of technological innovations, required, even more than before, close 
vertical integration of production, processing and marketing (Ellis 1983). Decision 
making regarding quality control and the use of particular inputs came to be highly 
concentrated in the hands of the transnationals. 
Colonisation and land tenure 
Colonisation by native Costa Ricans began in the last century when the northern part of 
the Atlantic zone, the Valley of Santa Clara was cleared (Koch 1975). Although the 
high expectations that this would become a thriving agricultural area did not come 
about, several colonies were established with government support. 
With the exhaustion of the 'coffee frontier' in Costa Rica in the fifties a large 
colonization movement developed. This process was stimulated by state policies aimed 
at the incorporation of unused land for productive and geopolitical purposes. These 
lands, located in areas unsuited to coffee cultivation, provided a safety valve during 
crisis periods in the coffee economy, when rural unemployment and landlessness 
increased explosively. Moreover, the profitability of coffee led to increasing land 
concentration, forcing a sector of the population to migrate to other areas. In this way 
non-coffee producing lowland areas became integrated into the economy under specific 
conditions. In the Atlantic zone the smallholder sector became an important supplier of 
foodstuffs for an expanding home market (especially maize, but also tubers) in the 
coffee regions and acted as a 'social frontier' with a large capacity to absorb surplus 
labour. Later, the state encouraged colonisation with the dual purpose of reducing 
labour costs for the export sector and decreasing land pressure in other regions in 
Costa Rica. 
Because of state policy to promote colonisation and make remote areas more 
accessible, land in the Atlantic zone took on a very particular role. Its value consists of 
a real and a speculative element. That is, the expectation of increasing infrastructure by 
the state led to a considerable valorisation of land. This increase in value is prompted 
by the realisation that the 'physical' agricultural frontier is coming to an end. This is 
seen in the rapid deforestation that is taking place all over the zone. 
The precise patterns of land tenure that are evolving in the region are not entirely 
clear, given the continuing expansion of the plantation sector. It is interesting to note 
that the Colombian Association of Banana Producers (BANACOL) has been buying large 
extensions of land for plantation purposes, also in the settlement sector. It is, however, 
clear that the outcome of this process depends on the dynamics of the banana 
economy and on the other regional actors (the smallholder sector and the economic 
elite) to impose their own 'social project'. 
An alternative approach 
1.3 The Land Development Institute and the 0 3 4 Programme 
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The IDA was established in 1961 when it was called ITCO: the Land and Colonisation 
Institute. It has a presence in the Atlantic zone that dates back to the sixties with the 
establishment of land settlement and titling programmes. With regard to rights to 
redistribute land, the IDA'S mandate was limited from the start. It had no clear 
prerogatives since it was the judiciary system which resolved all cases regarding land 
ownership. The IDA also did not have sufficient and regular funding. It therefore 
basically limited itself to conflict-resolving tasks in response to local pressures. It was 
constantly dependent on the sensitivity of the current political regime to the pressures 
of peasant organisations. 
In the early sixties the IDA undertook two large colonization projects, those of 
Cariari and Bataan. In the 1970's, after realizing that colonization efforts were 
expensive and had little overall impact, it shifted attention to titling and the provision of 
services in frontier areas. In 1975, in response to increasing peasant mobilizations, it 
adopted a policy of establishing production cooperatives in more accessible areas. 
Towards the end of the 1970's it started an ambitious policy of colonization, in 
"development poles", adopting a comprehensive territorial approach. It must be noted 
that the IDA has been the target of criticism by many, and for various reasons. By 
peasant unions and progressive intellectuals for its inability to carry out a 'real' land 
reform. And, especially by other institutions, as too weak in its relation i with 
smallholders, and unable to implement plans according to technical criteria. However, 
the IDA remains the front-line agency for dealing with various types of smallholder 
pressure groups and in that respect it has a special role in Costa Rica. 
The 034 Programme I researched was funded by USAID. Its wider objective was 
that of restructuring the then prevailing pattern of institution-beneficiary relationship in 
Costa Rica by strengthening the operational capacity of the IDA. It started in 1980 and 
ended in 1987. The 034 Programme included the following programme components; 
1. Agricultural Asset Redistribution, which included the establishment of three 
settlements in the Atlantic zone, in formerly invaded haciendas. 
2. Increased Tenure Security, which involved cadastre and titling activities in a 
160,000 hectares area of the northern part of the Atlantic zone. 
3. Strengthened IDA Administration, which included introducing a data management 
system for activities such as adjudication, credit, titling, beneficiaries and programme 
evaluation. 
The total budget of the 034 Programme consisted of $9,500,000, out of which $3 
million were destined as a revolving Credit Fund. The 034 Programme was the 
response to a prolonged period of sometimes very explosive land occupations in the 
'70's. The three settlements included in the programme, of which Neguev with 5,340 
hectares and 310 beneficiary families was the oldest, were set up as centres of 
concentrated state directed activity. This involved the development of infrastructure 
(roads, schools, electrical service, etc.), and the establishment of productidn-related 
services (credit, extension). It was expected that the growth effects of these 
settlements would radiate towards the non-serviced areas. 
The "style" of the programme was distinctively top down: it was predominantly 
directed to the enforcement of state presence in order to regain political initiative in the 
region. Although the settlement project was explicitly intended to find viable livelihood 
alternatives for a large sector of smallholders, the programme exhibited from the 
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beginning problems at both the planning and implementation levels. By the end of 1983 
the Credit Fund had run into its first crisis; Loans given for planting cassave in the 
Neguev settlement could not be repaid, due to marketing problems. By 1986 it was 
clear that the agricultural development projects in Neguev, those of cocoa and animal 
husbandry, were due to become a disaster. It is telling that no evaluation of the Credit 
Fund has been released since 1984. 
What is interesting of the 034 Programme is that it signalled the introduction of 
the integrated rural development model in the IDA, coupled with an attempt to 
reorganise the institute by carrying through a drastic decentralization to the regions. 
This entailed that a new approach to the 'land question' be adopted, one geared to 
eliminating prevailing 'paternalistic' state practices, and to transforming peasants into 
entrepreneurial farmers8. This should have been achieved through a comprehensive 
approach including titling, the provision of land and credit and extension to landless 
peasants. An important instrument for achieving this goal was to be an effective 
beneficiary selection system6. However, these attempts to reorganise the IDA'S mode 
of operating encountered much resistance within the institute7. Due to these conflicts 
8The project also included as one of its goals that of helping the 'poorest of the poor'. Interestingly, in 
a 1984 mid-term evaluation, serious doubts were expressed as to the compatibility of this goal with that 
of transforming settlers into entrepreneurial farmers. As the evaluators put it, "We are not certain it is 
possible to design a project that will really help most of the 'poorest of the poor' become, overnight, 
progressive commercial small farmers" (1984:79). 
"In fact, before starting the 034 Programme a detailed anthropological analysis was undertaken by 
researchers contracted by USAID of topics such as client-institution relations and 'the impact of titling and 
land provision on peasant attitudes' (see the unclassified project paper 'Agrarian Settlement and 
Productivity', published in 1980). In this analysis we find ample examples of what can be designated 
academic labeling. Thus Seligson (1980) is quoted as having found that "the cardinal personal qualities of 
squatters are high cynicism (low trust in government) and a high sense of personal efficacy (having one's 
actions noticed); the combined qualities produce 'alienated activists" (Annex II.D. p.28). Such forms of 
'academic labeling' provide the rationale for advocating a meticulous beneficiary selection system. This 
preoccupation with beneficiary selection became the first focus of attention for USAID planners and 
already at an early stage attempts were made to enhance the effectivity of the selection procedure. Thus 
it is stated in the same document that "Perusal of a large number of ITCO Selection Cases turned up the 
following rejects: those with family incomes over C1,500, families with less than four members or with a 
family labour force of less than two but also, "troublemakers; bachelors or single women without 
family obligations; those known to be lazy or poor workers; individuals who lived away from their plots or 
who lived elsewhere; alcoholics; individuals in violation of the law; and those already precaristas 
(squatters) elsewhere". The authors congratulate themselves for the progress achieved in bringing about 
an effective beneficiary selection system, "Although some exceptions are made on humanistic (sic), 
common-sensical grounds, the scrupulousness with which ITCO investigators perform their detective 
work, combined with the improvements it is making in the calculation of man/land ratios and land-use 
assessment, augurs well for a more suitable, rationally chosen clientele. 
'Although programme documents are very careful concerning the formulation of the third Progamme 
component, that of Administrative strengthening, it is clear that it was USAID's purpose to reorganise the 
whole institute. Thus a USAID funded mid-project evaluation undertaken in 1984 states, "IDA'S new 
Administration may want to consider reorganising the whole institution so that the technical units 
(accounting, beneficiary selection, valuation, legal, etc.) understand that their primary role is to support the 
regional staff, which is carrying out IDA'S programmes" (p.47). In reality, this attempt at institutional 
restructuring encountered heavy resistance in the IDA, especially on the part of the then Executive 
President (Don Antonio Salgado), for reasons which are discussed in chapter 2. Thus by 1984 only 16% of 
the funds allocated to that component had been spent. The same evaluation report asserts with regard to 
support by the IDA management, "Overall, IDA management has usually been supportive of the Project. 
However, it sometimes took 3 months for the former President (Don Antonio Salgado) to return a call or 
answer an urgent memo asking for a decision" (p.3). 
An alternative approach 7 
programme implementation suffered a considerable delay. As of 1984 only 37% of 
total programme funds had been spent. In order to speed up the programme a 
Programme Advisor (Don Roberto Arcos) was employed, who from then on was in 
charge of programme management. This led to a clash with the previously appointed 
Project Director who resigned in 1986. Ultimately, by 1987, the 034 Programme had 
ended as a failure with a very high level of indebtedness among settlers8. 
1.4 Laying out the Research Problem 
As argued the 034 Programme was considered to be of special importance by the 
USAID planners as its wider objective was that of restructuring the prevailing mode of 
intervention of the IDA. USAID and some IDA functionaries aimed through this 
programme to bring about radical administrative reform within the land reform institute 
and consequently to transform the existing pattern of relationships with the settler 
clientele. These relationships were considered too particularistic and to offer too many 
opportunities for what the planners called 'clientelism', and more blatant types of 
'corruption'. In the view of experts, these were major obstacles to carrying out 
efficiently the development tasks of the institution. 
The 034 IRD Programme began seven years before and was at the point of 
finishing when I arrived in Costa Rica at the beginning of 1987. The first task I set 
myself was to undertake an organisational overview of the IDA. After an initial round of 
interviews with the heads of the various departments and regional units of the agency, 
I gained the impression that, on the whole, state functionaries were a bunch of friendly 
people with good intentions but with very limited knowledge of what colleagues in 
other departments were doing. In fact I was surprised by the contrasting descriptions 
of the content of tasks and the contradictory ways in which the institutional 
problematic was expounded by department heads. I found that not only was there an 
incredible amount of task duplication but also that some departments were not doing 
what they were supposed to do and encroached upon the tasks of other departments. 
Moreover, it appeared that some departments, sections or units maintained special 
relationships with client groups in several parts of the country; and it soon became 
clear that a number of conflicting political agendas played an important role in the 
functioning of the institution. 
It was not surprising then that I found little correspondence between the 
organizational chart and the actual departmental functioning of the agency. However, 
few people (besides me) bothered about that, and a recurring explanation given to me 
during the two years of my field research was that the chart in use was outdated and 
that a new one was in preparation. Nor did the institute seem successful in 
implementing the integrated rural development model, introduced by USAID, aimed at 
resolving rural poverty by providing settlers with land, credit, extension services and 
improved agricultural methods. The model was to be designed and tested in one region 
"It is important to note that serious doubts existed as to the suitability of most of the soils of the three 
settlements purchased by the 034 Programme for agriculture. Hence recommendations were issued by 
USAID experts to develop livestock models and to concentrate on perennials. However, the transfer of 
modern agricultural technology went together with major errors on the part of research institutes such as 
CATIE (Centro Agronómico de Tecnología Investigación y Enseñanza), the Ministry of Agriculture (MAG) 
and the local extensionists. 
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before being replicated all over the country; yet so far the institute, it seemed, had 
been conspicuously unsuccessful in this effort. 
A relevant question, then, became: Why was it so difficult for the institute's 
management to carry out this programme in spite of the ample financial and 
organisational support it received from USAID? Or, put differently: Why did it seem that 
so many people at the IDA were skeptical of, or lacked the willingness to participate in 
such an ambitious effort to intervene in the lives of smallholders in order to transform 
their production conditions? After all, if I was going to study state-peasant relations 
and focus on the land reform agency I had somehow to develop a view of the capacity 
of the agency, or its incumbents, to act on behalf of the state, while establishing good 
relationships with its clientele. 
One way of finding some answer to this question, I thought, would be to 
approach those actors close to the field, namely, the front-line officials in charge of 
implementing the programme and establishing close relationships with the settlers. 
After meetings with several of them, I was immediately struck by their commitment to 
a distinctive intervention ideology which seemed to shape their dealings with the 
settlers.9 Especially the older agronomists, employed by the charismatic founder of the 
IDA Don Antonio Salgado, emphasized the necessity of 'understanding' the mentality 
and idiosyncracy of 'the peasantry', which they often did in florid terms, displaying a 
certain tenderness towards the settlers. They also stressed an image of themselves as 
generalistas (generalists) or empíricos (empiricists), as professionals weary from 
bureaucratic desk-work and strong in establishing trust relationships with the farmers, 
who were not afraid of getting their hands dirty in farmers' fields. They argued that 
there was no point in being an expert in the latest agricultural technologies if there was 
no knowledge about the human capacity to apply them. This attitude went along with a 
strong distrust of comprehensive development programmes directed at transforming 
agriculture. At the same time, they were suspicious of (foreign) theories designed to 
establish effective modes of intervention. Instead they emphasized the need to enhance 
the learning capacity of the farmers and, as evidence of their view, they pointed to the 
success of the coffee sector in Costa Rica, a success that had been achieved with a 
minimum of foreign assistance and on the basis of the development of local 
technology. 
Approaching the problematic issues in the settlement area 
However this rather harmonious, though paternalistic view of the relationships between 
settlers and functionaries which suggested itself during the first contacts with front-line 
wokers appeared to be of little avail when approaching in more depth the problems of 
the settlement area of the Atlantic zone. On the contrary, I encountered a highly 
politicized and conflictive situation in which distrust and mutual recrimination seemed 
to be more common than any form of constructive cooperation or enduring political 
alliance. There was in fact a high level of open conflict between local functionaries and 
settlers. And the discourse employed by field officials when talking about 'los 
campesinos' (the peasants or settlers) was part of an aggressive ideology of 
intervention with little room for the development of friendly patron-client 
relationships.10 
9The notion of intervention ideology will be further developed at the end of this chapter and when 
discussing administrative and implementation styles in chapters 2 and 4. 
10The notion of discourse is a central one in this work and will be laid out fuller at the end of this and 
following chapters. 
An alternative approach 9 
Neguev, the settlement where I started my research, illustrates this situation. Neguev 
was the first settlement where the Integrated Rural Development Programme was 
implemented. State intervention there was directed at stifling the attempts of a leftist 
peasant organisation (the Unión de Pequeños Agricultores del Atlántico, UPAGRA) to 
set up an independent power'base. In fact the settlement had come into being as a 
result of the invasion by this organisation of a huge cattle ranch or hacienda called 
Neguev in 1978. The state responded repressively with a concerted campaign of 
intimidation and marginalisation of leftist peasant leaders. At the same time, settlers 
were offered large amounts of credit within the USAID programme. The result was 
disastrous, since a majority of settlers ended up heavily in debt - a pattern that was 
repeated at other settlements where the programme was applied. Hence the effort to 
streamline institutional intervention by introducing rational forms of coordination and 
monitoring, implied in the 034 Programme, also came to nothing. There was little 
evidence that institutional performance had improved; instead it appeared that previous 
forms of political clientelism were supplanted by a new kind of dependent clientelist 
relationship between the farmer and the bureaucracy. This new kind of bureaucratic 
clientelism in the Neguev settlement was reflected in a particular way of talking about 
and addressing the settlers by the officials: as an individual who had to be serviced and 
encouraged to become an entrepreneurial farmer. In return it was expected from the 
client\beneficiaries that they should comply with the prevailing policy of IDA, the Land 
Reform Agency. Settlers who were not ready to show compliance were labeled as 
troublesome and excluded from IDA credit.11 It must be stressed, however, that in 
other settlements political negotiations still played an important role in the relationships 
between settlers and state agencies. 
In the course of exploratory interviews with policy makers and researchers 
committed to the Integrated Rural Development Approach, many explanations were 
offered for the difficulty of implementing the 034 Programme. For example, a number 
of specific features of the settlement sector in the Atlantic area were mentioned, such 
as the relatively young age of the settlements and thus of local organizations, the 
diversity in social and occupational backgrounds of settlers and their differing economic 
aspirations and commitments to a 'peasant way of life'. This last factor was often 
underlined because the majority of settlers were said to be ex-plantation workers. 
On the basis of such 'facts', two specific types of explanation recurred. The first 
related to the plantation background of many settlers. According to local functionaries, 
ex-plantation workers did not have much agricultural experience and thus needed 
special kinds of assistance. This argument was usually linked to the view that 'the 
plantation mentality' impeded them from becoming successful farmers, while at the 
same time making them vulnerable to extremist, communist influence. Also related to 
the argument that ex-plantation workers were troublesome (problemáticos) was the 
common view that they were inclined to become 'professional squatters' who would 
occupy land in order to sell it later at a profit. This assumed practice provided further 
arguments to those who were against the policy of distributing land through the 
settlement programme in the first place. I also encountered a vast literature on 
plantation agriculture that bolstered the idea that plantation life produces among 
workers a particular type of social personality characterized by being dependent on the 
institution and therefore lacking in personal autonomy (see, for example, Beckford 
"The adoption and transformation of this model of the client as an instrument of social control is 
analysed in chapter 3. The emergence of bureaucratic clientelism is discussed in chapter 6. 
10 Chapter 1 
1972). And many functionaries adopted a similar cultural-psychological interpretation 
when explaining programme failure. 
Yet, contrary to these views, I found that settlers in Neguev and other 
settlements had very varied backgrounds and life histories. Most came from peasant 
families, had worked in plantations but shared a hatred of plantation existence which 
was expressed in an unequivocal commitment to the autonomy of peasant life. Many 
settlers made clear to me that they had in the past faced, and would continue to face, 
the difficult decision of whether to continue a peasant life of insecure income and 
minimum services or to take the easier path of selling the farm and returning to the 
plantation. However, for the time being, many struggled on with the vicissitudes of a 
peasant settler life. Explanations based on the idea of some underlying cultural logic or 
personality type, then, simply ignored the complexities of the situation. To find a more 
adequate answer I would have to submerge myself in the diverse struggles taking place 
at the local level, in different settlements. 
A second type of explanation advanced by both local functionaries and settlers 
was the lack of 'community' and local organization. It soon appeared that there were 
large differences regarding local organisation between Neguev and other settlements. 
However, concerning the settlement sector at large the following can be said. 
Although settler leaders differed from functionaries in their opinions about the role and 
nature of local organizations, most of them emphasized the unwillingness of large 
sectors of the settlements to cooperate. One explanation given for this was the 
existence of competing farmers' local organisations with differing political and religious 
attachments. Indeed, within the settlements, there were many opposing groups, each 
establishing different relationships with state institutions. For example, there existed 
several leftist groups, and others, calling themselves 'the democrats', who received the 
full support of the land reform agency in its struggle against the 'communists'. In 
addition, various evangelical churches were expanding rapidly in the region. Alongside 
these more organized groups, there was a large number of small local organisations 
(e.g. committees set up to build or repair roads, churches, bridges, etc.). These latter 
were independent from particular political or institutional interests. 
It also appeared that for many settlers it was less beneficial to participate in large 
formal organisations than in groups oriented towards the achievement of short-term 
instrumental goals. Small-scale projects enabled farmers to establish (political) 
relationships with 'patrons' within an institution, without becoming entangled in a 
complex web of bureaucratic relationships. Cooperation, thus, was not only an issue 
among settlers but also in the relationship between settlers and bureaucrats. Indeed, 
settlers were often able to manipulate the situation in order to create considerable room 
for manoeuvre for their own 'projects'. This was especially evident in settlements 
where several government agencies provided similar types of services, thus offering 
peasant groups the possibility of playing off one institution against another. It was also 
common practice for settlers to find their way to specific persons at higher levels in the 
bureaucracy in order to extract the services they could not obtain at regional level. This 
was especially the case before an election, when a process of political negotiations was 
initiated in which local leaders offered their support to a political party in return for 
particular goods and services. Leftist oppositional groups would enter such negotiations 
in order to extort concessions in return for the commitment not to disrupt the electoral 
campaign of the party in government. 
It became clear then that the answer to the issue of 'cooperation' could only be 
analysed through a detailed understanding of local dynamics; the more so since it 
appeared that many settler organisations had developed skills in attracting and 
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(re)channelling the flow of administrative goods and services. And developing such 
lines of inquiry required identifying the critical arenas of negotiation. Such arenas might 
be provided by formal organizations, such as development associations, or by informal 
ad hoc groups formed by settlers to force the state bureaucracy to deal with a 
particular issue (such as the repair of a road or bridge). It also appeared that large 
integrated rural development projects as well as small projects initiated at the local level 
could easily be converted into arenas of conflict.12 
Next I discuss a number of methodological and theoretical concepts which are 
central to my approach. 
1.5 Conceptual Framework 
The analysis of events such as public ceremonies, formal meetings and informal 
gatherings, provide a rich source of material for analysing discursive practices 
constituting forms of labelling and legitimization on the side of front-line workers; and 
strategies of accomodation, resistance and manipulation on the farmer's side. Events 
provide the opportunity to see how various types of discursive practice are endowed 
with practical meaning. Thus I am not simply interested in language or rhetoric as an 
object of study. What attracts me is to explore the interaction between discourse and 
social situation, and particularly the way in which particular types of discursive practice 
become strategic resources in local struggles. It is in such situations that one is able to 
realize the power of discourse, and that discourse itself is a form of social practice.13 
This certainly has implications for the way the ethnography is organised and the 
value of such textual devices as case studies and life histories. In short, I view case 
studies as textual fabrications by means of which we draw comparisons between, say, 
styles of operation, or between different ways of constructing social reality (as implied 
in the social construction of the 'frontier', 'community', etc). Indeed, in the first part of 
the book, analysis is directed to comparing managers and front-line workers' styles of 
operation. In the second part of the work, case studies appear which revolve around a 
set of problematic events, which in turn cast light on contrasting forms of intervention-
coping. At the same time it should be stressed that case studies of particular persons, 
organised as life histories, are not mere illustrations or characteristic depictions of 
personalities. They, instead, have the function of showing how individuals develop 
styles of operation by having to confront a series of conflictive situations. 
An actor-perspective also comes to the fore in the fact that the perspective 
changes when a new set of actors is introduced in each chapter. This does not mean 
that I aim to adopt their 'point of view', but that I pay special interest to their own 
language of explanation (see de Vries 1992 for a critique of ethnographic forms 
claiming to give 'voice'). 
12This is a concept central to the whole thesis. Most case studies centre around such an arena of 
conflict. 
13lndeed, when talking about discourse in the course of this text I mostly mean 'discursive practice'. 
Thus 'officials' discourse' refers to the discursive practices bureaucrats employ in particular situations for 
dealing with clients, or advancing their own institutional projects. The 'discourse of public administration' 
refers to a particular way of speaking about, or representing, practices of govemability. 'Public discourse' 
refers to the ways in which arguments are constructed in a debate. 
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Central analytical constructs 
The concept of institutional or administrative project is central to Chapter 2, where I 
discuss how such projects emerge as a response to a variety of political and 
institutional pressures, it is argued that by focusing on institutional projects we might 
gain a better understanding of the complexities involved in the functioning of an 
institution, since they are grounded in a particular, practical understanding of 
institutional needs and tasks, and a determinate understanding of how relations 
between IDA and its (potential) beneficiaries ought to be. Furthermore, we will see that 
the institutional projects discussed evolve within the political framework of the 
Liberación Nacional party, and that they are the outcome of a learning process by 
which state managers develop a way of negotiating the demands of the central 
government, the political environment and the various organised client-groups. Different 
institutional projects may come into conflict as they cater to differing groups of 
institutional and political actors, and beneficiaries. The conclusion of Chapter 2, then, is 
that by focusing on institutional projects we obtain an understanding of the 'multiple 
realities' of institutional life. This in turn has major implications for our views on state 
activity. One major argument of this work is that in order to understand the dynamics 
of state intervention it is imperative to concentrate on the process of implementation. It 
is at that level, I argued, that the contradictions of state intervention become apparent. 
In Chapter 4 I introduce the notion of implementor's styles of operation in order 
to describe the 'fragmented nature of the front-line workers' lifeworld'. It is argued 
that, in contrast to desk-workers, implementors are confronted with the contradictions 
of participating in the differing worlds of the institution and of the farmers. 
Implementors or front-line workers, thus, are often farmers themselves and may share 
the same local socio-political commitments as those of their clients. This in contrast to 
the 'typical' desk-top bureaucrat who finds it easier to adopt an institutional 
perspective. In consequence front-line workers internalize the 'ideology of state 
intervention' in differing ways with, as a result, the emergence of different front-line 
workers' styles of operation. In Chapter 4 I discuss three such styles: the bureaucratic, 
the 'organizing' and the political. 
Notions denoting multiplicity and plurality are central to the book and are used 
with the purpose of providing a view of the pluriformity and heterogeneity of social 
reality. I do this by concentrating on differences between projects, styles, strategies, 
settings/domains, contexts and locales. Thus, in Chapter 2 I apply the concept of 
multiple realities 14 to refer to the different faces of a given institution or social realm 
(the IDA), as represented by competing institutional projects struggling within a number 
of institutional arena's. In Chapter 4 the concept of multiple realities is used again to 
distinguish the differing cognitive understandings front-line workers develop about their 
work and which are shaped within the differing domains of the administration and the 
field. It is argued that these cognitive understandings play an important roie in shaping 
their operational styles. The notion of multiple realities, then, is used to refer to 1) the 
different faces of institutional life and 2) in a more phenomenological vein, to the 
differing meanings which intervention acquires within the lifeworlds of bureaucrats. 
In Chapter 3 two different social settings are distinguished in which 
implementation takes place: those comprising the administrative process and those 
"The concept of multiple realities derives from Schutz (1962) and Luckmann and Schutz (1973), 
where it is used to describe how different actors accord different interpretations to the same situation or 
event, and thus construct differing social realities. 
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comprising service delivery in the field. The first type of setting I designate the 
administrative domain, and the latter, the field domain. It is also argued that such 
domains are not necessarily tied to a given physical location. Thus it is shown that the 
administrative process unfolds in a variety of locales exhibiting varying degrees of 
bureaucratic formality. In effect, some administrative locales are situated outside the 
'office'. The 'field', in turn, is a metaphor for designating a variety of spaces, or 
locales, in which farmers are able to exert a larger degree of influence in their 
interaction with state officials. Such locales include the farmstead, but also public 
spaces in the settlements, such as the community centres. 
Following Goffman (1974) and Giddens (1984), I see locales as spatial contexts 
which are associated with a particular type of social interaction. Locales play a central 
role in framing social behaviour, that is in providing the social settings in which specific 
types of topics and demands can be treated. Locales, however, are not given as such. 
They are shaped through the differentiated character of social relationships in time and 
space. 
The concept of lifeworld shares some similarities with that of multiple realities. 
However, it must be stressed that the latter refers to a single social realm (i.e. the 
institutional, implementation or locality contexts) whereas the Schutzian concept of 
lifeworld refers to the lived-in or taken for granted world of social actors which cross-
cut various realms. The concept of lifeworld is introduced in Chapter 4. I use it as 
embodying different kinds of commitments which social actors, in this case front-line 
workers, internalize, and which are often contradictory, if not conflictive. I show that 
social actors develop styles of operation for dealing with such contradictory sets of 
commitments deriving from contradictions between the implementation and locality 
contexts. 
Contrary to operational styles, I argue that social strategies are not individual 
constructs but consist of social practices which are socially available. It is argued that 
strategies for dealing with state intervention can be studied by concentrating on 
development projects - large and small ones, state-initiated and farmer-initiated - which 
evolve as arenas of struggle between different groups of farmers and state institutions. 
In adopting an interpretive approach I analyse how farmers (re)-define their problems 
when involved in such struggles. The concept of strategy is further elaborated in 
Chapters 5 and 9. It suffices here to say that in the second part of the book I 
distinguish three different strategies for dealing with state intervention: 
accommodation, resistance and manipulation. In Chapters 6, 7, and 8 I contend that 
an intervention-coping strategy proves to be viable inasmuch as it is able to link local 
problems over access to resources and services with a particular way of dealing with 
intervention. This, in effect, entails getting a good grip of the language and concepts by 
which state bureaucrats exert their authority. 
The concept of discourse is therefore central to this work. When referring to 
discourse, much more is meant than the language people use when talking about 
specific subjects. Following Foucault (1973), I see discourse as a form of 
(institutionalized) social practice embodying a particular conjunction between 
'knowledge' and 'power'. From this point of view, authoritative representations of the 
development problematic are constructed which have real power-effects when 
deployed. Yet, for reasons which I hope will become clear by the end of this book I do 
not speak of a 'development' discourse as embodying modes of 'objective' knowledge 
and techniques of social control constituting the discipline of development. Instead, I 
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hold that it is possible to distinguish different types of discursive practices which relate 
to 'development'.18 
The focus, then, is on 'discursive practice' and I distinguish three different types 
of bureaucratic discursive practice which are recurrent in the relationship between 
settlers and state officials: that of agricultural modernization, community, and 
democracy. Such modes of discursive practice, I argue, are inherent to specific types of 
state activity. What is important, then, is to study how they impinge on the way 
farmers define their own problematics.16 
This book, however, does not deal merely with how bureaucratic or policy 
discourses inform and shape state intervention, and hence provide an idiom for 
sustaining relations between peasants and the state, but on how local actors endow 
such discourses with practical and strategic meaning, within certain social 
contexts/domains and in regard to specific problematics. This, I designate the 
localization of discourse. Discourse, then, is interesting inasmuch as it is expressed 
through discursive practice. In Chapters 5 and 9 the concepts of discourse and 
discursive practice are further elaborated. 
The concepts of social and knowledge interface are discussed in Chapter 5. Here 
it will suffice to point out that social interface refers to the idea of social contradiction 
as experienced and dealt with by social actors with different social and cultural 
backgrounds. Following Arce and Long (1987) I argue that differentiated types of 
knowledge are generated within determinate social interface settings. Thus I make a 
distinction between the knowledge interfaces of the administrative and the field 
domain. Conflictive interactions within the latter domain I designate client-official 
interfaces. 
The administrative process encompasses one part of the front-line worker's task 
definition, such as reporting, task-coordination, the administrative handling of farmer's 
cases, etc. But it also includes the informal talk and gossip of officials with different 
social and ethnic backgrounds. It is argued that through the social interfaces ocurring in 
the administrative domain, front-line workers endow the administrative process with 
local meaning. Such a meaning-generating process, it is argued, is crystallized as 
practical knowledge about how to deal with beneficiaries as administrative cases, and 
hence leads to the fashioning of a particular model of the 'client' (as poor, uneducated, 
prone to clientelistic relationships). The central point, then, is that this model of the 
1 slt should be noted that I do not hold to a realist conception of the state as an entity embodying some 
unified rationality or world-view. Such a historical conception of the state, I think, has the drawback of 
counterposing dichotomous social constructs such as state against civil society. In holding to a nominalist 
conception of the state I concentrate on the conceptions, organisational practices and idioms of authority 
exercised by certain actors in particular institutional settings and arenas. The state, then, is viewed as a 
shorthand for referring to a diversity of institutional projects, practices of governability and modes of 
legitimization, which have in common a particular language or discourse of power. When talking of state-
peasant relations I, therefore, refer to the idioms and practices of intervention used in struggles and 
negotiations between bureaucrats and peasant/farmers. There is no assumption whatsoever that such 
idioms and social practices are expressive of wider social processes or structures. (See for a discussion of 
the theoretical implications of a nominalist conception of the state Rose and Miller, 1992, and Foucault, 
1971, 'on governmentality'). 
1 8We should beware, I think, of what Eagleton (1991) quoting Perry Anderson calls the 'inflation of 
discourse'. Thus the degree to which bureaucratic discourses shape farmer's modes of social organisation 
is a subject of empirical analysis and must not be presupposed. Indeed, in the case studies I show how 
farmers appropriate the discourses of 'community', 'agricultural modernization' and 'democracy', within 
their social strategies in order to accomodate, resist or manipulate state-intervention. 
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'client' has real effects for farmers through practices of administrative labelling. I show 
in Chapter 3, by focusing on seemingly trivial events and emphasizing the fragmentary 
and discontinuous nature of the administrative process, that this model is not a 
cognitive construct but has more to do with the stealthy workings of ideology. 
The client-official interface refers to conflictive relationships between officials and 
farmers, ocurring especially in the process of service delivery in the 'field', which leads 
them to acquire specific knowledge about the farmers' livelihood conditions, attitudes, 
motivations, etc. Front-line workers are, at the point of service delivery in the field, 
confronted with the contradictions inherent to implementation. In consequence they are 
compelled to legitimize their own role and that of the institution they work'for. We see 
then that in the client-official-interface administrative constructs (the model of the 
'client') and labelling practices, appear to be quite limited as modes for exerting social 
control over the settler population, and that practices of legitimization, therefore, 
acquire a special importance. 
Legitimization and labelling practices, together with the model of the 'client', 
comprise an ideology of intervention. The concept of intervention ideology is worked 
out in Chapters 5 and 9. In short, I see an ideology as an action-oriented set of beliefs 
associated with specific practices of social control (labelling, legitimization),, rather than 
as a coherent normative framework. Ideologies are pragmatic insofar as they serve to 
shape an understanding of the world which is useful within particular social contexts; in 
the case of front-line workers that of implementation. An ideology of intervention is not 
so much false in that it obscures the complex reality of the farmer, but an interested 
simplification of the conflictive nature of state intervention. That becomes clear to the 
front-line worker him/herself when confronted with the contradictions of 
implementation, compelling him/her to develop an operational style for dealing with 
conflicting social and moral commitments. The force of the ideology of intervention, 
then, is that it is able to produce useful interpretations for the ongoing problems of 
implementation, as well as practical ways to handle them, yet without being able to 
mask the power relations underlying such problems. 
Final overview 
The conflicts surrounding the 034 Programme are analysed in Chapter 2. The 034 
Programme stands also central in Chapters 3, 4 and 6. In Chapter 3, I examine the 
reality of the administrative process in the oldest of the three settlements! of the 034 
Programme, Neguev.1 7 In Chapter 4, I present three case studies of front-|ine workers 
in Neguev. 
Chapter 6 discusses two kinds of intervention-coping strategies which were 
developed by farmers in Neguev during the implementation of the 034 Programme. 
Chapter 7 and 8 discuss settlers' strategies for dealing with intervention organised by 
the Neguev Regional Office -thus after the completion of the 034 Programme - in two 
settlements which did not come under this programme. 
Summarizing, the principal sets of actors in this story are front-line workers and 
settlers/beneficiaries who are involved in the everyday struggles surrounding planned 
state intervention. Hence the book consists of two parts. The first (Chapters 2, 3 and 
4) concentrates on bureaucracy and covers the institutional environment as well as 
implementation at the local level. The conclusion is that it is not possible to understand 
planned state intervention without examining how peasant producers at the local level 
17The other two settlements are El Indio (3,200 hectares and 422 beneficiary families) a n d Maryland 
(300 hectares, number of beneficiaries unknown). 
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transform state policy. Chapter 5 is central to the whole argument as it addresses a 
number of conceptual issues regarding the relationship between the bureaucracy and 
people, as exemplified in knowledge interfaces and processes of administrative 
labelling. The conclusion is that it is necessary to develop a discourse oriented 
approach to the study of bureaucracy-client relations. The second part (Chapters 6, 7 
and 8) discusses a few of the intervention-coping strategies that peasants wield in 
dealing with state intervention (accommodation, resistance and manipulation). In the 
conclusions to the book a review of the whole argument is presented and an attempt is 
made to further elaborate a number of concepts proposed in this work. 
Figure 1.1 Map of Costa Rica 
CHAPTER 2 
LAND REFORM AND COMPETING INSTITUTIONAL 
PROJECTS IN COSTA RICA 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I related my first experiences with the land development 
Institute, the IDA. The apparent lack of a fixed organisational structure wasj exemplified 
by my difficulty in getting hold ot an organisational chart. I also related my first 
encounters with the bureaucracy and the realization that reality in the field was much 
more conflictive than its idealized representation by the agronomists I first met at 
headquarters in the capital of San José. It was not long before I was introduced to the 
various disputes cross-cutting the whole institution, and it appeared that the 034 
Programme played a central role in these disputes. 
I also noticed that the general standing of the IDA among other institutions was 
not very high. It was considered to be permeated by politics and corruption. Indeed, all 
through the research there were rumours that the central government was going to 
intervene in the institution because of financial irregularities. Furthermore, as we will 
see in this chapter, plans to decentralize the institution and make it more client-
oriented, were, in most "cases, successfully resisted by the IDA bureaucracy. In short, 
the IDA seemed to be a weak institution, full ot petty rivalries and quite distanced from 
what it should be doing. Yet this view of the IDA appeared to be too limited, for 
beneath the 'petty rivalries' and accusations of 'corruption' there was a power struggle 
between various factions within the institution which represented contrasting institutio-
nal projects.1 
The major argument of this chapter is that the attempts to restructure the IDA 
through the introduction of the 034 Programme, have to be viewed within the context 
or I U A ' S previous and ongoing" power struggles, it was suggestëâTrTÇhâpeTinthaTtTie 
'Interestingly, an institutional analysis in terms of struggles between competing institutional styles 
leads to a different view of the IDA. Thus I will argue later in the chapter that such an analysis contradicts 
two common critical views of the institution. The first view (see Barahona Riera 1980; Araya Pochet 
1982) argues that the institution was stillborn as an agrarian reform agency and that it served only to 
'extinguish fires' {apagaincendlos). According to the second view (Rovira Mas, 1987; Roy Rivera 1987) 
the IDA was set up as an apparatus of social control through a set of strategies of intermediation. In this 
line of thought the IDA is anything but inefficient. Indeed, it is seen as relatively successful in securing the 
reproduction of the dominant political and economic system. 
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034 Programme encountered much opposition within the IDA. Here I want to inquire 
into the social and ideological basis of this opposition. I do so by focusing on the 
institutional projects which had a strong influence on the functioning of the institute 
when the 034 Programme was introduced, and afterwards. 
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Figure 2.1 Organizational chart of the IDA since 1982 
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It should be emphasized that in talking about institutional projects I am not arguing that 
state managers engage in forms of rational decision-making according to given plans or 
programmes. An institutional project is the product of a series of {experiences managers 
accumulate when dealing with a variety of problems, events and conflicts, and which 
force them to problematize issues of governability from the viewpoint of their ability to 
handle them. Institutional projects, then, encompass practical knowledge of how to 
deal with institutional problems, together with the rationalizations for doing so. The 
focus of this chapter, then, lies on how state managers develop interests, aspirations 
and capacities within the corrtejrt oHiheir own understanding otfhe policy process and 
the socio-institutional problematic^ 
2.2 The Historical and Institutional Context 
The Costa Rican case is considered to be very unusual in Latin American terms. It is a 
country where democracy has prevailed since the Second World War and where a 
'popular' uprising in 1948 led to the abolition of the army, and to the establishment, 
within a democratic environment, of a series of institutions directed at alleviating the 
basic needs of the population and expanding both political and economic democracy. 
For this reason Costa Rica has been called the Switzerland of Central America, an 
island of peace in a region devastated by wars and characterized by repressive military 
regimes and feudal social structures. A combination of explanations for this "atypical" 
case has been invoked; the "democratic" and peaceful character of its population, 
originating in a yeoman farmer's mentality; the absence of a source of wealth (gold 
and Indians) during colonial times large enough for the consolidation of a reactionary 
aristocracy (as in other Central American nations); the existence of an egalitarian land 
distribution pattern until the advent of the coffee economy, preempting the rise of a 
reactionary class of large landholders as in the case of neighbouring countries; its 
ethnic homogeneity and associated absence of a racist colonial ideology or an "ethnic 
question"; the liberal ideology of its agrarian bourgeoisie, etc. In short, it can be noted 
that in the literature there is much emphasis on continuity in Costa Rican history. 
Many of these views, however, have been questioned lately. Gudmundson (1986) 
for example has shown that land ownership was highly concentrated even before the 
emergence of the coffee-based export economy and that military regimes were over the 
last century as common in Costa Rica as in other Latin American countries. With regard 
to its political history, a revisionist interpretation of the 1948 civil war has been offered 
by Jacobo Schifter (1986) and others casting doubts on the 'progressive' character of 
the outcomes of the events of 1948. This discussion is for my purpose highly relevant, 
as these events gave way to a drastic expansion of the Costa Rican institutional 
system. This expansion is attributed by the official historiography to the populist zeal of 
the victorious revolutionaries, who set out to incorporate the masses in national 
political life by increasing their access to basic services like health care, education, and 
housing, and by improving general economic conditions through a democratization of 
credit, better marketing services and access to land. 
As it would be outside the scope of this work to review Costa Rican political 
history and its interpretation, I will discuss here the work of Schifter in order to attain a 
better understanding of the political and administrative context in which the land reform 
agency IDA operates. Special attention will be paid to the discussion surrounding the 
populist and/or corporativist character of the Costa Rican political system. 
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From a non-transformational populist to a non-populist transformational regime 
Costa Rican democracy has usually been interpreted as the outcome of a 
populist/democratic revolution fought against a curious alliance between a charismatic 
caudillo, Rafael Calderón, the Church, and the Communist Party. Calderón, a member 
of the coffee oligarchy became president in 1940 and embarked on a series of reforms 
under the influence of catholic social reform doctrine. He was, among others things, 
responsible for the establishment of a generalized health care system and the 
introduction of a progressive labour legislation code. As these projects cost him the 
support of the traditional elites he allied himself with the Communist Party, which led 
the opposition to accuse him of combining authoritarianism with demagogic populism, 
and, associated with this, of corrupt use of state funds. Picado, Calderón's stand-in2 in 
the 1944 elections, had even closer ties to the communists, something that scared the 
upper and the middle classes. The 1948 elections, in which Calderón again was a 
candidate, were highly contested and when in the confusion these were annulled, 
social democratic intellectuals joined with conservatives in an armed attack on the 
government under the charismatic leadership of José Figueres, a staunch nationalist 
who dreamed of reviving the Central American Confederation. This insurrection gave 
way to what has been designated by historians the civil war of 1948 3 . 
A central role in the resolution of the conflict in favour of the "revolutionaries" 
was played by the USA who, increasingly preoccupied with the cold war, had become 
concerned with the communists' role in Picado's government (1945-1948). Finally, an 
agreement was reached between the contending parties stipulating that a Junta de 
Gobierno Provisional (a provisional government) would be established under the 
leadership of Figueres. While in office Figueres outlawed the communist party, 
eliminated the left from the government and state-bureaucracy and avidly repressed all 
forms of organization in which communists were suspected of being involved. Yet, to 
the dissatisfaction of the conservative opposition, he not only maintained Calderón's 
progressive legislation but even moved beyond it, by nationalizing the banking system 
and imposing higher taxes. The culmination of his programme was the abolition of the 
army, something which has made of Figueres the undisputed hero of the revolution, 
"the father of the modern democracy", and last but not least of the party he founded: 
Liberación Nacional. As a result, few authors nowadays doubt the democratic character 
of the 1948 movement, especially in view of the social democratic ideology of many of 
its leaders and the perceived dictatorial character of the Caideronista regime. 
Schifter (1983), however, suggests that the current Costa Rican democratic and 
institutional system is based on a political impasse, or "neutralization" subsequent to 
the revolution of 1948. Consequently, he argues that the civil war of 1948 has been 
mistakenly viewed as a popular insurrection. Instead, it was an armed insurrection 
carried out by a militarist adventurer (José Figueres), supported by a group of middle 
class intellectuals with a transformationalist ideology in alliance with the old coffee 
oligarchy. The reason for the common interpretation of the Figuerista movement as a 
populist one should, in his view, be sought in the rigidity of models used to interpret 
Latin American political systems. Thus, initially, models of political development 
focusing on democracy and citizenship proposed by authors such as Rostow (1952) 
and Germani (1973) and the official historiography of the 1948 events complemented 
each other. In this view these events were interpreted as the culmination of a 
democratic process which brought into power the middle class, a class which in this 
Costa Rican constitution forbids a president to serve two consecutive terms. 
3See Bell (1971) for an insightful account of the 1948 civil war and Shifter (1986), for a more critical 
analysis. 
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political science model was seen as the historical bearer of democracy. Within this 
model, the development of democracy is seen as correlative to economic modernization 
and an associated expansion of civil society. As a result the historical events become, 
in this basically modernization perspective, subservient to an ethnocentric linear 
political model. Schifter's thesis is that the events of 1948 led from a non-
transformational populist to a non-populist transformationalist regime, and that the 
democratic system emerged not so much by design but as the outcome of an implicit 
political pact between the victors of the civil war - the oligarchy and the middle classes. 
The great losers of this outcome, in his view, were the urban and rural working and 
lower classes "whose unions faced repression and economic blackmail" (idem). 
This reading of Costa Rican political history is highly significant as it provides a 
different explanation for the rationale behind the explosive expansion of the institutional 
environment after 1948. The explanation, then, should not be cast in terms of the 
populist/incorporationist nature of the political system but in terms of the state's double 
role in a) exercising social control over the lower classes and b) in providing services 
and jobs for the middle classes. 
In providing an alternative explanatory framework for the Costa Rican case, 
Schifter draws a sharp distinction between the development ideology that inspires 
political leaders and the participatory nature of the political movement or regime they 
represent. Thus, in discussing the Costa Rican case he differentiates between the 
nationalist/developmentalist transformationalist ideology of Figueres and the populist 
movement of Calderón, which in terms of development ideology was definitely 
conservative. The Figuerista movement, on the other hand, was not a popular one as it 
did not seek a wider participation of the working classes in the political process.4 
The social democratic movement, which provided the ideological basis to the 
Figuerista movement, had clear elitist tendencies as it never sought to gain the favour 
of the masses in order to accomplish the revolution. Figueres, the leader of the 
insurgency, saw his actions in the wider context of the liberation of Central America of 
reactionary dictatorships and its unification under a common rule. Yet, Figueres, when 
he was the head of an interim government board after he won the civil war, realized 
himself that he lacked the popular support necessary to carry out its nationalist 
programme in the face of his conservative allies. Thus he sought an accommodation 
with the communists in order to gain the support of the urban working class. However, 
these negotiations broke down and his movement got almost no electoral support in the 
congressional elections of 1950. At that moment, Figueres realized that ensuring power 
by means of a dictatorship was out of question, as his position vis-á-vis the oligarchy 
had become too weak. In that conjuncture, one way to ensure that the reforms he had 
enacted as the leader of the po«t-civiI-war Junta de Gobierno (Government Council) 
would not be annulled by a prospective conservative military dictatura was simply to 
abolish the army. In addition, Figueres took two crucial measures in order to lay the 
popular basis for a new political party. First, he maintained the social reforms enacted 
under Calderón. And, second, he expanded the state bureaucracy significantly by 
creating the system of autonomous institutions. ¿ 
"Accordingly, Shifter defines a transformationist 
a communist one) as "a non-marxist political 
principal aim is to restructure relations of 
economic development". A populist 
into the political system under an elitist 
development ideology (in contrast to a conservative or 
current oriented to social, political and economic change. Its 
dependence in order t o make possible a more independent 
m o v e m e n t / r e g i m e , in turn, aims at incorporating the popular masses 
cirection based on a multi-class alliance (Shifter, 1975). 
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The ensuing alliance between the conservative anti-populist elite and the Figuerista 
movement paved the way for an enduring democratic system. Within this alliance it 
was the conservatives who brought in the votes and the Figueristas who provided the 
military force. Given the debilitation of the Ca/cterorwsfa-populists after the conflict and 
the repression against the left, electoral success was ensured for Figueres in the 
presidential elections of 1953. 
Thus, in sharp contrast with the large majority of authors who characterize 
Figuerismo as a democratic/populist movement of the Peruvian APRA type, Schifter 
interprets the 1948 Figuerista insurgency as "a transformist intent to implant an 
authoritarian corporativist development model" (p. 194). However, the impasse which 
arose after the 1948 civil war led neither to a form of authoritarian corporativism nor to 
a continuation of the populist regime. The outcome paradoxically was "democracy". 
Indeed, Figueres, in view of his lack of electoral support in the elections for a 
Constituent Assembly in 1948 (he was then Head of State in an Interim Government), 
introduced a set of reformist measures which in effect combined the social reforms 
enacted in the fourties with a distinct developmentalist programme. Such 
developmentalism was carried out through the establishment of a large institutional 
sector intended to become a powerful instrument for state intervention. It is through 
such a programme that the party he founded in 1951, Liberación Nacional, has been 
able to remain the major electoral force in Costa Rica to date. 
The system of autonomous institutions, the mainstay of Costa Rican institutional 
life, expanded considerably over the years (Dunkerley 1988: 590-655). This sector, 
which already accounted for 44 per cent of the state budget during Figueres' first term 
(1953-1958) increased to nearly 50 per cent during the administration of Orlich (1962-
66). This increase was further sustained by the subsequent Liberacionista governments 
of Figueres (1970-1974) and Oduber (1974-1978). Similarly, in 1978 there were 182 
decentralized institutions, 76 of which were established after 1960. State intervention 
was both directed to supporting large-scale capitalist initiatives within the context of 
Costa Rica's entry to the Central American Common Market (CACM) and to bolstering 
non-industrial production activity while supporting national consumption. This was the 
case with the establishment of the INVU, the Housing Development Agency in 1954, 
and the CNP, the National Marketing Board in 1956. These institutions, by providing 
subsidies to producers (farmers and building entrepreneurs) and consumers (housing 
and cheap food for the urban middle and lower classes), both supported indigenous 
productive activity and served to create a social basis for the developmentalist 
programme Liberación Nacional. 
Applying Schifter's analysis to the IDA 
Schifter's account provides a highly useful interpretation of the establishment of the 
Costa Rican political system, not in terms of the effects of any 'development model' 
but as the (unexpected) outcome of a struggle between competing socio-political 
projects. Certainly, by adopting a basically corporativist framework, Schifter argues 
that Costa. Rican democracy is the outcome of the 'neutralization of classes' 
subsequent to this impasse. Yet, it would be interesting to extend the argument to an 
analysis of the dynamics of the institutional system. Thus, in applying Schifter's 
political analysis to the IDA, it could be suggested that in the IDA there is a tension 
between different institutional projects, each of them referring to the political project of 
Liberación Nacional, and that the history of the IDA can better be understood in terms 
of the struggles and compromises reached between such institutional projects, than in 
terms of the complete adoption and implementation of any one of them. 
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IDA's role within the institutional 
they belonged, a conception of 
relations between the IDA and its 
intervention. One major criticism 
land in a distanced colony, with 
Major social actors in the chapter 
In the remainder of the chapter I concentrate on those social actors who played a 
special role in their introduction and evolution. Thus, it is argued that the institutional 
projects analysed in this chapter were closely related to the leading role of three 
individuals who left a clear imprint on the institution: Don Antonio Salgado, the founder 
of the IDA who served three terms as Executive President; Francisco Salazar, a former 
Head of the Training and Education Department (Departamento de Organización y 
Capacitación Empresarial. DOCAEi), and who became the ideologue of the Cooperative 
movement (he was founder of the Cooperative Popular Bank) and later Minister of 
Agriculture; and Don Roberto Arcos, the General Manager of the Institute at the time I 
conducted my research. Each of tjhem developed a project which included a view of the 
framework of the Liberación Nacional party to which 
development and a particular understanding of how 
(potential) beneficiaries ought to be. 
Central in the definition of these institutional projects is their conceptualization of 
institution-client relationships as developed within the wider institutionalist world-view 
of the Liberación Nacional party. Don Antonio Salgado, a prominent Liberacionista 
politician of the old guard, believed that the modernization of Costa Rican agriculture 
was possible by distributing land 10 independent farmers, while avoiding too much state 
directed against his policy was that giving a settler 
little access to markets and institutional support only 
meant 'distributing poverty'. I designate this project, in a somewhat contradictory way, 
the anti-interventionist one.5 
On the other hand, we will see that the populist/incorporationist project of 
Francisco Salazar had a strong populist character. He developed his views on 
'economic democracy' as founder of the Popular Bank and ideologue of the cooperative 
movement. Underlying this popul st project was the view that rural inhabitants had to 
be incorporated within national political and economic life, so as to become rightful 
he was critiziced for deviating from the original 
'constitutional objectives of the IDA, and of converting the institution into a 'political 
machine'. Lastly we have the transformationalist project of Don Roberto Arcos, who in 
objectives of the IDA to the present agricultural 
situation of land scarcity argued that it was necessary to transform the peasant into an 
agricultural entrepreneur.8 We will see that such a tranformationalist project was 
within the IDA of the integrated rural development 
model (through the 034 Programme), together with attempts to implement a regional 
decentralization scheme. 
It should be stressed, however, that the existence of tensions between anti-
interventionist, populist/incorpora :ionist and transformationalist conceptions does not 
yet explain the actual dynamics of the power struggles within the institution. To that 
end it is important to analyse hov such conceptions underwrite institutional practices 
This term I think expresses the contradictory 
out intervention while attempting to counter 
sln designating Don Roberto Arcos 
closer to those of Figueres than those of 
sense refers to the idea that peasants haVe 
nature of Don Antonio Salgado's project, that of carrying 
the interventionist inclinations of IDA bureaucrats, 
as transformationalist I do not suggest that his views were 
Antonio Salgado and Antonio Salazar. Transformationalist' in this 
to be transformed into agricultural entrepreneurs. 
s'y le 
2.3 Analysing Competing Institutional Projects 
24 Chapter 2 
in relation to the land reform problematic. The approach followed focuses on the 
actors' own interpretations of the strategic choices they face during their career. I hope 
that by putting these interpretations within a historical context valuable insights can be 
gained into the dynamics of the IDA. 
The anti-interventionist project: Don Antonio Salgado 
Don Antonio Salgado played a decisive role in the formation and further evolution of the 
ITCO/IDA. As he was close to the historical leaders of the Liberación Nacional party, he 
was asked to extend the system of autonomous institutions by establishing a Land and 
Colonisation Institute in 1961. After founding the ITCO7 Don Antonio Salgado was 
twice again appointed Executive President of the institute. His second term took place 
during the last two years of the Oduber administration (1974-1978), when he was 
asked to negotiate the expropriation of the United Fruit plantations in the south-west of 
the country. In effect, Oduber's administration was the one that gave most impulse to 
the 'land question'. Before being appointed IDA'S Executive President, Don Antonio had 
been the Liberación party leader in Congress. He fulfilled his last tenure as Executive 
President during the Monge administration (1982-1986), when he experienced a series 
of confrontations with peasant unions, politicians and bureaucrats within the IDA. 
We will see that Don Antonio kept to a number of principles throughout his 
involvement with the IDA. These key conceptions were contested in his second and 
third terms by a 'populist' faction within the IDA that wanted to extend the institution. 
Yet he had a much harder time when opposing the attempts of funding organisations 
(USAID) to 'modernize' the institution during his third term. This led to the accusation 
from the 'modernizers' that he had an authoritarian and personalistic approach which 
was out of tune with the needs of the country. All the same, it will be shown that his 
conceptions of the tasks and responsibilities of the IDA still influenced the thinking of 
his successors within the institute. 
In exploring his institutional project I will focus on the relationship between his 
key conceptions and a number of emerging problems during his terms at the IDA. 
From the IDA's creation to the seventies: Problems in holding to an operational view of 
the the IDA's tasks 
For Don Antonio Salgado setting up an institution was not just an administrative issue, 
for this went together with a conception of the role that the institution had to play in 
order to resolve a concrete problematic. Indeed, for Don Antonio it had always been 
clear that the operational nature of the IDA should be paramount. As he put it, 
"When you are creating an institution you proceed according to a particular philosophy. I 
have always had a few conceptions which have been controversial, which have been 
opposed by some, but which prevailed as long as I was in charge. In my view the IDA 
should not become a large bureaucratic entity, but remain small, capable, with the help of 
its lawyers, of buying a finca, with its support to distribute plots to peasants and assign one 
or two agronomists to help the settlers to establish agricultural production. Then, the 
institution should go along, as the song says, with the music". 
Don Antonio always took care that institutional support in colonies and settlements did 
not become local bureaucracies. In his view, that would have opened the door to types 
Throughout the remainder of the text I hold to the designation IDA even when referring to the 
situation before 1981. 
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of institutional practice characteristic of an 'entrepreneurial state'. He argued that an 
institution such as the IDA shojld be small, flexible and able to mobilize people and 
highly goal-oriented. In his view it was important to 
avoid fostering any kind of paternalism towards (potential) beneficiaries. 
Yet such a view was not e|asy to maintain. In the seventies, from the government 
, the Costa Rican state became increasingly involved in 
stimulating national industries. This increase in state interventionism not only ocurred in 
urban areas and in industry,8 but also in rural areas, among other places on the the 
west coast where the IDA pkyed an important role in the expropriation of large 
landholdings and the lands of t i e United Fruit plantations in the south. At the same 
time, agrarian entrepreneurs were stimulated to engage in highly profitable forms of 
agri-business through state-subs tidies. As a consequence, a type of entrepreneurship 
emerged which was very dependent on establishing close relationships with the state 
ntervention offered opportunities to bureaucrats to 
to pursue their political ambitions. 
State-interventionism in Cbsta Rica in the seventies coincided with an increase, 
globally, of the popularity of interventionist strategies for rural development. It was 
therefore difficult for an institutional manager to hold to a conception of the IDA'S task 
as solely directed to the distribution of land, especially since the line ministries were 
not interested in laying out infrastructure in new areas where there was not yet an 
established population demanding their services. As a consequence, the IDA had to 
to attract people to these areas. But in Don Antonio 
the case only in the first phase of the establishment of 
bureaucracy. Moreover, state 
engage in business activities and 
provide these services in order 
Salgado's view that ought to be 
a settlement. 
Views on the integrated rural development idea 
Indeed, Don Antonio Salgado had strong critical views about rural development 
organized through constructs such as cooperativism, integrated rural development and 
related concepts such as the pilot project. He regarded the large scale comprehensive 
Programmes financed by USAID, the European community or other cooperation 
agencies in his third and last term in office (1982-1984) with much suspicion.9 He saw 
these programmes as damaging for the autonomy of the institution and for the 
sovereignty of the country. He argued that it was not necessary to introduce foreign 
models in order to resolve the Costa Rican agrarian question. For, 
"Costa Rican peasants have a 
positive and negative features 
independent and cling to their 
communitarian forms of producti 
According to him this whole 
fashionable due to the "alliance 
leng tradition of adapting to new conditions. Peasants have 
ind we have to take account of them. They are fiercely 
land. It is deleterious to attempt to introduce collective or 
I have always combatted that'point of view". 
ntegrated rural development" approach had become 
For progress" programmes and related ideologies. They 
"One result of this interventionism was the creation of CODESA (Corporación Costarricense de 
Desarrollo S.A), a conglomerate of indistries and businesses founded by Figueres in 1972. It expanded its 
operations during Oduber's tenure (197 >-1974). It is also interesting to note that Oduber had important 
political and business connections in Guanacaste, where he built a network of roads, and that landholders 
there received much support for agro-industrial crops (rice). Yet, it remained an area of outmigration to the 
Atlantic Zone. 
"The following loans had already beon approved when Don Antonio Salgado took up office: one of $30 
million from the World Bank for the cult vation of African oil palm in the ex-UFCO plantations in Coto Brus, 
and another of $8 million from the Irrterj-American Development Bank for reforestation projects in several 
areas of the country. 
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were not tailored to the Costa Rican experience. He had a few experiences with such 
integrated rural development programmes. He had been invited to Nicaragua and 
Mexico to admire colonisation schemes which had been set up according to that model. 
He commented, 
'You see that land reform agencies in those countries are very preoccupied in creating 
show-pieces. Thus, by concentrating on one model settlement they neglect the rest. In 
Mexico, for example, the settlement scheme we visited had its own hotel. There was a large 
presence of engineers and extensionists, well-dressed and well-housed. 
In his view this led to a rigid top-down structure. At the bottom of the whole structure 
was the peasant, badly dressed, their children with extended bellies, and with no say in 
the management of the settlement. The main purpose of this bureaucratic structure 
appeared to be to provide work for officials who were regularly following courses at 
technical institutes - by preference abroad - and to accomplish nothing. He argued that 
there was also an authoritarian side to these schemes as the peasants were deprived of 
their rights to decide what was best for them. He had seen similar schemes in 
Nicaragua. Thus he argued that the role of the state in agricultural development should 
not exceed that of providing the basic conditions for sustained development. He 
absolutely opposed a type of intervention which would generate autonomous interests 
of officials. Neither did he believe in the idea of the pilot project as it attracted too 
many resources in a limited area. In his view this had been happening in the IDA under 
the influence of new large integrated programmes financed by international agencies. 
As he argued, 
"For many functionaries it may be extremely attractive to be involved in a large programme 
financed by an international agency. That gives them the possibility to receive salaries higher 
than the president's. The result is what you see nowadays at the IDA; one department is 
working with this agency in this area and another department elsewhere. You see that 
currently most resources are channelled to areas where large projects have been established. 
That is unjust for the peasants of other areas and it creates regional inequalities*. 
Summarizing, we see that Don Antonio Salgado held to a clear administrative project 
based on a conception of the Costa Rican peasant as an independent and 
entrepreneurial freeholder, of the agrarian problem as one which could be resolved by 
way of a policy of settlement within the legal possibilities of the law, of the Costa 
Rican institutional environment as intimately connected with the social-democratic 
project of his party. It is not surprising, then, that Don Antonio was opposed to the 
034 Programme. He was afraid that the programme would transform the IDA into a 
bureaucratic entity, besides making it dependent on foreign funds. This opposition was 
reflected in his reluctance to cooperate with USAID functionaries.10 Neither did Don 
Antonio allow the 034 Programme to become an integral part of IDA, let alone for IDA 
to be restructured along the views of the 034 consultants. Ultimately, Don Antonio 
Salgado had to comply under the pressure of Luis Alberto Monge, the then President of 
Costa Rica, with the implementation of the project. 
In analysing Don Antonio Salgado's conceptions on Land reform it would be 
interesting to compare them with those of one of the USAID consultant of the 034 
Programme, and a well-known specialist on Costa Rican Land Reform, Mitchell 
Seligson. 
'Indeed this led to an open conflict with the USA's ambassador. 
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Contrasting two views on land reform: Don Antdnio 
Seligson (1980) in his influential book El Campes 
distinguishes three successive approaches to colonization and agrarian reform by the 
IDA: 
1 . land colonization (1962-66) 
2. an approach focusing on titling and resolving 
1970) 
3. third, the establishment of communal agrarian 
(1970 and onwards). 
ihe 
did not address the basic questions of 
of 
felt 
It is evident that the third approach has Seligsonfs sympathies, while he is quite critical 
of the first two. In his view the colonization approach was a failure as only 1272 
families acquired land on 15,412 has. in 11 colonies. The second approach, giving legal 
titles, though successful in its limited purposes, 
the agrarian problem. 
In Seligson's view, the colonization programme was a failure because of a lack of 
infrastructure in the colonies and their distancie 
structured interviews and attitudinal studies 
abandoned by the state. Furthermore, they received little support in terms of extension 
and credit. He also argues that the selection s:udy was flawed. Many received land 
thanks to their political connections, while others who were sent to these colonies 
were undesirable persons - drunks, vagabonds and political enemies. Finally, many 
settlers felt deceived by the IDA as they argued that they were lured to the colonies 
with promises that they would soon receive adequate housing and other social 
amenities. 
Underlying his analysis is a view of IDlA's problems as being caused by a 
mplication of this analysis is that the 
depoliticized. This, in Seligson's view 
was only possible by 1) reorganising 
paternalist relationship with beneficiaries. The 
relationship between IDA and clients should be 
and that of the planners of the 034 Programme, 
the institution so as to make it more effectiva and thus less paternalistic, and 2) 
developing an effective beneficiary selection system. In Chapter 3, I will discuss how 
these views crystallize in what I designate the 
that the key to successful land reform is that of 
are amenable to be transformed into entrepreneurial farmers. It suffices here to say that 
this model reduces the problematic of land roform to that of being a problem of 
institutional management, and that of identifying 
potential entrepreneurial farmers can be identified. 
In comparing Seligson's views with those of Don Antonio, I argue that two 
different conceptions confront each other, one which focuses on institutional efficiency 
and another one which views land reform wi thin the socio-political project of the 
Liberación party. Seligson's is an argument in favour of directed colonization, whereas 
Don Antonio is mostly interested in distributing 
Salgado 's and Seligson's 
ino v El Capitalismo Agrario11 
squatter's legal situation (1967-
enterprises and individual allotments 
from urban areas. On the 
he argues that many settlers 
model of the client', that is, the view 
selecting (groups of) beneficiaries who 
the key personality variables by which 
3 S much land as possible, with a view 
to preserving social peace within the institutional framework set up by Liberación. The 
latter's views, then, are not also institutional bu: also political, as he was interested in 
more than in improving the economic viability cf settlements. An additional argument 
can be put forward against Seligson's representation of IDA'S history. To begin with, 
IDA has never enjoyed the full support of the Costa Rican political system, not even 
within Liberación Nacional. Thus, it can be argue d that the failure of IDA in the second 
"The book - at least in its English edition - is influential 
Costa Rican agrarian reform for funding organisations such 
because it has become the standard work on 
as USAID. 
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part of the sixties to address the basic principles of the agrarian problem was not 
because of a flawed policy but due to the fact that non-Liberacionista governments 
never had agrarian reform high on their agenda.12 
Don Antonio's views, I think, show that the reality of state intervention is much 
more complex and that it is embedded within a history of institutional and political 
struggles. In his view, the IDA had to remain a small non-bureaucratic institution and 
maintain a degree of autonomy from the wider political system and from international 
agencies. He maintained that the IDA'S objective ought to be that of distributing land at 
the lowest cost possible, and not to getting engaged in costly developmental projects. 
Otherwise, he feared, IDA would become an instrument in the hands of larger political 
and bureaucratic forces. 
It can be argued, then, that Don Antonio Salgado's views, are institutional and 
political, whereas Seligson's are geared to denying the political nature of IDA 
intervention. The argument, then, is that state intervention is throughout a political 
process, and particularly, that IDA intervention in Costa Rica cannot be separated from 
the workings of political processes at the institutional and national level. 
Next, I will concentrate on how Don Antonio Salgado clashed with another 
institutional project, the populist/incorporationist one of Francisco Salazar, Head of the 
IDA Training and Education Department (DOCAE), and which was based on a 
contrasting set of assumptions. This project propounded an active intervention of the 
state in creating the appropriate organizational forms for agrarian development. In 
addition, various types of (grass-roots) political pressures were applied, or 'organized', 
to force the institution to intervene in land disputes. It will be shown that Francisco 
Salazar drew upon a wider political network than Don Antonio, in developing his 
incorporationist/populist institutional project.13 This project will be analyzed from the 
perspective of how Don Antonio Salgado and the 034 Programme advisor and later 
General Manager, Roberto Arcos, dealt with it. 
The rise of the populist/incorporationist project 
Already during Don Antonio's second term (1976-78) many new employees at the IDA 
appeared to have leftist sympathies, thereby opening a door to parties of the left. In 
fact, the Head of the Personnel Department was in the hands of a leftist sympathiser 
and he used his influence to employ many leftists, as many as 60 of them. As these 
people started to encourage land invasions Don Antonio Salgado decided to stop them 
and after obtaining money from the government for the "prestaciones" (the pension 
payments) he started to dismiss them. This was facilitated, he argues, by the fact that 
the political pressure from peasant groups was not yet so heavy, and he was able to 
control the situation. Crucial, though, was that he had the full support of President 
Oduber. At the time he had a large budget with which he bought some latifundia for 
land distribution to settlers. Although it cost him some popularity he was able to enter 
into confrontation with the leftists without too many risks. 
One of the critical "historical" events at the institution, which took place during 
his second term, was the conflict between Don Antonio Salgado and Francisco Salazar 
who, as stated above, was Head of the Training and Education Department of the IDA. 
12But also Figueres was not interested in agrarian reform, which is reflected in the low budget he 
assigned to IDA. 
1 3 l did not have the opportunity to interview Francisco Salazar. His institutional project is analysed on 
the basis of the accounts of former subordinates and colleagues who still were active in the IDA. 
Land reform 
Salazar was a very gifted politician and organize •. But as Don Antonio recalls, Francisco 
Salazar, at a given point, started to disregard his commands. They started to clash, and 
eventually in 1978, Don Antonio had to dismiss him. As he recalls, Salazar developed a 
'style' very much his own. He loved to do favours and had a great capacity to secure 
the commitment of the people he appointed. He 
ran in pursuing his political ambitions. When 
would have to dismiss him, Salazar argued that 
29 
was also very conscious of the risks he 
Don Antonio gave him notice that he 
ie was just using the rules of the game 
like any other intelligent party member would do. As Don Antonio recalls: "He 
suggested that I was doing the same and that it was his right to do so". 
The decision to dismiss Francisco Salazar was a difficult one, as Don Antonio 
himself had encouraged him to deploy his talents. In fact, in the beginning, their 
cooperation was excellent since Don Antonio needed his organizational qualities in a 
period when the institution was accomplishing major land reform tasks. Salazar, 
however, held very different Views and interests from Don Antonio. This young 
agronomist, though he had never worked as one, had been involved since he was in the 
university in the cooperative movement and represented the dreams for change of this 
growing sector. He was also Secretary of the youth sector of the Liberación Nacional 
party in a period in which the party made greqt efforts to secure its influence in the 
universities and gain the support of potential 
efforts was that the left was becoming an 
movement. 
In effect, apart from Don Antonio, Saldzar was the only IDA functionary to 
become a prominent politician at the national level. Salazar left the IDA in 1978 and did 
not reach a position such as General Manager or Executive President, but he was able 
to follow his political career in the cooperative 
IDA'S Training and Education Department he ha J already established a clientele, helped 
him much in developing his career. The coof erative movement, it must be noted, 
continued to grow during the Monge administration14 (1982-1986) and became active 
in organising farmers in the countryside. Its growth was also related to the rise of 
political unions in the plantation sector of the Atlantic zone which were close to 
Liberación Nacional, such as the FESIAN (Federación Sindical Agraria Nacional). Later, 
Francisco Salazar became founder and first President of the Cooperative Bank, and 
Minister of Agriculture during the Monge (1982-
It can be argued that don Antonio's 
transcended IDA, epitomized what the planners 
'paternalist vices' of the IDA. The influence of Salazar's project endured within the IDA, 
and as we will see, his followers there acquired: much power during the Liberacionista 
administration of Monge. Indeed, Don Antonio 
them in order to confront a series of conflicting 
student-leaders. One reason for these 
important contender in the student 
1986) administration, 
institutional project, which in fact 
of the 034 Programme designated the 
was forced to seek a compromise with 
demands. 
during 
Confronting conflicting demands 
During the Monge (1982-86) administration, 
became more complicated for Don Antonio. Befjore 
peasant organizations operating at the national 
with a long history in Costa Rica, had not 
had been in Geneva at the International Labour 
with a long history in Costa Rica, had not 
had been in Geneva at the International 
organization,and the largest USA union, the AFL 
been 
been 
his third and last term, the situation 
Monge there had been no powerful 
level. The communist party, already 
able to form them. President Monge 
organisation, ILO, and this organization, 
able to form them. President Monge 
Labour Organisation, ILO, and this 
-CIO, sent assessors to Costa Rica, 
"Former President Luis Alberto Monge was himself a f jrmer labour union leader. 
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after which they founded a democratic peasant union, which became the Federación 
Sindical Agraria Nacional (FESIAN). The members began to invade fincas, or large 
landholdings, shielded by the party banner. According to Don Antonio Salgado they 
were even worse than the leftists as they had easy access to the President's staff via 
the party. Moreover, they were competing with the leftists in radicalism. They had their 
own representative in Congress; a member of Liberación. That caused a serious 
problem to the IDA as they started to cultivate a large following. Don Antonio Salgado 
recalls that he spent much time in negotiating with these newly formed peasant 
organizations, in the typical Costa Rican, or tico tradition (e.g. in a conciliatory and 
peaceful way). 
It was rumoured that his frustration in dealing with them had led to his submitting 
his resignation. It was also said that the peasant organizations had asked for his head. 
As I confronted him with this view he laughed and contended that the Union had not 
been his worst problem by far. His real problems lay in a different field. They were 
connected with his relation to the Presidency, and other Ministers. Initially his 
relationship with Monge had been excellent. He was chosen as Executive President of 
the IDA with the status of Minister. The party had committed itself during the elections 
to paying most attention to the rural sector. For that reason the Monge administration's 
political lema (catch phrase) was volvamos a la tierra (let us return to the land). 
However, in reality Monge was not so interested in the agrarian question. This was 
more a propagandist move. At the same time there were various high-ranking people 
who were trying to manipulate the institute. That, in fact, was Salgado's problem. The 
vice-president (Alberto Fait) wanted to use the IDA to promote his candidacy as next 
president. He already controlled the IMAS, the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social 
(Institute of Social Welfare), an institute founded by José Figueres, in his last tenure 
(1970-1974), to combat poverty, especially in urban areas. Don Antonio was 
convinced that the vice-president wanted to expand his influence to the rural areas. 
Salgado also had ongoing conflicts with the various Ministers of Agriculture. 
Officially he was a Minister like them but it appeared that they had their own political 
agenda. Strange alliances were established with peasant unions, and invasions were 
not only tolerated but even encouraged. According to Don Antonio Salgado, that was 
playing with fire. Moreover, he argued that some Ministers started discrediting him vis-
à-vis the President in their efforts to gain control over the institution. As a result his 
relationship with the President lost much of its initial closeness. 
In short, it became very difficult for him to counter the pressures from peasant 
organizations at a time when high-placed politicians were not willing to respect the 
independence of the IDA. This was ocurring within a context of political turmoil and 
associated high ministerial turnover. There were three Agricultural Ministers during this 
government. The last one was Carlos Rojas, owner of one of the largest haciendas in 
the Atlantic zone, who was especially generous towards another peasant union, 
UPAGRA, because of the fear that they would invade his finca Bremen. (Instead 
UPAGRA invaded the contiguous hacienda of Neguev). 
Establishing a coalition with the followers of Francisco Salazar 
In the meantime Francisco Salazar had become President of the Cooperative Bank and 
the leading ideologue of the cooperative movement in the country, besides being 
Minister of Agriculture for a short period during the Monge administration. In the IDA 
his political friends took advantage of the institution's crisis for expanding their 
influence, by entering a series of negotiations with Don Antonio Salgado. Indeed, their 
ascendancy was the result of a conjunctural crisis which forced Don Antonio Salgado 
to negotiate a solution with them. The story is as follows. 
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In addition to these political problems, Don Antonio Salgado encountered a very 
complex situation when he came to IDA for his last period of (1982-1984). The IDA 
was in the midst of a financial crisis. There was a debt of more than 300 million 
colones. On top of this the union of professionals was demanding higher salaries and to 
that effect had initiated a law-suit against the IDA. One of the principal demands was 
that they should be paid extra allowances to offset the abandoning of the custom of 
hiring out their specialized services to private interests groups. They had been obliged 
to dedicate their services exclusively to the institution (dedicación exclusiva™). 
Obviously, Don Antonio was totally opposed to allocating scarce resources to salaries 
when they could have been employed for buying more fincas. 
In these circumstances Don Antonio Salgado established an alliance with the 
Workers' Union in order to neutralize the professionals' union. The latter was controlled 
by the opposition party. Unidad, but the Worker's Union was in the hands of 
Liberación, namely the group of Francisco Salazar supporters. In return for their support 
against the Professional Union he offered them key-positions in the institution and 
eventually within the 034 Programme. Thus, some succeeded in occupying such 
positions as Secretary of the Executive Board, Head of the 034 Programme Credit 
Fund, and other important positions within the institute such as Heads of various 
Departments. This group had a common trajectory, they had been through the Training 
and Education Department, DOCAE, and were active in the youth sector of the 
Liberación party. Furthermore, they controlled important organizations within the 
institution such as the Cooperative and, very important, the Worker's Union. 
The way the group of Salazar followers were able to acquire important positions 
is interesting, especially as they came close to controlling the entire institution. Yet, 
politically, they were not as clever as Francisco Salazar and they lacked the capacity to 
further develop an existing institutional project, let alone to put forward a new one. In 
short, they adopted Francisco Salazar's institutional project without being able to 
develop further his development ideology - based on the idea of cooperative 
development - and adapt it to the present situation. 
With the support of Salazar's followers Don Antonio Salgado won the law-suit 
and it became possible for him to improve the IDA'S financial position. Yet, the 
consequences of this negotiation - which had led to the promotion of many of Salazar's 
supporters to important posts within the IDA - were to become a heavy burden for the 
later programme adviser and then General Manager Don Roberto Arcos. 
But how does this power struggle relate to the 034 Programme? It is interesting 
to see how Don Antonio Salgado manoeuvred between USAID, which was putting 
pressure on him to accept the 034 programme by way of President Monge himself, and 
the political opposition he encountered from within the institution by the followers of 
Francisco Salazar's populist institutional project, who controlled the Workers Union. He 
solved this problem by offering a key position in the 034 Programme to the followers of 
Francisco Salazar, namely that of Head of the Credit Fund. The effect of this strategic 
move was twofold; in this way he could divide IDA'S professional and worker's unions, 
and thus overcome the financial crisis triggered off by the demands of the Professional 
Union for a salary increase; and secondly, by offering the leader of the followers of 
Francisco Salazar, the ambitious and highly populist politician Jesús Chavez, the post of 
Head of the Credit Fund. But in this second move he bequeathed to the 034 
15The allowance for dedlcacidn excluslva was being demanded retroactively, which would have meant 
a heavy financial burden for IDA. It should be noted that it is still common practice for IDA lawyers and 
agronomists to be engaged in the private work of their own interests and those of resourceful third parties. 
This has been considered one of the main factors which makes IDA so permeable to private interests. 
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Programme a real problem, for Jesús Chavez was intent on using this position in order 
to expand his clientele for political purposes. Given the hidden objective of USAID to 
eradicate 'clientelist' practices from the IDA, this, in effect, proved to be an effective 
way of undermining what had been one of the key components of the 034 Programme 
from its inception.16 
Discussion: Towards an understanding of institutional practices 
In what sense can the concept of institutional project contribute to an improved 
understanding of institutional practice? So far we have focussed on the various sets of 
claims and demands Don Antonio Salgado had to deal with. It would be possible to 
follow a corporativist type of analysis following Schifter and Schmitter (1972) in which 
institutions are viewed as elements of a system of intermediation aiming at the 
integration of marginal and less marginal client-groups within the political body. Within 
this view, which is defended by many Costa Rican students of land reform, the 
relationship between state and civil society is seen as largely determined by the 
capacity of the state to impose and manipulate the rules of the game. Although it is 
recognized that changes are possible through negotiations between the state and 
political organizations, these are held to take place within the prevailing dominant 
institutional framework, which according to Schifter is the outcome of an impasse 
between rival political projects. 
However, the institutional picture is somewhat more complicated as there are 
other types of pressures impinging upon state managers' decision-making, namely the 
pressures from foreign agencies and from political actors within the politico-institutional 
domain. As Don Antonio Salgado argued extensively, the intervention of international 
cooperation agencies can subvert existing organizational patterns by feeding the 
aspirations of many functionaries. In addition, an important force shaping the 
management environment is the operation of party politics within the institution itself, 
as there is a (ruling) party comittee in each institution which "advises" over the 
distribution of posts.1 7 
It also happens that government-supported peasant organizations are cabable to 
establish alliances with sectors of the government or the party, while pursuing their 
own, increasingly autonomous, interests. These pressures add to those from peasant 
organizations connected to oppositional, leftist parties, and the demands from politically 
non-comitted organizations building upon local interests. In addition, as we saw in the 
case of Don Antonio Salgado, institutional managers have to deal with the claims and 
demands from the central government, from the executive and from various ministers, 
and from Congress. Hence the cumulative demands of these organizations developed 
their own dynamic confronting the Don Antonio with a very delicate situation. 
As a result the functioning of the prevailing institutional framework may be itself 
subject to a drastic redifinition due to changing alliances among the 'old' social actors 
and the appearance of newer ones in the political scene. 
The thrust of the argument so far has been that institutional managers develop 
institutional projects on the basis of, first, their personal commitment to a particular 
"This account is based on interviews with Don Antonio Salgado himself and with the later General 
Manager, Don Roberto Arcos. It was suggested by the latter that Don Antonio Salgado expected that the 
Credit Fund would be discontinued as soon as it appeared that Jesus Chavez was using it for his own 
political purposes. 
1 7Yet, with regard to the party influence within the institution Don Antonio Salgado was emphatic that 
it was he who took the decisions. He did not let anyone impose any plan on him. Indeed, he agreed with 
the view presented to me by a high-ranking USAID official that he was an intransigent character. 
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politico-institutional world-view and of their own understanding of a particular 
problematic (in this case that of the agrarian question). In addition it has been argued 
that there is scope for negotiation and that by resolving one set of problems space may 
be created for managing another. In arguing this I am not suggesting that state 
managers' knowledge and understanding of institutional conditions is infallible. But an 
institutional project does leave an imprint on specific types of institutional management 
or practices of governability. What I am arguing is that they are not disembodied from 
determinate social relations with certain groups of actors, whether politicians, client-
groups, local administrators, etc. That Salgado's institutional project still played a role 
in the IDA, even though it became increasingly difficult to apply his particular socio-
institutional conceptions, is shown in the following case study of his successor, Don 
Roberto Arcos, who was first advisor to the 034 Programme (1982-1984), then 
Implementation Manager (1984-1986) and thereafter manager of the entire institute 
(1986-1988). 
IDA Executive President 
Antonio Salgado 1982-84 
Jorge Ellzondo 1984-86 
USAID consultant 
John Smith 1981-87 
Advisor to the 
034 Programme 
Roberto Arcos 1982-84 
Implementation 
Manager 
Juan Cells 1981-84 
Roberto Arcos 1984-86 
Head of the 
Credit Fund 
Jesús Chavez 1982-87 
Settlement Heads 
Neguev 
Fernando Campos 1983-
Maryland 
Figure 2.2 Organisational chart of the 034 Programme 
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The case of Don Roberto Arcos: The rise of the transformationalist project 
Don Roberto Arcos attempted, between 1986 and 1988, to transform the institution's 
mode of operation by implementing a regional decentralization plan, in association with 
the integrated rural development idea. This attempt provides a view of the 034 
Programme as an arena of struggle between different groups following contrasting 
institutional projects. 
I begin with the conflicts he had to experience in order to become General 
Manager of the institution. A number of themes related to these problems will be 
discussed in order to describe the tactics he devised to resolve those conflicts.18 Two 
major actors in this case study, besides Don Roberto Arcos, are Jesus Chavez, a 
follower of Francisco Salazar, and former Head of the Workers' Union who became 
Head of the Credit Fund, and the USAID consultant, John Smith, in charge of the 034 
Programme. 
Let us first recall some basic facts concerning the 034 Programme. A few yeais 
after the 034 Programme was initiated USAID started to doubt the IDA's capacity and 
its willingness to bring the programme to completion. It threatened to stop it unless the 
management capacity of the institution was improved. One major complaint on the pat 
of USAID was that the Programme Implementation Manager who was appointed by 
Don Antonio Salgado, Juan Celis, appeared not to be very efficient as an administrator. 
Consequently Don Antonio Salgado appointed Roberto Arcos as his personal consultant 
in order to take up the administration of the 034 Programme. When Don Roberto Arccs 
arrived in the IDA, the 034 Programme had suffered a delay of two years in i:s 
implementation. One major reason for this delay was Salgado's initial opposition to t i e 
programme, as it clearly contradicted his views on how the institution should function 
and the development model that should be followed. This was reflected in a personal 
conflict with the then American ambassador and a tiresome relationship with t ie 
USAID consultant, John Smith, who settled at the IDA's headquarters (in programme 
documents he is called the Resident Consultant). Yet, Don Antonio Salgado was forced 
to yield to President Monge, who, under American pressure, gave priority to the 
programme. The USAID Resident Consultant himself was keen to see that a young ard 
dynamic person was selected who was not burdened by the IDA's internal rivalries, and 
therefore approved Salgado's choice of Roberto Arcos. 
Before becoming advisor of the 034 Programme in 1982, Don Roberto Arcos was 
known as a hard-working engineer with good organizational abilities. In addition he was 
a promising black politician with some support in the Lim6n province of the Atlantic 
zone. At the time that he was offered work with the IDA he was working at the 
Ministry of Transport. He recalls that the decision to change this job for a position in 
the land reform agency was not an easy one. The IDA had the reputation of being a 
difficult (and many would say corrupt) agency, and its administration was known to be 
slow and cumbersome. As he put it, 
"I came to the IDA because I was asked to by the then Executive President 
executive. I was also asked to by the party.18 I had a rewarding job at the 
Ministry of Transport (MOPT), where at the time Rolando Araya was Minister. 
Moving to the IDA was personally a difficult step and it implied a political risk. 
, sln elaborating this case study I have made use of a number of taped and informal conversations, and 
material Don Roberto Arcos provided, such as a paper written by an ex-assistant for a course on business 
administration. 
,sPresident Monge himself asked him to accept the offer. 
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since I was working in the team (equipo) of an honest and solid person and, what 
is very important, a potential presidential candidate. Don Antonio Salgado offered 
me excellent working conditions at the IDA and was able to convince me of the 
great advantages that the successful completion of the 034 Programme could 
provide for my further career". 
In order to better understand how Arcos developed an institutional project of his own it 
is important to probe further into his views on the relationship between public office 
and a political career. He would describe this relationship in the following terms, 
"In Costa Rica there are two ways to have a successful political career, through a 
party organization or through an institution. Both demand the demonstration of 
remarkable organizational capacities. You see that aspiring politicians try to follow 
the trajectories of successful politicians". 
Climbing through a party organisation was not easy as this required a special political 
relationship with the older, 'historical' leaders. Thus Oscar Arias, who was President 
during 1986-1990, formed a political basis within the youth section of the party. But 
he belonged to a well-known family from the coffee oligarchy. Other politicians, like 
Don Roberto Arcos himself / had to prove their abilities in public office in order to catch 
the attention of party leaders.20 Don Roberto's strategy, then, was directed to 
developing a reputation as an able black technocrat, while establishing a political base 
in Limon city as someone who was able to represent the province at national level. This 
seemed a quite viable strategy as Limon was under-represented in national political life. 
The IDA, in fact, exhibited one special advantage for him: it had a very clear presence 
in the Atlantic zone, where conflicts over land were more pervasive than in the rest of 
the country. But he was quite aware of the difficulties, "the IDA has not produced 
many good politicians. No one, since Don Antonio, with the exception of Francisco 
Salazar, has been able to use the institution as a political platform for higher positions". 
The task of taking over the responsibility of the 034 Programme, then, was a 
challenge through which he could show his political and administrative abilites at an 
institution which was known to be highly difficult. Indeed, he thought restructuring 
such a political institution as the IDA would be a remarkable accomplishment. Thus it is 
important to note that underlying the institutional project he developed there was no 
rounded understanding of the agrarian problematic, but instead a political view about 
the importance of institutional frameworks in governing the country. We see then, that 
a technocratic outlook was coupled with a particular understanding of the relationship 
between public office and the opportunities it offered as a platform for advancing a 
political career. 
Initially, he did not intend to stay in the institution for more than a few years. 
However, soon after arriving, he realized that in order to carry out his job he needed to 
become more and more involved in current institutional struggles. A major problem for 
him became that of asserting his authority. 
Don Roberto Arcos' problems in asserting his authority 
When Don Roberto Arcos became advisor to the 034 Programme in 1982 he had to 
coordinate with Don Juan Celis, the Implementation Manager of the Programme and 
with John Smith, the USAID consultant. Officially Don Roberto Arcos was in charge of 
*°lt is telling that the only politician in Costa Rica who did not need to combine a reputation as 
administrator and politician was José Figueres. It is said that he governed the country as if it were his own 
hacienda. 
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planning and monitoring and Don Juan Celis of operational activities. The 034 
Programme depended on the support and the services of the entire institution. The 
Credit Fund, it should be noted, was one of the innovations of this programme and it 
was meant to play a pivotal role in its implementation. However, it soon became 
apparent to Don Roberto that there were few linkages between the programme's 
planning and its actual implementation. In his view activities were set up without any 
connection to programme goals. There was pressure on him to show progress in the 
short term and to that effect he needed the full commitment of a number of 
departments. Thus he decided to set up a coordinating commission which would meet 
weekly in order to discuss current matters. He recalls that one of his aims with those 
meetings was to gain an understanding of how the key functionaries perceived the new 
institution's policies. Thus, he saw attendance at the weekly meetings as a measure of 
the degree of commitment within the institution to the Programme. 
In this context the support of the planning department was crucial, especially 
from the section of statistics and evaluation. This section was to provide information 
about the progress of activities undertaken, and especially on tasks which for some 
reason had not been finished and on the reasons for the delays. However, according to 
Arcos, the Head of the Planning Department, Octavio Fajardo, alleged that the scarcity 
of qualified personnel did not permit him to cooperate as he would have liked to, and he 
refused to attend the meetings. After some time it became clear to Arcos, that the real 
reason for Fajardo's lack of commitment to the programme was his resentment that the 
management and planning of the programme had been centralized in Arco's hands. 
As mentioned before, the Credit Fund was central to the 034 Programme. Its 
Head, Jesus Chavez, was the former Head of the Worker's Union. His appointment had 
been the outcome of an agreement between him and Don Antonio Salgado. Arcos 
recalls that the Head of the Credit Fund frequented the meetings only at the beginning, 
and made it clear to all that he did not consider himself bound to decisions made in the 
meetings. In fact, he saw the Credit Fund not so much as a component of the 034 
Programme but more as a general institutional response to the problem of lack of 
access to credit for Costa Rican peasants. Thus Jesus Chavez argued that since the 
peasants of Costa Rica were marginalized credit subjects of the National Bank system, 
and the Credit Fund was the only credit source open to them, it was necessary to 
expand the clientele as far as possible. In addition he saw this clientele in generic 
terms, not as "progressive or innovative farmers" but as the great majority of poor 
peasants. But Arcos, in contrast, worried about the lack of efficiency in the use of 
credit. He argued that the Credit Fund could not continue disbursing millions every 
month without knowing whether this money could ever be recovered. This clash of 
views and interests led to a serious conflict between the two characters. This conflict, 
as we will see, became part of a power struggle for control of the IDA and was fought 
out in the political arena. 
Another serious problem for Arcos was that a clash with Juan Celis, the 
Programme Implementation Manager, became inevitable. Although officially Arcos was 
now in charge of planning and monitoring, he soon realized that for a successful 
outcome of the programme he would also need to take charge of programme 
implementation. Juan Celis resented Arcos' interference and avoided the weekly 
meetings. Soon the conflict between them became public. Juan Celis, an experienced 
agronomist and one of the oldest IDA employees, adhered to the same views as Don 
Antonio Salgado. In short, he gave a higher priority to the establishment of good 
working relations with 'cooperative' farmers than to the administrative tasks required 
for the implementation of an integrated rural development programme. When the 
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conflict became public Celis received the support of Jesús Chavez, the Head of the 
Credit Fund and Octavio Fajardo, the Head of the Planning Department. 
After some time Arcos concluded that the output of the weekly meetings he had 
introduced to coordinate programme activities was very low. Most participants did not 
offer concrete proposals for problems belonging to their field of competence. The 
meetings had evolved into an arena of conflict in which more effort was expended in 
creating obstacles than in finding solutions for emerging problems. One way to secure 
the cooperation of some key-departments in the implementation of the 034 Programme 
was by threatening them that in case of refusal, additional USAID resources would be 
withheld. From then onwards, Don Roberto Arcos and John Smith, maintained control 
of all programme activities. However, one consequence of this strategy, which ran 
counter to the original objectives of the Programme, was that little integration ocurred 
within the wider institutional structure. 
Don Roberto Arcos becomes the 034 Programme Manager 
Meanwhile the continuous pressure exerted on the IDA by Liberacionista and leftist 
peasant unions during 1982-1984 triggered off an agrarian political crisis which had 
serious consequences for the institution. The refusal of Don Antonio Salgado to 
negotiate with the government-supported peasant unions, culminated in union demands 
that Salgado should resign. At the same time, a group of politicians and an important 
part of the press also directed criticism to Don Antonio Salgado's handling of the crisis. 
With this, and in view of the lack of support he was receiving from the central 
government, Don Antonio Salgado did in fact resign. 
Soon after his resignation, in July of 1984, a serious conflict arose between the 
034 Implementation Manager, Juan Celis, and Roberto Arcos. Salgado had conceded 
complete authority regarding programme decisions to Roberto Arcos, but only as his 
personal assistant. With the departure of Doh Antonio, Juan Celis was not prepared to 
share any degree of decision-making power. Don Roberto, therefore, found himself in a 
difficult situation as he had not the required institutional backing for completing his job. 
In this situation he turned to the support of John Smith, the USAID consultant, who 
after all made the key decisions over the use of resources and who supported Don 
Roberto fully. 
John Smith had been heavily involved in the programme, especially at the 
implementation level, as he saw to it that resources were channeled only to specific 
activities according to a working programme. He was also involved in selecting the 
heads of settlements where the 034 IRDP was to be implemented. The settlement 
heads chosen had one thing in common, they were all young and all had a lot of 
experience as agronomists in the Atlantic zone, first on the plantations and thereafter 
within the IDA. Also, they were employed by the 034 Programme and thus lacked a 
stable contract as IDA personnel. Neither did they belong to any old faction within the 
institution. Their only allegiance was towards their direct superiors, Juan Celis and 
Roberto Arcos. 
Don Roberto, then, established an alliance with the Heads of the three 034 
Programme settlements with a view to ousting the Implementation Manager, Juan 
Celis. Don Roberto was able to secure their support by means of a plan to delegate 
authority for implementing the Programme to them. In consequence Don Juan Celis 
was forced to resign and Don Roberto became full manager of the 034 Programme 
(thus including implementation, planning and monitoring). Accordingly the settlement 
heads became responsible for the actual implementation at the regional level. 
This strategic alliance led to positive outcomes. By June 1984, the programme 
showed important advances in the areas of titling and road infrastructure, in spite of 
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the poor cooperation of the departments in San José. Yet, one other consequence of 
this strategy was the conviction within the IDA that the 034 Programme remained an 
alien body within the institution and that Don Roberto was not sticking to the IDA'S 
rule that important decisions should be made through political negotiations. 
At the same time the positive effects of delegation of authority to the settlements 
heads strengthened Don Roberto Arcos in his views - largely inspired by John Smith -
that the only way of improving the efficiency of the IDA was by giving power to the 
regions were decision-making was not burdened by institutional politics. Accordingly, 
he became totally committed to regional decentralization. 
A new Executive President is appointed and the conflict escalates 
In order to calm the political turmoil caused by the resignation of Don Antonio Salgado, 
the party decided to appoint a technocrat at the top of the IDA, Don Jorge Elizondo, 
who served as Executive President from July 1984 to July 1986. The Government also 
decided to "intervene" in the IDA'S Executive Board and to appoint new members. 
Jorge Elizondo chose for a low-profile policy. President Monge's government suffered a 
serious loss of prestige towards the end of his regime due to a number of political 
scandals, and the ambitious goal of resolving the 'agrarian problem' was pushed into 
the background. The new policy of the IDA was directed towards the rationalization of 
resources and towards supporting existing programmes.21 
Not surprisingly then, the new Executive President was soon confronted with 
multiple internal and external pressures in the form of political demands from peasant 
unions and politicians, and demands for higher salaries from the IDA's unions. At the 
same time Don Roberto Arcos' rival Jesús Chavez, Head of the Credit Fund, started to 
discredit Arcos by accusing him of attempting to isolate the 034 Programme from the 
rest of the institution. Jorge Elizondo, well-aware of the importance of the 034 
Programme for the relationship with USAID, established contact with John Smith. 
Elizondo was disturbed by the accusations from Celis that Arcos and the USAID 
consultant had conspired against him. But John Smith, as always, supported Don 
Roberto Arcos without hesitation. 
At this rather unfavourable conjuncture it became clear to Roberto Arcos that his 
major trump was the 034 Programme and its effect for the rest of the institution. As he 
put it, "Don Jorge Elizondo realized that he needed my experience in order to finish the 
Programme". Yet, the power balance in those days tilted towards Jesús Chaves, who 
sought for opportunities to undermine Arcos' authority within the Programme and the 
institution, and thereby to further isolate him. 2 2 
Then, Arcos saw an opportunity to impart a blow to his rivals. He chose to make 
public a study made by one of his assistants which concluded that the best way to 
rationalize resources was by setting limits to the excessive use of institution vehicles 
within the capital. He argued that the vehicles should be used in the field and not as 
personal cars for staff in the capital city. To that effect he received the explicit support 
from Elizondo to reorganize the IDA's transport fleet. Don Roberto's first act was to 
order the Programme vehicle assigned to Jesús Chavez, as Head of the Credit Fund, to 
21This new "technocratic" approach was to remain during the next Presidency as Oscar Arias clearly 
did not see the 'agrarian question' as an important issue. His battle horse was housing. 
^Referring to his problems with Don Jesus Chavez, Don Roberto Arcos commented, "I was not 
interested in a frontal confrontation. In an open confrontation I could have eliminated the entire opposition, 
but not without sacrificing the whole programme. The only thing I was interested in was leading the 
programme to an acceptable conclusion. Meanwhile the USAID consultant and myself administered the 
Credit Fund from a distance*. 
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be returned to the programme in order to be sent to the field. Don Jesús just refused to 
follow the order. In the face of this resistance Arcos decided to use the break down 
lorry to remove the cars. This move, however, backfired and Chavez created a huge 
fuss and succeeded in recovering his vehicle. Moreover, he accused Arcos of political 
persecution. 
At the end of Monge's term, at the beginning of 1986, a memorandum was sent 
to the Presidency accusing Don Roberto Arcos of organizing political persecution 
against other party members within the IDA. In addition, mention was made of a 
lawsuit against him due to an accident he (Don Roberto) had had a few months 
previously while driving an institute vehicle. It was argued that in that accident he had 
injured a woman and in the aftermath had shown little humanitarian feeling towards 
her, "a typical characteristic of his Machiavellian style". It was clear to Don Roberto 
that his opponents had set this law suit in motion. (In fact the accident took place in 
Cartago, the stronghold of Jesús Chávez). Arcos now felt in serious trouble. The 
memorandum had been sent to the President as an open letter and had the signature of 
the representatives of the institution's unions, both worker and professional. 
Don Roberto Arcos becomes IDA'S General Manager, but the struggle continues 
Don Roberto Arcos then decided to concentrate all his efforts on the Presidential 
campaign in favour of Oscar Arias, the Liberación candidate. He took unpaid leave and 
left for Limón, a province where Liberación lacked able politicians. In the middle of 
1986, after the election victory of Oscar Arias, the decision of the judges was made 
public and he was completely absolved of any blame in the accident. He then saw an 
opportunity to strike a blow. Soon a document supporting him was released with the 
signatures of a majority of the IDA employees. In this document - which was produced 
by his close collaborators - distance was taken from the actions taken against him by 
the representatives of the workers' and professionals' union. They were accused of 
acting without the consent union members. One week later the heads of the unions 
resigned. 
Apparently Don Roberto Arcos was able to muster support from a wider group 
within the institution thanks to his good relationship with the newly-elected President, 
Oscar Arias. In effect, the President made it clear in a letter addressed to the Executive 
Board that he had full confidence in Don Roberto. It was for no one a surprise that the 
new IDA Executive President, Don Sergio Quiroz, appointed by Oscar Arias after his 
election, chose Don Roberto Arcos as the new General Manager of the entire institute. 
That was in 1986. 2 3 However, Don Roberto's problems were not over, as a year later 
this institutional conflict was again reflected in the election of a Regional Director in the 
Atlantic zone. This became another arena of struggle in which his opponents sought 
revenge. 
The post of Regional Director in the Atlantic zone was the next step in 
implementing a new organisational framework which aimed to implement a radical 
decentralization programme. In Arcos' view the 034 Programme had been successful in 
finding new ways to delegate authority to the regional level. It was important, then, to 
appoint a Regional Director who was committed to this strategy of decentralization. 
The most suited for this post appeared to be the Head of the Neguev Settlement, 
"His rival Jesus Chavez had also been campaigning for Oscar Arias in his home area and he had also 
aspirations to become General Manager, but he lacked a reputation as a skillful administrator. 
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Fernando Campos, his most devoted supporter in the Atlantic zone. 2 4 However, Arcos 
had great difficulty in getting him appointed. He recalls that he had to use all his 
political connections within and outside the institution. The rival group, led by Jesús 
Chavez, proposed various candidates so as to stop this particular appointment. But 
Roberto Arcos rejected every negotiation, for he was convinced that Fernando Campos 
was the best candidate. Yet, it created a very unpleasant situation for him, as the main 
contender to Fernando Campos was a good political friend. He had to talk to him and 
tell him that he could not support him since he thought Fernando Campos was the 
more capable. 
Furthermore, Jesús Chavez started a campaign to discredit Fernando Campos by 
spreading the rumour that he was a former member of the opposition party Unidad, and 
arguing that he had made no contribution in the Atlantic zone to the election of 
President Arias. They called upon the MP's of the Limón Province and the Executive 
President of the IDA, arguing that it was a scandal that such a high position be given to 
someone who could not be trusted. Thus a rather difficult situation arose as Arcos had 
to place his entire political reputation on the block in order to refute these accusations. 
Key views underlying Don Roberto Arcos' institutional project 
As we saw, it was a long way for Don Roberto Arcos to become General Manager of 
the IDA. In fact, when he arrived at the institute as an petrol engineer with little 
knowledge about land issues, he did not aspire to that position. Yet, his involvement in 
the 034 Programme caused him to develop a strong commitment to a particular 
institutional project. This institutional project included the view that the problems in the 
countryside could only be resolved in an integrated way and that power should be 
delegated to the regions. The idea underlying this approach was that only in this way 
could settlers be encouraged to become entrepreneurial farmers. 
It can be argued that these ideas were implied in the integrated rural development 
approach. However, it would be simplistic to argue that Don Roberto Arcos just 
internalized the underlying assumptions implied in this approach. On the contrary, as I 
argue in Chapter 3, in the process of implementing the 034 Programme, Arcos 
appropriated such assumptions in such a way that they fitted in his wider 
understanding of how an institution ought to function. In this respect his views 
diverged much from those of the USAID programme designers.28 The clear 
improvement in the implementation effectiveness after delegating power to the regions, 
subsequent to his alliance with the Settlement Heads of the 034 Programme, convinced 
him that the necessary knowledge and skills for undertaking land reform activities could 
only be generated through the practice of programme implementation. In our last 
conversations he told me that he realised that during the period that he had been 
involved in the 034 Programme (first as advisor, later as Programme Manager and 
finally as IDA'S General Manager) he had been spending too much of his energy fighting 
2 4An important reason for choosing Fernando Campos was that at the time he was becoming involved 
in Uberacionista politics in the province of Limon, in the Atlantic zone. In effect, Fernando Campos' 
political involvement was important to Don Roberto Arcos as the Limon province was his political base. 
^Don Roberto was adamant that politics was an important and necessary part of policy, but that it 
should be conducted in a 'dignified' way. He also believed that a fundamental discussion on IDA'S role 
should be held. Interestingly, he identified two possible views on IDA's role; first, as an emissary of the 
state in the countryside, or second, as an instrument of change. He also suggested that the first 
conception was defended by Don Francisco Salazar, IDA'S former head of the Training and Organisation. It 
must be mentioned that Don Roberto held Salazar in high regard. For reasons of space I do not examine 
further Don Roberto's views. 
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rivals of his own party. He resented having received so little support from most of the 
Departments in the Institute. 
"We have to offer the settlers the necessary conditions 
become entrepreneurial producers. This will take place in 
produce for local markets and for their own consumption 
produce for international markets. But in order to make 
farmers we have to create for them the necessary 
infrastructure and other production conditions. This 
should be approached in an integrated way". 
in order to enable them to 
several phases. First they 
Then they should 
of them entrepreneurial 
conditions: housing, 
requires that their problem 
i in 
Thus two topics were critical in Don Roberto Arcos' institutional 
in implementing a regional decentralization plan and his 
which the institution had the obligation to service. Underlying 
semi-directed colonisation was no longer a viable strategy 
agrarian frontier. 
It is interesting to note that within Don Roberto Ar^os 
of the farmer as a client played a major role. His view 
provided with a package of services in order to become 
this did not entail for him that IDA should be depolitizic|sd 
that regional directors should be shielded from national 
better concentrate on implementation activities. He was 
for regional directors to participate in regional 
with members of parliament, and with the 
institutions. 
Thus Don Roberto Arcos did not hold to the 
eradicated from the institution altogether. In his view 
also unwanted. He saw land reform throughout as a political 
important decisions were made which affected the interests 
important to stress this here for I argue in Chapter 3 
manifested in the 034 Programme went much further anc 
the entire IDA. In Don Roberto Arcos' view the advantage 
development approach was that the implementation process 
political interference. In Chapter 3 the relationship 
institutional politics is studied in the Neguev settlement. 
USAID inspired attempt to change client-institution relationships 
project: his problems 
view of the settler as a client 
these views was that 
due to the exhaustion of the 
politics, 
politically 
project a particular model 
was that the client should be 
entrepreneurial farmer. Yet, 
. What he propounded was 
dolitics. In this way they could 
hdeed aware of the necessity 
since they had to coordinate 
appointed heads of other 
this 
a struggle for power between 
underwritten by conflicting 
This institutional conflict, however, was not merely 
two factions. It is my contention that it was 
conceptualizations of rural development. Thus, in Don Roberto's view regional 
decentralization and an integrated approach were necessary in order to resolve the 
problems of IDA beneficiaries. As he put it, 
View that politics should be 
was not only impossible but 
activity, since too many 
of so many groups. It is 
that the USAID approach as 
implied the depoliticization of 
of the integrated rural 
could be shielded off from 
between implementation and 
There I will examine how this 
worked out in practice. 
2.4 Conclusion 
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such as departments. 
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regional offices, etc., and that they may become important elements of an institution's 
memory. An institutional project, then, is not a mental construct determining state 
manager's behaviou/ but is itself changeable and remarkably loose and pragmatic, even 
though the socio-political commitments of institutional managers might be strict. In 
fact, it can be argued that institutional projects are shaped, adapted and transformed 
through practices of governability involving a variety of tactics such as negotiating, 
establishing coalitions, neutralizing (potential) rivals, enrolling third parties, but also the 
fine game of 'foul play' or as they call it in Costa Rica 'sawing the floor beneath your 
feet' (serruchar pisos). 
On the basis of the foregoing account I distinguished three different institutional 
projects; To begin with, the anti-interventionist project of Don Antonio Salgado who 
held to a view of the settler as an individualistic character able to open for him/herself 
an innovative path to progress. Second, the incorporationist project of Francisco 
Salazar who conceptualized the settler as a client who had to be incorporated into the 
national institutional and political structure. And third, the transformationalist project of 
Don Roberto Arcos who took the view that it was the institution's task to provide the 
settler with the conditions for becoming a successful rural entrepreneur through an 
integrated rural development approach. 
For the anti-interventionist project, the primary task of the institution was 
considered to be the distribution of land to peasants in the most efficacious and cost-
effective way, while refusing to engage in political negotiations with "pressure groups". 
The institution was seen as an instrument for achieving this goal and all activities had 
to be subordinated to the objective of distributing land. The evolving institutional 
project was, accordingly, perceived as authoritarian, as decision-making was Salgado's 
prerogative and little autonomy was left to Department Heads. Regarding client-
institution relationships he maintained that paternalism could be averted by avoiding 
further engagement in local developmental activities after the land had been delivered 
to settlers. This should be the task of other institutions. Not surprisingly Don Antonio 
Salgado lost much support within - and outside the institution -, especially among those 
who argued\hat the IDA should not only 'distribute poverty' but also ensure that the 
necessary production conditions be provided to the settlers for becoming commercial 
farmers. As we saw before this was also the view of an academician close to USAID 
(Seligson). Neither was Don Antonio Salgado popular among peasant unions. 
The populist-incorporationist project, in contrast, was intent on expanding the 
clientele through a network of local organizations (cooperatives, development 
associations, etc.) which would play the role of intermediaries between state and 
peasantry, of course, with the practical assistance of state officials. Within this project 
the IDA was to become part of a wider institutional effort to reach peasants, and 
accordingly coordination was sought with other client-oriented institutions such as the 
National Cooperative Organisation, DINADECO (Dirección Nacional de Cooperativas). 
The issue of institutional autonomy so dear to Don Antonio Salgado, if posed at all, 
would in this approach be viewed within the context of the broader project of 
expanding the state's and parties' clientele. Relationships were established with 
individual settlers, with 'grassroots' organizations and even with peasant unions 
supported by the Liberación party, definitely not with leftist peasant unions which were 
seen as competitors. This approach enabled Francisco Salazar to become immensely 
popular among front-line workers, not only those who operated in the regional offices 
but also those who operated from San José. Moreover, client-orientedness implied a 
labour-intensive approach, which gave him the opportunity to expand his social base 
within the institution. His institutional project, then, was viewed as being less 
authoritarian and more participative than that of his competitor Don Antonio Salgado. 
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Institutional optimality was not defined in terms of "how much would it cost to provide 
a settler with enough land for him to survive" but in terms of "how much meaningful 
action has been undertaken to improve the livelihood conditions of the settlers, in 
addition to giving them land". In this view the institution then was seen as providing 
the necessary political and organizational space for handling the conflictive nature of 
the agrarian question. 
Lastly, the transformationalist approach was wary of any political activity by 
clients, given the explosive nature of institution-client relationships in the Atlantic zone, 
where the 034 Programme was implemented. The institutional project associated with 
it was a direct result of the attempts to introduce thé integrated rural development 
model into the institution. We have seen in the case study of Don Roberto Arcos that 
this was not at all easy as there was substantial resistance within the institute to the 
way in which he attempted to bring the 034 Programme to a satisfactory end. Such an 
approach propounded a territorial notion through regional decentralization in order to 
ensure a maximum of coordination capacity, thereby introducing a distinct hierarchical 
principle at the regional level. We saw that Don Roberto Arcos received most support 
from the Regional Directors in the Atlantic zone. The support Don Roberto Arcos 
received from USAID was crucial. His approach was experienced by many bureaucrats 
in the IDA's headquarters in San José as technocratic and authoritarian. Yet, his 
approach entailed that new opportunities were created for able and ambitious officials, 
such as Settlement Heads, at the regional level. 
It is interesting to note that Don Antonio Salgado in defending his anti-
interventionist approach referred to new and presumably progressive colonization areas, 
for instance in the North. The group around Francisco Salazar, instead, would refer to 
areas where land pressure was high, where outmigration took place, and where the 
agrarian question played an important political role in regional, mainstream, politics. The 
transformationalist approach was devised in the Atlantic zone, a conflictive area where 
leftist parties and unions enjoyed traditionally much support among (ex)-plantation 
workers. 
In a wav. each institutional p r o j f l r t was t n snma n v t f t n t hasari nn a partial 
understanding of the multiple malitifts of institutional lifft Indeed, it must be stressed 
that no institutional project was able to cater to the contrasting interests and 
aspirations of the diverse sets of social actors it had to deal with. Yet, it must be noted 
that, at least at some point in time, they constituted viable end credible options as 
modes of institutional management. It could be argued then that elements of these 
institutional projects survived in specific institutional practices, thereby contributing to 
the failure of any attempt to restructure the institution according to a pre-determined 
model, as in the case of the 034 Programme. 
But what are the implications of a focus on institutional projects for our 
understanding of the role of planned intervention for state-peasant relations? Or, in 
other words, how can a focus on institutional dynamics shed light on the (in)ability of 
the state to shape the lives of peasants? 
Final analysis 
It is my argument that an institutional analysis in terms of struggles between competing 
institutional styles leads to a different view of the IDA from the existing ones. Such an 
analysis contradicts two common critical views of the institution. The first view (see 
Barahona Riera 1980; Araya Pochet 1982) argues that the institution was stillborn as 
an agrarian reform agency and that it served only to 'extinguish fires' (apagaincendios). 
According to the second view (Rovira Mas, 1987; Roy Rivera 1987) the IDA was set 
up as an apparatus of social control through a set of strategies of intermediation. In this 
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line of thought the IDA is anything but inefficient. Indeed, it is seen as relatively 
successful in securing the reproduction of the dominant political and economic system. 
The first view, which argues that the role of the IDA has been of little 
consequence as it has been unable to carry out a serious agrarian reform is not 
consistent. Thus it assumes that the institution's objectives should be a radical 
transformation of the agrarian structure on behalf of the peasantry by intervening in 
landownership relations. However, as we saw in the case studies, such objectives are 
not those of the main institutional actor's. Thus, this view blames the institution for 
failing to accomplish what it never set out to do. 
The absence of a more radical approach, then, is not due to the institution's lack 
of will (as we have seen there have been proponents within the institution of radical 
agrarian reform) but has to do with the political system which has kept agrarian reform 
out of its agenda. On the other hand, IDA'S activities have had definite effects on 
important sections of the rural population - for instance in creating expectations -, even 
if this has not entailed widespread land distribution. One problem with studies working 
within this line of thought is that they show little interest in the actual functioning of 
the institution. In short, the main problem with this argument is that it holds to a 
structural view of the state and then goes on to apply it to an institutional analysis. 
On the other hand, we have a more interesting argument which sees the IDA as 
having an intermediation function, interesting in that it pays more attention to the 
institutional dynamics. We find two different views within this thesis. A common leftist 
view sees the IDA as a manipulator, an instrument of the elite in scaling down agrarian 
conflicts by prompt intervention. The problem with this view, however, is that it 
bestows too much efficiency to the institution in achieving its Machiavellian goals. 
After all most functionaries are working on specialized tasks. Manipulating relationships 
with beneficiaries is not a central task for them but a requirement for being able to 
carry out extension, building roads and drawing maps, extending titles, etc. At the 
same time this view is naive insofar as it confers on the state a power which it never 
had; it underestimates the capacity of peasant groups and individual beneficiaries, 
themselves, to question the institution and thereby to influence its functioning. Indeed, 
as we saw in the case studies, the ability of clients and political groups to pressure the 
institution and thereby to influence the dynamics of the institution is quite large. Here 
we see that a conception of the state is applied that sees it as the instrument of a 
dominant social class. 
On the right (and this is a common view in the major Costa Rican newspapers) a 
similar type of critique is expounded, with the difference being that the IDA is seen as 
an instrument of populist groups (especially within the Liberación party) which use it for 
electoral purposes. After all, it is argued, is there a better way to win the allegiance of 
people than by giving them land?. The proponents of such a view clearly do not believe 
that agrarian reform can be combined with the modernization of agriculture and argue 
that the IDA is only 'distributing poverty'. In this view the IDA is an instrument of 
irresponsible and populist political elites. 
A less conspiratory and more complex argument would be a Skocpolian (Skocpol 
1979) kind of analysis focusing on the role of institutional actors in shaping rural 
society. Social control is then defined, not as an activity on behalf of a dominant social 
class but as a necessary institutional requirement for reaching its goals. These can be 
defined as the will to modernize the agrarian sector while avoiding major political 
turmoils. Institutional leaders, in this view, are depicted as politically skilled bureaucrats 
attempting to reach technocratic aims. This, essentially Weberian thesis, draws on a 
view of the state as a powerful organisation aiming to control people and territory in 
order to carry out a sort of historical project. State centralization and bureaucratization 
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are central elements within such a state rationality. In Chapter 5 1 will critically discuss 
this view as it has been put forward by Grindle (1986) for the Latin American case. 
My approach, however, is different. In this chapter I have argued that a better 
understanding of institutional life can be reached by viewing it as shaped by a sequence 
of conflicting institutional projects and their interactions than of analysing official 
policies. It was also argued that such institutional projects left their imprint in often 
strategic locations of an organisation in the form of a variety of work conceptions, and 
practical knowledge of how to cope with everyday situations. This in turn entailed that 
the plurality of institutional outlooks does not exclude the possibility that a dominant 
institutional project might impose widespread institutional change. Yet, the fact remains 
that all attempts to impose novel ways of conceptualizing and dealing with a changing 
agrarian problematic are fraught with contradictions due to the limited capacity of even 
very powerful actors to shape the multiple realities of institutional life. This, I think, has 
important implication for how we look at institutions. Thus, instead of conceptualizing 
institutions in terms of official policy or as instruments of classes, or as the instruments 
of some bureaucratic logic, it is proposed to focus on how institutional practices are 
shaped in a variety of arenas of struggle, some of which lie outside the institutional 
realm. Such a perspective on institutions, then, can be seen as providing a series of 
(sometimes contradictory) views on, and ways of dealing with particular 
problematics.28 
The next two chapters will concentrate on front-line workers, the state 
representatives in the field. One major conclusion in chapter 3 is that there is little 
sense in developing a general theory of implementation. Instead it is better to focus on 
the administrative process where determinate conceptions of the clients and labelling 
practices are sustained. 
1945 Costa Rican Civil War 
1953-58 José Figueres (Liberación Nacional) 
1958-62 Mario Echandi (Unión Nacional) 
1962-66 Francisco Orlich (Liberación Nacional) 
1966-70 José Joaquín Trejos (Unificación Nacional) 
1970-74 Figueres (Liberación Nacional) 
1974-78 Daniel Oduber ((Liberación Nacional) 
1978-82 Rodrigo Carazo (Unidad Nacional) 
1982-86 Luis Alberto Monge (Liberación Nacional) 
1986-90 Osear Arias (Liberación Nacional) 
Table 2.1 Costa Rican Presidents since 1945 
MBatley (1983) comes to a similar conclusion when arguing that the state's structural limits to change 
are not external to state organisations but internal to administrative practice. As he puts it, "Organisations 
are thus conceived, on the one hand, as products of a definition of reality, and on the other hand "as 
principal agents in the social construction of reality, providing an inventory of legitimate logics and axioms, 
and a repository of acceptable vocabularies, legitimate motives and laudable ambitions" (idem, p.20). 
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1961 
1961-66 
1974-78 
1976-78 
1980 
1981 
1981 
1982-84 
1982 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1984 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1986 
Foundation of the IDA 
First term Antonio Salgado as IDA's President Executive 
Francisco Salazar forms department of Organisation and Training 
and appoints followers all over IDA (among them Jesus Chavez) 
Second term Antonio Salgado as President Executive. He dismisses 
leftist group of IDA functionaries, also Francisco Salazar 
The 034 Programme is initiated 
Juan Cells is appointed Implementation Manager 
John Smith is appointed USAID consultant for the IDA 
Antonio Salgado's third term as IDA's Executive Director 
Roberto Arcos is appointed Programme Advisor for the 034 Programme 
Jesus Chavez is appointed Head of the Credit Fund 
Fernando Campos is appointed Head of the Neguev settlement, the 
Credit Fund starts extending credit in large amounts 
Antonio Salgado confronts agrarian crisis, and in July he resigns 
from the IDA 
Roberto Arcos is appointed 034 Programme Manager with the help of 
John Smith and Settlement Heads 
Jorge Elizondo is appointed IDA's President Executive 
Roberto Arcos attempts to break opposition within the IDA 
Roberto Arcos is accused of immoral behaviour and political 
harassment 
Roberto Arcos is appointed IDA's General Manager 
Table 2.2 Important events for the IDA and the 034 programme since 1961 
CHAPTER 3 
THE MODEL OF THE CLIENT 
AND THE IDEOLOGY OF INTERVENTION 
3.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter we obtained a view of the various power struggles taking place in 
the IDA, and the 034 Programme was already introduced as an arena of conflict in 
which different institutional projects competed. The impression might, then, have been 
created that state intervention is primarily shaped at the level of policy. In this chapter 
a shift of perspective will take place and the 034 Programme will be examined from the 
point of view of those who were expected to carry out policy guidelines and decisions. 
A_new set of social actors will be introduced: the front-line workers and their direct 
JpieTioTsTtJTeWaional Director and the Interim Head of the Neguev Settlement). These 
are the actors who are immersed in the everyday reality of implementation. 
The chapter consists of three parts. First, the geographical setting of the Neguev 
Regional Office will be outlined and in presenting an introduction to administrative life I 
proceed with a description of a number of locales in which the administrative process 
takes place. Second, a description of administrative life as a fragmentary and 
contingent reality will be given. Third, the genealogy of the model of the 'client', as a 
central element in an ideology of intervention, is presented. It is argued that this model 
is the outcome of an attempt by USAID planners to depoliticize institution-client 
relations. It will also be shown that this model of the 'client' is related to a particular, 
authoritative, representation of Costa Rican agrarian history. Finally, I show that the 
model is transformed in the process of implementation into the model of the 
'undeserving client' with which front-line workers and administrators confront 
beneficiaries. 
3.2 The Neguev Regional Office and Social Locales 
The local setting 
The Neguev regional office is located in the Neguev settlement, and was founded in 
1987. Prior to that it was a Settlement Office of the 034 Programme (from 1980 to 
1987). It covers five settlements with a total area of 12,724 has. and 1,294 settlers. 
Besides Neguev (5,340 has.) the regional office services the settlements of Agrimaga, 
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Florida, Made and Tierragrande. In the latter settlement the case studies of Chapters 7 
and 8 are located. 
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Figure 3.1 Schematic map of the area studied 
The Neguev settlement is situate in the northern part of the Atlantic zone, north of the 
Siquirres-Pocora railroad line, between the Reventazón river on the east and the 
Destierro river on the west. About a fifth of Neguev's total area of 5340 has. lies north 
of the Parismina river. Its geography is quite complex as it is traversed by various 
streams and swamps. The quality of the soil varies, but for the main part it is poor. 
Along the rivers there are excellent soils derived from recent alluvium and volcanic 
deposits which are suited for sustained permanent agriculture with perennial crops. 
Such soils can be found in the La Lucha (officially called Santa Rosa), Milano and 
Bellavista sectors of the settlement. The other two sectors, those of El Silencio and El 
Peje by contrast, contain the poorest soils. Neguev includes a forest reserve in the 
latter sector. 
The regional office lies at a distance of 110 kilometers from San José, and 15 
kilometers down a secondary road which turns off from the main San José-Limon 
highway shortly after Pocora. Neguev is connected by inner roads to the villages of 
Cairo to the south and, on the other side of the river, to Rio Jiménez and Santa Rosa. 
Larger urban areas are Siquirres to the south and Guápiles to the north. 
Neguev, before becoming a settlement, was a hacienda devoted mainly to beef 
cattle breeding and fattening; one of the largest ranches in the Atlantic zone. It 
belonged to a USA-Panamanian who subsequently sold it to a Costa Rican entrepreneur 
from San José. Apparently the latter neglected the farm, which may have encouraged 
its invasion in 1978 by a group of squatters under the guidance of the UPAGRA 
peasant union {Unión de Pequeños Agricultores del Atlántico). In 1979, after an 
agreement was reached between UPAGRA and the IDA, a rival peasant union, SPPAL 
{Sindicato de Pequeños Productores del Atlántico), invaded the pastures of the Milano 
sector were the IDA'S Regional Office is now located. 
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Figure 3.2 Schematic map of the Neguev settlement 
This situation lasted until 1980, when the 034 Programme started and the IDA'S 
presence became widespread all over the settlement. The settlement has been divided 
into 311 plots, varying from 10 has. on the most fertile soils, to 17 has. on the poorest 
soils. The IDA'S intervention was massive and was directed towards converting the 
settlement into a demonstration project. 
Next, before discussing the administrative context of the Neguev office I will 
make a few remarks on the settlements it services. 
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Some remarks on the settlement population 
Regarding the settler population in Neguev, it has been already stated in Chapter 1 that 
mobility after the invasion has been very high and that by 1986 more than half of the 
plots had changed ownership, at least once. The actual number of families in the 
settlement exceeds the number of plots due to subdivisions, and amounts to 425. 1 
Female-headed households are exceptions. I counted only 6 of them in the whole 
settlement, mostly widowers or divorcees. Thirty six percent of the plot owners do not 
live on the farm. This large percentage of absenteism consists largely of individuals 
who live in urban areas (20% of the plot owners come from the capital city San José), 
and who leave the farm in charge of a cuidandero, or a guard. It is also common for 
families to own two or more plots, which are registered under the name of sons or 
relatives. Absentee ownership is reflected in the large number of farms where only 
cattle is raised, especially in the sectors of El Peje and El Silencio. Indeed, cattle raising 
is an indication that the farmer does not depend on the farm for his livelihood, as it is 
considered that in order for a small family to subsist at least 40 heads of cattle are 
necessary. Most Neguev farmers do not reach such a number, the more as a plot of 10 
- 20 has. will not suffice for so many animals. Of the total farm area 56% is under 
grass, and only 16% is cultivated with crops.2 The rest of the farm area consists of 
brush and secondary forest. It must be noted that absentee ownership, unequal 
distribution of land and differential access to resources is even more marked in the 
Tierragrande settlement where goods roads necessary for transporting farm produce are 
lacking. 
It is not surprising, then that, as argued in Chapter 1 , issues of cooperation and 
community are experienced as problematic in these settlements. Settlers live dispersed 
on the farms and the distance to the community centres where the schools, churches 
and shops are located might be quite large. The community centres were intended to 
be the location of farmers houses, but few plot owners decided to move there as long 
as some basic services such as light and running water were not provided. In fact, 
community centres in Neguev are largely inhabited by landless peasant families. 
When in need of help farmers go to their neighbours. Beyond, they draw upon 
social networks which transcend the settlement and which are largely based on family 
ties. Farmers usually do their main shopping and search for distraction in the villages of 
Pocora, Siquirres, Germania, Guâcimo or Guépiles, along the railway. In fact, the 
dispersed location of farms and absentee ownership has led to an absence of 'village 
life' which is regretted by most farmers and which makes attempts to organise forms 
of 'community cooperation' tiresome. It seems that the evangelical churches are the 
only forms of local organisation which have been able to expand their social bases. 
Again, this lack of village life is even more marked in Tierragrande where the 
community centres have less services to offer and where it is often difficult, due to the 
rains, to travel on the roads. Furthermore, many settlers there choose to leave their 
families in the lowlands, especially in case of illness or when the children are old 
enough to attend secondary school (see Chapters 7 and 8). 
Finally a remark on the ethnic composition of the settlements. Since only 12% of 
the settler population in Neguev is originary from Limon there is a marked discrepancy 
between Neguev and the surrounding villages. The same holds for Tierragrande. In fact. 
nThe data used in this section comes from a survey conducted by the titling department of the IDA in 
march 1986. 
2 0f the cultivated area 9.73 % (83 has) was cocoa, 59.3% maize (504 has), 4.3% cassave, 5.5% 
citrics, 14.8% ayote, chile, cucumber, and others. 
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in Neguev there was only one black settler family at the time of my research and in 
Tierragrande none. Hence, the local black Jamaican culture is hardly represented in 
these settlements. 
The administrative organisation of the Neguev office 
Basically, activities in the Regional Office in Neguev are determined by two of the three 
components of the 034 Programme: Agricultural Asset Redistribution and Increased 
Tenure Security (see Chapter 1 , p.6).3 
In practical terms these Programme components involved two areas of activity; 
1 ) the promotion of agricultural development via the supply of credit and the provision 
of extension, and 
2) the achievement of effective control in the settlement through the regulation of 
access to land. This, it must be noted was a generally accepted, though not openly 
admitted objective of the 034 Programme, and it was never explicitly stated in IDA or 
034 Programme documents. However, policy makers such as Don Antonio Salgado, 
Don Roberto Arcos, or the influential USAID advisor, John Smith, would not make a 
secret of the fact that the Programme was also directed to the normalization of social 
relations between squatters and the state in conflictive areas such as Neguev4. 
In Chapter 6 I will elaborate on the contradictions which arose between the 
objectives underlying these two areas of activity. Here it suffices to observe that 
administrative process in Neguev consists of two types of tasks. First, those tasks 
which are carried out by the legal unit, the unit responsible for land issues and which 
has mainly a regulation function, and second, those by the agricultural extension unit 
and the credit unit (caja agraria), which have agricultural development functions. 
Extension was provided since the beginning of the 034 Programme for the following 
'old' Agricultural Development Activities: animal husbandry (Gonzales and his assistant 
Michel), cocoa (Jimenez and his assistants Gordon and Gordillo), root and tubers 
(Jimenez), maize (Rodriguez), species and medicinal plants (Lozano), pejibaye or palm 
heart (Gamba) and forestry (Gordon). Some técnicos 6 are chief extensionists in one 
activity and assistants in another, while some chief extensionists are in charge of more 
than one activity. Later on, by the end of the 034 Programme came the following 'new' 
Agricultural Activities: chili and pineapple (Lozano), and passion fruit or maracuya 
(Rodriguez). 
These Programme components include the following activities: a) land acquisition, b) land adjudication, 
c) road construction d) the construction of community and administrative facilities (schools, community 
meeting halls, health and nutrition centres, stores, administrative offices), e) settler orientation and 
training, f) agricultural development g) a credit programme. 
4ln fact, the two other settlements were also former invaded haciendas. Furthermore, IDA intervention 
in the Atlantic zone has to be seen in relation to attempts by the state to stimulate export production in 
the area. IDA tasks, such as colonization and the resolution of conflicts over land, were central in 
providing the basic conditions of social stability for making such a policy feasible. 
SA técnico is an official who has had an education in a technical/agricultural area and who deals with 
fanners both in the field and in the administrative domain. In Neguev only two of the técnicos have a 
university degree: the extensionist in charge of the cocoa and tuber programmes (Jiménez) and the 
veterinary officer (Gonzales). The extensionist in charge of the medicinal plants, species and pirtapple 
programmes (Lozano), is working on his thesis. The other técnicos have followed a few years university or 
technical training after finishing the agrarian secondary school. 
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The social worker or promotor social (Mario Green) straddles both types of tasks -
those of agricultural development and social control - as he has to channel settlers' 
initiatives through organisational modes approved by the institution. In the process he 
is supposed to struggle against initiatives and forms of organisation set up by elements 
with a 'negative' disposition towards the institution. 
The following positions can be distinguished in the Regional Office, with the 
names of the incumbents in italics: 
Head of Settlement and 
Regional Director 
Fernando Campos 
Interim Head of Settlement 
Hugo Paz 
Administ. Credit Extension Training and Legal 
Unit Unit Org. Unit Unit 
Assistant Supervisor Agr. Dev. Social Worker Agrarista 
Mateo Villegas Programmes Green Knight 
Cashier Maize Assistant 
Braga Rodriguez Ramos 
Cocoa 
Jim&nez 
Animal Hus. 
Gonzales 
Med.plants 
Spices 
Lozano 
Pej ibaye 
Gamba 
Coconut 
Gamba 
Forestry 
Gordon 
Chili 
Lozano 
Pineapple 
Lozano 
Maracuya 
Rodriguez 
Figure 3.3 Organizational Chart of the IDA officein Neguev in 1987 
In addition there are other professionally unqualified personnel such as cleaners, guards, 
store-keepers, the repairman, drivers, etc. working in the Neguev office. 
Next, the task environment of the personnel of the Neguev regional office will be 
discussed with special emphasis on social interaction within specific locales. 
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The Neguev regional office 
The Neguev Regional Office was built according to a standard design for all the 
settlements belonging to the Programme. The entrance hall is also the room where the 
secretaries work and it serves at the same time as the waiting room for clients. The 
Regional Director's room is at the left side and the extensionists' room behind, the 
largest room, separated from the waiting room by a hall and a glass window. Within 
there are two rows of desks for the técnicos. There are two more working rooms at the 
right hand side of the building, one for the legal and administrative assistants and one 
for the credit officials. This last room has a window that communicates with the 
waiting room. Behind the secretaries' place, and adjoining the extension room there 
stands a radio-transmittor on a desk. This radio transmits all day conversations held 
between Headquarters in San José, the settlement offices in the Atlantic zone, and the 
cars of the settlement heads. It must be noted that the social worker has no room for 
himself. He fulfills his administrative tasks in the extensionists' room. 
Guest 
House 
Extensionists 
Room 
Legal and 
Administrative 
Assistants 
1 
RegionalI Secretaries 
DireotorJ 
Entrance Hall 
Credit 
Unit 
Garage 
Figure 3.4 Plan of the IDA regional office in Neguev 
On a working day the secretaries will sit at their writing tables in the waiting hall, 
usually typing internal memos, letters to clients and to other institutions. They also 
operate the radio-transmitor and attend to visitors. They have the largest physical 
presence in the office and to some degree play a 'gatekeeper's' role. It is both for front-
line workers and settlers useful to entertain good relationships with them. This applied 
to me as well since they were able to give me tips as to where to contact someone, or 
to convey tactical (e.g. on the bureaucratic agenda) and even substantial information 
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(e.g. on the existence of programme documents, etc.). One of the secretaries supports 
the técnicos whereas the other works exclusively for the regional director. 
Given the importance of written communication in the bureaucratic administrative 
domain the efficiency of an official may depend on his relationship with the secretaries. 
Communication between the Regional Office and departments at Headquarters takes 
place by notes or cables called "IDAGRAMAS". Style is formal and bureaucratic. 
Official rebukes are also sent by memoranda or notes. Often these do not address in 
the first instance the official but are formulated in a general sense. Such notes can be 
used as weapons in conflicts between the regional office and a particular department, 
as was the case in a conflict between the Neguev office and the Credit Fund in San 
José. On the other hand, personal notes are sent in order to show that the Regional 
Office is acting against some irregularity that in the view of Fernando Campos, the 
Regional Director, is being tolerated by the respective department. Finally they may be 
used as a warning to call an individual to order. 
Settlers who want to talk to an official usually wait in the waiting room until they 
are given permission to enter one of the other rooms. However, as there is more face-
to-face contact with some settlers than with others, particular individuals have acquired 
'customary' rights to move in the precincts. That is especially the case with some pro-
institution leaders but it also occurs in the case of a few 'troublesome' settlers. Some 
characters have established excellent relationships with the secretaries, and spend the 
time they have to wait before a meeting with an official chatting with them. The 
secretaries are therefore ready to do various secretarial favours like typing letters for 
them and giving them 'useful' information. They might even 'arrange' important 
meetings by finding gaps in the agenda. In general, however, the secretaries avoid 
these kinds of relationships with settlers, for as one of them explained to me, "if we 
are too helpful we would end up being the secretaries of all settlers". The secretaries' 
attitude towards the settlers is always respectful and correct. There is little notice of 
any air of superiority on their part, especially as one of the two is a settler's daughter 
and wife. In the waiting room settlers and officials intermingle in a semi-official way. 
On Friday, the 'office day' (the day when Neguev officials stay in the office and receive 
settlers), this room is filled with settlers, but during the week there are few of them. 
With regard to the other rooms some are more private than others. The most secluded 
is the Regional Director's, then come the credit unit and the legal/administrative rooms 
and then the extensionists' room which is a more accessible place for settlers. In fact if 
a settler comes to talk to a particular extensionist he will often be told by the secretary 
to look for him inside. He/she will be able to see if the extensionist is busy with 
someone else through the glass window. Once in this room the settler will be asked to 
sit down at a desk and the conversation will begin. A characteristic of interaction 
between técnico and settlers within the office is that it is bounded by distinct rules. 
However, as we will see later, some clients have easier access to the office and to 
officials than others, thanks to their skills in negotiating access. 
With regard to the other rooms it is not much different. Someone coming with a 
credit issue can see whether the officials are present or not by looking through the 
window. If they are there he can sit down and wait for his/her turn. If they are not, 
they will have to ask the secretary whether they are in the field or just lingering around. 
By no means are settlers allowed to walk in, since money is being administered there. 
In the case of the legal/administrative units, they must be shown in by the secretary, 
the main reason for this being that legal issues are considered to be highly private. 
Finally, the regional director's room is off bounds. It is not easy to have an interview 
with him, not only because the irregularity of his presence but also because of the 
scarcity of his time. However, if anyone insists on an interview with the Regional 
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Director or with his substitute, the Interim Head of the Settlement, they will be 
received, only it may take a long time before they are shown in. More than in the other 
locales, it is the Regional Director who decides who, when and for how long he is going 
to receive a client. Furthermore, he is the person who finishes the interview, regardless 
of whether the visitor considers that his/her problem has been solved or not. 
In addition to the office, there are four other important locales were the 
administrative process evolves: the guest house, the garage, the store and the IDA 
vehicles. 
The guest house is inhabited during week days by the non-native front-line 
workers of Neguev, who at week-ends go to their home areas. Formerly it was the 
plantation house. Attached to the guest house there used to be also an eating room 
where meals were prepared for the officials. When the 034 Programme was ended in 
1987, and Neguev became a Regional Office, the meal service was abolished, and 
other services in the guest house were curtailed. The argument for doing so was that 
the institution was providing transport to the neighbouring villages, and as officials 
received special allowances for being separated from their families they ought to pay a 
rent. This, in fact, became an important point of conflict between the chief and the 
guest house dwellers. The guest house, then, is not only a major focus of grievances, 
but also the locale where complaints against the institution - especially the regional 
administration - are put forward strongest, at least by the non-native officials. 
The garage is the place where maintenance is given to the cars and simple repairs 
are carried out. It was formerly a barn and is situated some 20 meters outside the 
office. Socially this is a very important place. Officials gather in the garage to chat and 
gossip. The place has a strategic significance as cars are the scarcest administrative 
resource. Officials, therefore, spend a lot of time in the garage, out of self-interest 
(because their car is being repared) or out of interest in mechanics (the ailments of 
every car are followed by the officials as the development of a child by parents). The 
mechanic is a very talkative and friendly older man who loves gossiping. The officials 
therefore know that they can comment on problems and gather information there 
without risking being heard by their superiors. It is important for the field officials to 
maintain i\ good relationship with the mechanic so that he will do a good job when the 
car breaks; down. This can be accomplished by keeping him company and helping him 
and by letting him use the car once in a while (as one of his sons is a settler in 
Neguev). 
The store has similar qualities to the garage although it is less visited by the 
front-line workers, it is managed by members of the local Association of Small 
Producers. It provides a location where settlers and officials can meet in an informal 
atmosphee. Furthermore, the store plays an important role in the extension delivery 
system as it supplies agricultural inputs and goods, such as working clothes. 
The IDA vehicles are locales where officials spend a lot of time together each 
day. One car takes and fetches people to and from Siquirres and the other to Guacimo 
and Jimenez (direction Gu£piles). It happens that the first car is occupied by officials 
loyal to Fcirnando Campos, the regional director, whereas the second by officials critical 
of him. As one official would comment, "if you go to Guacimo at the end of the day 
you can score by critizicing the chief. If you go to Siquirres you really have to be 
careful with your words". 
It should be stressed that a good relationship with the secretaries, the mechanic 
and the drivers are important to the front-line workers. As an extensionist asserts, "if a 
settler passes and needs you they could tell him (the settler) that you are not in the 
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office while you are, or they could "forget" to pass you an important message. This 
could cause you a lot of trouble in your work". 
Social interaction in two selected locales 
Here I will provide two examples of the type of social interaction taking place in two 
locales which play a special role in the reproduction of the everyday, or 'informal' 
reality of the administrative process: the garage and the room of the legal and 
administrative assistants. 
The garage 
It has already been pointed out that the mechanic plays an important role in the gossip 
circuit. In the course of the research I realized that important discussions were held in 
the garage, which provided crucial information for understanding the administrative 
process. Thus, I learnt of significant events that were discussed and interpreted here, 
and noticed that veiled, and sometimes quite open criticisms on the regional direction, 
often in the form of jokes, would be common. For example I heard here the nicknames 
that were given to some superiors. 
In order to give an impression of the type of conversations that take place in this 
locale I will present an account of such a meeting in the garage when a couple of 
extensionists were present. 
In discussing a particular 'coordination' problem the mechanic suddenly starts 
critizicing the Head of the Settlement for not lending him a car for a union meeting. (It 
is however known that he has been rebuked for using one of the cars to visit his son 
who has a farm in the settlement). He complains that this is unjust especially as the 
Head of the Settlement openly uses the institution's car for his own personal advantage 
and has often been spotted taking his family out on Sunday trips. A few of the officials 
nod. Then the mechanic continues talking about the lack of recognition they receive 
from their superiors for the sacrifices they endure in such a difficult place, and starts 
comparing Jesús Chavez (Head of the Credit Fund) with the present IDA Manager 
(Roberto Arcos), arguing that the former at least is a humble character, someone ready 
to give anyone a hand and listen to their complaints. Moreover, he argues that Jesús 
Chavez is in favour of the working classes. Instead, individuals like Fernando Campos 
are only trying to place working people at a disadvantage. The driver then comments 
that he totally agrees with the mechanic and complains that while his allowances have 
been curtailed due to the closure of the 034 Programme6 those of the superiors have 
not. 
Then the administrative assistant contributes with a short example of bad 
treatment by the Settlement Head. He says, "yesterday I had to go to Guácimo, and 
we agreed the car was going to pick me up at nine o'clock (instead of 7.30 a.m.) in 
order to go straight to the municipality, I did not bother to dress early. So when 
Fernando Campos saw me in Siquirres (the village were both lived), he asked me, 
"what are you doing in shorts at 8.30 in the morning and why are you not working for 
you don't look ill, and he reprimanded me. I had to explain everything to him like a 
small child and feel guilty for going out to buy a newspaper". 
Subsequently the mechanic intervenes again and asks, "Why. Is the boss paying 
us with his own money? No, the money is the IDA's". The driver speaks up again 
^ e 034 programme was closed in 1987, which meant that the budget of the Neguev regional office 
had to be cut. 
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arguing that life in the institution is not bad as long as they pay the allowances. 
Without tríese and without other 'extras' he would have to resign. The mechanic 
agrees an i argues that it is all the bosses' fault, that instead of taking care of their 
problems and the farmers' they bother about insignificant issues like reducing the small 
benefits the officials have. 
It should, however, be remarked that only these three persons talk while another 
three liste i without commenting. 
Gatherings at the garage can also be funny. For example, one morning I arrived at 
the office, and as the técnico I had agreed to go with to the field was not in I walked to 
the garagn to look for him. All the officials were there, apparently having a lot of fun. 
Mario Green, the social worker was telling a story. He gestured a lot and constantly 
looked in the direction of the office to see whether the head might be coming. The 
story was about a Chinese restaurant owner in Siquirres who some time ago bought a 
plot withe ut title in a nearby settlement J Tierragrande. He was worried that the plot 
would be taken away from him as he did not qualify as a landless peasant. Mario Green 
and Pablo, a former credit supervisor, used to eat at his restaurant. When the 
restaurant owner heard that they worked for the IDA he offered them, as he asked 
them for legal advise regarding his plot chop suey and beer for free. Enthusiastic from 
the beer t iey promised to help him to obtain his ownership title. Since then, they were 
always welcome at the restaurant and received plenty of food and beer. However, 
when the Regional Office started to legalize the land situation in Tierragrande and Hugo 
Paz, the Interim Head, learnt that a wealthy Chinese owned a plot, the decision was 
made to rsvoke it and notice was sent to the Chinese. The next time they went to eat 
at his restaurant the Chinese was very angry as he complained in broken Spanish, hay 
hombre pequeño y calvo que dice que estoy salado, vamos a ver quien esta salado, yo 
o el, bacalao, (There is a small, bald man who says that I have bad luck, but we'll see 
who has had luck, he or me, poor guy), and he threw them out after telling them that 
he would see to it that they were sacked for making false promises. The Chinese 
argued that he had powerful political connections since he had made important 
contributions to the Liberación party. This andecdote was celebrated by the officials as 
they laughed loudly. 
Apparently this anecdote triggered off a stream of other anecdotes and 
comments which were quite critical of I the institution. One official laughed at the 
attempt by the Regional Office to confiscate 4 plots with macadamia trees owned by 
an American in another nearby settlement. "They have not even been able to evict 
Cacharpon nor Patas Verdes (both settler? supported by UPAGRA), how are they going 
to throw away this gringo with all his dollars?" Then another official recalls that 
Cacharpon (who lives next to the guesthouse) was once evicted, but the same day he 
was broujjht back to the plot. The mechanic then asks Moisés, the agrarista (the legal 
assistant), about his opinion, as he is in charge of legal issues. By way of answer 
Moisés tells an anecdote from El Indio, the settlement where he worked before. Once 
he had to evict a settler who claimed that he would not leave the plot unless dead. So, 
he told him that if necessary it would 
guarantee that the law was enacted. It cost him a lot of effort to coordinate with the 
local police for the eviction. A few days 
The sergeant, however, when he sensed 
happen that way, since he was there to 
later he arrived there with a few policemen, 
problems, started studying the eviction order 
in detail and concluded that he could not carry out the order because it was too old. 
Consequently, he had to leave humiliated with his tail between his legs (con la cola 
entre las oiernas). More of these stories followed, creating an impression that the law 
was eventhing but applicable. 
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These discussions were interrupted when settlers came nearby. However, there 
are a few who have access to these conversations. That means that when they 
approach the group no attempt is made to change the subject. It does not mean, 
however, that these settlers are accepted in the intimate group of the officials. They 
are tolerated to some degree, but no attempts are made to involve them in a 
conversation. 
Other personal subjects and experiences that were discussed in this locale were 
women and family issues, such as the case of settlers or colleagues having more than 
one woman. Issues regarding service delivery and general settler's problems are seldom 
discussed. Sometimes reference is made to failed agricultural development programmes 
but only to the effect of proving how unjust the promotion policy is. One example of 
such a remark is, "there is no consistency in the decisions made by the Executive 
Board of the IDA. Thus Z, after the failure of his agricultural programme, was promoted 
to Head of the Settlement in Y. You see, in the institution promotion chances are not 
dependent on performance but on your relationship with your superiors". 
The legal and administrative assistants' room 
Another locale where conversations relating to administrative life were common is the 
administrative and legal assistants' room. Here the same type of issues are discussed, 
often in a more detailed way and from a different point of view. Since both the legal 
assistant (the agrarista) and the administrative assistant are from the Atlantic zone this 
room is predominantly visited by the other officials native to the zone. Here they would 
complain about the 'fact' that it is outsiders (not from the Atlantic zone) who earn the 
best salaries and have the best career opportunities; about the 'fact' that many officials 
from San José come to the settlement to do jobs they can do themselves, while 
earning extra-allowances for doing so; and about the 'fact' that the real hard jobs are 
given in the weekend to the native officials because the others go back to their villages 
in Turrialba or Guanacaste. Here Mario Green, the social worker, would report on the 
suit he had filed against the institution to get back his regional allowance. 
Also, discussions that were held in the garage, were reinterpreted in this locale in 
a more 'realistic' way. For example with regard to criticisms that were once addressed 
against the Interim Head in the garage because he did not assign the car to (M) to go to 
the field the week before, (T) would comment; "The truth is that (M) has been seen too 
often in Guécimo (where he lives) with the car while he should have been somewhere 
else, so how can you be sure that he needed the car with so much urgency". Or, with 
regard to remarks that were made in the garage that a former legal assistant was using 
his function to earn "extra-income" the following comment was made, "well, if a settler 
is ready to give you some 2 or 3 thousand colones in return for speeding up the 
selection process why should you not accept. The only thing is that you should not 
take the money here in the office, where Fernando Campos or Hugo Paz could come in 
suddenly. Using the office for such business also soils our reputation". 
Analysis 
Yet, what does a focus on interaction within the different social locales which 
constitute the administrative domain tell us about the administrative process? To begin 
with we see that in these locales a strict separation - both physical and social - is 
brought about between settlers and bureaucrats. This social distance between front-line 
workers and settlers was not self-evident since the social background of most front-line 
workers did not differ much from that of Neguev settlers. It was the result of a 
particular bureaucratic attitude which, as we will see, prevailed in the administrative 
domain but not in the field domain. Thus, talk between front-line workers in the 
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administrative domain revolves around 'trivial' and everyday topics, and when reference 
to problems in dealing with settlers this is done in an anecdotal way. In this 
administrative domain is clearly insulated from the problematic reality of the 
is made 
way, the 
field. 
It was 
gossiping 
also shown that the topics discussed vary according to the locales; thus 
is rather common in the garage and in the guest house, but not in the 
extensionists' room. Even when the same topics are discussed the tone varies 
to the locale; in the legal and administrative assistants' room talk about 
appears to be more moralistic than in the garage. The sense of front-line 
commitment also varies according to the locale, and as we saw in the case of 
garafie the views on the capacity of the IDA to achieve its goals, can become 
Locales 
interpreted 
front-line 
enact 
valued; 
soil the 
regional 
thu 
3.3 
Process 
according 
'corruption 
workers' 
the 
rather cyhical 
Finally, it must be noted that these locales display 'emergent properties'. The 
character of social interaction within them is not derivative from their physical 
characteristics but is the result of a particular use of space by the front-line workers, 
provide a variety of arena's in which current issues and problems are 
and re-interpreted. In this way a particular understanding of the role of the 
worker in state intervention is achieved, as someone with little power to 
rules, subjected to unjust working conditions, whose commitment is not 
also as an individual who ought to hold to specific principles in order not to 
réputation of his colleagues and the office - at least within the confines of the 
office.7 
but 
The Fragmented and Contingent Nature of the Administrative 
In the previous section a somewhat static view was presented of the various patterns 
of interaction between officials. In this section I attempt to convey a flavour of the 
conflictive and problematic character of the administrative process. But first a note on 
methodology. 
st be pointed out that most of the ethnographic material used in this chapter 
originates from casual comments and informal conversations I had with officials. As 
was suggested in the first chapter, entry to administrative life in Neguev was not easy. 
When I made clear to the Head of the Settlement that I was interested in the 
organizational aspects of service delivery he stressed the necessity to develop a 
beneficiary's selection system. In effect, he wanted me to construct a number of 
profiles in order to identify those applicants who had most potential to become 
successful, entrepreneurial, settlers. 
I must recall that my status in the office was rather insecure and that the 
ambiance 1 1 encountered was not conducive to making open interviews. I then focussed 
on evaluative remarks and comments concerning ongoing problems and issues. In this 
way the contradictions and rivalries surrounding administrative life became apparent. I 
'This, I think has been neglected in most of the literature on local bureaucracy which generally focuses 
on the formal setting of the desk office, while paying little attention to the role of other 'places' in shaping 
the administrative process. See for an interesting Study on local bureaucracy which focusses only on the 
formal settng of the desk office, Raby 1978). 
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must say that the view that resulted was quite revealing, as it appeared that the 
administrative process was much less structured than I expected. In fact, I learnt that 
administrative life consisted of rather trivial issues and situations, and that formal rules 
were only referred to in the cases where the administrator had to enforce his authority. 
Organisational problems and interpersonal relations 
The issue of borrowing motorbikes is illustrative of an organizational problem which led 
to recurrent interpersonal problems. One eternal problem for Neguev officials was the 
lack of transport, until three motor bikes were procured. They were assigned to the 
social worker (Mario Green), the forestry extensionist (James Gordon) and to the 
pejibaye palm8 extensionist (Ernesto Gamba). The others travelled in cars with drivers 
either because they were Heads of agricultural development programmes or because 
they had no driving licence. Motor bikes were subject to different rules than cars as 
they were assigned personally. This meant that the officials could take them to their 
house and that there was less control as to their use. There were no clear rules 
concerning their use over the weekends or in the evenings. 
It was no surprise that these motor bikes became a very valuable resource, both 
for work and for activities of a more personal character. Thus, small irritations would 
arise between officials concerning their use. Borrowing arrangements were common 
and they were made without the knowledge of their superiors (Hugo Paz and Fernando 
Campos). A case in point was the social worker who would often complain that 
colleagues borrowed his motor bike and did not comply with the time conditions he set, 
the motor bike would often be returned with some small damage. However, it struck 
me that he always lent it again when requested by his colleagues. I supposed that he 
wanted to secure their solidarity this way. 
Another field of dissatisfaction concerned what was perceived as 'the arbitrary 
character of policy'. Some activities were regarded as useless by the front-line workers. 
For example, at a given moment the officials were instructed to carry out a 
questionnaire on three different settlements, two of which were not easily accessible. 
The objective was to gather data on settler families in order to design a housing-
programme. The task, however, was far from easy. Settlers were not easy to find for 
various reasons. Some spent a large proportion of the year picking coffee in other 
areas, as their farms only produced for home consumption. In fact, many settlers in 
these remote settlements see their property as an investment and survive by combining 
activities on the farm and in other locations. Besides, title on the land had in most 
cases not been legally secured according to the IDA law. The questionnaire, thus, 
became a rather wearisome exercise, as it could take hours to reach a farm, only to 
find the owner not at home, and if he was, they were received with suspicion. The 
social worker would be usually in charge of coordinating these activities, but Mario 
Green could see no point to it. He argued that the questionnaire was far too complex 
and lengthy and was not suited to the local circumstances of settlers. Moreover, he 
saw this as a typical example of unnecesary expenditure and lack of confidence in 
front-level workers' ability to find suitable ways to produce information. 
As argued, there was also a general discontent among the field workers 
concerning the organization of their work. Work activities were little structured and 
much freedom was allowed to them to fill in tasks as they liked. This resulted in a 
*The pejibaye palm is commercially interesting for its palm heart: 
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situation 
Rodriguez 
"at 
are 
characterized by few work incentives and no reward system. As Gabriel 
the maize extensionist argued, 
Neguev there is no stimulus. If you get promoted it is because of your political 
connections, not because of your capabilities. Successes at the technical level are 
always claimed by the chief. For example, when presentations have to be made 
about the goals achieved by the Regie nal Office it is always the chief who does it. 
There is anyway no acknowledgement of your role". 
Ethnic contradictions surfaced now and then in the administrative domain. However, 
some Nid stronger feeling in this respect than others. One official who openly 
complained to me of racism was James Gordon, a black extensionist in charge of the 
reforestation programme and cocoa assistant. On a trip to the Tierragrande settlement 
James Gordon, Mario Green, who is also black, and I had an unusually open 
conversation over the matter. It all bega|n when James Gordon started inquiring about 
race relations in Holland. Reflecting on Cpsta Rica he observed, 
white Costa Ricans are very racist. [f one black does anything wrong all blacks 
blamed. You must be careful thiit they do not humiliate you (que no se lo 
monten). For that reason I don't allow them to make jokes about me in my 
presence. Maybe you have noticed that I am always provoking people. I am like 
..The white officials in Neguev pre also racists. To begin with they are not 
from the Atlantic zone and do not really understand what is going on here... If you 
wa it to test what I tell you you should travel with them in a car when there is no 
bla:k in it, and remark that James is a vicious negro. I tell you, they will start 
tailing ill about negroes in general. In recent times there are many stories about 
smill girls who are raped. By luck no black has been jailed for such an act, 
otherwise we would all be linched". 
However, not all the black officials had such strong feelings about the subject. The 
assistant (agrarista), Moisés, would not acknowledge it. The social worker would 
claim that racism was in part the result of ignorance and that at any rate he did not feel 
intimidated by it. 
Institutional struggles and the administrative process 
It took some time before I was able to gather any indications that several political 
struggles had played an important role in what I perceived as low motivation and lack 
of commitment of the officials, as some of them started referring to these when 
explaining the evolution of the agricultural development programmes. These political 
greatly influenced the development of certain administrative practices at the 
Regional Office. 
Soon I learnt that Fernando Campos, the Settlement Head and recently Regional 
Director, got that position thanks to the current General Manager of the IDA and ex-
034 Programme Manager, Don Roberto Arcos (see Chapter 2). Fernando Campos was 
considered by many, especially the non-native officials as an authoritarian character. 
This showed in his overall management style and attitudes towards them and the 
farmers. Illustrative in this respect are] the comments by the extensionist Gabriel 
Rodrigue;:. When I asked him to describe! Campos' style he answered that he was very 
inflexible, always convinced of being in the right and unwilling to begin a dialogue with 
people holding different views. Interestingly, he added that this was not an 
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idiosyncratic feature of his chief but that it was a characteristic of a new group of 
administrators led by Don Roberto Arcos. He also commented that there was an 
opposing group, more flexible and intelligent and with a more participative style which 
was headed by Jesús Chavez, the Head of the Credit Fund. According to him, some of 
the officials in the office felt close to this group. For that reason some of them had 
been transferred against their will in the past. These were often the best officials. One 
of them was Pablo, a former Credit Supervisor, who was particularly committed to his 
work and to the settlers, and who during his stay had established an excellent 
relationship with most farmers. The reason for his departure, he argued, was both 
personal and political. Personal because Fernando Campos could not tolerate someone 
who was so popular, especially a Credit Supervisor in charge of taking decisions as to 
credit delivery and return payment. As Gabriel Rodriguez put it, "Fernando surely 
thought that Pablo was digging his grave". 
This clash was also related to institutional politics since it was the reflection of a 
wider and longlasting conflict at the level of the entire institution. It concerned a 
conflict between Jesús Chavez, and the IDA manager Roberto Arcos and Fernando 
Campos, Regional Director for the Atlantic zone (see Chapter 1 ). The upshot was that 
the regional office was clearly divided into two factions. The agrarista (Moisés Knight) 
and the native extensionists supported Fernando Campos, whereas the Credit Officials 
and most non-native extensionists operated in a tenous modus vivendi with him. It 
must be mentioned that the conflict between Fernando Campos and the transferred 
supervisor, Pablo, ocurred while the funding organization, USAID, was exerting a lot of 
pressure to disburse the credit funds. 
It is pertinent to look in more detail at this conflict at the Regional Office because 
it clearly shows that the administrative process is embedded in wider institutional 
struggles. When I had heard about the past conflict with Pablo, the former Credit 
Supervisor, I sought for any signals of political commitment on his part, especially 
because UPAGRA leaders would tell me that they used to have good conversations 
with him and that he showed much interest in their views. They supposed that his 
transfer was due to fear by Fernando Campos that he was becoming too progressive. 
Surprisingly, I did not find much evidence of political commitment on the part of Pablo, 
quite to the contrary. Mario Green, the social worker, who himself was very active in 
politics and had much knowledge of local and party politics described Pablo as a-
political, and explained the conflict in terms of institutional struggles. Later I learnt that 
this particular struggle concerned the implementation of the credit delivery approach 
propounded by the 034 IRDP Programme. 
Almost at the end of the research I had a meeting with Pablo, who had recently 
been promoted to Head of the Unit of Analysis and Supervision of the Credit Fund in 
San José. Not surprisingly, Pablo evaded all references to past conflicts in Neguev, 
between the Regional Office and the Credit Fund. At the same time he had a distinctive 
explanation for the problems of extension and credit delivery in the 034 Programme, in 
terms of the failure to apply a particular model of credit delivery. 
According to this model credit should function as an instrument in the hands of 
the técnico in his efforts to introduce modern technology, the latter being the real 
objective of the Credit Fund. This approach was being promoted at the time by the BID 
(the Interamerican Development Bank) after it had been successfully applied in the 
USA. It entailed that credit be extended for development purposes and not on a 
commercial basis. In this view, the técnico in his role of change agent was the person 
responsible for inducing within the settler a shift from a traditional mentality towards a 
modern one. Pablo agreed with this approach and emphasized that a necessary 
condition for this was that the técnico should have at his/her disposition a technological 
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package to offer to the producer. This, in his view, was precisely what was lacking in 
the 034 Programme. Originally an attempt had been made to apply a farming systems 
approach entailing the design of individual farm development plans, but due to different 
policy priorities on the part of the Regional Office the original approach was not 
implemented and the plan of developing differentiated technological packages was 
forgotten. 
Analysis 
The picture that emerges of social interaction between front-line workers then, is one 
that is characterized by little solidarity and unity, as the group seems to be torn apart 
by various contradictions, according to administrative function, commitment to some 
institutional faction, ethnic or residential background, etc. 
So far we see that front-line workers are engaged in a lot of gossiping and 
speculation, that they feel that their efforts are not appreciated enough by their 
superiors, that they are to some extent divided along ethnic and task-lines, that they 
quarrel about the use of cars, etc. Yet, we see also that they complain of not being 
given the possibility to concentrate on the really important issues in the settlement. 
They find many of their tasks redundant, and some of them have distinct views about 
how the settlement should be administered. In short, administrative life appeared to 
consist of a multiplicity of everyday, apparently trivial problems and issues. 
Yet this provided the context in which a large number of important decisions 
were made as to who receives credit and who not, about how problems over land-
adjudication would be dealt with, etc. The way such decisions were made appeared to 
be quite arbitrary to me as no clear criteria existed, for example, for allocating credit. 
Furthermore, it appeared that one central component of the IRDP approach, the design 
of individual farm development plans together with the design of an appropriate 
technological package was not carried out. 
3.4 The Model of the 'Client' as an Element in the Ideology of 
Intervention 9 
It struck me when talking with the front-line workers, that reference was always made 
to a particular, very negative, set of views of the farmer: as an individual who was not 
commercially-minded, not entrepreneurial, not capable of running a farm. Indeed, in 
spite of their divergences and dissatisfactions, and of the feelings that their work was 
not much valued, they all shared this way of talking of the beneficiary when dealing 
with everyday service delivery issues, in what was basically a form of labelling. It has 
already been argued that the social background of front-line workers did not differ 
substantially from that of settlers. I now argue that the the above-mentioned negative 
conception of the beneficiary was a central element in what I designated an 
intervention ideology, which reflected in labelling practices. Next, I contend that 
labelling was not a local invention, but that it was a local adaptation of the USAID 
T h e term 'model of the client', has been coined by myself. The jdea can be traced to an analogy Don 
Roberto Arcos once made when arguing that IDA officials should treat settlers in a similar way as the 
personnel of a clinic treat patients; that is as someone who has to be treated and cured. Thus in Don 
Roberto's view IDA officials should treat settlers as clients who have to be provided with all necessary 
means to become an entrepreneurial farmer. 
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planners' model of the 'client' by front-line workers and administrators. To that end I 
describe how the model of the 'client' was fabricated by USAID planners as a result of 
their problematization of prevailing institution-client relations in the IDA, and how it was 
appropriated by bureaucrats at the regional and local levels. 
The genealogy of the model of the 'client' 
As argued, one major objective of the 034 Programme was that of strengthening the 
operational capacity of the IDA. In the view of USAID planners this could only happen if 
the 'institutional culture' in Costa Rica was changed. Thus, John Smith, the USAID 
advisor to the 034 Programme, argued that political clientelism was a fundamental 
problem in Costa Rica as it generated patterns of transactions between politicians, who 
used state institutions in order to obtain electoral support, and groups of beneficiaries. 
As John Smith argued, the political use of institutional resources thwarted their 
effective utilization for development purposes. This emphasis on institutional efficiency 
and administrative reform, it must be noted, did not mean that USAID planners did not 
realize that some mode of social control in rural areas, directed against organisations 
such as UPAGRA, was required. 
In a context of increasing land scarcity and budgetary constraints the agrarian 
problematic came to be perceived, under the influence of USAID, more and more as a 
problem of effective institutional intervention, in which administrative reform and 
decentralization were viewed as central to a 'modern' approach to land reform. This 
entailed that the solution to the problem of landlessness and rural unrest was conceived 
by USAID in terms of the 'depoliticization' of institutional developmental activities, 
rather than in terms of the need to accommodate oppositional political groupings within 
the mainstream political system. 
The problem then was conceptualized by USAID planners as follows; how to 
establish a type of institution-client relationship which would eschew the customary 
patterns of political clientelism while maintaining a certain capacity to exert social 
control on particular populations, such as politically motivated squatters. The answer 
was that of instituting a mode of institution-client relations in which the beneficiary 
was viewed as an individual with certain rights, but also with distinctive obligations 
towards the state. In contrast with the practice of political clientelism these rights and 
obligations did not entail a political transaction, but a commitment to a particular 
pattern of smallholder 'development'. Thus central to this model of the 'client' was the 
endowing of the relationship between the institution and the beneficiary with a 
distinctive institutional, as against a political, significance. The client was treated as an 
individual who had the right to state services and goods in return for his commitment 
to, and active participation, in his transformation into an entrepreneurial farmer. 
The essence of the model of the 'client' was that s/he established a relationship 
with the IDA as an individual, not as a member of a larger group. This for the IDA was 
a very different policy from the previous one of engaging in negotiations with organised 
pressure groups. Hence, by allocating resources such as credit to individuals only, and 
refusing to engage in negotiations with groups, the power of organisations such as 
UPAGRA was undermined. 
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As for the 034 IRD Programme the individualization of the relationship between 
the IDA and clients was reflected in the following sets of activities. 
1. A beneficiary selection system geared to choosing potentially entrepreneurial 
farmers. 
2. A system of guided extension by which the beneficiary received credit on an 
individual basis. 
3. A focus on individual farm development plans. 
As we will see in this chapter and Chapter 6, through these individualization practices 
all kinds of negotiations with UPAGRA could be avoided. 
Next, I discuss how this model of the 'client' was legitimized by a distinctive 
reading of Costa Rican agrarian history. Such a historical interpretation can be found in 
the programme documents of the 034 Programme. 
The 'rural democratic model' of Costa Rican agrarian history 
Gudmundson (1984, 1989) has coined the concept of 'the rural democratic model' of 
Costa Rica in order to describe a particular representation of Costa Rican history as a 
country which until the advent of capitalism lacked widespread agrarian conflict due to 
a homogenous peasantry and the absence of typical Latin American latifundia. In brief, 
through this model a representation of Costa Rican agrarian structure is produced as 
being composed of ethnically homogenic, 'white' peasants with essentially democratic 
traditions in what was until the advent of the coffee economy an egalitarian society. 
This is in contradistinction with other Latin American countries where, according to this 
representation, an inegalitarian agrarian structure existed bolstered by highly 
authoritarian types of state-peasant relations. 
Gudmundson, in scrutinizing this thesis, extensively shows that there is no 
evidence for supporting this 'rural democratic model' of Costa Rican history. Instead, 
he draws a much more complex picture of Costa Rican agrarian history, characterized 
by a longlasting struggle for land in which a peasantry and rural elites were involved. 
Peasant political activity in present times, then, rather than the result of disruption 
caused by agricultural modernization can better be viewed in terms of wider historical 
processes of rural struggle which resulted in a complex pattern of class relationships. 
The 'issue of landlessness', then is a far more complex one than that of giving land 
through institutional means to the landless, in order to ensure their commitment to 
democracy. Instead, it involves intervening in an extended history of rural struggle. In 
short, land reform is a political problem in which the state, a peasantry and a variety of 
large landholders - fruit multinationals, cattle ranchers - are involved. 
Interestingly, the 'rural democratic model' of Costa Rican history prevails in the 
work of Seligson, who is regularly quoted in the 034 Programme documents as an 
expert on Costa Rican land reform, and we see that in the 034 programe documents 
this view is readily taken over. Thus Seligson (1980) is extensively quoted in the 034 
Programme project paper called 'Agrarian settlement and productivity' as "showing that 
until the early 1800's and the rise of coffee as the country's chief cash crop, Costa 
Rica was a country of independent, self-sufficient, yeoman farmers with little class 
stratification". 
This 'rural democratic model' leads to the following, more or less explicit, 
understanding of land reform in institutional terms. Peasants in Costa Rica (in contrast 
to other Latin American countries) are, by nature, democratic, peaceful and law-
abiding, as long as they have access to land. However, due to the expansion of 
capitalism in the nineteenth century persistent landlessness has become a common 
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feature of the Costa Rican agrarian structure, to the extent that it has become a danger 
to democracy in Costa Rica. In order to preserve the democratic character of Costa 
Rica, land reform has to be undertaken. Yet, land reform should target the 'real 
peasants' of Costa Rica, not those speculators who are ready to sell out after having 
squatted land, in the process becoming the instruments of politically subversive forces. 
Furthermore, land reform should not become a political instrument in the hands of 
ambitious politicians. This would only endanger the future of 'democracy'. To that end 
an effective land reform institute is necessary and a good beneficiary selection system 
is a critical element for its success. 
In this way land reform as a particular type of state intervention in specific arenas 
of rural struggle is to be depoliticized. 
The model of the 'client' in 034 Programme documents 
It is not surprising, then, that the agrarian problem in Costa Rica is conceptualized in 
the 034 Programme documents in terms of the effectivity of particular types of 
institution client relations. Thus it is argued that in the past IDA-client relations were 
permeated by 'paternalist and clientelist practices'. In effect, in the project document of 
the 034 Programme we see that the farmer is referred to as a 'client', which prior to 
the 034 Programme was not the case. We see also that the term 'client' appears in 
different forms, as when a classification of the clientele is made, or a description of the 
'total client pool' is given, or as when reference is made to particular types of 
institutional-client relationships. Paternalism, is mentioned as a danger which has to be 
be combatted through the 'rational choice of a clientele' (see project paper "Agrarian 
Settlement and Productivity"10). 
This focus on institution-client relations is also apparent in the explanations which 
are put forward for the 'failure' of IDA'S colonization policy in the sixties, and 
particularly in the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica. Thus we read in the above-mentioned 
project paper the following statement in which reference is made to the Bataan colony, 
"It is important to remember that, whatever the deficiencies that persist on the 
older colonies, they derived from a misconception in ITCO at the time of their 
establishment which the present project is explicitly attempting to avoid, that is, 
the belief that colonization in remote areas without reasonable access and minimal 
infrastructure is feasible and cheap. It is neither and, still worse, led ITCO to an 
economically and institutionally impossible paternalism that is as burdensome and 
unappealing to the institution as it is frustrating and anti-developmental for its 
clients" (Annex II.D. p. 20). 
However, in my opinion, this view is not only simplistic but it also leads to a self-
serving explanation of the supposed failure of earlier attempts to bring about 
colonisation in the Atlantic zone. Bataan was formerly a plantation where squatting by 
ex-plantation workers took place after the UFCO retreated from the Atlantic zone. It 
was converted into a 'colony' by ITCO in order to maintain social control in the area, 
and possibly to experiment with new modes of social control, by encouraging 
individuals from other areas in the country to settle in the Atlantic zone. It could be 
argued, then, that if 'paternalism' existed, it was not because of a 'misconception' 
concerning the most efficacious way of effecting colonization, but is an element of a 
10This 'project paper' was published in 1980 as an unclassified document. It provides a description and 
appraisal of the project as well as detailed project analyses. 
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very conflictive history of relations between the state, plantation labourers and 
peasants. 
In summarizing, the model of the 'client', as I define it, is a particular way of 
conceiving of the farmer, as someone who has to be serviced and provided with the 
necessary conditions for becoming an 'entrepreneurial' or commercially-oriented farmer, 
in this view the farmer should be treated as an individual with distinctive rights and 
obligations. This model, or oonception of the farmer, is the contrary of what is 
commonly designated in the literature on patron-client relationships, relationships 
through which 'clients' become the followers of political entrepreneurs in return for 
security and resources. The model of the 'client', as conceived by USAID planners was, 
in fact, geared to combatting exactly such relationships. It was a response to what was 
perceived as the over-politiziced functioning of the IDA in which a pattern of 
'paternalistic' relations had developed between front-line workers and settlers in order 
to combat the leftist peasant organizations. In short, the model of the 'client' implies 
the introduction of techniques of individualization in a highly politicized situation. 
Together with this new conception of the settler, huge amounts of credit became 
available in the 034 Programme to be distributed among the farmers. 
In the remainder of the chapter I argue that this model of the 'client' worked out 
in a rather special way in thd process of implementation. By front-line workers and 
administrators the model was endowed with a different, 'local' meaning, with the result 
that it became an element within a local ideology of intervention. The model of the 
'undeserving client', in effect, w a s employed by the Settlement Head (Fernando 
Campos) in order to force settlers to comply with the IDA policy. For the front-line 
workers the model of the 'undeserving client' became a tool for explaining the 
contradictions of state intervention as well as a 'labelling device'. The transformed 
model of the '(undeserving) client', then, became at the local level an instrument of 
social control. 
The model of the 'client' transformed in the field 
In this section I will present a short account of a meeting between four settlers, two 
IDA front-line workers (Mario Green, the social worker and trie pejibaye extensionist 
Gamba) and three officials of the IMAS, the Institute of Social Welfare. It took place in 
the extensionists' room within the regional office. The purposo of the meeting was to 
introduce a new agricultural programme which would be financed by the IMAS and 
monitored by IDA extensionists. The account is interesting as it shows how the 
ideology of intervention operates within the administrative domain. Although the 
principal officials in this account do not belong to the IDA there| are strong similarities in 
the way in which officials from both institutes approach settlers. This is manifested in 
their emphasis on training and education directed to individuals, and the expectation 
that their attention should be reciprocated by compliance to a particular conception of 
institution-client relations. It should be mentioned that the settlers present at the 
meeting were selected by the] IDA front-line workers, and that they, therefore, were 
considered cooperative 'clients'. 
The meeting starts at three o'clock. After having been introduced by the Neguev 
social worker one of the IMAS officials begins to explain the reason for their presence. 
They want to set up a pineapple project. However, as he argues, they, as officials of 
the IMAS, are more interested in the social and family aspects of development projects 
than in the technical ones. Thus, it has been decided that the Neguev extension service 
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will take charge of the technical supervision and that they will provide training on 
financial management, the establishment of a division of labour in the household and 
the use of profits. One problem, however, is that of the 9 settlers who applied for the 
project five were not present. Three sent a note mentioning that they could not be 
present and two just did not show up. The leading I MAS functionary becomes angry 
and starts complaining about the lack of responsibility and discipline on the part of the 
settlers, of their reluctance to cooperate with institutional efforts to abolish poverty. 
The IDA social worker intervenes and indicates that only two did not send a message 
and that they might have been incapable to do so because the distance from their 
farms to the regional office is very large. Furthermore, the roads are bad as it has been 
raining much lately and it is harvest time. Yet, the IMAS social worker is not convinced 
and stresses again the necessity to enhance settlers sense of responsability as the only 
way to overcome poverty. He relates about their problems in reaching poor 
communities. 
The settlers do not react, neither do they seem to be very impressed. Next, 
another IMAS official, a female social worker, starts to explain the conditions that have 
to be fulfilled in order to become a beneficiary, it strikes me that when questions are 
asked the leading IMAS official answers. Some confusion arises about the conditions of 
repayment. The social workers seem to elude the question. The settlers, who by now 
have become more concerned, demand a clear answer. Finally the principal IMAS 
official comments that they are not especially interested in the devolution of the credit. 
"Then it is no credit, but a gift", clarifies a settler. The leading IMAS-official answers 
irritated, 
"look, we are not a bank, so we are not interested in financial efficiency. What we 
aim is to create the conditions for you to become self-sufficient agricultural 
producers. Thus, our criteriae for evaluating the project is not whether you pay it 
back or hot, but whether the income that is generated by this new activity is 
recycled into productive activities, and whether profits are used in ways that are 
advantageous to the entire family. Our role as social workers will be to instruct you 
in the use of the credit. This project, thus, has predominantly a training function. In 
addition, we will make efforts to provide some information on marketing 
opportunities". 
The settlers then take the initiative and start asking questions about the amount of 
money that is being offered. They are interested to know whether it is below or above 
the amount that according the bank is necessary for an hectare of pineapple. The IMAS 
officials assert that the only thing they know for sure is that the crop area will not be 
larger than half an hectare. They think that a substantial contribution will be expected 
from the settlers in terms of labour, but that is something that they have to discuss 
with the Regional Director of the IDA, Fernando Campos. This clarification, however, is 
not enough for the settlers. In the beginning it was only one who took a critical attitude 
but now it is the four of them. The oldest one wants to know exactly whether it is a 
gift or not, and what the market perspectives are. Moreover, he doubts whether the 
project will be profitable. He argues, 
"probably you do not realize that it cost me a lot of valuable time to come here, 
time that I could have used productively. We really appreciate that you want to 
help us with this project, but for us it is important to talk specifics. We want to 
know how we are going to profit from this project". 
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Mario Green, intervenes at this juncture and argues that this was a preparatory 
meeting, that the project still has to be designed. The extensionist agrees with him 
entirely. This is the first time that he gives his opinion. As it is almost five o'clock a 
decision is made to meet again 
The I MAS leading social 
to discuss the details. 
worker then commends the settlers to convince 
other chosen beneficiaries to attend the next meeting. For, 
"you must understand that 
also should have a community 
solidarity. So, please take 
the 
these projects do not only aim at helping individuals but 
effect. That means mat it should unite you, foster 
that the others are present". care 
And in presenting another argument, 
"you should also realize that we have a lot of work to do. Presently we are 
working with a lot of groups, from Sarapiqui (to the north of the atlantic zone 
neighbouring with Panama) to the frontier with Panama, some of them with a high 
level of consciousness about their problems, and others, such as the Indians in the 
Talamanca, (an area in the south of the Atlantic zone), with very special needs. 
Our time is scarce, so ft is necessary that beneficiaries organize themselves in 
order to increase the efficiency of our activities". 
And he proceeds to talk about i:he large demand that exists for IMAS projects. Then he 
stresses the value of being responsible, with respect to the family, the community, the 
institutions. He finishes with the following statement, "thanks to your responsibility 
you will be able to help yourself and by helping yourself you will help us". 
At last everyone left after shaking hands. I followed the entire meeting from a 
distance while pretending to work with the files. I was rather surprised with respect to 
the way the meeting had evolved. I could not imagine that these settlers who, 
supposedly, were just able to survive under marginal circumstances could be so critical 
with regard to a potential gift. Although they had been selected by the extensionist 
and the social worker their attitude towards the officials was not really one of great 
respect and gratitude. On the contrary, they looked rather suspicious and calculating. In 
some respect it conformed to Fernando Campos' description of the settlers as 
manipulatory. But how did their concern with economic profitability fit in the image he 
depicted of them as traditional and with no sense for entrepreneurship? 
The model of the client and credit delivery 
In providing evidence of the absence of a 'farmers' entrepreneurial mentality, one 
extensionist referred to a questionnaire that was conducted under a selected sample of 
settlers on credit utilization. One of the questions was, "what is the difference between, 
the good and bad use of credi:?" It appeared that all of them replied that as long as 
credit was not spent on liquor and women the use was good. He pointed out that no 
reference was made in their reply to the need to use the credit rationally and of not 
using it for purposes other than those for which it had been extended (such as 
consumption or other production activities). Similarly, he argued that the settlers had 
no notion of the criminal nature of credit deflection. The argument then was that since 
peasants acted 'irrationally' they had to be further educated. Yet, he found it 
depressing that after so many years of attempting to teach the settlers to use credit in 
a rational way they had achieved so little. 
However, a better explanation in accounting for the outcome of this questionnaire 
would be that credit was distributed on such a large scale and with so little supervision 
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in previous years that settlers had no time to develop much 'discipline' in the use of 
credit. Interestingly, when I confronted the Credit Supervisor with this explanation he 
would agree. As he put it, the need to accelerate the distribution of credit, due to 
pressure from USAID, might have been one important factor in explaining why settlers 
had not learned to handle credit. 
The ten commandments of the 'real entrepreneurial farmer' 
The model of the client reflected on the ways in which front-line differentiated between 
good and bad farmers. One standard measure in such a practice was the model of the 
independent and entrepreneurial yeoman of the central plateau. Deviations from this 
model were seen as pathological and originating in a deleterious way of life. Thus it 
was common to explain the problems of 034 Programme in the settlement by arguing 
that alcoholism and lack of commitment and discipline among settlers were a major 
problem. On the basis of extensive conversations with front-line workers about how an 
entrepreneurial farmer should be, I was able to discern the following rules that such a 
farmer should observe11: 
1) He should live on the farm, and not engage in off farm work outside Neguev 
2) He should not grow traditional crops such as maize 
3) He should show the devotion and commitment of a 'real farmer' 
4) He should show respect to IDA officials 
5) He should follow the advise of the extensionists 
6) He should be imaginative and be able to improvise 
7) He should not be an ex-plantation worker 
8) He should not drink 
9) He should not participate in activities organised by leftist groups 
10) He should not be an evangelical (evangelicals spend too much time in the church) 
In fact, these ten rules, or commandments, which the settler should follow in order to 
conform to the front-line workers' views of what a 'real' entrepreneurial farmer was, 
composed a powerful labelling device. 
Given the failure of the agricultural development programmes in Neguev, and the 
fact that no more than 10% of the farmers were able to derive a sufficient income from 
the farm without having to engage in off-farm work in some banana plantation or other 
farm, it was quite impossible for farmers to conform to this model. Moreover, the only 
three settler families in Neguev who according to the front-line workers did conform to 
this model, and who could thus be considered real entrepreneurial farmers, had never 
received IDA credit nor extension12. On the other hand, those settlers who were 
viewed as the best ones in Neguev did not conform to this model either; of the three, 
one was an ex-plantation worker, one was an occasional alcoholic, and another a 
Jehovah's Witness. 
"A female in the front-line workers' view was not capable to run a farm. Women who did not have 
grown-up sons who could take care of the farm had difficulties in obtaining title to the land (see Chapter 4 
for a case of a divorced female beneficiary who fights for her rights). 
, 2 I do not want to go into the analysis of why the programme ended a failure. It suffices to mention 
that to a large extent the soils in Neguev are not suited for agriculture. In addition major errors were made 
concerning extension and technology transfer. 
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Ironically, the integrated rural development programme, instead of creating wealthy 
smallholders, had created a pool of poor, indebted and dependent clientele. Settlers, 
then, were labelled, virtually by definition, non-entrepreneurial or traditional farmers. In 
this way they got the blame for the failure of the 034 Programme. But labelling had 
also a more practical function ais it became a device for excluding 'troublesome' settlers 
or problemáticos. Indeed, a settler being labelled a problemático signified that it would 
become quite difficult for him to gain access to credit. 
The model of the 'undeserving client' 
A question which I want to adress now is 'how is this labelling model related to the 
model of the 'client' which was introduced by USAID'? To recall, this model conceived 
of the settler/beneficiary as a client who had to be provided with the necessary 
conditions - land, credit and an appropriate technological package - to become an 
entrepreneurial farmer. Yet, I want to show that this model of the 'client', which 
originally was meant to depolarize institution-client relations, was endowed with a 
definitely political meaning at the level of implementation, and that it became an 
instrument in the hands of the local administrators13 for fighting 'undeserving clients'. 
As we noted, the 034 Programme had two main goals that of providing settlers 
with the necessary conditions to become commercially minded settlers and that of 
overcoming what was perceived as a politically delicate situation in Neguev. Indeed, it 
can be argued that one major contradiction in the 034 Programme lay in the fact that it 
was designed to confront a very conflictive situation in the Atlantic zone by combining 
a policy of careful beneficiary selection and an approach geared to transforming settlers 
into entrepreneurial farmers in order to fight the influence of leftist organisations such 
as UPAGRA. At the same timis a large number of UPAGRA sympathisers passed the 
beneficiary selection system. This caused a major problem to front-line administrators 
which can be formulated in the following terms, 'how to transform unruly clients, such 
as UPAGRA followers, into entrepreneurial farmers'? We will next see that Fernando 
Campos viewed this as a contradiction in terms. Consequently the model of the 'client' 
was transformed into a model of the 'undeserving client'. 
The model of the 'undeserving client' as an instrument for exercising social control 
Fernando Campos had a distinctive theory of how a peasant should look. This 
conception of the beneficiary was not unique to him, though, and later I learned that it 
was quite characteristic of many administrators in the area. On this subject he once 
confided to me. 
"If you want to tell a real farmer from someone who is not, look straight into his 
eyes. A farmer will lower his sight, will become shy, for he is not accustomed to 
dealing with people from the city, they are humble, speak with respect. A banana 
worker is something else, direct in his conduct, insolent. That is the result of the 
plantation culture and the 
negative aspects of everything1 
, 3When referring to 'local administrators' 
Implementation Manager of the 034 
ideology of the unions which always stresses the 
I mean the Settlement Head in Neguev and the former 
programme. 
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According to him the union leaders in the plantations would tell the plantation workers 
that they were poor because others were rich, that they were stupid because others 
were intelligent, that they were ugly because others were beautiful. In his view 
plantation workers developed an inferiority complex which expressed itself through 
envy. And he warned me, 
"If you meet them they will try to mislead you and tell you stories about their 
extreme poverty. But the truth is that they are ex-banana workers, people who 
cannot manage a farm autonomously. They are accustomed to receiving everything 
from the boss, a cheque every month, a house with water and electricity. They 
dress well and drink and do terrible things to their wives and children. It is really 
awful. In return they work a few hours, from 6 to 11 in the morning. They have a 
lot of free time. They become conceited, rebellious, have no respect for authority. 
Instead a real farmer works the entire day. And if necessary also at night. "If the 
cow is sick he will not sleep at all". 
This 'cultural problem' had in Fernando Campos' view played a central role in the 034 
Programme. He commented that the squatters had received beautiful schools and 
meeting centers, excellent roads, even a housing programme had been initiated. Yet 
they had never shown any gratitude. Hence he complained that "unfortunately that is 
the human material we have to work with in the settlements". At the same time, he 
had a clear theory of settlement's growth and development in terms of stages, with a 
strong social Darwinist bent. Once he explained to me, 
"You see in Neguev like in so many other settlements that after the political 
situation has been normalized, a mechanism sets in of natural selection. Settlers 
who are not real farmers are forced to sell out because they accumulate debts. 
Although they receive credit and extension, many of them, maybe a majority, 
have not the ability to develop the enterprise. So they are forced to sell out. Others 
take their place, often people with more resources. They are obliged to take on the 
debts their predecessors incurred. So they are better motivated to develop the 
farm. In fact they have a more entrepreneurial outlook. The result is that after 
some years a majority of the original population will have disappeared. Only then 
will the conditions be fullfilled for achieving the objectives of the institution. This 
process is irreversible, it is a law of nature. The only thing we can do is to alleviate 
the lot of those who suffer most". 
In Fernando Campos' view the problem was that peasant unions such as UPAGRA 
targeted their actions to a particular type of individual, who due to his plantation 
mentality was not able to become an entrepreneurial farmer and therefore, was prone 
to engage into clientelistic relationship with radical organisations and eventually with 
the IDA. The question as to 'how to transform unruly clients into model beneficiaries' 
was viewed by him as a contradiction in terms. Such 'human material' was not fit to 
become entrepreneurial farmers. In fact, we see in the case of Fernando Campos that 
he sustained a genetic conception of the farmer which, it must be emphasized, was not 
shared by the front-line workers. 
It can be argued that the above-mentioned contradiction of state intervention (the 
'normalization' effect vis-a-vis the client-transformation goal) formed the backcloth in 
which the clash between Fernando and Pablo took place. Credit, as we saw, came to 
be viewed by Fernando Campos as a tool for undermining the social basis of UPAGRA. 
In this context, attempts such as those undertaken by Pablo, to apply an individually-
oriented approach to credit delivery were seen with much suspicion by Fernando, the 
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more as he suspected that the credit officials were using their position to establish a 
clientele. 
The upshot, then, was that for Fernando Campos the model of the 'client' was 
transformed into a core element in an ideology of intervention which was meant to 
confront 'unruly clients'. In effect, the model of the 'client' was transformed by front-
line administrators from a device for depolitizicing institution-client relations into an 
essentially political instrument for marginalizing 'troublesome' beneficiaries. 
Next I want to show that the model of the 'undeserving client' was more than a 
cognitive construct intended to marginalize radical settlers. It is my argument that the 
model of the 'undeserving client' was part of an ideology of intervention which also 
included practices of labelling.! To that end I discuss the workings of this ideology of 
intervention as manifested in tpe front-line workers' dealings with beneficiaries' within 
the administrative domain. 
The model of the 'client' as a protective device 
With respect to the radical leftist settlers the model of the 'client' played an important, 
'protective', role. It should be noted that interaction between officials and radical 
settlers was rare and when it took place it was for the largest part in the field domain. 
Indeed, the técnicos or extensionists in charge of agricultural development programmes 
had evident difficulties to come to terms with the peasant union UPAGRA and would 
display a curious ambiguity n relation to them. In fact, two técnicos who had 
experienced problems with Fernando Campos, the Regional Director, due to their 
supposed involvement with UPAGRA people were the 'maize extensionist' Gabriel 
Rodriguez and Samuel Lozano, the extensionist in charge of the medicinal plants 
programme. 
When discussing the role of UPAGRA as a peasant union both técnicos would 
stress that they respected and even admired their efforts to defend the farmer's 
interests, and that they found it totally legitimate and even necessary that such an 
organization existed as they recognized that the IDA's interests were not necessarily 
the same as those of the settlers. They argued, however, that they did not agree with 
their means and their intransigent position. In fact, they were highly crtitical of their 
mode of operation. Thus Gabriol would argue, 
"UPAGRA has its own 
receive you in a very polite 
try to get information out 
on them. However, they 
are surprisingly friendly, 
They hope that the official 
they can transform the 
institute". 
ways of dealing with técnicos. When you visit them they 
manner, and by telling you a lot about themselves they 
of you. They are aware that you might write a bad report 
db not seem to mind. When they attend meetings they 
while seeking ways to critizice all the institute's ideas, 
will lose his temper in order to create a conflict, so that 
character of the meeting into one of a tribunal against the 
When referring to individual 
chapter a case study of the telcnico 
how this tension is manifested 
conceived of (ex)-UPAGRA act vists 
reference to those who had de sts 
Like other front-line workers 
UPAGRA leaders to repay their 
drinking habits and their smoking 
Gutierrez, one of the principal 
activists they were remarkably negative. In the next 
Samuel Lozano, will be presented and we will see 
in his style of work. Here we will examine how Gabriel 
in the practical context of his work, especially with 
Gabriel would account for the unwillingness of some 
maize debts by referring to personality failures, like 
of marihuana. A case in point was that of Porfirio 
UPAGRA leaders who a few years ago had requested 
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credit for maize. After the first harvest he paid the debts plus interests. The second 
harvest, however, proved to be problematic for Porfirio, and he did not repay the credit. 
He told Gabriel that due to heavy winds output was nil. Gabriel, however, considered 
that this had not been the case and that losses due to the winds were minimal. In his 
view Porfirio simply had not been applying the inputs given to him and had sold them. 
Gabriel saw this as a serious breach of trust, the more so as he had convinced 
Fernando Campos to give him the credit on the grounds that Porfirio had "cooled 
down" and left UPAGRA. He pointed to the fact that Porfirio after failing to pay back 
the credit again became involved in radical activities. 
This view of UPAGRA sympathizers as irresponsible settlers was general among 
the técnicos. Settlers who indulged in collective actions like marches and blockades 
could not be good farmers. In their view they were almost never at their farms, thus 
there was not much sense in visiting them. UPAGRA, in their view, channelled the 
feelings of frustration and dissatisfaction of settlers arising out of their personal 
inabilities. The extensionists, then, would select unproblematic settlers and not 
UPAGRA followers. This was evident in the case of the chili agricultural programme for 
which Samuel Lozano set out to select beneficiaries with a 'good record'. Only one 
UPAGRA follower, out of the 30, was selected, and Samuel Lozano recommended him 
to distance himself from UPAGRA and "look for better friends". 
It must be stressed that this fear of UPAGRA was in the case of most técnicos 
not so much due to a political stance but more an attempt to keep delicate political 
issues out of their direct relationship with settlers, for the técnicos were perfectly able 
to consider general explanations of settlers' life conditions in terms of a wider political 
framework. Yet, these explanations were of little use within the implementation 
context. Although officials would, outside the administrative domain, readily recognize 
the general validity of "radical" claims, such views were experienced as annoying 
within the day-to-day context of service delivery. 
3.5 Conclusion 
We have seen then that a model of the 'client' - or the model of the farmer as a client 
who has to be serviced and provided with a package in order to encourage him to 
become an entrepreneurial farmer - js used by three sets of_jjctoisJnJJhreediffering 
^_ways. For USAID it was an element In a strategy of depoTitizicing the functioning of the 
IDA and eradicating clientelistic and paternalistic politics. For the General Manager, Don 
Roberto Arcos, it was an element within a conceptualization of land reform which was 
meant to advance the implementation of the 034 Programme. For the front-line 
administrators, Fernando Campos, the model of the 'client' was used for combating the 
influence of leftist organisations such as UPAGRA. And finally, when the programme 
proved to be a disaster this model of the 'undeserving client' served as a 
'rationalization' for failure, and as a way for casting the blame onto the farmer. 
The model of the client, then, changes from being a core element within an 
attempt by planners to change the current pattern of client-institution relations 
into an element of an ideology of intervention which serves to conceal the 
contradictory and conflictive character of state intervention, which was reflected in, 
1) major errors made in design and implementation 
2) the impossibility to deny the political character of state intervention in a plantation 
area as the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica where resources such as land and capital are 
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monopolized by the banana transnational, and where state intervention serves as an 
instrument for social control. 
Thus the failure of the 034 Programme was ascribed to the fact that the settlers 
were hoT entrepreneurial janriers. In this way it was not necessary to inquire into the 
major errors in programme planning, implementation and in technological transfer. 
What then is the main theoretical conclusion of this chapter? We have seen a 
description of the administrative process as an intrinsically fragmented and conflictive 
reality in which a host of petty struggles take place. Yet, it is important to stress that it 
is precisely within this adminikratiye reality,.andjnjresjpjnse 
contlicrs~TFOTrr-iine workers a r l B j a n ^ 
louid see such an ideology not as an coherent set of beliefs which is imposed 
upon them, but as a set of beliefs and social practices which have differing effects in 
different social contexts. It has been argued that the ideology of intervention in Neguev 
encompassed a particular model of the '(undeserving) client', and practices of labelling. 
Among other things wq have seen that through the intervention ideology the 
worldjof the 'clients' was kept apart from thajqrgministrative life. This was the case 
aTsettiers were seen as clients who had to be serviced, and not as individuals who 
often shared the same local preoccupations of the officials. But the_ ideology _gf 
intervention was also instrumental in achieving quite practical effects such_js_ 
pTOecting^ront-lin¥~workers from 'troublesome' settlersTIt also~~served as a oulde~for 
selecting cooperative beneficiaries. We can, then, pinpoint five different ways in which 
the ideology of intervention worked: 
1) As achieving a neat separation between the administratiye_ajidjthe^elc^^ In 
this way front-line workers were insulated froifTthe conflictsTntne 'field'. 
2) As concealing the contradictions of state intervention by providing easy explanations 
for current an7T6ng"6ing problems concerning programme implementation. 
3) As a way of rationalizing programme faillira. Thus it was argued that the 034 
Programme was a failure due to the lack of an entrepreneurial mentality on the part of 
the settlers. The errors which 
of credit as an instrument of 
explaining programme failure. 
4) As a jyay^f_^ptect ing front-line 
ocurred during programme implementation, and the use 
social control, were concealed as major factors for 
_»rorkejrs_Jrom^^ 
Ugagristas who were out to politicize what was viewed by them as ^technical issues'. 
5) AVa way ot"sl5reefiHg°Tc^ '~ -
It should be noted that 1 and 2 refer to a particular way of talking about intervention 
and the 'client' in the administrative domain; 3 was a way of 'naturalizing' state 
intervention as a 'tecnical' and non-political activity; 4 and 5 comprise front-line 
workers' labelling practices which are useful for carrying out their work. 
In the second part of this book (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) I show how this 
intervention ideology is deconstructed by settlers in social interaction with front-line 
workers in the field domain. At the same time it will be argued that labelling practices 
can best be seen as negotiated practices between the bureaucracy and settlers, instead 
of as an 'objective process'. This is apparent when front-line workers have to legitimize 
their activities in the field. This is a major theme in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE FRAGMENTED LIFEWORLD OF THE IMPLEMENTOR: 
FRONT-LINE WORKERS' STYLES OF OPERATION 
4.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter the administrative process of the Neguev Regional Office was 
discussed, and already some personal characteristics of the incumbents have come to 
the fore. In addition various conflictive issues were discussed, as well as the role such 
issues play in the reproduction of what I denominated the model of the client. The local 
adaptation of this planners' construct by front-line workers and administrators, it* was 
argued, was reflected in modes of labelling and classification which became a central 
part of the ideology of intervention. It was also pointed out that such an ideology is not 
some kind of coherent set of conceptions imposed from the outside on front-line 
workers and which impairs them in recognizing the 'true' significance of their role as 
'agents of capitalist expansion and state centralisation'. On the contrary, I argued that 
such an intervention ideology is a pragmatic response to a set_pf conflicts and problems, 
which are pervasive within the 'a lm^^r lb f f l j ^a in , . and _9JLe_Qfter£oT"a quite trivial. 
cTfaTactefT^ " 
~Yet, like all ideologies, this ideology of intervention was partially true, in the 
sense that it corresponded to some of the experiences of front-line workers in the 
course of their work, and which were much commented upon by them. It was 
'ideological' in the sense that it served to simplify the complex reality of the non-
administrative setting. And, as I show in this chapter, front-line workers were often 
forced to acknowledge this, especially when encountering the everyday life reality of 
farmers in the field. In this chapter it is argued that an ideology of intervention besides 
comprising a model of the 'client'and labelling practices, includes practices of 
legitimization. Thus I concentrate on front-line workers' efforts to gain the trust of 
farmers or to enforce their compliance through other means, while legitimizing their 
actions as state representatives. To that effect I focus is on the client-official 
interface.1 
1See for a discussion of a number of notions which are central to this chapter, such as client-official 
interface, operational styles and lifeworld chapter 1 and 5. 
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On front-line worker's operational styles 
My aim in this chapter is that of analysing the differing wavs in which front-line 
workers internalize the ideology of intervention, while developing styles of operation. 
ThVsituation or tront-ine workers is quite unique in comparison to desk-front 
workers, since they are confronted (and may even participate) in their everyday 
functioning with different sots of social commitments: those of the institution, of 
organised peasant groups, o1 regional political movements, etc. Although they might 
subscribe to the ideals of onu or more of these groups, j t jsjnot possible for them_to 
adopt them as guiding principles in their work. In contrast to institutional managers 
who in developing an operational style strive to develop a general view for dealing with 
the political, institutional and social pressures they are subject to, front-line workers 
seldom achieve such a degree of consistency. In other words, a tensjgjijsrjaaias. 
between the various sets of principles and commitments thev hold to. The question, 
then, becomes, 'how do front-line workers develop ways to handle these conflicting 
demands, while complying with a particular intervention ideology?'. As argued in the 
course of this chapter, the resjult is often a fragmented lifeworld. 
At this stage it is useful to introduce the notion of 'locality^,. It refers to a variety 
of issues or problematics which have to do with the different ways in which local 
people internalize the wider political or policy issues within their lifeworlds. Thus the 
issue concerning the price policy of maize is given a local political meaning which is 
expressed in the discussion 
marketing board in Guácimo 
on the 'right of peasants to sell their maize to the 
'. Similarly, perceived contradictions in the IDA's land 
distribution practices are locally translated in terms of 'the survival of the peasantry in 
the Atlantic zone'. Such issues, thus, become central topics in farmers' discussions on 
on the 'role of Institutions' in development and more specifically on the role of the IDA 
in resolving the 'land question'. As we will see in the case studies, the local meaning 
that is attributed to issues regarding the rights and obligations vis-a-vis the state cannot 
be avoided by front-line workers in their relationship with clients. Indeed, the result may 
be a potential politicization of such relationships since radical peasant leaders are skilled 
in using arguments which are part of the official discourse. As a consequence front-line 
workers develop particular attitudes. 
In the case studies I distinguish three front-line workers' operational styles; first, 
the authoritarian style of the agraristas geared to exercising social control; second the 
propositional attitude of the: extensionist directed to the establishment of trust 
relations; and, third, the negotiatory and intermediational style of the social worker. In 
the respective case studies 
intervention, as manifested in 
the client-official interface. 
we will see the degree to which the ideology of 
the bureaucrat's conceptions of their work, bears upon 
4 .2 The Agrarista and e Administrative Approach 
The agraristas are the officials in the settlements in charge of the selection of settlers, 
and legal issues relating to the purchase and sale of plots (encargados de asuntos 
agrarios). Functionally, they fa I under the section of 'selection of beneficiaries' of the 
departamento de estudios básicos at headquarter's in San José, that is the department 
that carries out basic studies - in the field of agronomy, soils and human geography -
designed to create the conditions for an orderly development of settlements. Besides 
dealing with legal issues at the local level and carrying out selection studies of 
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prospective beneficiaries, the agraristas are in charge of consciousness-raising 
activities. The diverse nature of these activities entails that the agraristas have to deal 
with the several relevant departments in San José as well as those in the regional 
office, and with the settlers. 
One characteristic of the agraristas is the uniqueness of their function in the 
settlement. They have to communicate quite often with the settlement head, who in 
Neguev is also the regional director, in order to establish a well-defined policy with 
regard to land. Their work requires that they visit the central offices of the IDA, in the 
capital San José, regularly. This, combined with the fact that they often carry out the 
selection studies in different parts of the country, makes of them a highly mobile group. 
In addition the job requires that they have to maintain the confidence of Francisco 
Campos, the regional director. At the same time they usually enjoy a large degree of 
autonomy in carrying out their job. This entails that each has a relatively large degree of 
power to help or hinder land transactions. 
This case study of the chief agrarista 2, Moisés Knight, starts with a discussion of 
his local background, and his involvement in a regional union of agraristas of the 
Atlantic zone. This will be followed by an analysis of his operational style. 
Local background 
Moisés is 24 years old and comes from the neighbouring village of Guácimo. Before 
moving to Neguev he worked for two years in another settlement which belongs to the 
same 034 Programme. Before, he had worked for a banana company as an 
administrative clerk and attended university for one year with the aid of a scholarship. 
However, due to family financial obligations, he had to interrupt his studies and decided 
to look for a job. His mother, a Jehovah's Witness, is divorced and he has two younger 
brothers of school age, and a sister is studying law and works for a government 
institution. 
He entered the IDA when the 034 Programme was looking for young people from 
the area with at least a high school education. He applied for the job of agrarista in the 
El Indio settlement and was accepted thanks to the recommendation of a fellow villager 
who was also working as an official in that settlement. Moisés was given the 
opportunity to continue following courses of public administration at the University of 
Costa Rica in San José, and for that purpose he received one day free a week. 
Moisés had a place in the guesthouse at the Neguev settlement. However, he 
almost always sleeps in Guácimo. There he has a group of young friends who consist 
largely of teachers and employees in government institutions (such as the municipality), 
and some working for private companies. They all attended the same secondary school 
in Guácimo and belong to the Liberación party. When they come together they chat and 
joke. Yet, they are conscious that they belong to a special group, reflected in their 
criticism of the 'conformism' of their fellow villagers, in for example, their acceptance 
of the commercial values transmitted by television and magazines. The following is a 
typical statement made when discussing with his three teacher friends, 
"The problem with much of the youth here is that they would work for weeks to 
buy 'brand jeans'. You cannot appear at the university in San José if you do not 
wear a pair of fancy jeans. They think that in those jeans they are modem. But 
they do not realize that they are deceiving themselves, that their mind is distracted 
*ln 1988, when the 034 programme ended and the Neguev settlement office became a regional office 
an assistant agrarista was employed. Since then numerous settlements were serviced in Neguev. 
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from their real situation, from the problems most of them have to finish the study, 
to find work. You see the same here in Guácimo, most of our youth are not 
conscious of the real jroblems they encounter in life. They grow up as 
conformists. The result is that they do not have much confidence in themselves, 
that they become dependent on consumption values". 
It was possible to detect in Moisés conceptions a certain ambivalence towards the 
social movements of the arsa. He belongs to a native middle class dependent on 
government and plantation company jobs. He is aware of the social neglect to which 
the area has been exposed by the government and the fragility of the economic base of 
the region. Yet, it is the same government and the resumed banana activity that has 
offered them jobs and new educational opportunities. This ambivalence is expresed in a 
highly anti-communist political stance combined with a rather ambivalent position 
regarding the monopolization of land and other resources by outsiders. This ideological 
position is exemplified in the way Moisés talks about his early involvement in a peasant 
organisation that eventually organized the invasion of the Neguev settlement, 
" When I was at secondary school we organized a march supporting UPAGRA. In 
those times I agreed with their actions. The truth is that they were more 
committed to the people and to the cause of the poor peasants in the Atlantic zone 
than now. Later, however, they became involved in leftist politics and betrayed all 
the people that trusted them. Their struggle became a political one. They wanted 
to amass power and to that end they needed the people's support. But it was no 
longer for ideals that they were fighting but for an alien political ideology. When 
that became clear to me I distanced myself from them and became involved in 
democratic politics". 
As will become clear throughout the case study, Moisés' interest for social justice 
originated in a strong self-consciousness as a young black from the Atlantic zone, 
better educated than most others and eager to reach out for opportunities that were 
not available to the older generations. In fact, Moisés belongs to a generation of young 
blacks, active in various social and political fields and very interested in the future of 
the Atlantic zone. 
The Union of Agraristas of the 
One major initiative in which 
Agraristas of the Atlantic zone 
area. The union's main objectives 
the development of clear proced 
improvement of the social anc 
This initiative is of interest 
workers to create an independent 
Moreover, the union was 
directed to the defence of 
policy and planning activities 
establishment of more efficient 
the establishment of effective 
this last point they put forward 
the agraristas who were able 
The Regional Union of 
the direct aim to offer the 
net 
the 
Atlantic zone 
he was involved was the establishment of a 'Union of 
This was a joint endeavour of the agraristas of that 
were the introduction of a recording system aimed at 
ures in the process of decision- making, and the 
economic position of agraristas. 
as it was the only attempt I encountered by front-line 
and professional organization at the regional level, 
at all designed as a trade union type of association 
interests of the members, but as a support group for 
The union's goals, then, were those of promoting the 
work procedures, the design of local level studies and 
linkages with individual and group settlers. In regard to 
a strong argument to the effect that it was precisely 
' o accomplish this goal. 
Agraristas was officially formed at the start of 1986 with 
sossibility to "maintain a professional relationship with 
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colleagues". In the first letter addressed to IDA'S General Manager and Executive 
President its general objectives are stated in the following way, 
"Our tasks are not only circumscribed to dealing with pressure groups, carrying out 
censuses and preliminary studies of landholdings, selection and legal studies, 
conducting adjudications and titling for particular properties, etc., but the real 
object of our task is 'man himself with all his pecularities. This is the relationship 
IDA-PEASANT, which in the field reality actually is IDA-/4ffra/7sfa-PEASANT. Given 
the nature of our functions and the delicate and responsible character of our tasks 
we are worried that the function of Agrarista is not given a specific [professional] 
classification. To that effect we request your support [letter addressed to the IDA'S 
Executive President]. 
Two types of studies were deemed to be urgent. First, the establishment of an 
inventory of institutions and enterprises linked to the agrarian sector. The aim was to 
provide information about the IDA'S activities and about the laws governing the 
settlement sector. In this way it was expected that the enforcement of the law against 
attempts by private persons and enterprises to acquire cheap land or crops (through 
contract-farming) in settlements would be facilitated as well as an effective 
coordination with other institutions. Second, the undertaking of a list of individuals who 
had engaged in land speculation practices, who should be denied permission to become 
beneficiaries again. 
This attempt of the agraristas to improve their status as professionals expresses 
their special role as front-line workers involved in the most important tasks of the 
institution: that of selecting beneficiaries and seeing to it that land was distributed 
according to the law. That was the reason why the agraristas - more than any other 
functionary - had to be officials who enjoyed the confidence of the regional director. At 
any rate a problematic agrarista, - contrary to a problematic social worker - could not 
maintain himself in his position. Not surprisingly, then, the agrarista tended to be 
someone who had to adapt himself constantly to the official institutional ideology. 
The agrarista and the ideology of intervention 
Moisés was not different from the other agraristas in this respect. At the same time, 
however, he had a distinctive opinion as to what the objective of his function was, 
which clearly differed from that of his superior. Thus he would assert; " We must help 
the settler to become independent from the IDA, but that does not mean that we 
should merely make commercial farmers out of them. No, the social aspect of their 
enterprise should also be stimulated. If we help them all to become entrepreneurs they 
will be more busy with making money and fighting each other than with cooperating in 
communal organisations. What we need is a combination of both aspects, the 
commercial and the social in order to fight social injustice and to improve agricultural 
production". 
These views belonged to a wider understanding of the colonization problematic 
which manifested itself in a strong believe in the importance of bringing about social 
justice through the distribution of land. This contrasted to that of his superiors who 
held to the view that the principal role of the IDA was that of educating settlers to 
become agricultural entrepreneurs. Thus he once remarked, "I do not subscribe to this 
idea of giving incentives to entrepreneurial farmers. If you hold to this view you will not 
be able to prevent the expansion of poverty in the country, and injustice within the 
settlement areas. The entrepreneurial aspect is an important one, but not paramount". 
In effect, the regional union of agraristas had been reflecting about the issue, and had 
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taken a stand against those within the union who took the view that it was necessary 
to orient policy towards farmers with more success potential. 
Moisés also had clear ideas of his tasks and the way in which he should fulfill 
them. He also had distinct views on how the regional office should function in order to 
improve the administration. To begin with, he considered that that was his principal 
obligation, to hold to the law of the IDA and the formal legal procedures. At the same 
time, he was conscious of the fact that he had ample discretionary room in applying 
institutional rules, in view of his special knowledge of local conditions. Indeed, he 
enjoyed showing me, with the help of specific cases, how he translated the general 
institutional objectives according to his own interpretation of the situation. As he would 
argue, 
"The problem is that the law does not provide answers for all situations. The law is 
too rigid and does not allow for all possible cases of conflict. For that reason you 
are forced to develop your own methods in order to enforce the law and for the 
benefit of the institute and the beneficiaries. Yet, you must be conscious that 
when making a decision on, say, a conflict on boundaries, deciding in favour of 
one means deciding against the other". 
One issue in which he was very principled, at least when he arrived in Neguev, bore 
upon the practice that had developed there to permit (and many argued even stimulate) 
the sale or property tranfer of plots. He made it clear that he disagreed with his 
predecessors as to this local policy. Once, he told me. 
When I had just arrived there would be everyday a queue of 5 or 6 persons waiting 
to arrange such transfers [traspasos). I made it a custom to send them all away by 
telling them that I wanted to spend my time on other things, so as to demotivate 
them. In this way the rate of transfers decreased enormously and at the moment I 
have only two traspasos a week. The reason I am against transfers is twofold. 
First, 1 am convinced that this is the only way to stop land speculation in the 
settlements. And second, by permitting such sales we stimulate people to invade 
other small haciendas, fincas, in order to sell again". 
Although sympathetic to the 'peasantist' objectives of the IDA, Moisés was not naive 
as to the settlers' capabilities to manipulate the relationship with the officials. In effect, 
he would be very strict in his relationships with settlers, both on his visits as well as 
during office hours. I accompanied him several times on office days in the field. Twice 
a week he would set up office at the communal building of a distant sector. On one 
such occasion he gave me an interesting picture of settler's behaviour when dealing 
with functionaries. He commented: "Settlers never tell us the truth. They will always 
present the facts in a very different way from how they are. For that reason I prefer to 
go to their farms. Then I can see with my own eyes a lot of things; about their lifestyle, 
whether they are good farmers, whether they have additional resources, and so forth". 
On such office-days-in-the-field the Neguev front-line workers would dedicate the 
morning to visiting farms and in the afternoon they would mostly sit chatting waiting 
for settlers who might come with problems, etc. Sometimes they would be joined by 
the local teachers. For the rest these técnicos would stay together and make little 
contact with settlers. Moisés, by contrast would have a busy day attending settlers 
who complained about disputes, or were concerned about bureaucratic issues, or with 
selling or buying plans. And, sometimes he could react quite irritatedly. Thus once, 
when a settler came to him to complain about his problems with his neighbour who, as 
he argued, was not only wrong but totally unwilling to consider the issue in a civilized 
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way, Moisés fulminated against him; "The problem with you all is that you do not 
organize yourself and that you expect that we can resolve everything for you. I was 
here last Saturday explaining the procedure that would be followed in distributing the 
communal housing plots, and almost no one came. You probably did not come neither. 
But when you have a problem then you need me". 
The settler then answered in an accommodating tone arguing that it was his 
intention to do everything according to the rules, that he was no communist and that 
he would be present at the next information meeting. 
Contradictions between the bureaucratic ethos and the local lifeworld 
As might be expected Moisés' way of dealing with settlers was not always consistent, 
since he had to take contextual and personal factors into consideration. Thus, what 
often appeared as a rather uncomplicated case would later appear to be complex and 
liable to differing interpretations. There was, in my view, a contradiction in his mode of 
approaching settlers. In his eagerness to make sense of particular situations in order to 
find a quick solution he would narrow down the problem so as to be able to describe it 
in causal terms; for example the lack of coordination between central departments and 
regional office, or the lack of discipline on the part of the settlers, or the unwillingness 
of settlers and (some) officials to follow the rules. However, his own practical 
understanding of and continuous involvement in rural life in the Atlantic zone forced 
him to interpret situations within a broader interpretive framework. 
This, I assumed, was the reason for his contrasting and changeable moods; from 
being strict and bureaucratic in a disinterested way, to gay and playful, to overly 
concerned and highly committed. Moisés, after all came from the zone and he knew 
many people in the settlement. He himself was a villager who had grown up in the 
same conflictive environment and he was perfectly aware of the different lifeworlds 
and local frames of reference of different types of settlers. Sometimes I would be 
surprised by his sudden interest in the personal circumstances of settlers and 
conversations would ensue which, due to their local significance, had little meaning to 
me, as reference would be made to characters and events I (as yet) did not have 
knowledge of. 
Nevertheless, it is striking that when discussing particular cases, in spite of his 
awareness of the complexity of the situation Moisés would always account for them 
within a bureaucratic framework. This did not mean that he was not prepared to take 
up political issues, or to criticize shortcomings in the functioning of the institute, but 
these were seen as irrelevant factors outside the bureaucratic interpretive framework. 
This led in my view to a sort of ambiguity in his style of operating, on the one hand his 
continuous appeal to this bureaucratic ethos, on the other hand his inability to apply it 
and/or comply with it. 
Before discussing a few occasions in which this ambiguity came to the fore it 
should be remarked that not all settlers were treated in the same (distanced and strict) 
way by the agrarista. This was especially the case among those who received advise 
and support from functionaries in the central departments in San José, and who had to 
deal with the agrarista in order to normalize their legal situation. These clients often 
saw the agrarista as one of the many steps in the process of securing land. In having 
access to capital resources and institutional networks they were much less dependent 
than poor settlers on the local bureaucracy. 
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Attempting to stop land speculation 
One initiative Moisés undertook after arriving in Neguev was to set up information 
meetings (charlas) for settlers in order to clarify the policy he was to follow. These 
meetings were organized by him and the social worker but also various técnicos 
appeared to talk about their programmes. The first meeting was held in Santa Rosa and 
was attended by a large group of settlers. Among these were UPAGRA sympathizers 
and other settlers critical of the IDA'S activities. The meeting was well organized with 
leaflets specifying the role of the IDA and the rights and obligations of settlers. Data 
were provided on the number of families that had received land from the institute so 
far, and on the importance of land for the peasants for maintaining social peace. Moisés 
in his contribution talked about the various facets of his work. At a certain moment he 
declared his intention to put an end to land speculation in declaring, 
"I can assure you that from now on illegal sales of land are finished. I will see to it 
that only on rare occasions will farms be sold and that the price paid does not 
exceed the value of the improvements. This is the only way to preclude people 
enriching themselves at the cost of other landless peasants who are also waiting 
for land". 
After saying this a few people intervened. One of them was Juan José, a communal 
leader and former member of the board of UPAGRA. He wished Moisés luck with his 
fresh approach and commented; "Moisés, you are right to stop speculation in land but 
you should know that it was your predecessors who stimulated the sale of land by 
settlers. They themselves served as intermediaries and asked money for it. That is not 
a secret here, it is public knowledge". 
Moisés replied that he did not like his predecessors to be defamed. He was aware 
that the former agrarista held to a different policy. However, that was something of the 
past, and worrying about that would not resolve anything. He concluded, "what we 
need now is unity within the community and with us to ensure the progress of the 
village". 
The case of a disputed plot in Santa Rosa 
On arriving in Neguev, Moisés was confronted with various cases of land purchases by 
people who clearly did not qualify. Thus, in his zeal to introduce law and order in the 
settlement he pledged that no irregular transactions would be permitted any more. One 
typical case of such a deal could be found in Santa Rosa where a plot had recently 
been bought by an entrepreneurial family, the Arias, owners of a contiguous plantation 
who were interested in buying the plot in order to gain direct access to the road to Rio 
Jimenez. Officially it was one of the 'landless' sons who applied for the plot and to that 
end Moisés' predecessor had been contacted. 
Meanwhile, the whole community of La Lucha knew about the attempts of the 
Arias family to extend their landholding at the expense of the rights of landless 
peasants and this was seen as one more example of the inability of the IDA to pursue 
its objective of social justice. When confronted with this situation Moisés promised that 
if he could not stop this family from taking over the plot he would resign from the 
institute. The situation was as follows; The Arias family had virtually been given 
permission to legalize the purchase of the plot thanks to the intermediation of a 
member of the Board of Directors of the IDA. Moisés argued that he could postpone 
the actual approval since it was the regional office which had to apply for it, and he 
was by no means prepared to do it. Moreover, he asserted that in the case of his being 
ordered to start the procedure, the regional office had the right to appeal to the Board. 
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Even if this appeal was rejected he would write a declaration making it clear that he 
carried out the order against his will. This attitude, indeed, made much impression in La 
Lucha and the plot became a test case of the capacity and ability of the new 'agrarista' 
to apply the rules of the game to the locality's benefit. 
One group that was interested in the plot was a small asociation of women who 
planned to grow commercial crops cooperatively, and therefore proposed to rent the 
plot. This women's group had the support of UPAGRA and a San José based NGO 
specializing in assistance to poor women. It was also argued that a benefit of putting 
this plot at the disposal of an organized communal group was that a more direct path to 
the village of Rio Jimenez was assured for the other settlers. 
With regard to the women's group Moisés had his doubts. He had little 
confidence in the capacity of a small group of women to develop a whole plot of 20 
has. productively. Moreover, he was afraid that this could be a stratagem by UPAGRA 
to appropriate the plot for developing their own projects. Moisés, however, maintained 
good contacts with several of the women (one of them was at the time member of the 
Board of Directors of UPAGRA), and he displayed a certain sympathy for them. 
The relationship with the women's group became, over the period of a year, 
rather troublesome as there was a set of expectations concerning the support they 
might receive from the IDA. They were not only interested in acquiring the 'Arias' plot 
but also wanted to rent a small plot in the communal area in order to grow vegetables 
and rice. In addition, some of the women were involved in legal disputes over land. 
It is therefore interesting to look at the case of one such woman as it exemplified 
the relationship Moisés entertained with the women's group. 
The case of a divorced woman settler 
Anita came every week to the office-day-in-the-field in Santa Rosa to discuss issues 
concerning the women's group and her own problem. Anita was involved in a conflict 
over land with her former husband and father of her son, whom she had thrown out of 
the house because of his drinking habits and unwillingness to contribute to the 
household. Anita lived on part of the plot (3 hectares) which they both acquired after 
the invasion. The ex-husband, however, sold without her consent, the other 4 hectares 
of the farm to a neighbour. She was able to stop this transaction on the grounds that 
the property belonged to both and that he had left the family. Then he started 
harassing her in various ways and, among other things, he wrote a letter to the 
National Infant Welfare Service accusing her of neglecting her child and spending the 
whole day 'on the street'. These argument were used against her in his attempts to get 
hold of the farm. 
Anita had been fighting the case tenaciously before the Infant Welfare Service 
and the IDA. It was not difficult for her to show evidence to the former institution that 
the accusations against her were foul slander, since she made a living by selling clothes 
in the area. In addition a public letter was written and signed by neighbours and many 
other members of the community attesting to her good reputation as a person, and as a 
mother. Yet, her legal situation remained difficult, for the reason that there were doubts 
as to whether she was capable of developing her farm productively in view of the lack 
of family labour and her dependence on off-farm work. She consequently argued that 
she was strong enough to engage in commercial agriculture and that she was only 
waiting for credit to do so. On the farm she was growing food crops and she had a 
cow. The dispute had been going on for years and it was up to the Board of 
Directors to take a decision. But her ex-husband had, through a lawyer, been pressuring 
the IDA's legal department to decide in his favour. With regard to the part he sold, he 
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argued that he had to do it in order to pay for the improvements [mejoras) 3 due to the 
former owner, and he insisted that she had to return to him half this amount, adding 
that it amounted to more than one million Colones. In response to this she declared 
that the value of the farm was less than 200 thousand and that anyway he had not 
cared to pay the entire debt. She insisted that, given the fact that she was still living in 
the settlement and that it was against the law to sell settlement land, she should be 
given the whole plot. 
The dispute became a long-drawn out one and when Moisés suggested that he 
could only allot her the 3 hectares, she lost confidence in being able to get her rights 
through legal means. She then turned to UPAGRA which offered her legal advice and 
accepted her claim as one more to be discussed in a next round of negotiations with 
the institution. 
In fact Moisés was limited in his ability to support Anita, since as he argued, it 
was extremely difficult to reverse decisions that had been already made, especially if 
there had been a financial transaction. More importantly, however, the fact that Anita 
was being supported by an UPAGRA lawyer and that she was a member of the 
women's association restricted his space for manoeuvre since it would be highly 
deleterious to him if the regional director thought that he was bowing to the pressure 
of this leftist peasant union. 
Losing the confidence of the settiers 
In the meantime the women's group applied for assistance from the section for women 
and family (mujeres y familia) of the Training and Organisation Department in the IDA. 
They had a female social worker working with women's groups in the Atlantic zone and 
they gave her responsibility over the group in La Lucha. The women voiced their 
demands about the 'Arias plot' and subsequently she promised to put forward the 
issue in San José. This, however, led to a conflict between the Training and 
Organisation Department in San José and Fernando Campos who maintained that this 
women's group should not be given assistance since it was supported by Upagristas. 
The result was that the social worker was forbidden to continue assisting the women. 
A year later Moisés had changed his attitude into a more bureaucratic one and at 
long last agreed to approve the purchase by the Arias' son, under the condition that he 
should move to the farm with his family and that the plot be not converted into a 
banana plantation. Later on, it became rather easy for Moisés to distance himself from 
the clients' complaints and pressures as the regional office's service area was 
expanded considerably and the weekly visits to the sectors of Santa Rosa and El Peje 
were suspended. His task load grew considerably heavier with the result that he had to 
deal with cases more and more in the office. Consequently, the emphasis of his work 
shifted from one of enlace (middleman) between the settler and the office to that of 
processing routine cases, carrying out preparation studies and serving as a link man 
between the regional director and the field. 
In that period he received several written requests from the women's asociation 
to adjudicate the plot in their favour. One recurring theme in the letters was the 
egoistic attitude of men, both on the peasant and the institutional side, and their 
unwillingness to do something on behalf of the women. In one of these lettlers they 
defended their claims by reason of the machista attitude of men, settlers or 
'Officially a settler has not the right to sell the plot but only the 'improvements' s/he made on the farm, 
such as trees, perennial crops, a house, a barn etc. 
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functionaries. The only thing Moisés had arranged for them was the lease to the 
asociation of a small plot in the communal centre for the purpose of growing rice. 
Summing up, his attitude to these women in Santa Rosa was ambiguous like his 
attitude toward UPAGRA sympthizers. On the one hand, he saw himself as the 
representative of the rightful aims of the institution, and as a loyal implementor of 
particular, if quite formal, procedures. On the other hand it became more and more 
difficult to ignore the specific practices of bureaucratic control he was meant to carry 
out. This was evident in his relationship with the members of the women's association, 
and, consequently, with a broader sector of the community. After all, he had 
committed himself to stop the operation of a market in land. And in his zeal to 
demonstrate his determination, and his capacity of action he pledged not to permit the 
Arias family to appropriate the plot under dispute. Moisés lost much trust in the 
community over this and many settlers started to express their mistrust of his good 
intentions. Thus I remember that once, after talking to Anita, he jokingly said to her 
that she, as a single woman, could well look after herself. She, then, meaningfully 
looked at him and replied, "it is you who should watch out and act conscientiously". 
Moisés was aware of the expectations that existed, and his reaction was to avoid 
exposure to possible demands and claims by settlers. He was perfectly conscious of 
the problems involved in dealing with issues of justice in an institutional way. In fact, 
this remained a common subject of conversation between us. In these conversations 
Moisés would lay much stress on the need to follow formal and universalistic criteria 
for decision making instead of making institutional policy secondary to the ad-hoc 
needs of exercising social control. The upshot, then, was that ultimately the social 
control aspects of the agrarista's functions became more important than that of serving 
as a 'translator' of the settlers' needs and as a mediator between them and the 
institution. This was evidenced by Moisés' ultimate choice to comply with the regional 
office's day-to-day policy and by his inability to accommodate to local conceptions of 
justice. 
Discussion 
In examining the evolution of the current agrarista's operational style it could be argued 
that it was predictable and that it came to resemble that of his predecessor. In effect, 
the 'agrarista' - more than any other functionary - stands very close to the regional 
director, and hence is continually impelled to show his allegiance. Consequently, the 
agrarista tends to be someone who has to adapt himself constantly to official 
institutional ideology. 
As a result, Moisés, when forced to choose between accommodating to the less 
idealistic practices of institutional life and the legitimate pressures of his beneficiaries, 
saw himself forced to adapt to the everyday institutional exigencies of his job. 
Furthermore, this choice was strengthened by his personal circumstances - he got 
married and his wife was pregnant - and the concomitant financial obligations. Thus, 
much of his attention was diverted to the purchase of a plot and the securing of a 
mortgage for building a house. Furthermore, to improve his career chances he became 
more involved in local politics. 
This situation led to various complaints from settlers. He had lost the trust from a 
large sector of settlers in Neguev, and accusations of corruption were made by farmers 
in other settlements, in what seemed an effective attempt to destroy his reputation as 
an energetic and honest functionary. Whether these accusations were based on 'true 
facts' or were just slander does not concern us here. However, it does point to an 
increased distance between Moisés and the settlers, belying his initial concern for 
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justice and equality and attendant aspiration to being the 'translator' of the settlers' 
needs to the institution. 
In concluding, the case of the 'agrarista' shows that some functionaries are more 
ready to adhere to - or internalize - the ideology of state intervention than other 
functionaries, so much so that they are inclined to strive for a close correspondence 
between their personal conceptions and the exigencies of their work. To that end they 
are prepared to downplay or ignore the contradictions arising in the fulfillment of their 
jobs. This way of putting the issue might be interpreted as a form of social 
determinism, suggesting that the practical and ideological choices Moisés makes can be 
explained in terms of his position in an institutional structure. However, the situation is 
much more complex than such a view suggests and it is my argument that the 
internalization of the state's point of view is the outcome of a series of choices the 
official himself makes. In talking about policy internalization - or the internalization of 
the ideology of state intervention -1 do not have in mind something such as a specific 
psychological mechanism by which subjects incorporate the bureaucratic world view 
into their everyday thinking, forming part of a more general process of institutional 
socialization. It cannot be stressed enough that an actor oriented approach which pays 
special attention to actors' interpretations and discourses must reject such a type of 
functionalist analysis. Yet, In setting up the argument in terms of 'internalization'4, I 
attempt to show that some administrative practices - in this case the practices of social 
control necessary for the maintenance of a legal order in the settlement - are more 
central to intervention than others, and that they therefore require a strong adherence 
to state policy on the part of the actors involved in them. I argue that such an 
adherence is both of a principled and a practical nature, and that the success of the 
functionary is dependent on the degree to which he/she is able to attain the highest 
degree of correspondence with the prevailing style of state intervention, to such an 
extent as to become the life embodiment of state intervention. As I attempted to show 
in the case study this signifies a process of internalization of state policy, not in the 
sense of learning their formal meaning, but by developing a practical ability to adapt 
and if necessary transform given policies, in order to make them meaningful in the day-
to-day reality of implementation. 
4.3 The Técnico and the Organizing Approach 
Samuel, the técnico in charge of medicinal plants and pineapple programmes, comes 
from San Vito, a coffee producing area in the southern part of the country which is 
known as one of the few successful attempts to promote colonization by Europeans in 
Costa Rica, and where his father is a small coffee farmer and cattle holder. Given this 
background Samuel liked to define himself as a campesino. For that reason he argued 
that he preferred to work with smallholders in the field than in the office; and that most 
of the satisfaction he had in his work derived from the appreciation he received from 
the farmers he worked with. 
4 I take the concept of 'internalization' from Arce (1989). 
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The Medicinal Plants Programme 
Samuel was employed at the IDA'S headquarters in San José and sent to Neguev for 
the explicit purpose of establishing a medicinal plants, spices and dyes programme. 
This programme, Samuel's first, was initiated in 1982-83 by an agronomist who 
worked for the IDA, Alberto Ramos, who was in charge of setting up the programme at 
the national level. 
Samuel had already met this agronomist during his studies while he was doing an 
obligatory course called "communal work". For this course students would do practical 
work for the benefit of a community or an institution. During the preparation of field 
work in two Indian reserves in his native province, Samuel went to the national 
museum where Alberto Ramos, who was already considered as an expert in the area of 
medicinal plants, was working. Since then they have established very close working 
relations. 
In the Indian reserves he dedicated himself to collecting and classifying such 
plants on the basis of the Indians' own indigeneous knowledge. To that end he spent 
15 days in each Indian community living with an Indian family. This was an important 
experience for him and he recalls, "these people are highly reserved and if you want to 
gain their confidence you have to make a lot of effort. Yet, ultimately I developed a 
deep appreciation of them and I think they also valued my work". 
After Samuel graduated from the university, Alberto Ramos, who in the meantime 
had been employed by the IDA, made arrangements to get him a job on his medicinal 
plants programme. However, it was very difficult and they had to wait until someone 
known to them was appointed to the Board of Directors to get the necessary support. 
Finally he was tranferred to Neguev in 1984, where he set out to select all the plants 
with medicinal properties from all over the area in order to establish a demonstration 
plot. As he recalls, "I started to relate to the plants, for I did not know much about 
them in this area. I had to detect them and learn their names, the scientific and popular 
ones". 
Samuel and Alberto planned to promote the cultivation of medicinal plants for 
commercial purposes. To that end they had connections with a Swiss exporter. After 
some time they had a nice variety of plants (such as Cuani/ama, Selva Virgen, Sauco, 
Frailecillo, Zacate de Limon, Oregano) on small plots of 100 sq.mtrs, while they were 
experimenting with various planting distances, stalks, etc. They had already some basic 
infrastructure, such as a dryer. Then Samuel started to look for settlers willing to grow 
these plants. In the beginning it was decided to work with 4 different settlers, each on 
half a hectare and with 5 different plant types. However, as soon as the plants were 
ready to be collected the problems began. To begin with the dryer could not cope with 
the large volume, and finally, it appeared that the Swiss had not the required 
connections for exporting the plants. Certainly, he was convinced that there was a 
large international market for those plants, but he did not realize how difficult it was to 
enter it. According to Samuel they could have won a court case against the Swiss, but 
it was not worth the effort. For him this was a bitter experience. As he comments, "My 
conscience said to me that I had to find a way of getting rid of that plant material while 
paying the farmers for it. Otherwise I would lose their trust". Thus he decided to buy 
the plants himself. "I had established friendship relations with several settlers and I 
knew that they would be very dissappointed in me if I told them that there was no 
market for the plants". In fact, he paid the farmers the prices agreed with money he 
borrowed, thus incurring a heavy personal financial loss. 
From then on emphasis was placed on the social function of the programme; that 
of providing home grown medicines (against headaches, nervous illness, etc.) - some of 
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them for preventive use (for children and the elderly) - to the farmers. To that end they 
had planned that the programme should be related to a number of educational 
activities. Settlers were offered the plants for free. Altogether some 60 gardens were 
established in the settlement. In addition a communal garden was set up where settlers 
could examine and choose the plants they wanted, and various field days {dias de 
campo) were organized. In addition gardens were established on the school grounds in 
collaboration with the teachers. It was hoped that they would explain to the children 
the various uses of the plants and that the latter would take them home. In fact, the 
teachers played an important role in approaching settlers who were interested in the 
programme. 
In this way Samuel became known in the community and established a working 
relationship with many settlers. Yet, only a minority of settlers continued with the 
programme, as many lost interest due to the absence of a commercial outlet. Although 
some efforts were made to find a commercial market no trustworthy exporter was 
found. After some time demand for the plants decreased sharply. Later, when he 
became overly involved in other crop programmes, the medicinal programme came to a 
standstill. 
Nonetheless, Samuel considers that some success was achieved. For instance 
one settler in Milano, who has about 4 hectares of Oregano, earned an income by 
selling it in the producers' market in San José. He also provided medicinal plants to 
UPAGRA, the peasant union, that some time ago organized a festival in which women 
with the most beautiful gardens were awarded a prize. Samuel would proudly assert 
that all material came from one of his demonstration plots. However, it became clear to 
him that men were predominantly interested in commercial programmes. Thus, Samuel 
discerned different underlying interests between women and men with regard to 
livelhihood strategies. As he put it, "With men you have to talk in Colones -the Costa 
Rican currency - because they are mostly interested in money. Women ere more 
interested in family affairs, cheap medicines, the opportunity to have a small additional 
income. Medicinal plants is a programme that demands much work, and men are not 
going to provide it if the monetary reward does not correspond to the amount of labour 
they expend. 
But he also had problems in other settlements with a few women's groups 
assisted by the "women and development" section of the IDA. The social workers had 
promised them good profits in a short time, if they would only organise themselves. 
However, although the amounts were small enough to sell in a regional market the 
matter was not so easy, as the plants required much careful selection to provide a good 
product. Once Alberto Ramos and himself were accused of deceiving the women after 
the produce fetched a much lower price than the women expected. Marketing, Samuel 
pointed out, was a profession in itself, and he comments that in their enthusiasm they 
made an error by suggesting to the women that the main difficulty was that of growing 
the plants. Indeed, he recognizes that as yet he had been too paternalistic in his 
relations with settlers. The main lesson of this experience for him was that production 
and marketing problems could not be resolved by the extensionists only, but required 
close cooperation between them and the beneficiaries. 
The chili programme 
After this, not so positive experience, came the chili programme. Samuel, by then, had 
become convinced that the only way to solve the livelihood problems of the settlers 
was by developing a mix of cash crops which were suited to smallholder cultivation 
and profitable at the same time. From the beginning he had been looking for a spice 
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that would attract the commitment of a wider group of farmers, but he could not find 
any which combined good market possibilities with agronomic conditions. 
His choice for the red pepper - or chili - was rather casual. Once a settler 
commented to him that he was thinking of cultivating chili. He told Samuel that close 
to Pocora some farmers were growing it and they had no difficulty in selling it. This 
interested him much and he went to Pocora where he inspected a few plots and talked 
to the purchasers. He also went to Pocora to talk with the manager of a processing 
company, Kamouk. It appeared that the manager was a very open person and they 
immediately got along well. On that same occasion they talked of a possible production 
area, possibly 50 hectares. Later, they reduced the planned area to 25 hectares, in 
view of the high yields that were be expected. Actual yields, however, appeared to be 
higher than even the most optimistic projections. 
There was not much available data on the hot chili, only ASBANA - the National 
Association of Banana Producers - had been doing research on it. With the help of 
information that was provided by the farmers growing it Samuel made a cost 
calculation (avío) which he presented to the Credit Fund. It must be remarked that he 
had a good relationship with functionaries from the Fund in San José, and they decided 
to extend credit for the programme. Subsequently he initiated the search for possible 
programme beneficiaries. As he tells it, "First I talked to settlers I knew from the 
medicinal plants programme, but there was not much interest. Then I made lists of the 
best farmers with the help of two other técnicos. On the basis of that list I succeeded 
in finding 25 beneficiaries". 
However, many settlers had lingering doubts. Chilies were a new and rather 
unknown crop in the area and all other previous programmes had been failures. Since a 
few decided to plant half an hectare they reached only 17 has of the 25 we planned. 
At any rate, there was much distrust. For example, the first credit delivery was not 
accepted by the settlers because they wanted to have more information. Ultimately 
they fared very well, "much better than any of us would have dreamed. In fact, I would 
have already been relieved if it had not become another failure. In fact, this was the 
first really successful programme in the settlement and some beneficiaries made a 
profit of as much as 600 thousand colones". Samuel calculated that altogether it had 
made the settlement 7 to 8 millions richer. Indeed, this had significant consequences 
for him. As he comments; "Since then, the roles changed and instead of me pursuing 
them, settlers would start asking me if they could participate in the programme. But the 
market was restricted and I could not include any more beneficiaries". 
In effect, a major advantage of red peppers is that they grow on infertile soils, 
provided these have a good drainage. Yet, they are actually not suited to humid tropical 
areas since they are highly vulnerable to a fungus called malla which as yet cannot be 
controlled. It is a question of time before malla comes in, after which chili cannot be 
grown for at least 3 years without being affected by traces in the soil. Samuel knew 
that sooner or later the plantations would be affected by this illness. Chili, then, was an 
incidental crop, a transitional product, which offered many the opportunity to make a 
quick profit, but without providing an alternative to the production/marketing problem. 
Subsequently the number of chili cultivators expanded to 42 on the whole 
settlement, with many farmers financing their own chili. All cultivators received 
extension help from Samuel, with the exception of Santa Rosa\La Lucha, a sector that 
was not serviced by him on account of its better soils and cultivation opportunities, 
indeed, Samuel claims that he was in search of profitable alternatives for those areas in 
the settlement with the poorest soils. Furthermore, Samuel adopted a careful attitude 
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towards credit, providing new chili cultivators with no credit because of the risks 
incurred by the spread of malla. 
Later on he continued his search for a stable crop, one which could provide a 
maracuya (custard apple) was "discovered" by 
Samuel. Again, it was a suggestion of a settler who told him that in the area of 
Sarapiqui fairly large plots were being planted. He went to the area to investigate. At 
the National bank of the village of Sap Miguel he had a friend who got him a cost 
producers who were cultivating maracuya with 
bank credit. Maracuya, he considered. Was more adapted to the Atlantic zone and had 
the same favourable characteristics ajs chili in that it provided a regular monthly 
income. 
Relationship with settlers 
Samuel, like the other officials, was 
with, although he claimed that he 
relationship with only two or three, 
'difficult settler' (problemático), Norbe|rto 
way. 
get 
He 
selective with regard to the people he worked 
along with the majority and he had a bad 
recounted a nasty experience with a really 
Casas. He described him in the following 
"There is in El Silencio a farmer called Norberto Casas, who is terrible. He criticizes 
everything, he gossips with you about other officials and with them he gossips 
about you. He also spreads stories about his neighbours and then when you visit 
them you feel uncomfortable. Since he is an older man he thinks he knows 
everything better than us kids. First I had problems with him because he did not 
want to follow my recommendations. He even diverted the credit. Once I gave him 
money to buy inputs and he pocketed it. Then I wrote a really harsh note to him 
(bien chiva) with a copy to the Credit Fund in which I made clear to him that given 
the fact that he was diverting credit and that he gossiped about me and about 
other técnicos I could not continue assisting him. I had already given him a lot of 
credit, about 60 thousands. I talk to him only if it is absolutely necessary. I 
attempt not to have any kind of involvement with him". 
In his view, such issues relating to trust relationships between técnico and farmer 
cannot be taken into consideration in programme design, and this makes extension 
practice much more complex in reality than on paper. Thus, he would argue; "That is 
the problem with these programmes of technological transfer. You can design a 
technological package but you cannot change the farmer. How are you going to change 
the customs of someone who has been tilling the land for 25 years? In the end 
extension amounts to a matter of personal relationships". And, in these relationships 
the issue of control was an important one to him. 
He thus found it easier to work with new crops, not known to the farmer and 
which required modern technology. For example in comparing maize with chili he would 
argue that in the former case settlers have extensive knowledge, whereas in the latter 
settlers had to listen more to the técnico. It then was easier to wield control over the 
application of a technological package. To that effect trust between him and the farmer 
was in his view essential to his work. Trust, however, was not merely intuitive but 
something that could be tested on the farmer. Thus, Samuel before going to the field 
always reviewed a map with recommendations and notes that he made about the 
settlers he was going to visit. Trust for him was something that should be validated on 
the basis of real progress. It was not merely based on friendship or sympathy. 
In elaborating upon this theme Samuel commented, "With settlers I usually have 
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a good relationship. Yet I always keep a distance. That is my nature. It takes time 
before I trust them. That has nothing to do with the fact that I am a técnico and they 
supposedly peasants. For, neither do I have relationships of friendship with the other 
técnicos. And in talking about them, 
"They are colleagues (companeros). But to say that they are friends, well I do not 
know what your concept of friendship is... , to have a friend, I consider, is like 
having a brother. You must have a lot of confianza (confidence). I would say that 
here I do not have real friends, but there is certainly a feeling of friendship among 
us. 
Establishing a friendship with a settler was problematic in his view, since that could 
give way to situations which should not occur in a relationship between farmer and 
técnico, like displays of disrespect. Yet, he was clear in arguing that, "In essence it 
does not matter to me that they are farmers. I have been a farmer myself for a long 
time. Friendship after all is a personal relationship, it is subjective". These remarks 
denote very well a contrast between Samuel and the other técnicos; the former being 
used to making displays of friendship with settlers characterized by jokes and not 
taking things seriously, while Samuel's was more concerned with establishing relations 
with settlers based on mutual respect and trust. 
Once he had a deceptive experience with a settler, whom he had included in the 
chili programme and whom he considered as one case of a settler who could play an 
important role as a local leader. The settler diverted the credit to other uses. "Actually", 
he argued, "I like him as a person, but that does not conceal that I am disillusioned". 
On the other hand there were settlers he initially did not trust much, but for whom he 
gained much appreciation in the course of the work. As he put it, "in the course of a 
relationship you learn things from them and often you have experiences that are not 
pleasant at all". 
Trust as the basis for a working relationship, and for a possible friendship, did not 
permit in his view unjust or politically-oriented criticism. One experience he had with an 
UPAGRA leader gives evidence of this. During a visit that a few técnicos from an agro-
processing company made to Neguev to provide information on non-traditional export 
crops, one UPAGRA sympathizer started to critizice the IDA. In doing so he started to 
talk about what he saw as the political function of such production programmes. 
Samuel recalls this as a very unpleasant experience, especially since it took place in 
front of an outsider. In his opinion "dirty linen should be washed at home". Another 
radical leader, on that occasion, congratulated him for his commitment and called him 
the first técnico in the settlement who showed that he was ready to share his 
knowledge with the peasants. Yet, he continued questioning him for not being able to 
take an independent stand vis-á-vis the local administration. As this radical settler put 
it, "Look, Samuel, you have shown that you are not afraid of establishing relationships 
with peasants and thereby to run risks. Why are you afraid to question the institution's 
policy of dividing the community? As a child you surely contradicted your mother, 
didn't you? Well, I think that an institution does not deserve more respect than your 
own mother". 
In effect, Samuel had an ambiguous relationship with UPAGRA leaders. On the 
one hand he resented that Fernando Campos, the Regional Director, had various times 
stopped him from working with organized groups which were considered to be close to 
UPAGRA. Thus, once he was forced to dispose of a truck full of medicinal plants which 
he was going to deliver to such a group. In addition he had an ongoing relationship with 
a few leaders who argued that he was neglecting the need to forge strong local 
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organizations which could defend the producers interests, and that his approach only 
benefitted the wealthier pro-IDA producers. Samuel, in fact, was very sensitive to these 
arguments, but he argued strongly against a political approach to the 'organisation' 
problem. He would then refer to the success of the coffee sector in Costa Rica, 
achieved through piecemeal but constant efforts at building strong organizations 
directed to production. At the same time he took the view that a union such as 
UPAGRA should be given the opportunity to defend the interests of the peasants, but 
in a peaceful way, in a collaborative spirit. He also regretted that many peasant leaders, 
with highly developed organizational and rhetorical skills were not involved in the 
establishment of local organizations. 
At the same time he was totally opposed to handling social objectives - relating 
to community issues - through the local production organization in which he was 
involved, as some radical leaders suggested. He also regretted that many of these 
characters preferred to spend their time "smoking marihuana and drinking", instead of 
working hard on their plots in order to repay their debts. 
Samuel's personal projects in relation to the bureaucracy 
I went to the field various times with Samuel, usually in his old jeep but a few times -
when his car was being repaired -1 offered to drive him around. 
Samuel was quite open about his view of the institute and about his personal 
projects. He also liked to reflect on the deceptions and tensions that working with 
smallholders entailed, on the political underpinnings of administrative life and on his 
aspiration to be paid in accordance with his professional abilities and dedication. He 
repeatedly asserted that he had little aspirations to ascend within the institute. A major 
reason for that was that he did not like office work. In addition he dreaded the kind of 
political struggles an institute's manager had to become involved in in order to maintain 
himself in that position. Moreover, he was thinking of becoming independent from the 
IDA due to the low salaries that were paid in the institute. He was even considering 
going independent and providing extension to producers on a private basis. He was 
emphatic that the only incentive he had received was the gratitude of the smallholders. 
From the administration he had received little recognition. He commented that taking 
initiatives in an institution provided no rewards, only risks. "If the chili programme had 
been a failure everyone would have blamed me. And the same holds for the new 
programmes I am involved in". 
Discussion 
In contrast to the agrarista Samuel was very dependent on his own skills and initiative 
as a técnico to gain the trust of the settlers. As became clear throughout the case 
study there are contradictions and dangers inherent in the establishing of trust 
relationships with farmers, as exemplified in the efforts by some to enroll him in their 
personal projects and by others to involve him in forms of oppositional political activity. 
In chapter 6 we will see that in order to carry out his work he had to establish 
coalitions with settlers. At the same time, however, he could not 'go native' and had to 
continue representing the point of view of the institution. For Samuel, then, the 
ideology of state intervention and control is not very helpful in pursuing his professional 
aspirations. Indeed, he has to develop a conception of settlers as individuals with 
complex life histories and involved in a series of struggles. One thing that makes 
Samuel particularly interesting is his refusal to become involved In any form of political 
activity, something which did not help him to advance his career opportunities within 
the institution. 
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4 .4 The Social Worker and the Political Approach 
Mario has been a social worker in the settlement scheme for three years and is an 
inhabitant of the neighbouring village of Pocora. As we will see, his life-story is closely 
bound up with that of the Atlantic zone and he is in some ways - but not in others - an 
exponent of a new generation of blacks who have had access to education and to the 
political system. His grandfather arrived in the Atlantic zone from Jamaica at the 
beginning of the century and was engaged as a railway worker. There he met his wife, 
and after having wandered through many places in the zone, they moved to Pocora in 
the fifties. Pocora, used to be a black village, at the edge of a settlement area where 
colonisation - often spontaneously - from the rest of the country has taken place. Its 
recent growth is mainly due to the influx of migrants attracted by the increased 
availability of land resulting from a number of land invasions of surrounding haciendas. 
Mario claims that his family belongs to the poorest sector of the black population. 
This is evidenced by the fact that when the government made it possible for them to 
acquire Costa Rican nationality, they did not see much advantage in it, as they were so 
poor that they did not expect to apply for bank credit or carry out any financial 
transactions. Nor did they learn Spanish as they did not see the point. 
Mario's father earned a living as a tractor driver on the neighbouring Bremen 
hacienda. They complemented their income with cocoa and fruit grown on some 5 
hectares of land his grandparents had inherited from the United Fruit Company. In 
contrast to his parents, who had almost no formal education, Mario attended secondary 
school and entered university. He would comment: "I belong to a very special 
generation. I am the first in my family who is not dependent on agricultural activities or 
migration for making a living". 
One experience that may have influenced his views on the region was his 
friendship with one of the sons of the owner of the neighbouring Bremen hacienda. 
Both are of the same age and have known each other since the young Rojas began to 
help his father at Bremen. In their youth they used to roam around together. Later, 
when Federico began to combine his escapades in the area (with pretty girls) with 
drinking, Mario backed out, as he cannot have liquor (nor does he smoke). 
Nevertheless, the young Rojas remained quite attached to him and offered him a job 
whenever he needed one. Later, however, when Mario became involved in the invasion 
of one of their haciendas the Rojas lost trust in him. Still they used to have a 
friendship. 
Mario recalls that he became conscious of the regional socio-economic problems 
while attending secondary school in the larger neighbouring village of Siquirres. The 
secondary school was led by a charismatic priest who encouraged social discussion at 
school. Mario became a well-known member of the school council. He also entered a 
sort of debating club in which solutions were sought for the most pressing social 
problems of the moment. He remembers that he became involved in the writing of a 
document addressing the agrarian question in the Atlantic zone called, 'tenure and 
productivity'. The pamphlet argued that the government should take care of distributing 
land in an organized way, not under the pressure of unions supported by political 
forces. A case was made for a taxation system and for the confiscation of land that 
was not used in a productive way. Their goal was to achieve a land-reform which 
would not affect agricultural productivity negatively. 
While attending school he used to help his father and worked on various 
neighbouring plantations at the weekends and in the holidays. He recalled "although I 
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was a highschool student I never lost contact with the land. I was a peasant who went 
to school". In those days the village was growing due to the establishment of banana 
plantations in two neighbouring haciendas (Bremen and Las Mercedes), a situation 
which led to an increase in labour union militancy. This was reflected in Mario's life, for 
while attending highschool he became involved in a widespread land invasion 
movement that started in the second half of the seventies. Two reasons can be singled 
out for these invasions. First, access to land was becoming difficult for locals as 
sharecropping agreements on the haciendas were being curtailed. Second, the 
expansion of the regional economy attracted many outsiders in search of land. 
Mario did well at school and for that reason was awarded a scholarship by the 
World Bank. After high school he went to university to study agronomy. He was 
already known as a good speaker and a sociable person. With regard to the choice of 
career he says, "many people were surprised that I chose agronomy as a career. They 
tried to convince me to study law as this is a profession with good monetary 
prospects. I responded that they may be right that lawyers earn more but agronomists 
produce more. I am a peasant's son of the Atlantic zone, I like agriculture and I think 
that as an agronomist I can achieve more than as a lawyer". 
It was as a student that he became involved in party politics. Shortly after 
entering university he had joined the Liberación party. He recalls that this decision was 
not really well thought out, and actually he could have joined the other large party. 
Unidad, or even one of the leftist parties. Henceforth he became active in a number of 
organizations in Pocora, such as the local development association and the local party 
branch. In university he was elected to various posts in the Student Association and 
the University Council of which he became president in 1982. He considers that was a 
very fruitful time, for 'I belonged to a batch of young and dynamic leaders who fought 
for the rights of poor students for cheap housing, scholarships, etc. Maybe we were 
not experienced, but we were not corrupt like many others, and we made a lot of 
proposals. In those times we held a dialogue with rightists and leftists and sought to 
define principled positions with regard to major problems. We did not eschew conflicts 
and were more than once persecuted by the teachers organization. There was a lot of 
corruption among them and they needed the help of the students to maintain their 
positions. We began to question the way they got scholarships and distributed them, 
their use of university resources, etc". 
Meanwhile his family situation changed. He married the daughter of a former 
manager of the Mercedes plantation and the local representative of Liberación. He has 
five children so far. His marriage, however, has not been without problems. His 
problems revolve around his wife's life-style. As he claims, "she is accustomed to 
socialize with wealthy people, thus she likes to pretend we are wealthier than we really 
are. She likes attending expensive restaurants with her friends. Though she is a teacher 
and earns more than I do, she expects me to bear the weight of the family expenses". 
Mario is well-known in his village for his integrity. As a colleague explained it, "he 
is so damned political that he cares nothing for money. You see him with holes in his 
T-shirts, neither does he drink nor is he a womanizer. His only vice is polities'. Mario 
has distinct views on politics. He has contempt for those who hope to progress 
economically through politics, for all those opportunists who think that the party will 
render them well-paid jobs. On the other hand, he understands why some politicians 
feel forced to amass a fortune, by definition in an illegal way, in order to consolidate 
their political power. With regard to this particular issue, he has been thinking about a 
system in which politicians are made managers of state enterprises, such as banana 
plantations, that would give them an economic base enhancing their independence from 
96 Chapter 4 
the country's financial elites. He has put this proposal to the party. In effect, Mario has 
come to the conclusion that the only way to resolve his financial problems is to 
become an agricultural entrepreneur. He grows one hectare of export pineapple, an 
enterprise that looks highly promising. To that effect he shares all his time between his 
work, his political activities and his pineapple plantation. In short, his obsession is the 
attainment of sufficient economic autonomy to ensure the well-being of his family and 
to enable him to participate in politics. This autonomy implies not owing anything to a 
political patron, neither being forced to act in a particular way in order to comply with 
the demands of an employer. This is one reason why he is not happy working for the 
IDA. In relation to this he comments, " 
"I have been offered many posts in local government, yet I have never been 
interested in them. Politicians expect to pay off their debts in this way. I am not 
interested in money but in ideas. In Pocora and in Limon they may say that I am a 
bad politician but no one can say that I am an opportunist. My political capital 
- consists of my reputation as someone who cannot be bought". 
The job: recruitment and functions 
Mario's recruitment for the 034 Programme happened because of his good political 
connections and because he again needed a job since his term as President of the 
Student Association had concluded. The job was offered just at the right moment. The 
job was offered by Don Roberto Arcos, who was then manager of the 034 Programme. 
"We met at a congress of the party's youth" he related. "He approached me and said 
he needed dependable people for the 034 Programme with a good knowledge of the 
local situation and asked whether I would be available". At the time he was working on 
the Macadamia estate of the Rojas family. The work was not ill-paid but it entailed a lot 
of responsibility. His intention was to get a job which gave him the opportunity to 
continue his studies. Thus, he decided to call Roberto Arcos and remind him of his 
offer. He said he would talk to the Head of the Regional Office and then he again 
interviewed him. On that occasion he was told that he had asked for information about 
him from the national Institute of Alcoholism and Drugs (IAD), where he had worked for 
a few years. He was told that they had thought him to be a valuable element, effective 
in his work and capable of handling conflict situations under difficult circumstances. 
The only thing he was criticized for was not writing reports. "He was not far off the 
mark. I really enjoyed that work" said Mario. The IAD operated with a minimum of 
resources. There was no transport and they would only occasionally receive daily 
allowances. They would travel to a community and the villagers would look after them. 
He had the opportunity to establish excellent relationships and really liked the work. He 
thought that the Programme Manager liked the idea of employing someone with the 
right local connections in an area permeated by powerful leftist organizations and who, 
in addition, could work with few resources. Thus he got the job. He said he saw it as a 
challenge, thinking that it would be similar to work with the IAD. 
In that period a sociologist was working in the Regional Office and Mario became 
his assistant. A division of labour evolved between them in which the sociologist would 
assist the Head of the Settlement on organizational issues and Mario would deal with 
daily problems. After some time the sociologist was transferred to another settlement 
because of a 'skirt' problem, (probiema de fa/das). He made a settler's daughter 
pregnant and did not want to recognize the child as he was going to marry another 
woman. One of his tasks in the settlement had been trying to set up a cooperative/He 
had not been particularly successful, because of what were, in his view, problems with 
the plantation mentality of the settlers. He made a clear distinction between 
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organization and promotion functions. According to him his major function was to 
establish policy guidelines for the productive development of the settlement, not to 
motivate settlers. Promotion or consciousness-raising tasks were practical issues, he 
said, which did not require the specialized knowledge of a sociologist. 
Cooperative organization was, according to the sociologist's model, to take place 
via established channels. It was his task to connect the settlers with the various 
agencies comprising the cooperative movement and to evaluate their progress. Of 
course Mario's task was to be the consciousness-raising one. The relationship between 
the two was not always without strains. Mario resented the sociologist's arrogance and 
aloofness towards the settlers. Many of them were old acquaintances and their 
situation seemed quite familiar to him. In contrast, the sociologist held a view of 
settlers as ex-banana workers with little decision-making capacity. Moreover Mario 
disliked the sociologist's irresponsible behaviour with regard to the settler's daughter. 
"How can we judge the settlers' actions", he exclaimed, "when we do things like this. 
Do we then have any moral authority to guide them"?. He saw the sociologist as a 
political opportunist since he used to carry membership cards during the presidential 
campaign of the two major parties. His aspiration was to take over as Head of the 
Department of Organization and Training if the opposition party won the elections, and 
all departmental heads would be replaced. 
"Actually we did little more than drive around in the car", he complained. 
"Sometimes we would visit friendly settlers. They would serve us food and treat us 
well. One of those friendly settlers was the father of the girl my companion made 
pregnant. We visited him not only because he received us well but because he had two 
very pretty daughters. In a way I feel sorry for what happened"5. Mario's attitude to 
him is typical of his relations with others whom he considered opportunists. The 
sociologist was always on friendly terms with his superiors. He would readily defend 
the institution's interests. When Mario met him somewhere he would greet him but not 
stop to talk to him. If he asked him to have a drink with him, he claimed he would say 
"later, later", for he really did not want to waste time with that sort of person. If he 
needed help, Mario would give it, but did not seek friendly relations with him. 
Nonetheless, the reason Mario was given the job was that the sociologist did not have 
the practical experience for handling day-to-day affairs. 
Mario was sometimes asked to carry out 'special' jobs. One such job was the 
'normalization' of relations between a nearby settlement and the IDA. This settlement 
had been established by invasion at the beginning of the seventies. The IDA had 
located an office there which became well-known for the head's authoritarianism and 
corruption. Consequently, a situation emerged in which the settlers would not permit 
the entry of IDA functionaries. The situation was so conflictive that there was even 
evidence of the existence of a guerrilla cell. Mario was asked to establish contact with 
the settlers' organizations. Recalling this experience he says, 
"Nobody in the institution would do this job. They did not dare. For me it was a 
challenge. I invited the members of the settlement's committee for a meeting. 
They declared me to be a fool. One said I should be hanged, not so much for being 
an IDA functionary, but for being so stupid as to go to talk to them alone. In the 
first meeting they abused me and the institution for hours, for the neglect they had 
The situation of course was more complicated and the settler was criticized by others for having 
provided the sociologist with the opportunity to get intimate with his daughter. Apparently he expected 
that the sociologist would marry her eventually. 
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been subjected to, the promises that had not been fulfilled, the practices of the 
former head, etc. I chose to be silent. When they asked me why I did not defend 
the institution I answered that I did not know about the events that had taken 
place there and that I would rather wait until they told their story before I took a 
stand. This tactic helped, for ultimately they grew tired. Their aggressiveness 
towards me subsided. They began to pity me for working for such a miserable 
outfit. I returned a few times and had conversations with the leaders who seemed 
most moderate. I knew many of them. I did not defend the IDA. I told them my 
objective was to serve as a channel of communication in order to enable them to 
benefit from new programmes if they chose to. In this way I helped to normalize 
the relationship between the IDA and the settlement. I was highly regarded for it". 
Mario received a letter of congratulations from the regional director, and the Head of 
the Training and Organisation department of the IDA (DOCAE) asked the personnel 
department to give him a living allowance, something which was conferred only on 
functionaries who had been transferred from other areas. They allowed him to change 
his address to Guácimo to fix that. He told me that in those times he was regarded as 
the big man, "the fixer", he said. Subsequently, Mario specialized in jobs like ensuring 
that leftist elements were not elected to committees, etc. He became a trusted person, 
responsible for 'delicate tasks'. 
A bureaucratic social drama 
Mario's relationship to his superiors suddenly changed in a negative way when he got 
involved in a political struggle. The events took place shortly after the presidential 
elections. He had been working hard for a promising but relatively unknown candidate 
for the Liberación party, Oscar Arias. Arias was an outsider in the party's top echelons. 
He got there as head of the party's youth section to which Mario also belonged. Arias 
also depended on a generation of young and dynamic leaders, most of them coming 
from the party's youth. Mario did a lot of campaigning for him in Pocora. Mario had 
also been able to convince a former colleague of his, Rolando, to campaign for Arias. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, after Arias surprisingly won, a fight for the position of 
General Manager of the IDA between Chavez and Arcos ensued. Arcos obtained the 
position thanks to his connection with the 034 Programme and the support of the 
USAID consultant. Arcos intended to improve management through a decentralization 
scheme, which entailed giving more power to the regions. Accordingly, he forced 
through the establishment of the position of Regional Director. As expected, he chose 
as the candidate for Regional Director of the Atlantic zone one of his supporters, 
Fernando Campos; who at the time was the Head of the Neguev Settlement. We also 
saw in Chapter 2 that an alliance had been forged between Roberto Arcos and the 
Settlement Heads of the 034 Programme. 
Chavez, still in rivalry to Arcos, decided to strike at Arcos' base of support and 
started to plot to get his own man into the Regional Directors' post.6 Chavez 
supported Rolando, who had a long experience in the Atlantic zone, using the argument 
that since his candidate had supported the party, and thus the election of Arias as 
President, he should be rewarded with the position. At the same time a campaign 
started, to discredit Fernando on the argument that he was not even a Liberacionista, 
but a supporter of the opposition party Unidad. Accordingly an open letter was sent 
with signatures of a majority of the frontline workers to the Executive President of the 
IDA and Liberación politicians. Mario, for the same political reasons, and because they 
"See chapter 2 on the wider significance of this institutional struggle. 
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had worked together for President Arias campaign, supported Rolando. This support got 
him into trouble with the General Manager, Roberto Arcos, and his local boss Fernando 
Campos. 
Suffering 'politicalpersecution' 
The relationship between Mario and Fernando grew sour after the attempted 'coup' to 
oust him. Fernando resented Mario's involvement since he had been the only native 
functionary to have supported it. In fact, Fernando thought that Mario had been behind 
the whole conspiracy and that he was the instigator of the letter. However, the whole 
history was more complicated. The manoeuvre had been well-planned. As Mario recalls. 
"I was invited to a meeting at the house of a local politician. Jesús Chavez himself 
was there and a few extensionists. There was really good food and lots of booze. 
We started to plot for Rolando. When they started to get drunk they began to 
divide amongst them the most important positions in the Atlantic zone. One 
extensionist would become head of the extensionist unit, another head of another 
settlement, a local politician head of the Neguev settlement, etc. I would become 
Head of La Lucha, which is a sector within Neguev. I spent a pleasant time, though 
I do not drink, observing all the people getting drunk and talking bullshit". 
Once I asked him why he took part in this coup. Mario answered, 
"It was not ambition, for I honestly did not believe that we had a great chance to 
win the fight. I was experienced enough to know that political action by 
functionaries against a superior could not have much success, and ft was clear to 
me that Jesús Chavez had lost the game". And after reflecting some time he 
continued, "the truth is that I participated because I considered that Rolando 
deserved the job, as he had been a dedicated campaign-worker, in contrast to 
Fernando. It was a political choice, and I consider that in politics it is more 
important to loose a battle after a heavy fight than to avoid it". 
However, the consequences were highly negative for him. One of the técnicos of the 
Neguev office who supported Fernando told him about the letter. Fernando, in turn, 
informed Roberto Arcos who called Mario by radio. Mario recalls, "he said to me that 
he would consider every action against Fernando an attack against himself, and that he 
would annihilate everyone in Neguev who was causing trouble". 
This was an important setback for Mario. His party had won the elections and he 
had been a committed local supporter of the new president. Nonetheless, he had got 
into trouble with an influential politician like Roberto Arcos. Thereafter he experienced a 
period that he characterizes as 'political persecution'. His regional allowance was 
withdrawn - a considerable financial loss, half his monthly salary. He was no longer 
allowed to use a vehicle. "I had to do everything myself", he says. "In a few months I 
lost weight, several pounds. Sometimes it was humiliating, to see the others driving 
around in the cars while I sweated on the road". One consequence, though, was that 
his relationship with settlers improved remarkably. They liked a functionary who walked 
in and out of their farmsteads instead of driving. 
Some time later another incident took place. The Executive President of the IDA 
phoned the Regional Office ordering Mario and another extensionist working in the 
settlement to present themselves as soon as possible at headquarter's. Mario thought 
his luck had changed, that he was going to get a promotion. He travelled to San José in 
the company of functionaries from another settlement. When they heard he was going 
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to have an interview with the Executive President they asked not to be forgotten if he 
got an important position. 
However, when he met the Executive President his joy rapidly disappeared. He 
accused them of creating dissent in the regional office and Mario, in particular, of 
organizing invasions in the region, producing a newspaper clipping in which two IDA 
functionaries were accused of fomenting invasions. He feared for his job. Luckily some 
people spoke later on his behalf. One of them was Pennycot, a well-known peasant 
leader active in land invasions. Fernando had asked him whether Mario had been 
involved in the invasion of a large adjacent hacienda. Pennycot denied it. Mario thought 
this, in effect, saved him, though he did not know why. According to him Pennycot 
had absolutely no reason to do so. 
Relationship with settlers: the client-official interface 
Mario's relationship with settlers was characterized by the following statement, "I am 
always careful not to be unjust to anyone, since in fact I am a peasant like them. If I 
lost my job as an IDA functionary, I would not like people to say that I took advantage 
of my position as a bureaucrat. I will probably need their help later". Mario was always 
amiable to settlers, and always ready to meet a request. Yet, he was not considered a 
good functionary by settlers, for he simply did not fulfill his obligations towards 
producer's organizations. He was expected to assist them in various ways: in their 
internal organization and in intermediation with other institutions. Yet, he had no 
specified work programme in relation to the settler's associations. In effect, his 
operational style could best be described as rather ad-hoc, without specific targets. 
This situation was not due to lack of interest in his job, but with a particular way 
of dealing with the contradictory and conflictive character of state intervention. The 
034 Programme had led to a pattern of heavy dependence by the settlers on the IDA 
and this had led to most functionaries seeing settlers as dependent, atomist, conflictive 
and in search of vertical asymmetrical relationships with powerful parties. Mario, who 
felt socially much closer to the settlers in Neguev than to the other officials could not 
take such a rigid view. Indeed, his involvement in the 'local' world of the settlers 
sometimes led to his becoming entangled in conflicts which had much to do with the 
history of IDA intervention in Neguev. 
Next, a telling incident will be discussed which illustrates such conflict. 
Conflictive client-official interfaces 
In February of 1988, a number of abandoned plots were invaded by sons of settlers 
and day labourers. Before taking action, the invaders had attempted to secure the 
support of the community and in particular of a radical leader, Porfirio, who was known 
to be involved with UPAGRA and who had a prominent reputation for his militancy and 
fighting qualities. After the IDA intervened in this settlement a tiresome stalemate 
ensued between radical settlers and the IDA. 
One of the plots occupied belonged to a nephew of Nicolas, a well-known 
member of the pro-IDA association of small producers. In fact, Nicolas had always 
actively cultivated a good relationship with the Settlement Head, especially by taking a 
strong stand against radicals such as Porfirio. On this particular day I accompanied 
Mario to one of the sectors of Neguev with the highest support for UPAGRA, 
Bellavista. On arriving at the community center in order to stick a few posters on the 
wall we met with some settlers. Mario, as usual greeted them with much joviality. He 
started inquiring whether the plots were still occupied after the police visit. At a certain 
moment he said, "Nicolas is saying that Porfirio is organizing invasions within the 
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settlement". One of the settlers, an old staunch UPAGRA supporter then exclaimed, 
"Well, I will tell Porfirio what Nicolas is saying. He has already been warned not to tell 
lies about him and the union. You will see, Porfirio will give him a sound thrashing. 
Moreover, (and this he said in order to scare Mario), I will tell him that you are 
spreading around Nicolas' accusations. I saw Mario growing unsettled. "Well", he 
smiled, "those where not the words that Nicolas used. Actually, I was just joking and I 
guess Nicolas was not entirely serious either. The old settler responded with a laugh, 
yet with a malicious tone: "No, Mario, you are wrong, functionaries should always be 
serious about what they say. After all you are paid for that, aren't you? The other 
settlers joined in what became a joyful exercise of functionary teasing. Mario tried to 
swallow his worries and started to joke with the settlers. Later, in the car he said to 
me, "I am in trouble now. Porfirio will use this politically and say that I am concerting a 
campaign against UPAGRA". Then I suggested to him that we go to Porfirio and explain 
the situation. Mario agreed immediately. 
Porfirio invited us in, showing his usual hospitality. "Mario, what a surprise to 
receive a visit from you, that is not very common, is it?", he exclaimed, not without a 
sting of mockery. We sat down, and after an introductory chat on current issues he 
said to us, "Well, I imagine that you have not only come to share a pleasant moment". 
Then I told him that there were rumours about his involvement in the invasions and that 
we were interested to hear the truth from the source. I also told him about the 
'incident'. First he reacted angrily towards the pro-IDA settler, Nicolas. "Now the time 
has come that I should teach him a lesson for a liar and traitor of his class". Then he 
explained that it had been UPAGRA's position ail the way not to become involved in 
invasions unless they were based on a clear programme concerning organization and 
production. 
"That means that if we, as an organization, support invasions we do it openly and 
that we will seek negotiations with the government aimed at finding solutions to 
the peasants' problems, not only with respect to access to land, but also with 
regard to credit and extension. However, in this particular case I am a community 
member and I thought it was important to show my solidarity with some of the 
invaders". 
And he enlarged upon his comment; 
"Take the case of Juancito, I have known him since he was a child. He is a 
hard-working lad and has a wife and children. He needs the land. The parcel he 
occupied is owned by an investor from San José, a speculator who only has a few 
cows on the plot, on what is fine land for agriculture. This boy came to me to ask 
for advise. I said to him that the help I could render him was the same as that of 
other community members. That the responsibility was his but that he could only 
maintain himself on the land with the moral and material support of the 
community. Yesterday I helped him to build his shack. 
"By the way", he inquired, "is he still there? I hope so for him". He continued, "What is 
your opinion on these issues, of the relationship between the institution you work for 
and the peasants. You are so quiet Mario, I am curious to know what your point of 
view is. After all I do not have every day a chance to discuss these issues with a 
functionary". At that instance he began to recall sourly how the IDA had done 
everything to blacken them, to marginalize them, during and after the invasion. In the 
meantime Mario held his eyes closed, his hands crossed like he was preaching. When 
Porfirio finished he waited a few seconds and commented. 
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"I consider that some of us do not function satisfactorily. Not all of us are as 
motivated as we should be. I agree with you that the relationship between settlers 
and the institution could be improved considerably. We need to generate 
mechanisms to find solutions for a number of problems concerning the production 
conditions of the settlers. This is a position on which some of my superiors 
probably do not agree, but I maintain it here and if necessary would do so in front 
of the Executive President of the IDA. I do not know whether you are right or not 
to blame the IDA for the problems you have been listing. I am relatively new in the 
institution so I was not present when all these events you mentioned took place. 
However, I should stress that since I chose to be a functionary of the IDA, I have 
the moral obligation to defend the principles and objectives of the institution". 
The peasant leader was rather pleased with this answer, as he argued that it was at 
least honest. 
Mario's relationship with settlers, however, was not always so careful as with 
this particular peasant leader. In fact, he enjoyed talking to them and is very candid 
when he talks about his personal situation, his problems with his superiors and above 
all the struggle for getting back his regional allowance. I was often amazed about his 
openness on these issues. As he once told a leader of the association on a visit, 
"I know I have been a bad promotor, that you have every reason to be angry with 
me. I hope that when I solve my conflict with the institution over the regional 
allowance I will have more time to spend on you. This has become a matter of 
principle. A week ago I had an interview with an Assistant to the President and I 
told him plainly that I am suffering political persecution by the General Manager of 
the IDA, Roberto Arcos". 
On the other hand he knew how to make settlers laugh. He liked to present himself as 
a peasant and enjoyed telling about life in the region in the past. No one had a grudge 
against him. Many considered him as inefficient, even ignorant, but nobody said he was 
arrogant or authoritarian. At any rate he was accessible. 
Relationship with colleagues: the administrative domain 
Amiability also characterized his relationship with his colleagues. They liked him for his 
good humour and his jokes. He kept good relations with both factions into which the 
regional office was divided. He also took care to act as a good colleague. One 
consequence of this was that on several occasions he faced conflicts with his superiors 
for lending out his motor bike. However, this amiability is not entirely disinterested. He 
would take mornings or afternoons off to work on his pineapple plot. He knew he 
needed the good-will of his colleagues and immediate superiors to maintain this 
freedom. That meant that he must be ready to do special jobs during weekends and 
holidays. 
With regard to his work situation Mario would complain that no discussion in the 
administrative domain was possible. Addressing the he would argue, 
"If I talked with my colleagues about the issues we discuss they would accuse me 
of introducing politics into the office. I already have a reputation of being too 
independent. It could even be dangerous if someone became enthusiastic about 
some of the issues I would like to propose. If a Fernando supporter should hear this 
I might be accused of trying to take his position. Fernando himself would certainly 
take this view. I used to talk with Y about regional issues and he seemed 
interested, but I have stopped doing so". 
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Accordingly he adopted a rather critical attitude towards his colleagues, and in doing so 
he likes to reflect on their moral character, on their political involvement and on their 
dependence upon illegal economic sources. As we have seen above, Mario has a strong 
wish to improve his economic situation and he holds to the view that the institutional 
system should offer the officials enough opportunities so that they do no have to resort 
to forms of corruption. Thus he would adopt an ambiguous, though critical, position 
towards the agraristas. whom he suspected of accepting bribes. On the one hand he 
argued that it was quite natural for them to take advantage of this opportunity to earn 
something extra, on the other hand that it would be more dignified for them to engage 
in some independent commercial or agricultural enterprise, as he himself did. 
Interestingly, he would address this issue in a series of discussions he had with one MP 
from LimOn, suggesting that functionaries should be given the opportunity to start their 
own enterprises - if possibly cooperative ones - so that their economic needs would not 
come into contradiction with the service delivery ethos. 
He was not less critical of those who used politics to improve their standing in 
the institution. For, in his view this was an opportunistic stand that betrayed a lack of 
'principles'. He could be quite scathing about those who would measure their actions 
with a view to pleasing their patrons. In effect, he would be very critical of his fellow 
colleagues in other settlements for not being able to confront difficult situations 
without calculating the possible consequences for their institutional careers. It was 
precisely this lack of political independence which, in his view, led to an image of the 
functionary as irresponsible and disinterested on the part of the settler. 
But his attitude towards the institution was somewhat ambiguous. Thus he would 
comment, 
"I agree with most of the objectives of the IDA, and I think that the institution 
plays an important function. However, I do not think that there are chances within 
the institution for me to develop myself. When I have to spend weekends walking 
kilometres while other functionaries refuse to go there because the four-wheel 
drive car jumps too much, I become quite demotivated. If I go, I do ft for the 
settler, but actually it makes no difference to them. It would be quite different if 
they were my employers and I were compelled to give accounts to them. Besides, 
why should I undertake all sorts of ethically doubtful jobs for the miserable salary 
they pay me. No, I am a simple functionary and I should behave like one". 
And he would give the following example of the sort of moral stance he had towards 
settlers. 
"Some time ago the wife of a settler said to me that all functionaries were thieves. 
I am no thief, what could I steal? I agree with her in that I steal time from the 
institution. But no one cares. Time seems to be no scarce resource at the IDA. My 
actual priorities are my family, the pineapple enterprise and getting back my 
regional allowance". 
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4.5 Concluding Remarks: Policy Internalization and the Creation of 
Autonomy 
As we have seen in the case studies, front-line workers have to deal with conflicting 
demands coming from both clients and the administrative environment. In contrast with 
desk-level functionaries - who operate exclusively within an administrative domain or 
who are able to enforce a clear separation between administrative and service delivery 
tasks - front-line workers have to handle problematic situations in the field, in a context 
of highly personalized expectations. The ensuing tension is manifested by the fact that 
they are seen as representatives of a legitimate authority (in the case of the IDA, a 
state agency pursuing the welfare of its beneficiaries through the provision of land and 
other necessary conditions for becoming a successful farmer) while at the same time 
being confronted with a series of power struggles and social contradictions which 
constitute the everyday reality of service delivery. 
In contrast to views of front-line workers as alienated characters, it becomes 
apparent through the case studies that they, like other people, are not cynical 
characters who say things they do not believe in and do things they know are wrong. 
Neither do they lack the ability to differentiate between the ideals they purportedly are 
striving for and the much less ideal practices they become engaged in. At the same 
time, the argument that front-line workers adopt pragmatic attitudes appears to be too 
general, for, as the case studies show, they might adopt differential attitudes towards 
beneficiaries, on the basis of the various demands and pressures they are subject to (de 
Vries, forthcoming). 
The three officials had in common a large - but in the case of the agrarista a 
dwindling - motivation to relate to settlers. Indeed, Mario, the social worker had the 
tendency to 'go native', whereas the extensionist, Samuel, assumed a position towards 
his beneficiaries which was described by many (both settlers and functionaries) as 
paternalistic - but not clientelistic -, and the agrarista made efforts to deal with them in 
a just and impartial way before he decided to opt for a greater distance. The social 
worker recurrently became entangled in political struggles involving radical settlers, 
loyal settlers and bureaucrats. As a result, he was not able to exercise much 
institutional authority. This, however, was in accordance with his attempts to distance 
himself from the authoritarian attitude of his superiors while maintaining good 
relationships with people in the locality. The extensionist, in turn, had to take much 
care to distance himself from radical settlers who attempted to use the problems that 
arose in the implementation of the programmes for political purposes. At the same time 
he had difficulties in maintaining relationships of trust with "loyal" settlers without 
having to engage in paternalistic practices which, in his view, reduced the 
organisational capacity of the producer's organisation. (In Chapter 6 we will see how 
this tension led to a rupture between him and the traditional leaders). 
Both the extensionist (Samuel) and the social worker (Mario) were able to develop 
a degree of autonomy towards the institution. However, the reasons for doing so and 
the strategies they followed were different. The extensionist in his wariness of political 
involvement and institutional intrigues spent all his energy on his work. His institutional 
network consisted of a few friendship with people, whom he trusted for their 
professionalism. He certainly did not engage in patron-client relationships which could 
be utilized politically. The social worker, in contrast, in his commitment to politics 
would not make a neat distinction between political and bureaucratic decisions. This, 
however, was not without costs as he became the object of marginalisation. Yet, he 
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was able to exploit the events for the purpose of accumulating political capital as an 
independent politician. At the same time he knew that he was the only person with the 
capacity to undertake certain, "delicate" tasks, a knowledge which enabled him to 
concentrate on his other, more personal, endeavours. 
Both functionaries had high expectations for the future with regard to their 
involvement in non-bureaucratic commercial enterprises (Mario with his pineapple plot, 
Samuel as a member of a guava cooperative). In fact, they saw this as a possible 
avenue for becoming financially independent from the bureaucracy. Engagement in 
such activities, however, was in the case of Samuel directed to continuing his 
involvement with small-scale agriculture, whereas in the case of Mario the motivation 
was that of creating the necessary financial independence for furthering his political 
activities. 
From the foregoing we can conclude that these front-line workers handled their 
involvement in political, institutional, local and economic networks in such a way as to 
develop operational styles which enabled them to establish a space for manoeuvre, that 
is to enhance their power of discretion in their dealings with settlers. In making the 
distinction between the different social pressures officials were confronted with - those 
in the implementation and the locality contexts - it could be argued that the social 
worker was interested in cultivating relationships oriented to 'locality', whereas the 
técnico concentrated on the tasks of service delivery. The administrative process was a 
reality which they certainly had to deal with, yet, they were able to adopt a certain 
autonomy. 
This was different in the case of Moisés, the agrarista, who from the beginning 
adopted the administrative perspective. He did this thanks to his capacity and 
willingness to internalize what I earlier called the ideology of state intervention, so 
much so that he came to identify himself in large measure with the 'state project'. An 
operational style based on such a strategic option, however, is not an evident, or 
unproblematic choice. As we saw in the case of Moisés it implied that he had to accept 
a number of 'facts' about the administrative reality which did not correspond to his 
initial aspirations and social outlook, and modify his operational style in accordance 
with the administrative imperatives of exercising social control. 
It must be emphasized that such a strategy is not an easy one. It certainly implies 
more than adopting a 'bureaucratic' rubber stamp attitude. For taking up the 
administrative perspective entails processing a set of contradictory experiences in such 
a way that they may conform with an ideology which holds to the right and even the 
obligation of the state to intervene; in, and if necessary shape, the livelihoods of people. 
Holding to such an ideology entails that the legitimacy of the state never be 
questioned, and much less negotiated (as the social worker was quite ready to do). 
We can conclude then that the way in which the ideology of state intervention is 
internalized is not at all a self-evident, mechanical process. In effect, such process is 
fraught by all sorts of practical and moral problems, as front-line workers recurrently 
have to face the contradictions inherent to state intervention itself. These 
contradictions (i.e. social justice vs. social control, the client as a case vs. the client as 
a complex individual) must be tackled differently in the administrative domain from the 
field domain. In addition the functionary carries a heavy cognitive load deriving from his 
involvement in local socio-political networks. 
It will be argued in the next chapter that this is a more complex view than those 
held by authors such as Grindle (1980) and Lipsky (1980) who tend to view 
implementors' strategies in terms of ways for coping with the (structural) constraints to 
the implementation of state policy. In effect, some front-line workers become very 
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good in representing the state, whereas others may be inclined to side with 
beneficiaries in subverting the authority of the state. The point then is that not only the 
goals of state policy are transformed in the process of implementation, but also the 
meaning of state intervention. The result is that the ideology of intervention comes to 
mean different means to different front-line workers in different implementation 
contexts. 
CHAPTER 5 
A THEORETICAL INTERLUDE 
5.1 Introduction 
It is expedient now to summarize the argument, so far. In Chapter 2 an analysis of the 
IDA and the 034 Programme was presented which focussed on competition between 
institutional projects representing different views of how the IDA should confront 
landlessness, rural conflict and colonization, it was argued that an advantage of an 
approach centering on competition between institutional projects is that it enables usto 
develop^ an understanding of institutions which_takes._ account of their jMnfljctive 
historical evolution as against approaches which view institutions as homogenous 
'components of a state apparatus. 
" Chapter 3~TocusserJ~on front-Tine workers and administrators. The analysis centred 
on how front-line workers sustain an ideology of intervention which was aimed jo_ 
eradicate politics from the implementation process through the employment of 
techniques of individualization. The delivery of credit and extension to individuals 
~~corresponded with an implementation model in which the beneficiary was viewed as an 
individual client who in return for specific services and goods, should comply to the 
institutional objective of transforming them into entrepreneurial farmer. In this way it 
was hoped to transform patterns of client-institution relations that were based upon 
sets of political transactions between the institution and groups of settlers into a more 
effective type of relationship between beneficiaries and the IDA. In making a distinction 
between the administrative domain, where this model of the 'client' was predominant, 
and the field domain where social interaction between front-line workers and farmers 
takes a personalized character it was possible to show the contradiction* of t h ' « 
intervention ideology. Whereas in the administrative domain labelling plays an important 
XPjejJrijyTeJi^ 
with beneficiaries. . ~~—'—~ * 
*" ChapterTHInalysed three contrasting styles of operation developed by front-line 
workers. It was argued there tha^ont-jine workers not only—haye_J:o_jcope wjthjthe 
contradictions of impie^entatic^^ yaryjpg 
JlsetsjoT^ was also 
"iflrtowTnfiaTTro^^ operational styles, internalize these sets 
oJLpressures and demands in differing ways. " 
However, so far the analysis~~Rasnremained centred on institutional life and 
intervention practices. Little attention has yet been paid to the strategic ways in which 
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state-subjects deal with state intervention: i.e. to intervention-coping. This requires that 
we develop additional concepts that enable us to study how farmers/beneficiaries 
developTlnodes of~jet^n 3 a » ^ l I ^ B 9 t L - i ^ f e . . .oreyig"f~^eriences— w i t h 8 t a j e _ 
^reaucracies. theThrust of the argument is that in order to analyseliow~la7mers' 
aiJpTopriate state intervention it is necessary to develop a notion of discursive strategy. 
I will briefly lay out the rationale for a discourse-oriented perspective by pinpointing 
some basic differences between the world-views of front-line workers and those of 
farmers/beneficiaries. 
A rationale for centering on intervention-coping strategies 
Bureaucrats, such as implementors, share a bureaucratic world-view which differs in 
important ways from that of the populations they attempt to target and service. Or, in 
other words, they defend the perspective of the state and its idiom of authority. In 
contrast, farmers in the Atlantic zone are not constrained by one and the same world-
view. Thus in the coming chapters we will encounter settlers with differing attitudes to 
life and farming: some with an entrepreneurial outlook, others exhibiting the 
individualist attitude of a frontier world-view, and others holding to radical and 
collectivist views. 
In the case of the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica three major types of discursive 
practice can be defined which play a role in local struggles on how to organise the 
relationship with state agencies: those of community, ofjd^mo^racyand of agricultural 
modernization. We will see in the coming chapters that certelrTsettieTsTre highly skilled 
I n adapting" such discursive practices to the dynamics of the local situation. The point, 
then, is that such types of discursive practice come to mean different things to 
different people in different types of encounters and local settings. This, I think, is 
different from the world of bureaucrats, where the intervention ideology - though weak 
and unconvincing it may be in particular settings - remains a constant in bureaucratic 
encounters. 
It is my argument that these types of discursive practice are appropriated by 
settlers, and that in the process particular intervention-coping strategies are 
constructed for dealing with state institutions. These strategies are the outcome of a 
series of local struggles and conflicts over how to deal with the state bureaucracy, in 
which various - often competing - groups of farmers are involved. In these struggles, 
there exist particular arguments, themes or discursive practices; and it is precisely 
through their articulation and deployment in particular arenas that intervention-coping 
strategies are shaped. Yet it must be emphasized that such intervention-coping 
strategies come about within specific localand historical contexts. Strategies, then", 
cannot be interred trofTnJiSTfslsum^ can they be constructed 
on the basis of general or a-historical theories (e.g. Chayanovian ideas of peasant 
economy). Instead, I argue that they can only be studied by analysing how social actors 
develop local and interest-specific strategic 'languages' {or discursive strategies) for 
dealing with the authority of the state. 
Organisation of the chapter 
This chapter is meant as a theoretical interlude and its aim is twofold. First, a number 
of concepts that were introduced in previous chapters will be placed within a wider 
theoretical discussion. Such a discussion has been avoided so far. Yet, it must be 
stressed that underlying concepts such as 'intervention ideology' and 'social interfaces' 
are important theoretical debates concerning the 'role of the state' and 'local 
bureaucracy' in planned Intervention, the nature of implementation in service delivery-
and Third World contexts, the relationship between policy discourse and labelling, etc. 
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The second aim of this chapter is to form a bridge between an approach centred on 
bureaucrats' operational 'styles' and another which focuses on settlers' intervention-
coping 'strategies'. 
The chapter is organised as follows: First, I discuss Grindle's institutional 
approach to the state in order to assess the usefulness of the concept of development 
ideology for understanding state intervention. Second, two theories of implementation 
are examined: Grindle's discussion of implementation in the Third World and Lipsky's 
analysis of implementation in service delivery bureaucracies. The conclusion will be that 
implementation cannot be studied without taking into account the ways in which 
different sets of social actors adapt and transform the ideologies of intervention. Third, 
a few interpretive approaches to the relationship between the bureaucracy and its 
clients are critically reviewed: Handelman's interface approach focusing on bureaucratic 
world-views and Long's interfaces approach concentrating on structural discontinuities. 
The purpose of this discussion is to appraise the usefulness of such approaches for 
understanding the strategies clients/beneficiaries develop to gain access to state 
resources. Four, a critical approach to the relationship between the bureaucracy and 
beneficiaries from the perspective of public administration will be discussed: the work 
on the organisation of access and eligibility as developed by Bernard Shaffer and his 
co-workers. Four, a critical review will be presented of approaches to development 
administration which focus on labelling as an element of administrative practices. This 
will be followed by a discussion of Apthorpe's work on the deconstruction of policy 
languages. By then the path will be cleared for the elaboration of a theoretical 
framework for the analysis of intervention-coping strategies with special emphasis on 
discursive practice.1 
i i I 
5.2 An Institutional Approach to the State f 
j ' 
In examining the institutional context in which state policy is designed and executed 
Grindle (1977) focuses on relations of loyalty between officials belonging to rings 
(argollas) based on similarities in generation, education, social or regional origins, etc. 
These argollas are differentiated in composition and hierarchical in structure, claiming 
loyalty to a caudillo type state-leader. In addition they are subject to restructuring on 
the occasion of changes in the political regime. Policy within this view is made at the 
top and transformed in the course of the bureaucratic and political negotiation process. 
At the same time, inter-agency competition and the need to secure the support of 
important political actors such as governors and powerful private interests become 
'It should be noted that recently in the dutch context a number of important debates have been going 
on on development administration and bureaucracies (Quarles van Ufford Ph., Kruyt D. and Downing T., 
1988) and on changing perceptions and conceptions of the development problematic (HOsken, F.D., Kruyt 
D. and Quarles van Ufford Ph., 1984). However, in this book I have chosen to focus on approaches which 
make an explicit connection between intervention ideologies, bureaucratic labelling and the state, rather 
than discussing the relationship between particular images of development and bureaucratic organisation, 
or issues concerning the linkages between levels in development administration, and between state and 
non-state organisations (see various contributions in Nas P., Schoorl J. and Galjart B., 1989). In adopting 
an actor-oriented approach I am interested in the (discursive) practices through which modes of labelling as 
well as notions of state legitimacy are fashioned. The dutch debate revolves around the relationship 
between the state as an agent of development, the changing roles of development organisations, and 
attendant ideologies of development. Reviewing it would have meant addressing the vast literature on 
'development and organisation', something I have avoided. 
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important obstacles in the implementation process, with the result that original policy 
goals are diluted. With every regime change, the process, then, starts anew. Again, 
programmes and related implementation structures (new agencies, coordination 
mechanisms, etc.) are designed in order to tackle the same set of problems with the 
difference that the 'development ideology' will probably be different. 
Grindle's account is theoretically interesting, as she develops an insightful view of 
the relationship between political culture and the policy process. She examines the 
policy process from the perspective of the development of the Mexican state and, in 
relation to this, takes into consideration the central role of organizations such as the 
PRI (the state party) and the CNC (the National Peasants' Confederation) and other 
corporatist state organizations in maintaining social order. By focusing on decision-
making in the context of bureaucratic negotiation she identifies the sets of transactions 
that pattern the relationship among the different institutional and non-institutional 
actors, in what is basically a transactionalist patron-client model. By combining such a 
model with an analysis of the Mexican's state historically evolved practices of social 
control, she is able to describe the gap between the objectives and actual outcomes of 
policy analysis. Moreover, by showing that practices of social control are explicit 
conditions for, and effects of, state intervention she shows that the policy process 
cannot, for practical purposes, be separated from the process of political negotiation. 
However, in my view her approach is limited since it does not account for the 
ways in which functionaries interpret and come to terms with abstract policy 
statements and development ideologies. It is not enough to concentrate on observable 
transactions. We should also study how functionaries invest their actions with 
meaning, appropriate policy models, and how they develop forms of practical 
knowledge which become embodied within particular intervention projects.2 
Grindle (1986) elaborates on the same approach in her book Development Policy 
and Agrarian Politics in Latin America, in which she presents a theoretical approach for 
analysing the relationship between socio-economic factors (investment patterns within 
the framework of capitalist accumulation) and political factors and the role of the state 
within the Latin American context. In contrast to neo-marxist structuralist analysis she 
conceives of the state as a major actor in shaping the ideology and content of 
development activities, although she basically agrees with de Janvry's (1981) neo-
marxist assessment of the outcomes of agricultural modernization (Grindle 1986:3). 
In critizicing the view that state policy is derivative of class relationships she sets 
out to demonstrate the state elite's variable capacity for autonomous decision-making 
by focusing on issues like policy choice, political leadership, and state expansion (p.4), 
and by linking the content of state policy to the development ideologies held by state 
elites (p.5). In addition, she provides a historical case for concentrating on the 
development ideologies influencing state policy, by arguing that the state anticipated 
capitalist expansion in agriculture by establishing in the 1940's and 1950's an 
extensive administrative and political infrastructure in the countryside, before 
widespread capitalist investment in export agriculture. This laid the basis for a situation 
in which subsequently, "the state was [thus] able to increase its power vis-è-vis 
specific social classes or alliances, and individual agencies acquired control over policy 
areas that they then used to build their own political and bureaucratic bases" (idem). 
institutional projects, it has been argued, are shaped by the changing relationships between the 
institution, the political environment and client constituencies. I have shown, for the Costa Rican case, 
that these relationships can be conceived in terms of sets of negotiations within a historically evolved 
framework of institutional commitments, values and understandings. These in turn are the result of a sort 
of institutional memory which shapes notions of bureaucratic responsibility and authority. 
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Furthermore, she argues, "so extensive and ongoing was the growth of the state's 
intervention and so varied was the use of its resources that its activities cannot be fully 
encompassed by an explanation that rests on capitalist dominance and crisis 
management alone" (idem)". 
In developing a theoretical framework for analyzing the social origin of state 
policy she draws on the Weberian tradition. Thus, she defines the state as "an enduring 
executive and administrative apparatus that makes authoritative decisions and 
exercises control over a given territorial entity". In laying out her own approach she 
critizices theories deriving from the corporatist approach (the bureaucratic politics 
approach) for leaving unaccounted the state's linkage? to organized economic interests 
or considering these as "part of bureaucratic games in which public agencies acquire 
support groups to press organizational or suborganizational interests on formal decision 
makers". Consequently, in this view interest groups are largely viewed as being 
incorporated into the extended state, hence according little autonomy to societal 
groups. I 
Finally, she argues for an approach which, in addition to focusing on the role of 
state elites in the formulation and implementation of public policies, "accounts more 
fully for the linkages between state and society in terms of the variable autonomy of 
the state" (p. 17). 3 Moreover, she contends that state autonomy is a desirable 
condition sought after by state elites. She also asserts that "relative degrees of 
autonomy vary over time and across policy arenas" (p. 18). Thus, in her account of 
state intervention in agricultural and rural economies in Latin America she accords 
special significance to development models or ideologies which, she argues 
"not only explained the causes of the economic problems suffered by the region or 
nation: they also proposed specific policy solutions to these conditions, thereby 
providing a concrete guide to state actions to change existing realities. Policy 
makers, therefore, had definite perceptions of how economic growth was to be 
achieved and they attempted to ensure that state policies actually conformed to 
their interpretations of cause-and-effect relationships in economic growth" (p.19). 
In my view, her approach is highly significant as she breaks open the rigid discussion 
on the state by focusing on institutional practices in an original way. At the same time 
she avoids the ahistoricity of managerialist decision-making models which assume the 
existence of a bureacratic rationality underlying the policy process. By focusing on the 
role of important institutional actors such as policy makers she makes it possible to 
develop a view of state activity as a set of social practices which cannot be reduced to 
the workings of a class or a mode of production. 
Yet, in my view her approach, though insightful, exhibits various shortcomings. 
Her focus on policy making by state elites without assuming an a priori type of linkage 
between the state and societal socio-economic interests is correct. In this respect her 
remarks on the timing of state action in relation to the different stages and types of 
3As she puts it, her approach "accepts the possibility that the state, as an executive and administrative 
apparatus for decision making and control, has identifiable and concrete concerns about the definition and 
pursuit of national development... These concerns are independent of, but not necessarily opposed to or 
different from, the immediate interests or welfare of any particular group, class, class fraction, coalition, or 
alliance in society. This perspective ... provides a framework for focusing on the development belief 
systems (development ideologies) of policy makers and planners, on the formulation and implementation of 
specific decisions, and on the skills and influence of particular leaders" (p. 17). However, she pays little 
attention to how front-line workers and administrators adopt, appropriate and transform such development 
ideologies, so as to become instrumental for dealing with the contradictions of state intervention. 
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investment in agriculture in Latin America are highly pertinent. Second, her focus on 
development models/ideologies and their unintended consequences for development 
may provide useful insights into policy discourse without discarding them as mere 
justificatory instruments. 
Since official development models are not applied comprehensively to specific 
realities I argue that it is important to examine the ways in which officials appropriate, 
modify and transform these ideologies by giving them local and practical significance. 
Thus the conceptual limitations of her state-centred approach lies in the fact that she 
refrains from inquiring into how various social actors accord meaning to notions of 
'development' and 'modernization'. Underlying her analysis is an idealist conception of 
social action in which the work of state officials is determined by particular 
development "ideologies", arising within the given framework of capitalist (institutional) 
modernization. 
Another major point of criticism concerns Grindle's neglect of the subjects of 
reformist state intervention. Thus, I would argue that her approach shares one thing 
with most neo-marxist structuralist approaches, in that she also views the issue of 
state autonomy solely in terms of the state's relationship to powerful economic 
interests, while neglecting the role of rural smallholders, the rural poor and the rural 
middle classes. Although she mentions the "versality, vitality, and persistence of 
peasant subsistence production, even in the face of deteriorating conditions", she 
basically views them as unresponsive victims of larger processes. However, as I argued 
before, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are often able to transform the social 
meaning, political content and actual outcome of state policy. 
Thus, in addressing the subject of state autonomy she fails to pay attention to 
the variety of social actors who do influence the functioning of state institutions. Thus 
when regarding agricultural policy in Costa Rica, are we only talking about the 
autonomy of the state vis-a-vis the fruit transnationals, the landed elite? How do we 
conceive of the attempts by organised farmer's pressure groups, and groups of 
beneficiaries to shape a particular type of relationship with the state? One important 
question, then, is how do different types of state-peasant relations impinge upon the 
functioning - or for that matter the relative autonomy - of the state? A third problem in 
Grindle's account is that she attributes too much continuity between the world of 
policy makers and that of implementation, with the result that her treatment of 
implementation becomes somewhat linear and definitely top-down. It is at the level of 
implementation, she argues, that the capacity of the state to shape the agricultural 
structure is foiled, as powerful local and regional actors see possibilities to influence 
front-line workers and thereby to transform the aims of planned intervention. 
My approach is different. Although it is recognized that 'development ideologies' 
are central to the institutional projects of managers, I argue that it is necessary to 
inquire into the reality of implementation in order to understand the role that 
'intervention ideologies' play in shaping state-peasant relations. Intervention ideologies 
are instrumental in shaping the bureaucratic attitude front-line workers adopt vis a vis 
farmers in the administrative domain, in the process imbuing implementation with a 
definite moral dimension. Conversely, through such ideologies intervention acquires 
particular meanings for beneficiaries; as attempts to change their ways of life, by being 
labelled and treated as bureaucratic cases. I will argue in the chapters to come that it is 
against such experiences of state intervention that farmers react when developing 
intervention-coping strategies. 
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5.3 Two Perspectives on Implementation 
Grindle's approach to policy implementation in the Third World 
In her study of policy implementation in the Third World, Grindle (1980) attempts to 
draw up a model of "the political and administrative context in which middle-level 
bureaucratic implementors make decisions". In doing so she concentrates on "how and 
why resources are often allocated at the local level" (p. 198). In this model the 
implementor is seen as the focus of the frequently conflicting demands and 
expectations of a set of actors, including the national, regional or local bureaucratic 
chiefs, the local elite (landowners and influential groups such as businessmen, clergy), 
the local and regional political sector and bureaucracy, and finally the clients of 
government organisations. 
Furthermore, she argues that implementation in the Third World has special 
characteristics inasmuch as the political system in most of these countries does not 
provide satisfactory opportunities for interest representation, a situation conducive to 
fierce competition for scarce resources at the point of allocation. The implementor then 
is expected by superiors, at least implicitly, to dedicate him/herself to resolving political 
problems in addition to his/her usual bureaucratic tasks. 
At the same time Grindle holds to a rather negative view on the possibilities of 
low-status clienteles being able to exercise effective political clout in this competition 
for influence in the course of the actual implementation process, with the result that 
they become overly dependent on patronage relationships with local bureaucrats. As 
she suggests, this situation may not hold for all intended beneficiaries since some, 
"... may be able to offer bribes and other pecuniary inducements that might be 
attractive to him. On some occasions and in some environments, they may have 
the capacity to create a public disturbance - a demonstration in front of his office, 
for instance - which may be embarassing to him or cause problems with superiors. 
Or, the recipients may have personal ties to politicians who could be mobilized on 
their behalf. By and large, however, low status clienteles must rely on cultivating 
personal ties with the administrator, offering him the opportunity to be their 
benevolent patron and protector in return for their loyalty, deference, and public 
support" (Grindle 1980; 206). 
in short, the argument is that large areas of political decision-making in Third World 
regimes is displaced to the allocative level in which a series of actors - some very 
powerful and others less so - fight for the distribution of resources in regional and local 
arenas. Consequently, even quite radical redistributive programmes might have 
outcomes which do not work out to the benefit of the targeted clientele due to the 
ability of various elites to exert influence upon the process of implementation. 
Moreover, the allocative process, in this view, offers ample opportunities for the 
development of political patron-client relationships due to the presumed lack of political 
influence on the part of the poorest sections of the clientele. In this view we obtain an 
image of the relationship between implementors and low status clientele as one of a 
triangle without a base, in which clients standing at the bottom have relations of 
dependence with state representatives standing at the apex of the triangle, but not 
having relations with each other. The lack of client forms of cooperative organisation in 
this image is, then, reflected by the absence of the base of the triangle. Accordingly, it 
is assumed that clients do not organise themselves in other ways than through 
corporatist politics for the reason that the political cost of autonomous collective 
organisation is presumed to be too high for them. 
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This is not to say, however, that Grindle argues that implementors are simply 
passive recipients or that they are prisoners of the organisational context in which they 
operate. Rather they might be seen as actors attempting to maximize the achievement 
of goals in accordance with their perceptions of the situation and their best chances of 
achieving a variety of goals such as striving for personal enrichment, maintaining a job, 
anticipating a brighter career future, amassing a personal following, or conforming to 
professional ideals of the 'good public servant' (p.207). And, although they can rarely 
avoid alienating the support of one or more groups of actors when pursuing a particular 
goal, implementors have a repertoire of tactics and strategies at hand for protecting 
them from the possible retaliation of those whose demands they ignore. These tactics 
vary from providing false information to higher bureaucratic levels or confusing them 
with disturbing information, to intimidating low-status clients and establishing alliances 
with local actors by disclaiming authority over decisions by blaming the straitjacket of 
rules and regulations imposed on them. 
Concluding, she argues that allocation decisions tend to be highly adaptive to 
local-level and immediate political issues, one effect of this implementation context 
being that 'decisions to avoid or ameliorate conflict situations will take precedence over 
those to implement programmes as they are envisioned by policymakers' (p.208). This, 
in effect, adds to a pragmatic attitude, and possibly to a lack of commitment to 
programme 2objectives on the part of front-line workers as they bear the burden of 
political contradictions at the allocative level. 
Grindle's approach is interesting in that she is able to conceive of implementors 
as actors combining different sets of interests, instead of as powerless characters in a 
given bureaucratic structure of service delivery. In this respect she has a good feeling 
for the political nature of implementor's decisions. However, I think that a number of 
criticisms can be directed to her approach. To begin with, she shares with him a 
disregard for the tactics clients might display in the allocative process. For, while she 
conceives of implementors as skilled operators able to create space for manoeuvre for 
their own projects, she has the tendency to view low status clients as entangled in a 
'structure of alternatives' determined by what is essentially a patron-client model. In 
this model implementors play a special role as brokers in a pattern of transactions of 
resources and legitimacy between state, local elites and poor clients thus contributing 
to the transformation of policy within the implementation process. 
Another shortcoming of Grindle's approach, I would argue, is that she analyses 
implementor's strategies in terms of their role within a given bureaucratic and political 
structure. Such an approach precludes an inquiry into how intervention ideologies 
emerge as the result of a history of relationships with clients. As we will see later in 
the chapter, this is a field of research which has been explored by more 
phenomenologically inclined authors such as Handelman {1976, 1978), Arce (1987), 
and Arce and Long (1987). 
Lipsky's analysis of street-level bureaucracy 
In his book on street-level bureaucracy Lipsky (1980) has developed an interesting and 
original approach to implementation which differs from mainstream managerialist 
approaches in that he focuses on the social conditions in which implementors, as 
persons, have to work. Although he makes no explicit reference to developing 
countries, I think that his analysis has general validity since the central bureaucratic 
processes he focuses on (what he calls the 'social construction of the client' through 
practices such as labelling and stereotyping) are common to the practice of non-market 
service delivery. 
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Lipsky argues that implementors are forced to develop practices to cope with a 
variety of pressures, which often contradict the ideals that they bring into service. 
Consequently, implementors often spend their working lives in 'a corrupted world' of 
service. Yet they hold to the belief that they are doing the best they can under adverse 
circumstance, and accordingly they develop techniques to salvage service and decision-
making values within the limits imposed upon them by the structure of work. To that 
end they develop conceptions of their work and of their clients that narrow the gap 
between their personal and work limitations and the service ideal (Lipsky 1980:xii). 
Central to Lipsky's views is the assumption that the demand for free public goods 
and services always outstrips the offer. At the same time, he argues that relationships 
between implementors and clients are organised in terms of exchanges within an 
unequal power structure, a situation which enables implementors to manipulate their 
clients. Clients dependent on service bureaucracies, therefore, only have one thing to 
offer: their compliance. Paradoxically this situation confers implementors a high degree 
of discretion, especially in the case of agencies specialized in the delivery of social 
services to low-status clients. We obtain, then, a view of implementors not as mere 
executioners of policy but as playing a critical role in the allocation of goods and 
services, and hence engaged in the creation of policy. 
Lipsky, however, is rather pessimistic about this sort of discretionary power -
manifested through adaptive 'coping mechanisms - and discusses these mechanisms in 
terms of front-line workers' alienation from their work. Alienation, in his usage, does 
not stem from the workings of an oppressive ideology but from the stress resulting 
from the inability of street-level workers to comply with the qualitative and quantitative 
requirements of their work. In actual service this is reflected in problems in handling the 
overall 'caseload' which result in a trade-off between the number of client-cases and 
the time invested in them. As a result adjustments to the needs of individual cases 
aimed at improving the quality of service lead to a smaller number of cases being 
treated. He sees front-line workers as creating defenses against the deleterious effects 
of discretion by providing themselves with a more manageable task and environment. 
Hence emphasis is placed on the tendency by street-level workers to develop rigid 
practices as 'survival mechanisms' involving rule conformity. One strategy to attain this 
is through categorizing and stereotyping, in short by labelling. Labelling is, in Lipsky's 
view, brought about by the use of simplifying assumptions and the adoption of 
stereotyped responses to clients in general, which, in his view, can be seen as a 
'psychological coping mechanism' resulting from the need for street-level bureaucrats 
to differentiate between clients. 
Labelling and stereotyping are strategies which play a role in shaping the 
relationship between the street-level bureaucrats and clients, with the function of 
streamlining service provision. At the same time, however, labelling is also a part of a 
general process in which persons are ascribed a bureaucratic identity, a process which 
he calls 'the social construction of a client'. As he puts it, 
"People come to street-level bureaucracies as unique individuals with different life 
experiences, personalities, current circumstances. In their encounters with 
bureaucracies they are transformed into clients, identifiably located in a very small 
number of categories, treated as if, and treating themselves as if they fit 
standardized definitions of units consigned to specific bureaucratic slots. The 
processing of people into clients, assigning them to categories for treatment by 
bureaucrats, and treating them in terms of those categories, is a social process. 
Client characteristics do not exist outside of the process that gives rise to them. 
An important part of this processs is the way people learn to treat themselves as 
if they were categorical entities" (p.59). 
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Lipsky's approach is highly suggestive as it focuses on the practices of labelling and 
stereotyping by which individuals are depersonalized and transformed into bureaucratic 
cases, while being impelled to define themselves in those very same terms. 
However, in my views, Lipsky's overly pessimistic account is problematic, 
especially in relation to the way in which he conceptualizes social relationships 
between front-line workers and clients. Thus we see a basically Durkheimian 
conception of social order as necessarily consensual in order to avoid dysfunctional 
effects. What he calls alienation (actually better described as 'anomie') is the case 
when there is a discrepancy between a number of moral commitments and actual 
performance. This view is seconded by a transactionalist view of social interaction in 
which the distribution of power is, by definition, held to be regulated within institutional 
channels, in which compliance by clients is obtained by the agreement not to exercise 
negative sanctions (i.e. the withholding of essential services or resources). Such a view 
is expressed in the following statement, 
"Every social order depends on the general consent of its members. Even the most 
coercive institutions, such as prisons, function only so long as those affected by 
the institution cooperate in its activities (even if the cooperation is secured 
ultimately by force). Typically, cooperation is neither actively coerced nor freely 
given, but, rather, it emerges from the structure of alternatives" (p 117). 
It is precisely this structure of alternatives which is accepted by Lipsky as lying beyond 
the reach of social actors' influence and capacities, and thus taken as given. 
Individuals, in adapting to them, shape patterns of cooperation in accordance with their 
capacities and (psychological) needs. Thus, he argues that the emerging pattern of 
cooperation may be deleterious to the stated objectives of an organization, as is the 
case in servicing bureaucracies. However, in positing the problem in terms of structural 
contradictions between the organizational requirements of service in the face of 'the 
virtually unlimited demand of those services', our attention is directed only to 
determinate types of strategies bearing upon how clients are 'processed'. In relation to 
these strategies Lipsky distinguishes four basic dimensions to the control exercised by 
street-level bureaucrats over clients, which affect the process of client construction: (1) 
distributing the benefits and sanctions that are supposed to be provided by the 
agencies; (2) structuring the contexts of clients interactions with them and their 
agencies; (3) teaching clients how to behave as clients; (4) allocating psychological 
rewards and sanctions associated with clients entering into relationships with them. 
Although suggestive in its own right, this account of service bureaucracies has, in my 
view, major shortcomings, stemming from a number of assumptions made and 
reflected in the research methodology applied. Accordingly, Lipsky pays, in what is 
essentially a behaviourist type of analysis, little or no attention to the actual dynamics 
of the relationships between clients and officials (the social interfaces), with the result 
that the latter's role is attributed too much power, whereas clients are seen largely as 
powerless. In effect, what actually is a mix of tactics available to clients -
confrontation, avoidance, compliance, politicization - is reduced to only one alternative, 
that of submitting to the authority of the front-line worker. Client's strategies, in this 
view, have no more than adaptation or compliance functions in view of their essential 
vulnerability. 
Works that focus on the relationship between implementation and politics (Gridle) 
stress that implementation is thwarted by elites, or particular pressure groups, holding 
specific social interests. On the other hand, approaches which focus on organisational 
contradictions at the level of implementation (Lipsky) see implementors as caught in an 
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eternal impasse. Both approaches see implementors as responding to outside demands 
in a rational way, as having to respond to given sets of demands and pressures, 
whether of a political or organisational nature. 
Summarizing, policy transformation has been analysed by authors such as Grindle 
in terms of the relationship between the 'implementation process' and a 'political 
system' (or culture). Others (Lipsky) have focussed on the gap between implementor's 
expectations and the reality of service delivery, analysing the effects that frustrations 
over the impossibility to respond to the clients' needs have on implementors. Such 
works have in common that they aim to explain how the rationale of intervention is 
subverted or transformed by social actors such as implementors but also by other 
powerful groups. 
In effect, in both approaches we see a similar behaviourist methodology which 
differs only in the underlying problematic; in the case of Lipsky, that of the alienation 
effects that service bureaucracies have upon implementors, and by extension upon 
clients; and in the case of Grindle, the displacement of structural (class) contradictions 
influencing state policy to the level of implementation. Both analyses are similarly 
pessimistic when accounting for the capacity of ordinary people to influence or shape 
the system of service delivery or even to force upon the bureaucracy alternative models 
of service allocation. 
One major conclusion of this critique of Lipsky and Grindle, then, is that it is not 
possible to construct a general theory of the "implementor" on the basis of an ideal-
typical portrayal of his/her structural location within a bureaucratic and/or political 
system. As a consequence, I argue, that it becomes important to focus on the 
intervention ideologies underpinning front-line worker's styles of operation. In Chapter 3 
I defined an intervention ideology as a set of pragmatic beliefs and social practices 
through which front-line workers and administrators deal with a series of conflicting 
situations in the process of implementation. It is important to stress that I conceive of 
ideology as an actor-oriented set of beliefs and social practices, rather than as a unitary 
meaning system. Concerning planned intervention on behalf of smallholder agriculture 
such beliefs and practices are related to a particular conception of the farmer, and in 
the case of the 034 Programme I argued that this conception of the farmer derives 
from a particular attempt by USAID planners to resolve the agrarian problematic 
through a client-oriented institutional approach. 
5.4 Theorizing the Notion of "Interface". 
Handelman's phenomenological approach to bureaucracy 
In arguing for an anthropological approach to the study of bureaucracy, Handelman 
(1978) presents case studies discussing the 'organizational connection' between clients 
and bureaucrats in Newfoundland and Israel. One reason he gives for concentrating on 
this theme is the insufficient attention that has been paid to "the clash between the 
ways in which supralocal institutions conceive of administrative territories and the 
ways in which territorially based populations conceive of themselves as communities" 
(1978:5-6). Such clashes take place between bureaucracy and local populations and 
involve differing definitions of overlapping situations, with each definition supported by 
a different world of experience, institutional framework, resources and goals. Service 
delivery is then conceptualized as "the interface across which demands are made, 
requests evaluated, and allocations rendered with consequence" (idem). 
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In order to study such clashes he introduces the concept of official/client 
interface4 which he defines as "a crucial point of articulation ... and hence a likely 
node through which to expose the coercion and fragility of structures of power" (p.6). 
Indeed, as he argues, a way of revealing this fragility is by showing the role of 'the 
bureaucratic view' in transmuting the interpretation of the problems and issues it 
attends. The 'bureaucratic view', it must be stressed, is seen by him as expressing an 
internal logic of perception and organisation. This does not mean, however, that 
focusing on the official/client interface simply amounts to studying bureaucratic activity 
in terms of how a particular rationality - or world-view - is imposed on a particular 
population. On the contrary, the official/client interface consists of a pattern of 
meaningful transactions between people operating within determined interpretive 
schemes. 
Thus in a case study of child care in Newfoundland, Handelman adopts a 
phenomenological perspective in order to elucidate the ways in which a "client case is 
constructed" by case workers through a process of interpretation in which they "try to 
attain consistency in explanation by typifying persons and behaviour" (p.64). Such a 
process of typification takes place through the ascribing of motives to protagonists, an 
activity which "enables officials to construct the story-line as a cause-and-effect 
relationship that substantiates the goals and ideology of the organisational life-world" 
(p.62). The focus, then, is on how the boundaries of relevance are constructed as a 
flow of contradictory information keeps coming in about the client, in the process 
making it possible to construct alternative interpretations. 
Yet, he argues that the boundaries of relevance are reconstituted through a 
process of 'retrospective interpretations' in which a 'biographical stretch' is 
established. Underlying these notions we find the assumption that it is possible to 
understand a character's present behaviour in terms of his/her past motivation. Thus by 
holding to the notion of a 'personal history' the reach for consistency in the story is 
extended to the past. Both devices - retrospective interpretation and biographical 
stretch - lead, according to him, to a reified structure of the case being constructed. 
The reason for this lies in the way officials' performance is assessed, that is in terms of 
the number of cases they are able to resolve. Handelman refers to this as the striving 
for 'bureaucratic closure'. Bureaucratic closure, then, is achieved through a dialectic 
between the interpretation of (new) relevant data and the emerging structure of the 
case. 
This analysis leads him to conclude that, "bureaucratic personnel perceive their 
organisational life-world and its tasks in positivist terms", and he argues that (p.66), 
"This is why a phenomenological perspective that assumes the bureaucratic life-
world to be an arbitrary but integrated and meaningful social construct can 
illuminate the interpretive dynamics which enable this life-world to function in 
accordance with its positivist assumptions about its own procedures and 
accomplishments". 
Although providing a useful research agenda Handelman's transactionalist and 
phenomenological approach has major shortcomings when applied to the development 
interface. To begin with it does not take into account the role of variables such as 
gender, class, ethnicity and locality in the structuring of the organisational lifeworld. As 
I showed in the previous chapters, variations in the social and personal commitments of 
4 I adopt Handelman's notion of official/client's but use it in a different way. For that reason I use the 
term client-official. 
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officials plays an important role in shaping the multiple realities of the organisational 
life world. Thus, in holding to a rather unitary view of the officials' organisational 
lifeworld, while abstracting from the bureaucrats involvement in wider sets of social 
networks, this approach wrongly assumes that there is only one interpretive context 
influencing officials' thinking.6 
Indeed, it can be argued that it is this tacit assumption that leads Handelman to 
posit that bureaucratic personnel develop positivist conceptions of their task 
environment. This is too limited a view of the official/client interface. In the final 
instance, it amounts to no more than the study of the effects on clients, and the 
organizational lifeworld, of attempts by officials to apply rules to cases. This, I think, is 
a rather conventional problematic and contributes little to the understanding of the 
dynamics of contrasting types of official/client interfaces. 
In developing this critique I will outline the problematic aspects of the two central 
ideas he works with: that of closure of the case and that of bureaucrat's positivism. To 
begin with, the assumption of closure of the case is a problematic one, as bureaucrats 
very often have a continuing relationship with clients. Closure might have been 
achieved on paper but this does not mean that it is the case in the actual social 
interfaces in the administrative or field domains. Furthermore, it might be more useful 
to view the process of interpretation not so much as a means for achieving consistency 
or congruence in the story, but as a means of ensuring an ongoing relationship between 
both parties. Interpretive processes, then, cannot be viewed outside a strategic, 
performative context. 
Second, and following from the previous point, I would argue that if we accept 
that the interpretive process is embedded within a power struggle in which the 
bureaucracy attempts to impose its world-view, we have to take into account the 
attempts of all parties - including those of the clients - to influence, if not to shape, the 
actual organisational contexts, themes and rules which make the bureaucratic context 
meaningful to all parties. Meaningfulness is not only the result of an intersubjective 
endeavour, but emerges within the confines of struggles over access to authority and 
resources. The production of meaning is not merely an interpretive process, but a way 
of exercising power within the wider context of institutional efforts to exert social 
control over a given population. This entails that it is important to study how 
bureaucrats attempt to impose particular conceptions of the 'deserving client' or the 
'good farmer' by way of labelling practices, as well as the clients' efforts to resist such 
practices. 
Third, the assertion of bureaucrat's positivism is problematic for the reason that 
in actual contexts of negotiation it is difficult for officials to sustain a stable 
bureaucratic world-view, as a taken-for-granted entity. To the extent that such a world-
view exists, it has to be defended and legitimized in front of clients. I would argue then 
that instead of conceiving of the organisational life-world as an "integrated and 
meaningful social construct", we should view it as negotiated and essentially 
contested. The problem with phenomenological approaches such as those propounded 
by Schutz and Luckmann in assuming a sort of "naturalism", is that they render the 
actual dynamics of social relationships with people as "unproblematic". Interest is paid 
to how social actors come to (mis)-understand each other, but not to how they 
cognitively conceptualize and find ways to tackle concrete livelihood problems. Indeed, 
the actor's point of view is not taken seriously in its own right but is seen as an effect 
take this point from Arce (1989:48-49). 
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of the dynamics of a particular interactional (e.g. administrative) context.6 
Concluding, I would argue that Handelman's interface approach, though theoretically 
sophisticated as well as ethnographically skilled, is limited insofar as it precludes a 
detailed examination of the ongoing flow of social relations between officials and 
clients while conferring on the bureaucratic lifeworld an unwarranted degree of -
cultural - autonomy. Thus in adopting Handelman's notion of the official/client interface 
I make a distinction between social interfaces in the administrative domain and in the 
field domain. Social interfaces in the administrative domain do exhibit a number of 
features Handelman describes in his discussion of the organisational lifeworld. 
However, as I showed in the previous chapters the organisational lifeworld in the 
Neguev Regional Office is more characterized by a lack of purpose and commitment 
than by a coherent and effective bureaucratic world view. Thus client-official interfaces 
in the field domain encompass those non-administrative settings in which officials and 
clients interact, and which provide the officials with a set of - often disturbing -
experiences which add to the existing divisions of the organisational lifeworld. 
Subsequently, I concentrated on how officials construct operational styles on the basis 
of their participation in wider social networks, and thereby find ways to overcome the 
conflict of loyalties between the administrative and the field domains. In effect, this 
distinction between social interfaces in the administrative and field domains made it 
possible for me to combine an interest in administrative practices of social control (as 
manifested in labelling) with a detailed study of the dynamic of encounters between 
bureaucrats and settlers in less formalized non-administrative settings. 
Long's interface approach focusing on structural discontinuities 
Norman Long (1984, 1986b, 1988, 1989; and with van der Ploeg 1989) has developed 
a different notion of interface in an ongoing debate with political economy approaches -
whether in Marxian "commoditization" or in (neo)-modernization "incorporationist" 
guises. In his view these theories are lacking to the extent that they advance a view of 
development as determined by unilinear, externalist and determinist or inevitable 
processes.7 His aim is not that of discovering general or universal laws, processes or 
tendencies but to reach an understanding of how "ordinary people - peasants, workers, 
entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, and others - are actively engaged in shaping the outcomes 
of processes of development" (1984:169). To that effect Long focuses on social 
actors, who are not seen merely as "carriers" of history but as endowed with human 
agency, 
"which means recognizing that individuals, whether they be peasants, landlords or 
bureaucrats, attempt to come to grips with the changing world around them and 
that they do this both cognitively on the basis of existing cultural categories, 
ideologies and forms of practical consciousness, and organisationally in the way 
they interact with other individuals and social groups" (p.171). 
Accordingly Long occupies a unique place in the sociology of development in that he 
applies a phenomenological perspective which gives pride of place to the ability of 
social actors to attribute meaning to changes in the wider political economy and to give 
slt should be noted that there is a lack of epistemological symmetry in this approach, for it is possible 
to assume positivism on the part of the researched only to the extent that a distinction is made between 
researchers' scientific knowledge and the bureaucrats world-view. This, in fact, entails assuming that the 
former is "true knowledge" whereas the latter is belief. The hallmark of scientific positivism, indeed. 
7For a trenchant critique of neo-marxist development sociology see Booth (1985). The critique, 
however devastating, does not lead him to an alternative conceptualisation of the field. 
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shape to their effects on the local scene.8 He thereby chooses to focus on localized 
practices of state intervention - seen as an arena in which not only the bureaucracy but 
also other actors representing commercial and landed interests participate in order to 
document the various ways in which people create room for manoeuvre for their "own 
projects". As he puts it. "All forms of external intervention necessarily enter the life-
worlds of the individuals and social groups affected and thus, as it were, pass through 
certain social and cultural filters" (171). This has led to the development of a 
methodological and theoretical perspective based on the concept of "social interface", 
... "based upon the simple notion of focusing upon the critical points of 
intersection between different levels of social order where conflicts of value and 
social interest are most likely to occur... Studies of social interfaces should aim to 
bring out the dynamic and emergent character of the interactions that take place 
and to show how the goals, perceptions, interests, and relationships of the various 
parties may be reshaped as a result of being brought into interaction" (p. 177). 
In applying this notion of social interface to the study of state-peasant relations he 
chooses not to focus on large-scale historical processes of struggle and resistance, in 
order to discover "structures of domination", but focuses instead on the actual models 
and practices of planned intervention at hand, as they are constructed, modified and 
transformed by the actors' involved. Such practices, then, are not made subservient to 
their significance within any historical model, but are examined as meaningful in their 
own right. History and structural notions, are introduced, not as explanatory variables, 
but as contextualizing and indicative concepts which help us to deepen our 
understanding of the various struggles involved in "state-peasant relations". Moreover -
and I think this is an important advantage over Handelman's phenomenological 
perspective - Long's approach enables us to develop a sense of "reflexivity" as it 
shows that "intervention models" are themselves being shaped and legitimized by 
planning and policy models, and in this way he shows the role played by social and 
administrative science in the current evolution of state-peasant relations as taking place 
within the process of implementation of development projects and programmes. 
We see also that the notion of interface undergoes a conceptual development. 
Initially the methodology of social interfaces focussed on interactional processes and 
fields, considered to be "linked into larger scale systems", while interfaces were seen 
as containing within them "different and often conflicting value systems or 
rationalities", and instrumental in revealing "the nature of state-peasant relations in 
particular localities or regions, and thus indirectly facilitating a fuller understanding of 
the character and significance of state formations" (p.179). Subsequently we see that 
under the influence of the sociology of knowledge, structural and cultural issues 
become more closely integrated with an actor perspective. Since then his major aim has 
become that of developing a sociology of everyday life of relevance for 'development' 
issues (see also Long 1990, 1992). 
This revised "interface" approach has led to a number of interesting - if for some 
disturbing ethnographies - in which the received tool kit of intervention "sciences", 
such as extension and planning, are undermined. One illustration of such an 
ethnography is provided in an article written with Alberto Arce (Arce and Long 1987) 
on "knowledge interfaces" in which the authors apply ideas deriving from the work of 
Knorr-Cetina (1981). There we see a shift from viewing "intervention" as an arena in 
"See Aiden Foster Carter's (1987) interesting reflections on the absence of a phenomenological, or 
"actor-oriented* perspective in development sociology. 
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which various actors struggle for access to resources, to one which concentrates on 
how "intervention" is socially constructed on the basis of the clash between systems 
of differentiated stocks of knowledge - that of the bureaucracy and that of rural 
producers. In this particular case study they focus upon the difficulties a técnico, or 
extensionist, encounters when having to face the conflicting demands of smallholder 
producers and his administrative superiors. In fact, various attempts initiated by him in 
order to bridge the contradictions between his development views and those of his 
clients fail, with the result that the differences between the bureaucratic and local 
knowledge systems are exacerbated. 
Here again we see an approach based on the assumption of social discontinuities, 
as implicitly suggesting the possibility that the reproduction of systems of ignorance 
might be reinforced through strategies adopted by farmers for dealing with "intervening 
parties" such as extensionists, etc. Yet the approach is clearly actor oriented as they 
reject types of "culturalist" explanations which assume that "cultural values and norms, 
or cognitive structures, are somehow external to ... social interaction". In fact, they 
take the view that knowledge systems are internally highly differentiated, as they arise 
from "the specificities of the life-world experiences and careers of particular 
individuals" (p.28). 
In comparing Long's interface approach with that of Handelman we see a number 
of differences. To begin with Long's interest in bureaucratic knowledge systems is not 
so much directed to an understanding of a particular cultural pattern, or world-view, 
but is motivated by an interest in issues of development. "Culture", in his usage is not, 
in the final instance, the object of analysis, but a necessary element for understanding 
how particular world-views influence local dynamics while stressing that people 
themselves endow social change with meaning within their everyday life. In contrast to 
Handelman, Long treats "culture" more in a cognitive way, as socially differentiated 
knowledge, than in an aesthetic fashion. Another difference is that in focusing on the 
reproduction of "ignorance" the focus does not lie on how functionaries process clients 
and situations as "cases". In this way the problematic assumption of achievement of 
"closure" is avoided. 
Instead, a strong emphasis is placed on "strategic action" and, especially in a 
material sense, in the various ways in which resources are managed and their access 
secured. This is reflected in an enduring involvement in the "commoditization debate" 
(Long 1986), in which a position is taken against deterministic views which deny the 
role producers play in giving shape to, organisationally, the types and levels of 
involvement in commodity, labour and input markets. Thus, while adopting a 
perspective grounded in "knowledge". Long rejects decision-making or rational choice 
approaches which concentrate on individual action as something that can be abstracted 
from the sets of social relationships in which social action is embedded. To that end he 
applies a number of methodological notions such as social networks, arenas and social 
fields which provide a sense of "structure" by virtue of which individuals and 
organisational units - households, various forms of cooperation - function.9 
One point of critique, however, is that the interface approach still lacks a 
conceptual framework for studying state 'intervention' within the perspective of the 
genesis and evolution of institutional practices. Thus we see a lack of a detailed 
analysis of bureaucratic techniques - such as labelling and types of administrative 
slt should be noted that the concept of interface has been appropriated in a positivistic way by linking 
it to (soft) systems analysis and rapid rural appraisal methodologies. In attempting to provide the tools for 
social engineering such approaches are rather weak in social analysis (see Doorman 1991). 
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practices by which access and issues of eligibility are dealt with - which sustain the 
reproduction of administrative modes of intervention. 
In addition, little attention is paid to the kaleidoscope of tactics smallholder 
beneficiaries deploy in dealing with state representatives. For that reason I argue that it 
is important to study the various types of discursive practice - of cooperation, 
community and citizenship/democracy - which social actors deploy in the everyday 
politics of state intervention and intervention-coping. Thus I will show in the coming 
chapter that these types of discursive practice are used for subverting and confronting 
practices of social control and domination.10 
Consequently, I concentrate in the second part of this book on how social actors 
actively construct the social world by skillfully drawing upon a series of local and 
dominan: (i.e. administrative) types of discursive practice. The concept of social 
interface, then, can help us find the critical contexts in which such types of discursive 
practice are generated and deployed, and I will return to this point later in the chapter. 
Bu: next I will discuss an approach to administrative process which attempts to 
provide ¡3 theoretical framework for analysing different kinds of encounters between 
bureaucrats and beneficiaries. 
5.5 The Politics of Access 
Bernard Schaffer in a number of co-authored articles has developed an original 
approach for studying how beneficiaries gain access to services in administrative 
systems, which departs in a significant way from the usual manner in which the issue 
is treated in the development administration literature. While starting from - at least 
from an anthropological point of view - a rather restricted and technocratic definition of 
the problematic, he is able to broaden the issue so as to include the wider political and 
administiative factors involved in the identification and conceptualization of access 
problems, and the attendant design of administrative structures intended for handling 
these prciblems. In drawing on the work of Hirschman (1970; 1974) on exit, voice and 
loyalty, !5chaffer together with Lamb (1976) defines the problem of access as "the 
relations between the administrative allocation of goods and services and the people 
who need them or for whom they are intended" (p.73). He pays special attention to the 
process of "service definition" as requiring "the move from policy activity to the 
institutionalisation of programmes, so that resources can be allocated and an 
organisation built to carry it through". Indeed, it is precisely in this context that an 
access problem arises, a problem which is intimately connected to the activity of 
bureaucratic penetration. For, as he argues, in attacking the myth of decisionality 
(1984), policy is not innocent, and neither are its workings obvious. Different policies 
could always have been considered, and often still can. Accordingly, the political nature 
of policy is revealed in access situations, where policy encounters a reality which is 
very different from, and responsive to other interests than those of policy makers. 
Access situations and encounters, in short, relate to who gets what and in what 
ways, in relations between people (such as settlers) and administrative allocations 
(such as subsidized credit, land ownership titles, the right to participate in particular 
"In addition 
incorporate 
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approach. 
we see that the concept of interface has been appropriated by a number of works which 
ft within (soft) systems or rational choice approaches (see respectively RSIing 1988) and van 
1990). In my view such approaches are a step backwards from Long's social-constructivist 
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programmes). These linkages are established through eligibility procedures, determining 
that some individuals will be selected as beneficiaries to certain programmes and others 
will be excluded. Beneficiaries are, in contrast to common public policy approaches, not 
viewed as passive recipients. Instead, the focus lies on 'how transactions emerge and 
are constructed between people and authoritative allocating institutions' and thereby 
shape bureaucratic administrative processes. These transactions in turn lead to certain 
types of intermediary (1986: 362). 
It must be noted that by focusing on access situations the authors do not attempt 
to provide a formal (i.e. explanatory and predictive) theory of the "organisational 
connection" between institutions and applicants. Instead a number of concepts are 
developed to enable analysts to make sense of problematic situations resulting from the 
state's attempts to define particular social problems in terms of people's lack of access 
(due to "marginality", poverty, lack of organisational capacity or other deficiencies). 
The focus ultimately lies on people's responses to such attempts and the possible 
effects on political activity. Thus they concentrate on a number of factors structuring 
access situations and the various ways in which people respond to or attempt to 
influence these situations (i.e. voice and exit). As they put it, / 
"The major problem ... is that we have been taken to the threshold of politics and 
of institutional processes: the need is for a systematic analysis linking particular 
processes and outcomes with types of voice activity" (Lamb and Schaffer, 
1976:83). 
It must be emphasized that they do not concentrate on particular types of behaviour, as 
in the case of behaviourist approaches to policy admninistration, but on different 
access situations; and especially on how these are shaped organisationally through an 
ongoing process of negotiation. What is interesting here is that "access" is not posited 
as a "natural" problem of scarcity and poverty in the sense that this problem exists 
outside of the policy process and the administrative structures of the state. As Schaffer 
argues in an article on Irish itinerants, 
"The question is whether there is an objective world of problems outside the 
problems with which the practices of policy claim to be concerning themselves. In 
practice policy constructs those sorts of agendas of problems which can be 
handled. It then labels the items on those agendas as problems in particular ways. 
For example, people become referred to as categories of target-groups to whom 
items of services can be delivered" (1985:33). 
In focusing on the process of service delivery the politics of access is viewed as part 
and parcel of the mode of intervention of specific institutions, with specific groups and 
individuals, in specific periods of time, and (often) in specific locations. This entails that 
different types of localized access politics cannot be lumped together and endowed 
with a unified dynamic, as implied in models which see the main contradictions as that 
of citizen versus the government, or for that matter farmers against the state. The 
politics of access by definition differ according to the institutions and agencies 
structuring the conditions of access. We see that clearly in the case of the institutional 
field of rural development in Costa Rica where the same services are provided by say, 
the national banking system or the IDA'S Credit Fund under rather different conditions. 
Certainly, as Schaffer makes all too clear, elegibility rules, ordering and counter 
arrangements are for each institution different. 
In relation to - or should we say as a response to - access, the notion of voice is 
introduced. Voice refers to the different types of tactics an applicant can resort to. 
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given thei fact that in access situations there exists "much discretion, much room for 
interpretation and therefore for the exercise of voice by an applicant" (p.75). In this 
view decisions as to elegibility are not without consequences in the types of voice that 
will be used and on the relationship between official and the applicant. It is in such 
apparently technical problems, I think, that the language of access succeeds in 
exposing the political aspects inherent in implementation. Thus, as Schaffer asserts, 
the elegibility conditions, the gateways, will look different on either side of the gate" -
that is they are viewed and experienced differently by front-line workers and 
beneficiaries, by the beneficiaries included and by those excluded - "they will look 
different at various institutional levels" - that is they acquire differing meanings for 
implementors and administrators - and therefore, "they will have surprising effects on 
the implementation of policy, on what the ideology comes to mean". The gateway here 
becomes a metaphor for signalling the various ways in which types of eligibility are 
organisationally structured through an ongoing struggle over the definition of who is 
entitled lo what, for how long, under which conditions, etc. Yet, on the other hand, 
eligibility choices can also be circumvented, subverted, undermined by actors - often 
having political support - employing a determinate kind of "voice". Indeed politicization 
might be i the case during the administrative process prior to, and accompanying 
provision, 
Counter-labelling and intervention-coping 
Access theory has been further developed by Geoff Wood (1986) as a way of analysing 
labelling as a current practice in administrative encounters. More than Schaffer, 
however, he addresses the legitimation function (or authoritativeness) of the ideology 
of intervention - or as he calls it the 'technico-rational' model - in determining the 
structure of agency-recipient exchanges. In brief, he regards this model as a "highly 
functional model or ideology for bureaucratic survival...since it diffuses the issue of 
responsibility and disorganizes subordinate classes while imposing bureaucratic order 
.."(p.477). 
At the same time, he argues that the model is not homogeneous owing to the 
fact thai the image of technico-rationality is inherently contradictory, "since the 
imposition of bureaucratic order entails the organisation of recipients (or potential 
recipient*!) as well as their disorganisation" (487). Within this view, science plays a 
central role as it renders the model with the necessary legitimation (while not its 
rationale), by providing the taxonomies, classifications, typologies, which underly the 
bureaucratic decision-making sequence. It should be noted, however, that this leads to 
a highly pessimistic picture of recipients' capacity to influence - and much less to shape 
- the outcomes of administrative encounters. As he puts it (p.478), 
"The ideology of service is: delivery from organized institutions informed by 
science to disorganized recipients motivated only by immediate individual, family, 
sec ional or class interest. Attempts by them to organize for improved access, 
and tor re-labelling purposes, become a challenge to the rationality implied by the 
model". 
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Accordingly, Wood tends to stress the structural characteristics of the organisational 
while conceiving of administrative encounters in terms of clashes between a 
rationality and people, the latter becoming disorganized by them. Encounters, 
, are determined by the operation of an administrative ideology or rationality 
by administrative science, while the people involved in such encounters seem 
minor role in structuring such encounters. If resistance takes place it is the 
'systemic disorganization', and not because of their active deployment of 
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strategies of intervention-coping. Nevertheless, Wood does allow for the emergence of 
forms of counter-labelling. 
Counter-labelling as resistance to labelling 
In developing his views on counter-labelling. Wood draws attention to the limitations of 
labelling practices in terms of the rationality in which they are embedded. Thus he 
argues that if the authoritative model of agency-recipient relations is too narrow and 
rigid this is not so much owing to the active strategizing of the 'clients' but because 
the hegemonic model contains contradictions which create spaces of resistance for the 
clients. He writes, 
"Labelling is essentially a contradictory process in the sense that its primary 
function of disorganising the dominated, the weak, the vulnerable, the poor or just 
the excluded (via the decomposition of their story into separate cases) contains 
simultaneously the potential of reorganising interests around the solidarities which 
the labelling might itself engender. It is perhaps more accurate then to recognise 
hegemonic tendencies in this labelling process rather than hegemony itself" (Wood 
1985:20). 
In this view, such 'solidarities' engender forms of counter-labelling. As he argues, 
solidarities are created consequent upon continuous and long-term relationships 
between agencies and recipients, leading people to recognize their shared labels. 
Thereafter such groups can coalesce into nationwide forms of political action, or lead to 
forms of cooptation as in patron-client relations. We see then that labelling, defined as 
an objective process, might be "resisted" only when a shared consciousness emerges 
as a result of having been labelled. In effect, people acquire agency through labelling. 
However, this "objectivist" conception of labelling is limited for various reasons. 
For one thing, labelling in the integrated rural development programme I studied, was 
characteristic in administrative practice, especially at the implementation level, and 
acquired great significance in the administrative domain, especially in bureaucratic 
encounters in which applicants played a subservient role. However, at the point of 
interaction between recipients and functionaries in non-administrative settings, labelling 
became problematic as in the field, the categories used in labelling appeared to be 
limited. Thus the extensionists, social workers and other field bureaucrats encountered 
a reality which was much more complex than assumed in the administrative domain. 
Labelling then can better be viewed as part of an ideology of intervention which has 
more effect in some settings than in others. In the context of service delivery, 
relationships between officials and smallholders - the client-official interface - appeared 
often to be underwritten by strong forms of moral argumentation employed by the 
recipients. In Wood's terms, in the field a "case" became again a "story", and modes of 
administrative labelling (of classification and stigmatization) gave way to the necessity 
of front-line workers to legitimize their activities. 
In effect, no technico-rationality endured the complex relationships between 
settlers and functionaries, in which the latter had to respond to the former's moral 
claims and demands for responsibility, while confronted with specific settler's histories. 
In a sense it could be argued that counter-labelling existed. Settlers had distinct views 
of what a 'good' and a 'bad' official was and what the weak and the strong aspects of 
state agencies were. Accordingly they used these views in order to forge dissenting 
organizations. All the same, it would be false to view counter-labelling and attendant 
attempts to forge solidarities as the only imaginable response to intervention. It will be 
argued in the coming chapters that 'intervention' is only in exceptional cases resisted 
head-on: sometimes some elements are resisted while others are welcomed, while on 
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other occasions intervention is deconstructed by the beneficiaries themselves in order 
to show that it means something quite different than in officials' discourse. The 
outcome, then, is a set of intervention-coping strategies for dealing with intervention, 
ranging from accomodation, resistance and manipulation. 
Concluding, it can be argued that in a similar vein to administrative labelling, 
counter-labelling was part of a struggle, part of a set of negotiations in which the 
specificities of the organisational connection were negotiated. Counter-labelling, then, 
could certainly not be equated with some sort of resistance in which 
settler/smallholders were assumed to have certain essential characteristics and 
interests in common. Instead it was a practice which settlers used in particular 
contexts and for a variety of purposes. 
The language of access and social interfaces: some critical remarks 
First, it must be emphasized that relations between state representatives and clients 
are imbued with moral significance, leading to the forging of strong moral relationships. 
Concerning the notion of "voice" it could be argued that though it refers to the various 
types of responses open to applicants, the analysis seems to stem from some notion of 
an administrative logic underlying the organisational connection. Although there are 
good reasons for maintaining that the discourse and practices of development 
administration are indeed pervasive, actual implementation encounters a reality which 
cannot be comprehended only in terms of access situations. A focus on access then 
may serve as providing a set of sensitizing concepts for studying intervention practices. 
However, it seems to me that it is limited for the empirical study of intervention-related 
organisational forms (e.g. implementation structures). 
Indeed, one shortcoming in the approach is that it lacks an ethnographic basis. If 
the aim is that of examining the interconnections between politics and institutional 
processes by means of "a systematic analysis linking particular processes and 
outcomes with types of voice activity" and not the testing or replication of a number of 
propositions based on a model of political activity (as in Hirschman's original 
formulation (1970: 83)) an impressionistic approach will not suffice. A detailed 
methodology must be constructed for drawing comparisons between specific types of 
access situations and "voice" in different organisational and cultural contexts. Only by 
taking into account the role of non-administrative discursive practices (e.g. 
'community', 'democracy') and local, situated, practices of local organisation will it be 
possible to highlight the actual dynamics of the organisational connection. 
I would argue that different types of "voice" emerge, not merely as a logical and 
predictable response to the structuring of scarcity through the establishment of access 
structures, but from a stock of local knowledge comprising a repertoire of strategies of 
accommodation, confrontation/resistance and manipulation. The choice of strategy is to 
a large part the result of prior experiences in access situations, and strongly influenced 
by participation in a variety of local arenas of struggle. It is within these arenas that 
"voice" is politicised and endowed with moral significance. Voice, in short, is not an 
individual - or for that matter an aggregate - response, it is socially constructed within 
the context of local forms of cooperation and communal organisation. Accordingly, the 
institutional connection is but one of several arenas in which farmers develop voice. 
This means that actor's - clients and officials - interpretations of access situations 
within the context of their livelihood problematics need to be central in the analysis. 
This I think is crucial, especially in order to avoid exhaustive explanations of 
institutional failure in terms of rational choice and universalistic models. As Schaffer 
and his co-authors show very well in their discussion of brokerage and corruption there 
are clear advantages in treating different types of voice as strategic elements within 
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wider struggles and not in terms of individual choice. One relevant question then 
becomes how "voice" is distributed in a particular social field by focusing on particular 
actors, such as intermediaries. 
Finally, I would argue that responses to intervention do not only consist of 
"voice" (through mobilization, brokerage, and the exhaustion of administrative process) 
but also include individual and group strategies directed to penetrating the bureaucracy, 
shaping alternative access structures, and thereby questioning the existing bureaucratic 
access systems. It is to such political strategies that I turn next when proposing an 
alternative framework for studying relationships between bureaucrats and 
farmer/beneficiaries. 
5.6 Labelling and the Deconstruction of Development Discourse 
Very useful for analysing legitimacy is the work of Apthorpe (1986) on discourse in 
politics. He shows how language is used to construct and legitimize particular sets of 
codes, rules and roles. Seen in this way policy discourse can become a sort of 
rationalization of the hegemony of particular actors within the 'development arena'. As 
he argues, 
"'discursive practice' can be taken as an example of the capture and exercise of 
power by some sorts of people, arguments and organizations against others 
through specific happenings, in particular arenas, over various periods of time 
(1986:377)". 
Indeed, one difference between official and political discourse, and development policy 
discourse, is that the latter "justifies itself as being professional and scientific, and on 
that account socially and politically and altogether unproblematic" (p.378). 
Apthorpe analyses the 'discursive habits' of social scientists engaged in 
development studies by applying a semiotic approach inspired by Barthes and others. 
Such 'deconstruction of policy discourse' is, in his view, not simply an intellectual 
enterprise; on the contrary, it has a constructive purpose: that of reminding that "facts 
never speak for themselves, they are bespoken and spoken for". The reason for 
focusing on the language of development is that of stressing that "there are always 
alternatives, some of which may remain to be considered again, even those which have 
been rejected on other grounds". And, also that contradiction and conflict are always 
inherent in the actual practice of public policy [what he calls policyspeak, Apthorpe 
1985]. He argues that there are 
"always some [who] suffer painful or, at least, highly unsuccessful efforts to take 
policy, so to speak at its 'word'. It is precisely so as to manage, to exclude, or 
otherwise deal with potential contradictions and conflict that development policy 
discourses have constructed their ploys and games. These discursive ploys are 
available only to certain sorts of participant who for the most part are themselves 
labelled and disguised so as to avoid a full display or enlightenment about what 
they are doing (p.385)". 
Apthorpe, together with Schaffer and Wood (1986) argues that development 
intervention goes together with forms of labelling which stigmatize people - as 'poor', 
'resourceless' and 'dependent' - and hence reduce their capacity to engage in 
independent organizations. In their view the administrative project model mainly serves 
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to legitimize state intervention and depoliticize the issue of the role of the state; thus 
by bestowing on entire categories of people an identity as 'clients'. This is apparent 
when individuals are forced as 'clients' to adopt the discourse of bureaucrats in order 
to express their needs. Development administration, then, cannot be viewed as external 
to the problem of 'development' but is itself constitutive of it. indeed one might argue 
that it has a significant function in producing the actual shape in which it appears. Thus 
Schaffer argues that scarcities are constructed through discourses of development 
along with social practices of administration, and that they lead to a specific mode of 
social control and legitimacy. 
However, neither Schaffer nor Apthorpe in their critique of develoment discourse 
and the evasion of responsibility (through the escape hatches built into development 
administration thinking) follow the issue through to the field, to the level of actual 
implementation, where a different dynamic holds from that of the planners' lifeworlds. 
It could be argued then that the discursive practices related to planned intervention are 
put to different uses by different people and that they therefore have different effects. 
To take an example: Apthorpe's (1984) distinction between physicalist, institutionalist 
and distributionist discourses of agricultural development is highly suggestive, and it 
can be applied to an analysis of how policy is made at the IDA. Yet, as I just argued, 
this distinction throws little light on the actual dynamics of power struggles within the 
institution (and even less at the level of the client-official interface). Thus we can say 
that Don Antonio Salgado, the IDA'S former Executive President, exhibited a mixture of 
an institutionalist and distributionalist discourse. Certainly we find a high degree of 
coherence in his views. Yet this coherence is the result of an understanding based on 
his practical knowledge which he acquired in the course of his career. It would be, in 
my view, mistaken to explain this conceptual coherence in terms of the semiotic 
structure of the texts in which intervention ideologies are constructed. In short, 
intervention ideologies are not only produced within texts but also, and especially, in 
real-life struggles. 
In concluding I argue that it is useful to undertake a semiotic analysis to texts in 
order to identify the codes by which a discourse of development policy is shaped. Yet, 
such enterprise should be coupled with an analysis of institutional struggles in terms of 
competing institutional projects and styles of operation social actors develop by 
engaging in problematic confrontations. 
Summary 
On the basis of the previous theoretical review we can draw the following conclusions. 
Behaviourist approaches to implementation (Lipsky and Grindle) view bureaucrats 
actions as rational responses to particular implementation structures. They fail to 
inquire into how intervention ideologies and labelling practices are shaped, modified and 
transformed by local level bureaucrats in the process of service delivery. 
Phenomenological approaches to bureaucracy (Handelman and Long) do pay 
attention to state officials' ideologies, but they are not able to come to grips with the 
wider power struggles in which relationships between farmers and bureaucrats are 
embedded. Accordingly, it is argued that forms of labelling and legitimation practices 
cannot be understood without a wider historical perspective on intervention practices. 
In addition such studies have not been able to deal with intervention-coping as a set of 
political strategies deployed by clients/beneficiaries. When addressing the issue of 
farmers' responses to change they tend to apply concepts such as social interface in 
order to analyse the function of local conflicts in given institutional systems; in which 
case change is still endowed with some kind of logic, thus implying an externalist view 
of social change. By contrast, I argue that instead of analysing social situations and 
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events in terms of dichotomies such as structure and action, or actor and system, or 
adopting linear models such as implied in intervention models, it is more interesting to 
view how institutional practices and global ideologies of development are attributed 
with local meaning. This is what I call localization practices. Thus I have attempted to 
show in Chapters 3 and 4 how front-line workers actively appropriate and transform a 
particular policy geared to establishing a novel mode of institution-client relationship. 
Approaches focusing on the 'organisational connection' (Schaffer) do inquire into 
the contrasting ways in which state-subjects respond to state intervention. Yet, in 
starting from a rather restricted view of the problematic they get stuck with a 
conception of 'voice' (or in my terms intervention-coping) framed in terms of 'rational' 
reactions of individuals to certain kinds of bureaucratic organisation (as in the case of 
access). Furthermore, although they pay attention to labelling as an element of power 
in bureaucrat-beneficiary relations, they fail to inquire into the wider sets of social and 
political relationships which shape administrative structures of access. 
In Chapter 2 I argued that one way of developing an institutional' perspective to 
bureaucratic activity which rejects both linear views of intervention and reifications of 
the state is by concentrating on institutional projects. Yet, such a perspective, though 
focusing on beneficiaries' and front-line workers and their connection, fails to analyse 
how beneficiaries actively develop strategies in order to deal with state intervention. 
Institutional approaches to the state such as Grindle's which focus on the role of 
development ideologies in the way state policy is designed, tend to underestimate the 
capacity of the targets of policy (such as farmers) to shape the relationship with the 
state bureaucracy in such a way that policy acquires a very different meaning at the 
level of implementation. In addition, it can be said of Grindle that she holds to an 
idealized view of a development ideology, which neglects the practices of labelling and 
legitimization which bolster a particular understanding of rural development by 
implementors (in terms of specific models of the 'client'). 
Lastly, in searching for a concept of discursive practice which is useful for 
studying intervention-coping, semiotic analysis was found to be limited as it only 
applies to textual analysis. Hence a choice is made for an approach to intervention-
coping based on discursive strategies. 
5.7 Establishing an Analytical Framework for the Study of Bureaucrats-
Farmers Relations Centred on Discursive Practice 
In approaching the theme of legitimacy in terms of discursive practice it should be 
emphasized that discourse cannot be viewed as distinct from specific, situated 
intervention practices. Thus the discourse of development policy can be viewed as a 
set of institutionalized practices which inform the activities of actors involved in writing 
plans, evaluations, etc. In this vein, it could be argued that discourse - as in the case 
of academicians, policy makers and others - is itself a form of practice, entailing the 
active production of interpretations of specific problematics by making specific 
connections between concepts and empirical reality while enforcing the authority of 
'science' and 'expertise'. This activity, is should be stressed requires a number of 
skills - of persuasion, argumentation - and the ability to translate the needs of others in 
delineating particular problematics (see Macdonnel 1986 on discourse theories). 
Discourse as an element of social practice then encompasses: first, the discursive 
skills necessary for setting up authoritative arguments, or truth claims, required for the 
production of certain forms of institutionalized knowledge, as in the case of the 
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discourses of development; second, the discursive skills required for dealing with 
different types of knowledge - formal and institutionalized but also common or local 
knowledge - in particular settings and social context. That is the case, for example, 
when radical peasant leaders refer to the history of repression by the state, in rallying 
support for specific struggles for legal access to land. Lastly, besides discursive 
practices we find non-discursive practices which refer to the shared practical 
knowledge that is required for accomplishing a multiplicity of everyday tasks. It is such 
non-discursive practices which constitute particular livelihood strategies as reflected in 
particular combinations of sets of activities within and between households. 
The deconstruction of the first type of discursive practices -or as Apthorpe calls 
them discursive habits - might be useful for reminding the various actors in 
development that nothing in what experts do and write is self-evident, unquestionable 
and unobjectionable. The second type of discursive practice seems interesting for 
analysing how social identities are constructed in specific struggles for access to 
(state)-resources and the enforcement of 'citizenship rights'. Yet it is not only within 
broader movements or hegemonic projects that discourse is developed, but also within 
a number of everyday life settings based on family, community, market and a variety of 
institutional contexts (legal, educational, etc.). Sabean makes the same point when he 
argues that 'what is common in community is not shared values or common 
understanding so much as the fact that members of a community are engaged in the 
same argument, the same raisonnment, the same Rede, the same discourse, in which 
alternative strategies, misunderstandings, conflicting goals and values are threshed out' 
(Sabean, 1984:29-30). 
Thus, in the following chapters I am intent on examining how a variety of 
discourses are used, transformed or created by social actors and to relate such 
discursive practices to the ways in which they construct intervention-coping strategies. 
This requires that we examine how, why and in what social context social actors, 
emply particular discursive practices, and in relation to which problems. In this way we 
might acquire a feeling of the diverse roles that 'the state' plays in the social practices 
of the various actors, whether farmers, front-line workers, policy makers, researchers 
who write about the state, and other 'outsiders'. 
Discourse and the idealized view of language 
One major argument in this book is that in order to avoid explanations of social 
processes by having to refer to the attitudes, intentions or predispositions of social 
actors (that is to their inner states), while interested in how social reality is constructed 
through particular sets of social relations we should focus on discourse (see Knorr-
Cetina 1981). This, in fact, has been called in post-structuralist theory 'the decentering' 
of the subject, which means rejecting the view that knowledge resides within the 
unified consciousness of a subject as ideological, and instead concentrating on the 
production of 'social meaning', in relation to power and knowledge.11 
"Within this view the notion of the subject as having a fixed and stable identity is criticized as 
corresponding to the modernist notion originating in the enlightenment, when the social and natural world 
came to be viewed as objects of knowledge. This went together with attempts to ground knowledge in 
some transcendental subject, that is in a subject who could develop objective knowledge about the outside 
world and about the self. We see then that a narrative of human nature is being constructed in terms of 
the progressive achievement of specific Western institutions. Post-structuralism is highly critical of this 
view as it has served to obliterate other types of knowledge, say, in non-western, non institutionalized 
settings. It sees knowledge, or truth, not as given in nature but as culturally constructed. In effect, the 
humanist ideology of 'progress' is seen as legitimizing an alliance of science and power which is 
instrumental in subjecting people to a determinate regime of truth (see Foucault 1972, Bernstein 1983). 
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When using the notion of discourse we must keep in mind that something 
different is meant than simply language. The orthodox view of language as a unified 
linguistic body is unhelpful for social analysis as it conceives of language as little more 
than a vehicle for communication. In this line of thought the relationship between 
language and the social conditions in which it is employed becomes one of identifying 
the convergence between linguistic usages and specific social groups or speech 
communities. This, in effect, is a highly idealized view of language as it based on the 
assumption of 'speech communities' as homogeneous wholes. Hence issues of power 
concerning discursive practices by which certain groups of actors are excluded from a 
speech community are ignored (Hobart 1985). 
Also problematic is the view that discourse can be studied without referring to 
the social context in which it appears. In this way the focus remains on the system of 
signification to the detriment of the ways in which social actors with different interests 
and cultural backgrounds exchange meanings within particular social contexts. The 
problem with this idealized view of language, in fact, is that it holds to a conception of 
language as referring to a reality existing outside the social (discursive) practices social 
actors are engaged in, thus conveying an image of language as an 'objective' and value 
free communicative tool. However, as Hall (1983:71) argues. 
In language the same social relation can be differently represented and construed. 
And this is so ... because language by its nature is not fixed in a one to one 
relation to its referent but is 'multi-referential': it can construct different meaning 
around what is apparently the same social relation or phenomenon (Hall 1983: 71). 
What is interesting to study then, is the various ways in which meaning is constructed. 
One way to to this is by studying how social actors engage in a variety of discursive 
practices. 
Towards a non-intentionafist conception of strategy 
It is possible to distinguish three ways in which the notion of strategy is used (Crow 
1989). First, we can talk of a strategy in relation to the goals and preferences of a 
distinct set of individuals, as when talking about peasant survival strategies. This is the 
typical intentionalist usage of the concept of strategy, as it pressuposes the existence 
of a category of subjects (in this case peasants) possessing well-defined social 
interests, reflected in actors' mental states (intentions, preferences), which they follow 
in attempting to gain access to given resources to achieve some predetermined goal 
(survival). This positivist usage of strategy does not allow for a notion of discursive 
practice, as it is enough to infer them and, in an objectivist fashion, to portray them as 
social facts. As such they are taken to explain farmer's behaviour. 
Second, strategies can also be viewed in relation to some predefined social 
function, as when referring to social control strategies which a particular institution, or 
say a land-reform agency such as the IDA, may deploy. This is a non-intentionalist 
conception of strategy as it is not linked to the volition of particular subjects. However, 
in using this notion of strategy it is easy to fall into a kind of tautological thinking, that 
is, to read off from a given set of activities (i.e. cooperative training, extension, titling) 
some kind logic or function which may explain some pressuposed outcome (i.e. 
subjecting the landless to an institutional regime which makes it impossible for them to 
pursue their rights to land), without delineating the precise social practices by which 
such an outcome (i.e. institutional incorporation) is achieved. In effect, this functional 
notion of strategy ascribes agency to some abstract mechanism. In avoiding such a 
usage of 'strategy' I discuss practices of social control (e.g. labelling) which are 
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exercized by particular social actors (front-line workers) in particular contexts (the 
administrative domain, the field domain). 
The third usage of the notion of strategy refers to a particular conjunction of 
knowledge and social practice, which takes place within a determined social context. 
Thus we can talk about workplace strategies, or household strategies as embodying a 
stock of social knowledge necessary for carrying out activities which are central to the 
workplace, the household, or - as is in the case of this book - for dealing with state 
intervention. Such accomplishments, however, can only be seen as the outcome of 
strategies when analysed in the context of social struggles over the control of a given 
set of activities (a project) involving struggles over access to material or symbolic 
resources (authority). The capacity to control the access to particular resources, then, 
is crucial for securing the compliance and the participation of other actors in a given 
project - say the construction of a road, the establishment of a cooperative. 
Intervention-coping strategies are defined as consisting of modes of talking about the 
social interests, goals or preferences of a group or category of individuals, together 
with practices of securing the participation of other actors in the accomplishment of a 
given project. These I designate enrolment practices. 
This, in short is a discursive conception of strategy, seen in terms of the capacity 
of social actors to accord local meaning to particular discourses with a view to enroling 
other important actors within a particular project.12 
Strategies and discursive practices 
I distinguish three different types of discursive practice, or ways of talking about given 
problematics, prevailing in the relationship between settlers and the IDA: those of 
agricultural modernization (or production), community and democracy/citizenship. This 
is not to say that there are no other types of discursive practice which permeate state-
peasant relations, but that these play a major role in the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica. 
Discourse, as argued before, from an actor perspective, becomes interesting through its 
deployment in particular arenas of struggle. Arenas of struggle in the case studies are 
producers' (Chapter 6) or 'development organisations' (Chapter 7), or particular 
infrastructural projects (Chapter 7 and 8). Situated discursive practices, in short, can be 
seen as the activity by which notions of community, democracy and modernization are 
endowed with meaning, not in abstract, but in the context of specific local struggles 
and conflicts. The upshot is that a particular way of talking about interests (those of 
'the community', 'the nation', 'the people') is fashioned which has strategic power. 
Summarizing, localization of discourse, as I define it, does not yet define a 
strategy of intervention-coping, for a strategy in my view is more than a series of 
rhetorical skills. In addition to a language of interests it also includes tactical or 
practical knowledge of how to deal with state officials and agencies, and the necessary 
organisational skills for enroling key actors in a given project. Finally it must be stressed 
that a strategy is no property of an individual, (although some individuals might be 
quite skilled in tailoring a given strategy to a particular situation). On the contrary, an 
intervention-coping strategy implies a locally-specific way of constructing state-peasant 
relations. The degree of success of an intervention-coping strategy depends on the 
capacity to enrol key actors. 
12Bourdieu (1977) develops a notion of strategy as a way of countering the functionalist connotations 
of concepts such as rules and norms. This is clear when he writes about marriage strategies, which are 
culturally provided. I attempt to develop a concept of strategy which corresponds more to the idea of 
agency, that is, of the capacity of social actors to deal with a particular problematic, such as state 
intervention (see also Long 1990). 
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The remainder of this work focuses on three strategies of intervention-coping. In 
Chapter 6 I will show how a group of pro-IDA settlers establish preferential 
relationships with the institution, thereby reproducing forms of patron-client 
relationships which appear to be detrimental to the capacity of farmers' associations to 
develop viable modes of local level organisation. I will show that although this 
'problematic' is recognised by all parties the prevailing (authoritarian) mode of 
intervention thwarts efforts by more independent farmers to establish less clientelistic 
relationships with the institution. Central to this chapter is how an authoritarian style of 
intervention gives way to gatekeeping strategies which in turn preclude the emergence 
of more 'participative' forms of local organisation. 
Strategy Localization 
of Discourse 
Discursive 
Practices 
directed to 
Type of 
Enrolment 
accomodation 
gatekeeping 
Neguev 
agricultural 
modernization 
adapting to 
prevailing mode 
of intervention 
front-line 
workers 
distancing 
Neguev 
agricultural mod. 
community 
establishing new 
modes of cooperation 
with state agencies 
potential 
benefi-
ciaries 
resistance 
Macadamia 
democr/community continuous negotiat. 
through politicizat. 
all 
settlers 
manipulation 
La Is leta 
democr/community taking advantage of 
local and institut, 
contradictions 
front-line 
workers, 
settlers 
Table 5.1 Intervention coping strategies in the different settlements 
In Chapter 7 and 8 two activist strategies for dealing with state intervention are 
discussed, while the discourse of democracy/citizenship will be paramount to the 
ethnography. Chapter 7 focuses on a particularly direct type of state intervention in a 
settlement aiming at establishing law and order. Existing modes of local organisation 
there are labeled by the IDA administration as unlawful and subversive and are thus 
supplanted by a 'democratic' and peaceful local association. The resisting 'communist' 
peasant leader adopts an unconciliatory attitude, in the process compelling his rivals to 
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show that they have the full support of the Neguev regional office and that they are 
capable of improving upon the existing modes of local cooperation. In resisting state 
intervention he tests the ability and willingness of the officials to impose their own 
project, even in opposition to that of local actors. It depends on this test whether a 
majority of the settlement will be convinced of the advantage of participating in the 
IDA-supported association. 
In Chapter 8 an aqueduct project is discussed which, although a remarkable feat, 
evolved into an arena of conflict between a variety of competing groups in a quite 
inaccessible settlement in the frontier. The various tactics of enrolment of settlers and 
state agencies by the competing factions will be discussed. It will be argued that these 
enrolment tactics, more than responding to the particular interests and conceptions of 
the rival groups, shaped the practical meanings of the notions of 'development' and 
'community' as utilized by the actors involved in the struggles over the project. 
In Table 5.1 the various strategies of intervention-coping are presented, together 
with the kind of discourse which are localized, the tactics used and the actors enroled. 
It is not my purpose here to present a detailed review of the argument of the coming 
chapters. It will suffice to make the following comments. Central to this table is the 
relationship between the type of discourse that is drawn upon, the tactics which are 
used in establishing a particular relationship with the state bureaucracy and the actors 
which must be enroled. However, such a relationship is not a mechanical one, it 
depends on the ability to develop a language for talking about the interests of farmers 
which can be used in negotiations with other beneficiaries and bureaucrats in the 
context of particular projects. 
CHAPTER 6 
STRATEGIES OF ACCOMODATION AND THE HISTORY 
OF INTERVENTION IN NEGUEV 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is twofold: to reconstruct the history of the invasion of Neguev 
and the subsequent intervention by the IDA; and to document the effects of a particular 
kind of client-official interface upon the settlers' capacity to develop independent forms 
of local organization. It is argued that IDA intervention in Neguev led to the ascendancy 
of a group of 'loyalists' who maintained preferential relations with the IDA, and who 
took advantage of their position in order to develop as 'gatekeepers'. It is maintained 
that 'gjtejce^ping' had negative effects on the ability of the settler population to 
develop stron^ojrms pTTocal organisation.1- ~ ~ ~ " 
The chapter discusses the different phases of the history of intervention and the 
034 Programme: the invasion and its aftermath, the introduction and implementation of 
the 034 Programme, and the termination of the Programme. It begins with a discussion 
of the IDA'S attempts to create a clientele in the Milano sector of Neguev in the course 
of its struggle with the peasant unions that organised the invasion of the Neguev 
hacienda. The second section of the chapter concentrates on gatekeeping in relation to 
the implementation of the 034 Programme. Third, an account is presented of the 
workings of gatekeeping as illustrated by the case of Oscar, a former UPAGRA 
'Here follows a short comment on the rationale of the approach chosen. I could have focused on 
'resistance to intervention' rather than on accommodation strategies and thereby it would have been 
possible to show how IDA intervention led to the marginalization of large sectors of the settler population 
in Neguev, through practices of labelling. Yet, in such an analysis the role of certain groups of settlers in 
accomplishing the marginalization of radical settlers would have been left out. For it was precisely through 
an alliance between particular IDA officials and distinctive groups of settlers that such marginalization 
practices could occur. Marginalization, then, was not a direct outcome of labelling practices. As argued in 
chapter 3 labelling was more of a protective device for front-line workers than an effective weapon for 
securing the compliance of 'unruly clients'. If large sectors of the settler population were forced to comply 
with the conditions of state intervention, while having to bear its negative consequences, it was because 
alliances were forged between other groups of settlers - whom I designate gatekeepers - and IDA officials. 
It is my aim in this chapter to outline how these alliances came into being, and how they came to be 
questioned, not only by radical settler but also by others, more accomodative ones, who saw them as an 
obstacle. 
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supporter in the sector of La Lucha, who became an intermediary between the Regional 
Office and the settlers, while furthering his own personal and political interests. In the 
fourth and fifth sections of the chapter I discuss the Association of Small Producers of 
Neguev; its formation and the attempts to adapt it to the new policy of agricultura de 
cambio at the time that the 034 Programme ended (See for an account of agricultural 
policy in Costa Rica appendix 1). 
6.2 The Invasion and its Aftermath 
The struggle for land 
The invasion of the Neguev hacienda was carried out in 1978 under the guidance of 
the UPAGRA peasant union after which a protracted struggle with the state followed. 
The squatters built huts and planted crops at the fringes of the forest in what is now 
officially called the Santa Rosa sector.2 They were evicted several times and their huts 
and crops were burnt. The third time this happened a large group of squatters was 
jailed and taken to prison in Limon, the capital of Limon province. Only after UPAGRA 
organized a march to San José did the IDA decide to intervene and start negotiations 
with the owner of Neguev to purchase the hacienda. After the march, the decision was 
made by the UPAGRA invasion leaders to cross the Parismina river and start occupying 
other parts of the hacienda. 
When UPAGRA finally reached an agreement with the IDA in 1979, the SPPAL 
union3 organized an invasion of parts of the Milano sector of the old hacienda, 
something which the UPAGRA leaders interpreted as an act of enmity. UPAGRA, after 
learning that SPPAL had invaded these lands, advanced via the Bellavista forest side 
and the El Peje sector towards Milano, distributing as much land as possible. 
Subsequently, an accord was reached between the two peasant organisations and it 
was agreed that a huge hedge would be built with a view to separating their areas of 
influence. 
Soon after the invasion, the SPPAL Squatter Committee lost much of its force, 
especially after they lost a struggle with the IDA over the latter's decision to reduce the 
size of the plots from 17 to 10 has. It is said that the SPPAL leaders lacked the 
discipline of their UPAGRA counterparts and stories abound about their favouritism in 
distributing plots.4 Later, when SPPAL supporters realized that the union could not 
2Local people call the sector La Lucha (the struggle) instead of Santa Rosa, as it is the place where the 
invasion started. 
*The SPPAL [Sindicato de Pequeños Productores del Atlántico) was at the time the largest peasant 
union in the area and benefitted from the organisational resources of Vanguardia Popular, the communist 
party. In the beginning of the 1970s it had organised the invasions of a number of neglected 'haciendas', 
(such as Tierragrande which will be discussed later). At the end of the 1970s, however, it was considered 
as a reformist organisation, seeking to expand its political base in the Atlantic zone for electoral purposes. 
More radical unions, such as UPAGRA, very much resented this policy and accused them of organising 
land invasions for clientelistic reasons, and of engaging in negotiations with other political parties and large 
landholders. In effect, the invasion of Neguev was a bold action in this context, and UPAGRA saw it as an 
expression of utter opportunism when the SPPAL started invading 'their' territory from the other, more 
accessible side. 
'The two principal leaders of SPPAL were brothers of a communist MP who specialized in carrying out 
land invasions. Apparently, these brothers were more interested in the monetary benefits of invading 
landholdings than in the political struggle. Thus many stories circulate about them speculating in land. 
Interestingly, this led to a clash with their ideologically more commited MP brother. 
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maintain a stand against the IDA, many sought for accommodations with the 
institution. 
A major point of conflict in the negotiations between the IDA and the Squatters' 
Committees was the distribution of provisional land titles. Squatters lacked any legal 
right to the land that was alloted to them by the peasant unions until they had received 
titles from the IDA. The IDA, however, insisted that the squatters should pass a 
detailed beneficiary selection system. IDA officials argued that this was necessary in 
order to avoid professional squatters and people who already possessed land in other 
areas from being alloted land. UPAGRA, however, accused the IDA of using this 
argument for postponing the distribution of land titles, compelling them to leave their 
plots, since without such titles no applications for bank credit could be made. It was 
more than a year before the titles were distributed by IDA officials. 
This situation led to a number of incidents which enhanced the feeling of IDA 
functionaries that they were dealing with a particularly explosive, if not subversive 
situation. One such incident made a strong impression on them. A car with officials 
once went to the settlement and was confronted by an angry crowd demanding that 
they immediately be alloted with the promised provisional property titles. The crowd 
sequestered the officials for a whole day until they received the assurance from IDA's 
President that the distribution of titles would take place as rapidly as possible. In the 
meantime the officials spent a frightening time as they faced threats that they would 
be thrown into the river, car and all. 
Establishment of a Settlers' Committee: the rise of the loyalists 
IDA's presence became permanent in 1979 through the arrival of two agraristas. 
Among other things, these two gave references to settlers with which they could apply 
for bank credit. They also supervised the establishment of a Settlers' Committee which 
aimed at combatting the influence of UPAGRA in the settlement. This committee 
consisted of ex-SPPAL supporters and newcomers who had been selected by the 
agraristas. Agraristas and members of the committee used to travel to El Silencio and El 
Peje, which were UPAGRA strongholds, to convince the squatters that the IDA was 
working for their benefit. In addition, the Settlers Committee met to discuss issues 
related to whether settlers could classify as IDA beneficiaries or not. There was a 
period when these meetings were attended by more than 90 persons. At the meetings 
the agrarista would propose the names of settler candidates and the people would 
comment on whether these people had properties elsewhere. But also much emphasis 
was placed on whether they were known as peaceful and "democratic" elements. In 
this way an alliance between agraristas and 'loyalists' was formed in order to exclude 
leftist groups from the day-to-day affairs of institution-client relationships. 
Most members of this committee were settlers from the Milano sector. Milano is 
the most accessible part of the settlement, with fertile grasslands. It was there that the 
former hacienda house was located and where the IDA established its offices. In 
Bellavista, El Silencio and El Peje, land had less value than in Milano. As a 
consequence, little land was sold in these poorer sectors for speculation purposes. In 
contrast, in Milano a lively land market came into being. Within a period of five years 
half the plots (50 out of 97) there changed owner. Newcomers in Milano were often 
people with savings who had no relationship with UPAGRA. In effect, most of these 
newcomers became loyalists. It is no surprise then that Milano became a stronghold of 
IDA as the agraristas made sure that new beneficiaries had no red sympathies, let alone 
connections with UPAGRA. It must be said that the Settlers' Committee did not 
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accomplish much in the way of 'development' activities. It functioned more as an 
instrument for recruiting settlers with a compliant attitude. In fact, the Settlers' 
Committee established by the IDA consisted of individuals loyal to the institution. 
In order to 'normalize' the situation in Neguev, the agraristas had two instruments. 
First, that of providing bank credit recommendations for 'trustworthy' settlers. Second, 
creating a selection mechanism to ensure that new settlers would not sympathize with 
'subversive' groups. They had been fairly successful in Milano and had made some 
inroads into the other sectors of the settlement, though UPAGRA retained much 
influence in El Peje and El Silencio sectors where the quality of land and roads were 
worse, and in Bellavista and La Lucha, sites from which the invasion was started. This 
continuous struggle for the allegiance of the settler populations between the IDA and 
UPAGRA lasted for more than two years (1979-1981). Settlers would tell me that one 
day UPAGRA leaders would hold a meeting at the pulpería (a small shop) warning them 
not to trust the IDA, and the next day the IDA agraristas and pro-IDA settlers would 
appear to inform the settlers about the coming changes with the introduction of the 
034 Programme. On the other hand, UPAGRA and other radical settlers accused the 
'loyalists' of being land speculators, and even worse, of being IDA spies and traitors to 
the 'peasant class'. 
The 'loyalists' of the Settlers' Committee were quite close, as many of them 
were relatives and with the exception of one family, were all migrants from the West 
Coast. As argued, the Settlers' Committee played a pivotal role in fighting UPAGRA. 
One important action they undertook was to impede UPAGRA from establishing a maize 
collecting centre in Milano, which provided the best location, even though UPAGRA had 
signed an agreement with the Marketing Board, the CNP, in which it was stipulated 
that UPAGRA together with the CNP would take responsibility for the marketing of 
maize. This agreement was interpreted by the IDA functionaries as undermining their 
authority, and they consequently took measures to curtail UPAGRA's power and 
ambitions. The pro-IDA Settlers' Committee filed a complaint with the authorities 
against UPAGRA for encroaching upon their prerogatives. It accused UPAGRA of 
coercing the settler population to participate in undemocratic organisations, and of 
misrepresenting the wishes of the population while engaging in political negotiations 
with government institutions such as the CNP. The IDA, in turn, used this as an excuse 
to ask for police action. More than 150 policemen were sent in to stop a handful of 
UPAGRA people who came, largely from the other sectors (El Peje, El Silencio, 
Bellavista and La Lucha), to defend 'their' collection centre. This was a dramatic event, 
as for the first time UPAGRA leaders were forced to negotiate with IDA functionaries at 
gunpoint.4 
In 1980, UPAGRA members were accused of having fire arms in their plots and 
of organising military training and other subversive activities.6 UPAGRA then 
demanded that an official investigation be established in order to disclose the facts. 
When a Congressional Commission arrived in Neguev to investigate the supposed 
subversive activities, the accusations were withdrawn as no evidence was found for 
their existence. In addition the Congressional Commission proposed a number of 
'This was morally a very disruptive event as different groups of settlers were set against each other. 
Most of the settlers who acted against their UPAGRA compañeros later distanced themselves from this 
action. Interestingly, some of these settlers became heavily involved in evangelical churches, avoiding 
involvement ever again in political activity, whether on the side of UPAGRA or IDA. 
"Two ex-UPAGRA leaders were found willing to bear witness to these subversive activities. One of 
them would play a major role later in La Lucha. Another one was a Colombian, already suspected of being 
an agent of the intelligence police by UPAGRA people, as he had been offering his services as an 
'experienced guerrilla leader' to the UPAGRA leaders who had led the invasion. 
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measures for improving the relationship between the IDA and all groups of settlers, 
especially UPAGRA followers. One major recommendation issued by this Commission 
was the establishment of Coordination Committees in each settlement sector which 
should include representatives of the IDA, UPAGRA and 'independent' settlers (or 
loyalists). It did not take long before UPAGRA retreated from these Coordination 
Committees as they were seen as IDA instruments for manipulating the settler's 
demands. The Committees, then, also became arenas of accomodation between 
loyalists and IDA officials. 
With the introduction of Credit and the Agricultural Development Programmes in 
1982 the IDA office in the settlement expanded, as several técnicos and a formal 
Settlement Head arrived. This was a watershed in the history of state-peasant relations 
in Neguev. So far, only the agraristas had been in charge of fighting the UPAGRA 
influence. 
6.3 The Introduction of the 0 3 4 Programme 
Institution-client relationships change 
The 034 Programme signalled a dramatic change in the relationship between all settlers 
and the IDA, as easy credit became available to whomsoever was ready to comply with 
the authority of the IDA, and thus also to UPAGRA sympathisers. In addition, roads 
were built to the most inaccessible parts of the settlement.6 One result of this massive 
state-intervention was that less importance was given to the Coordination Committees. 
Instead a much more powerful weapon for gaining the allegiance of the settlers had 
arrived: large amounts of credit in combination with roads. Bank credit, as argued, had 
been provided to settlers by way of the recommendations of the agraristas, but had so 
far been in short supply. 
The new Settlement Head (Fernando Campos) did not take the Coordination 
Committees meetings seriously. During his term minutes were no longer written of the 
meetings and thus in the absence of written agreements, failures to carry out 
agreements could not be sanctioned. A decision was therefore made to stop the 
meetings. In the opinion of the IDA loyalists to whom I spoke this was fatal for the 
settlement. Projects aimed to establish sewage systems were not implemented. But 
Fernando Campos had little confidence in settler organizations. He once made it clear at 
a meeting that it was his, and not the Coordination Committees' right to determine 
what was best for the settlement. From then on, no communal organizations 
functioned. 
As we saw in Chapter 3, Fernando Campos was aware' of the paternalist 
character of the relationship between the 'loyalists' and IDA functionaries, and of the 
tendency of 'loyalists' to take advantage of local forms of organisation in order to get 
jobs at the institution (as painters, shopkeepers, etc), and to become the first 
beneficiaries of IDA programmes. In addition it appeared that the loyalists lay special 
claims to institutional resources such as credit, housing plots, the use of tractors, etc. 
Fernando Campos took up a consequent position entailing that the IDA should avoid 
6This was one reason for the very high level of expenditure of the 034 Programme, since access to an 
all-weather road existed for each farm; an astonishing situation in view of the fact that whole sectors of 
the settlement (El Peje and El Silencio) had soils not suited for agriculture. Such a concentration of vital 
infrastructure in Neguev makes a sharp contrast with the situation in other settlements where such 
infrastructure is minimal (see chapters 7 and 8). 
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entering any kind of negotiations with either pro or anti-IDA settlers. This, as we will 
see later, did not mean that the influence of the 'loyalists' was terminated, since they 
were able to establish 'special' relationships with front-line workers (and as we will 
see, with the Settlement Head himself), and thereby to engage in gatekeeping 
activities. 
Meanwhile, the skirmishes between the IDA and UPAGRA continued, but 
UPAGRA was drawn into a defensive position.7 Although UPAGRA leaders continued 
their meetings, only those settlers who for one reason or another were not eligible for 
credit (often settlers on the worst lands) appeared to be receptive to UPAGRA's 
message. UPAGRA leaders then, were effectively marginalized. They were able to 
organise their come-back only years later, after 1985, when it appeared that a majority 
of those who had received loans were heavily indebted and unable to sustain a 
livelihood from farming. Henceforth, UPAGRA again could expand its constituency 
amongst those who suffered most from indebtedness. 
The implementation of the 034 Progamme 
As commented before, the new style of intervention heralded by the 034 Programme 
entailed a different kind of client-official interface, one which was grounded in working 
with individual 'clients' rather than dealing with groups of beneficiaries. The agraristas 
and the social workers were joined by a group of técnicos and credit officials who 
played a major role in the implementation of the 034 Programme. From then onwards it 
was the técnicos who established the closest relationship with settlers as they were in 
charge of selecting the beneficiaries for their programmes. The Credit Fund officials, in 
turn, were in charge of investigating the beneficiaries' solvency. Credit was easily 
available from the beginning of the 034 Programme, although when it became clear 
that credit recovery would be difficult, more and more restrictions were built into its 
distribution.8 The 034 Programme as a whole was a failure, but some programmes left 
a deeper imprint on the beneficiaries than others. In what follows a short account of 
the various programmes implemented through the 034 Programme is presented. 
The major goal of the 034 Programme was defined in the project paper as 
follows: "to develop lower cost, more effective mechanisms for establishing 
productive, profitable, and environmentally sound campesino farms on former 
latifundios" (see project paper agrarian settlement and productivity). This implied that 
farm production should be diversified and that tree perennials such as cocoa, pejibaye, 
and root crops should become the mainstay of the farmer economy, at the expense of 
annual crops such as maize. 
Maize remained the most widespread crop, being at the same time the crop with 
least risks. Yet, maize could not be grown profitably for long periods except on the best 
soils, near to the rivers, while one of the aims of the 034 Programme was that of 
substituting maize by non-traditional crops. By 1985, 500 hectares had been planted 
with maize, 133 hectares with root crops, and 60 hectares with cocoa. Most land, 
however, was under pasture. The first programme failure occured in 1983 when 
'Evert UPAGRA leaders opted to accommodate to the new situation, and after some reticence also 
applied for credit from the 034 Programme. But they continued to criticize the way the 034 Programme 
was implemented, the lack of settler participation, and the 'hidden agendas' underlying state intervention. 
^ i s is the best kept secret of the 034-programme. A report showing that credit-recovery was less 
than 40% was censured by the USAID consultant (personal communication by official from IDA's project 
evaluation office). 
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cassave producers were unable to sell their product for a price high enough to cover 
the costs of harvesting, while some farmers sold to a firm that went bankrupt and 
never paid them. Great expectations existed for cocoa which according to the 
programme planners should have become the principal source of income for the 
farmers. But yields remained so low that settlers could not even repay the interest. 
Other agricultural development programmes such as tubers and coconuts dealt with 
serious marketing problems. Pejibaye (peach palm), was not planted on a large scale 
due to doubts regarding marketing. 
Of all the programmes, that of animal husbandry was the most expensive. Yet, 
since its inception there existed doubts about the economic viability and environmental 
desirability of this programme. Finally, the most succesful agricultural programme, that 
of chili, was the result of the personal initiative of the técnico Samuel Lozano in 
collaboration with a group of settlers. 
In order to obtain an idea of the credit and extension coverage in the settlement 
the following figures are interesting.9 
number percentage 
no c r e d i t 153 49 
c r e d i t f o r one programme 93 30 
c r e d i t f o r two programmes 5 1 16 
c r e d i t f o r th ree programmes 1 1 3 
c r e d i t f o r f o u r programmes 5 2 
t o t a l 313 100 
Table 6.1 Distribution of credit for agricultural programmes among farmes in Neguev 
Source: técnicos of Neguev, July 1986. 
number percentage 
no e x t e n s i o n 32 20 
animal husbandry 38 24 
coconut 7 4 
pe j ibaye 8 5 
maize 28 17 
med ic ina l p l a n t s 14 9 
t u b e r s 9 6 
cocoa 24 15 
t o t a l 160 100 
Table 6.2 Extension provided to credit recipients according to agricultural programme 
Source: técnicos of Neguev, July 1986. 
"These figures do not include the chili programme, which at the time - middle of 1986 - was in 
preparation. The new agricultural programmes of pineapple and maracuya, which were not funded by 
IDA'S Credit Fund, were also not included. 
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The failure to establish a Farm Planning Unit 
Originally the intention was to provide credit and extension in such a way that it would 
adjust to the individual possibilities of the farmer, his family and his plot, through the 
design of individual farm development plans. The idea was that a specialized Farm 
Planning Unit, composed by experienced agronomists, would design cultivation plans 
for individual farmers indicating the crops that were suited for the soils of his plot, in 
accordance with the amount and type of family labour available and that would permit 
the family to repay the credit while being able to live off the farm. In this way, it it was 
expected that individual families would be able to make the shift from 'traditional' 
farmers producing largely for their own consumption to commercial farmers. It must be 
noted that within this approach no allowance was made for the establishment of 
farmers' organisations, whether based on crop programmes or locality. The farmer was 
expected to make his decisions on the basis of the cultivation plan designed for him 
and after consultations with the técnicos, who were responsible for the agronomic 
viability, and the Credit Fund officials who were in charge of the financial viability. 
Yet the Farm Planning Unit was never established and the cultivation plans were 
never designed due to the fact that programme implementation was running two years 
behind schedule and that the loans had to be extended as rapidly as possible10. As a 
result, the técnicos became responsible for the design and implementation of the 
agricultural programmes. 
Client-official interface changes: combatting political cliente/ism 
It is not surprising, then, that implementation became a quite personal issue between 
individual técnicos, who wielded considerable discretion in selecting beneficiaries, and 
the farmers. The técnicos, mostly young and inexperienced, carried the burden of 
dealing with settlers who were considered troublesome, and were glad to offer loans to 
individuals they trusted. Furthermore, they would follow the policy of Fernando 
Campos, the Settlement Head, of demanding from 'less trustworthy' settlers that they 
keep far from radical activities. Also the Credit Fund officials, when assessing the 
beneficiaries' financial viability, took into consideration their willingness to become 
'responsible and entrepreneurial farmers'. Since credit was in large supply, both 
técnicos and Credit Fund Officials did little more than administer the extension of 
credit. Of the original plan of dovetailing credit to the possibilities of the faYmer, little 
was upheld. 
As argued, forms of cooperation between beneficiaries of one and the same 
programme were discouraged. Inasmuch cooperation existed it was the result of the 
initiative of individual farmers, but it was surprisingly limited. Even for a large 
programme such as cocoa, which at one time included almost fifty beneficiaries, no 
attempts were made to establish a farmers' organisation. Problems concerning 
extension and repayment were dealt with by the técnicos and the Credit Fund officials 
with individual beneficiaries. Any attempt to deal with such a problem by an organised 
group was viewed as potentially subversive by the Settlement Head. This type of 
client-official interface in which forms of local organisation were strongly disheartened 
was broken when the Association of Small Producers was created and towards the end 
of the 034 Programme, the chili programme gave rise to a form of production-oriented 
local organisation. 
Interestingly these figures suggest that by 1986 only about half the farms of 
Neguev were receiving credit or extension. Of the rest different types of farmers can be 
10See Chapter 2 for an analysis of the institutional struggles causing this delay in programme 
implementation. 
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distinguished. Some had poor soils and no pasture, others were 'troublesome' settlers 
who had never received credit, or who after having received credit for maize had not 
been able to gain the trust of a técnico to be included in one of the larger programmes; 
others were newcomers who bought their farms after the Credit Fund had stopped 
distributing new loans for livestock11 and who had little interest in crops, and some 
farmers (about 30) had been written off by the Credit Fund and were subject to legal 
prosecution. At the same time, a large proportion of the farmers, that is, most of the 
beneficiaries of the animal husbandry, cocoa, and coconut programmes received no 
income from these activities. Summarizing, it can be said that the situation for the large 
majority of farmers in Neguev by 1986 was rather critical. 
This situation led to much dissatisfaction vis-á-vis the IDA, also on the part of 
settlers who had turned their backs against radical organisations such as UPAGRA, or 
who had never had a radical attitude. Fernando Campos certainly had good reasons to 
distrust independent forms of organisation among indebted settlers. In fact, he refused 
to negotiate with a committee of settlers, which with the support of UPAGRA, 
demanded a renegotiation of the debts. 
From 1987 onwards UPAGRA leaders remained active within the Renegotiation 
Committee and were convening meetings which were attended by increasingly larger 
groups of settlers (more than 40). They would also question the 'corrupt' role of the 
gatekeepers and the lack of responsibility of the front-line workers. They argued that 
the 034 Programme had been part of a conspiracy by USAID and the IDA to weaken 
combative forms of communal organisation, such as the Squatters' Committee, through 
the use of credit, and by offering the settlers credits which they could not repay, and 
thus forcing them to sell their plots to middle-class people, or those who at any rate did 
not belong to the 'peasant class'. UPAGRA leaders still enjoyed a high degree of 
respect among settlers and therefore were feared by front-line workers. They would 
occasionally appear at meetings organized by front-line workers for training purposes, 
something the latter were afraid of. In Chapter 4 a few examples were given of 
encounters between front-line workers and UPAGRA leaders that caused anxiety 
among the former. In effect, the radicals were capable of using the discourse of 
community in their criticisms against the way in which the 034 Programme was 
implemented. 
The alliance between gatekeepers and front-line workers 
The front-line workers, then, had to rely in their day-to-day affairs in the settlement on 
a restricted number of loyalists, or gatekeepers, with whom they had established good 
relationships over the years, and who received preferential treatment in the adjudication 
of plots, the renegotiation of old credits, in the introduction of new agricultural 
programmes, etc. They were also the first ones to benefit from small aid programmes 
(such as Food AID) and showed their compliance to the técnicos by participating in 
training activities (días de campo). 
In addition the gatekeepers - in total some 15 families - participated in a range of 
committees, such as the Housing Committees in the population centres which had to 
deal with the distribution of plots, and the construction of a sewage system, in the 
Educational Board, etc., and in this way they were involved in stopping the influence of 
radical elements. Indeed, the gatekeepers presented themselves as the spokesmen of 
"Loans for livestock were the most desired by newcomers. But by 1986 the animal husbandry 
programme was already in disarray and since there was no credit recovery, credit delivery was stopped. 
Many newcomers, it must be noted, were part-time farmers who were interesting in investing in land, and 
who either derived an income from other entrepreneurial activities or wage employment. 
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the settlers in Neguev, at a time when no local organisations were functioning. They 
were always present at any ceremony or institutional activity, for instance when a 
congressman or the Minister of Agriculture visited the settlement. On such ceremonies 
they were always ready to thank the IDA for what it had done for the settlers. 
In their dealings with other settlers the gatekeepers always stressed the necessity 
of 'cooperating' with the IDA functionaries by following :he recommendations of the 
técnicos, and refusing to be involved with 'non-democratic ' organisations. At the same 
time they were always complaining to the officials that it was always a small group of 
people who were ready to take up responsibilities in comm jnal organisations. They also 
complained about the lack of interest by most farmers in finding constructive solutions 
for the production problems of the settlement, and of the danger that 'non-democratic 
organisations such as UPAGRA could channel the apathy of the majority of settlers in a 
way that was contrary to the interests of the IDA. In effect, the gatekeepers were 
better in establishing close relationships with front-line workers than they were with 
fellow settlers. 
It can be said, then, that the 034 Programme was successful in depoliticizing the 
institution-client relationship, but given the lack of local forns of organisation that were 
representative for wider sectors of the settlement peculation, it stimulated the 
appearance of a group of settlers who monopolized the relationship with the IDA, in a 
kind of interface which can be characterized as 'bureaucratic clientelism'. 
Next I discuss how a former UPAGRA member turn 3d into a loyalist and then a 
gatekeeper. This case is particularly interesting as it illustrates how 'gatekeeping' 
becomes a problem for the wider community. ! 
I 
6:4 Gatekeeping in La Lucha: the Case of Oscar! 
It has been argued that gatekeeping arose as the result of IDA'S attempt to introduce a 
different kind of institution-client relationship in which politics would not play a role in 
programme implementation. Within this model the beneficiary was treated as a client 
and goods and services were provided on an individual basis. Attempts to establish 
local modes of organisation were viewed with a high d e g r e e of distrust by the Regional 
Office. However, in order to carry out their work it was neckessary for front-line workers 
to establish strong connections with particular 'trustworthy' settlers. Gatekeepers, in 
short, were those settlers who were able and willing to conform to the prevailing 
implementation model, while playing an active role in the IpA's attempts to marginalize 
UPAGRA followers. This, however, had effects which (were not intended by the 
Regional Office, as some gatekeepers were able to establish positions of intermediation 
which were experienced as highly detrimental by the community at large. In this 
section a case is presented of a gatekeeper who uses his relationship with the 
Settlement Head in order to pursue his personal and political ambitions. In the process 
he acquired so much influence that his power had to be curtailed by the Regional 
Office. ; 
Oscar, a former foreman in a banana plantation in Jimenez, was recruited by an 
UPAGRA leader who knew of his organization abilities and who offered him a plot in 
the settlement. This was in 1978 after the invasion of Neguev had taken place. He 
became a member of the UPAGRA Squatters' Committee, 
of the organisation because of corrupt practices. 
The way in which Oscar managed to obtain a better plot was considered as a 
turning point in the struggle between UPAGRA a n d the IDA. Initially Oscar had been 
but soon he was thrown out 
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assigned a plot by UPAGRA in the Bellavista sector. However, he preferred to have it in 
the central part of La Lucha, nearer to the main road to the village of Rio Jimenez, 
where he had formerly lived. This last plot belonged to someone who did not qualify 
according to the IDA, so the UPAGRA Squatters' Committee had then assigned it to a 
young settler. But Oscar, who had already left UPAGRA, negotiated permission from 
the IDA to settle on the plot and threw the young settler out. The story goes that he 
struck him on the street in front of every one. This caused quite a stir among the 
settlers, especially in view of the fact that it was the UPAGRA Squatters' Committee 
that had assigned this plot to the young settler.12 
Finally the UPAGRA people decided to leave the situation as it was, especially as 
it appeared that Oscar had the total trust of Fernando Campos, the Settlement Head. In 
effect, the latter saw Oscar as the only person with the rhetoric and organisational 
skills necessary to break the influence of UPAGRA in La Lucha. This had been proved in 
his willingness to confront the Squatter's Committee head-on. Thus Oscar played an 
important role in preparing the settlers in La Lucha for the arrival of the 034 Programme 
by making it clear to them that if they wanted to apply for credit they should 'prove' 
that they were peaceful and compliant people, and by setting up a Settlers' Committee 
which was recognized by the IDA. 
Fernando Campos relied on Oscar's accounts of the progress made in eradicating 
the influence of the Upagristas in local forms of organisation such as the UPAGRA 
Squatters' Committee. Oscar was also asked to carry out tasks which enhanced his 
role as intermediary, such as that of making lists of settlers who lost their maize crop 
during the recurrent inundations, and who could claim compensation for the damages, 
etc. In addition Oscar was employed by the IDA and put in charge of their road 
construction programme in La Lucha, and in that capacity he could offer jobs to settlers 
who had no monetary income whatsoever. Another source of income for Oscar was a 
path constructed by the IDA which crossed his plot. This was the only possible entry to 
a riverbank where sand could be collected for construction purposes. Although he was 
legally obliged to let people pass through the plot to gather sand, Oscar charged money 
for it. It is not surprising, then, that Oscar became a very powerful person as he could 
present himself as the local representative of the Settlement Head. 
Oscar played a leading role in setting up a Settlers' Committee (comité de 
parceleros) which was loyal to the IDA. This committee was founded in 1979 and 
functioned for two years. However, soon after the formation of this committee, most 
members started to distrust Oscar as it appeared that he was selling timber from what 
would become the communal plot, without rendering any accounts or profit to the 
committee. As a result the other members of the Settlers' Committee decided to 
distance themselves from him. The treasurer of the committee, for instance, had a 
clash with Oscar about his pocketing the proceeds from the timber sale. When 
questioned Oscar answered that he had no need to answer to anyone except the IDA. 
1 2lt is important to note that the beneficiary selection process shortly after the invasion took place as 
follows: UPAGRA would come with a list of people - who were factually in possession of the land - and 
the IDA would investigate whether they fulfilled the conditions. In general this caused no problems, as 
UPAGRA people ensured themselves that the squatters were landless and had not sold land in other 
settlements. The incident with Oscar, in fact, was a rupture with this procedure. 
Accomodation as a strategy 147 
Gatekeeping comes under fire 
Oscar became the main representative in La Lucha of the Coordination Committee 
which was established in 1982 in order to normalize the relationships between the IDA 
and the settlers. In addition, Oscar derived much power from the importance Fernando 
Campos gave to his advice regarding the allocation of plots to particular persons. It is 
also said that Oscar earned a lot by offering to act as an intermediary between settlers 
who wanted to sell their plots and the Settlement Office. In the meantime a market for 
land came into being in La Lucha which stimulated settlers to sell their land. In this 
way, settlers were attracted to the settlement who had no obligations vis-à-vis 
UPAGRA. [ 
A particular incident acquired much importance in La Lucha as it questioned the 
legitimacy of Oscar's power, and hence of gatekeeping in La Lucha. This incident had 
to do with an abandoned plot which the Board of Education of the La Lucha school 
wanted to use to cultivate crops to finance school activities. After a formal request to 
the Settlement Head by the Board of the school, the agrarista notified them at a 
meeting that Fernando Campos had agreed to allocate the plot to the school to 
generate funds. Thereafter, members of the Board started! to grow maize on the plot. 
However, Oscar was against the idea since Juan José, j a leading UPAGRA leader, 
played a pivotal role on the Board. Fernando Campos agreed with Oscar that UPAGRA 
should not be given the chance to gain control of a communal plot through the Board of 
Education. Oscar had a clear idea of what to do with the plot, he settled a woman on it 
with whom he had a love affair. After the agrarista itevoked Fernando Campos' 
decision, the woman proceeded to plant maize on those parts that had been already 
cleared by the members of the Board. 
The Board then demanded that a meeting be convened with the agrarista and Fernando 
Campos in order to straighten things out. Fernando and trie agrarista declared that a 
decision had never been made to allocate the plot to the Baard of Education. Indignant 
about this injustice the members of the Board decided to 
and to use the revenue for the purchase of school materia , 
that this was an illegal action and that they could be put i i jail for it. Altogether there 
were more than 40 farmers who participated in the harvssting. Among them was a 
member of the UPAGRA Squatters' Committee, Juan José. 
Upon hearing this Oscar became furious and urged the woman to sue. They were 
all summoned to go to the court in Guâcimo and it was Juan José who confronted 
Fernando Campos there when the latter accused thum of being thieves and 
communists. Later, Juan José reassured many settlers by declaring that if they were 
put in jail UPAGRA would start a political campaign for their release. In the face of the 
determination of the settlers of La Lucha, Fernando Campos decided not to act, thus in 
fact respecting the first decision to allocate the plot to the lEducation Board. 
This incident was also important to the front-line workers since it showed the 
dangers of working with intermediaries such as Oscar who could take advantage of 
their position, and create highly conflictive situations. Eventually, Oscar was left out of 
any decision regarding the distribution of credit. 
This did not mean, however, that Oscar played no role in the settlement any 
more. Oscar was politically active in the oppositional Unidad party as an active 
campaigner. He therefore maintained excellent relationships with the congressman of 
that party in the Limon Province. Besides being engaged in local party politics, he spent 
much energy on the local football team, receiving a subsidy which covered part of the 
costs. Thereafter, he became involved in the invasion of an abandoned landholding of 
about 200 hectares adjoining Neguev and asked a few poor settlers in La Lucha to 
participate. After the invasion was recognized by the IDA he started negotiating with a 
harvest the woman's maize 
although they were aware 
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company that was interested in buying the land. Then Oscar, who had been earning a 
lot of money by offering his services as an intermediary to the squatters, employed a 
lawyer and summoned the squatters to leave the finca on the grounds that he was the 
legal owner. In return, he offered the squatters a small compensation. The squatters 
then asked UPAGRA for assistance. Fortunately for the squatters, the UPAGRA lawyer 
was able to invalidate the transaction between Oscar and the company interested in the 
land. 
Finally, Oscar made attempts to establish a Housing Committee in La Lucha in 
order to apply for subsidies from a Rural Housing Programme promoted by the 
government. To that end he ensured the support of an influential person in La Lucha, 
the preacher of an expanding evangelical church. In addition, he asked for additional 
funds from his friend the MP of Unidad. In this way Oscar was preparing his come-back 
in La Lucha. 
This attempt to regain influence had to be stopped by a concerted effort of the 
social worker, the agrarista and the members of a new Development Committee formed 
with the assistance of the IDA. Indeed, the fear existed that Oscar would use the 
Housing Programme to extort money from the settlers, while pressurizing them to vote 
for Unidad. In the future, attempts by Oscar and others to engage in forms of political 
clientelism were actively com batted by the IDA front-line workers. 
Next I discuss the functioning of gatekeeping in relation to the Association of 
Small Producers. 
6.5 The Association of Small Producers 
In this section I argue that the absence of any kind of local organisation was a major 
reason for the failure of the Agricultural Development Programmes, and that the IDA 
administrators realized the necessity of promoting farmers' organisations. This will be 
shown by focussing on the creation and further evolution of the Association of Small 
Producers in Neguev. It will be shown that gatekeeping as the product of an 
intervention style which was intent on obliterating forms of political negotiation, 
subsequently became an obstacle for the implementation of the 034 Programme itself. 
Association. This, in fact, was the irony of the 034 Programme: that it substituted 
forms of 'political clientelism' in which negotiations between groups of farmers and 
institutional leaders, by a form of 'bureaucratic clientelism' which was characterized by 
a relationship of mutual dependence between gatekeepers and front-line workers. 
The failure of the Animal husbandry programme 
The largest agricultural development programme in the whole of Neguev was the 
animal husbandry one, both in terms of number of beneficiaries and in terms of loans 
per beneficiary. This programme consisted of a dairy livestock and a beef cattle 
component. Here I will dwell on the reasons for the failure of the largest component, 
the dairy livestock. 
As noted before, at the beginning of the programme there existed doubts 
concerning the financial viability of a dairying programme in the Neguev. The animals 
bought were unable to deliver the expected yields unless they were fed with high-
quality grass. In brief, little thought was given by IDA planners to the quality of 
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pastures until the damage was done 1 3. The situation was further complicated by the 
fact that the milk-processing companies Borden and Dos Pinos improved their quality 
standards and started rejecting milk from all over the Atlant c zone. In addition the price 
of cattle plummeted in 1983-84. This was a blow for many settlers who were unable 
to pay the interests on loans. Thus many were forced to sell their cattle assets in order 
to pay the interests on those same assets. It need not be said that this became a 
source of enormous disaffection vis-a-vis the IDA. 
It is important to note, however, that all parties (a so many UPAGRA leaders) 
agreed that the fault of the failure of the programme was not only the IDA'S, since 
there was also an element of personal responsibility. Them was much cheating in the 
purchase of cattle 1 4. For instance many bought low-quality animals while claiming the 
money for good quality cattle and pocketing the difference. Others started selling cattle 
in order to live, while failing to pay the interest. A common story is that some just 
spent the money in the canteens. UPAGRA followers capitalized on these errors by 
inciting the people not to repay their debts. They argued that the credit was a present 
given by USAID to the IDA and thus the IDA was exploiting the peasants by demanding 
that the money be returned. In fact, one argument resurrently used against the 
institution was that credit had been provided at an interest 'ate of 15% whereas it was 
known that USAID charged only 4%. As noted before, Upagristas contended that these 
programmes were set up with the conscious intention by the IDA of creating a large 
degree of indebtedness among settlers, so as to force them to sell their plots.1 6 In 
view of the threatening disaster of the animal programme the Settlement Head had 
decided that some form of local organization might be necessary to salvage it, and 
consequently the Association of Small Producers was created. 
The formation of the Association of Small Producers 
1985 The Association of Small Producers was established in 1 
Ramirez, a sociologist who was responsible for the Training 
Neguev, and the veterinary officer Felipe Gonzales establi 
most important lines of activity were securing funds 
introduction of a control system whereby milk from 
Initiatives were made to raise funds from the Canadian 
shing 
for 
sick 
end 
13This was the view of Hugo Paz who was employed by IDA to rescue the dairying programme. Hugo 
Paz, who was a dairy cattle specialist and Felipe Gonzales, the veterinary, had different opinions on the 
reasons for the failure. The latter criticized Hugo Paz for recommending expensive concentrates for the 
cattle. In his view, large yields could never be attained under the non-tec hnified conditions existing at that 
time in Neguev. The result was increased indebtedness. In his view the collapse of the market did the rest. 
Hugo Paz, who had participated in a specialized programme of dairy production under small farm 
conditions in the northern areg>of Rio Frio in the Atlantic zone, blamed the policy of the Ministry of 
Agriculture for deciding to give priority to the highlands as a dairy production area. He argued that with the 
necessary investment, infrastructural support and initial subsidies, the Atlantic zone could, in the middle to 
long term, produce in a more cost-effective way than the meseta central. However, this decision was not 
made for the fear of estranging the politically influential highland dairy producers (see for the political 
underpinnings of agricultural policy Annis, 1987). 
"According to the veterinary, control was not only impossible but he was not expected to be too 
stringent in assessing the purchase of cattle, for the money had to be spent as rapidly as possible. 
1 8 A loyalist with whom I discussed the history of intervention had a less conspiratory view. He argued 
that the failure of the agricultural programmes was due to a combination of ignorance, negligence by the 
técnicos as well as the settlers, and a lack of thought given to the absence of markets for these products. 
on the initiative of Virgilio 
and Education Unit in 
a collection centre. The 
a cooling plant and the 
cows could be refused, 
the German Embassies. 
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Membership was open to all beneficiaries of the dairy livestock programme, but in 
reality only a small group of beneficiaries participated. 
The founders of the Association, twelve in all, were close neighbours. They 
maintained an excellent relationship with Felipe Gonzales and had been involved in the 
animal husbandry programme from the beginning. They were viewed by most front-line 
workers as 'loyalists'. They were known by the social worker and the agrarista as 
'responsible characters', who were ready to seek 'constructive solutions' to communal 
problems. In any case neither the técnicos, the agrarista nor the sociologist needed to 
fear that the founders of the Association would indulge in forms of public criticism 
against them and the IDA. 
As a group, the 12 founders of the Association had much in common. Some 
were traders and others were small artisans. It was common for most to combine 
activities in the settlement with businesses or jobs outside. And a few would have their 
families in neighbouring villages or in San José. For one thing, they were not as 
committed to farming as they made the IDA officials believe. Yet, they were able to 
play an important role in programme implementation through their close relationship to 
some front-line workers and their involvement in the Association. Accordingly, they 
remained points of reference and important allies in day-to-day service delivery tasks. 
As they acquired rights and developed skills in voicing settlers' needs they were 
considered a part of the institution by many settlers, and by some they were called 
"the apple of IDA'S eye". 
Five of these former 'loyalists' formed the Board of the Association. It was never 
clear to me what the precise number of members of the Association was, although the 
President of the Board claimed that all the thirty beneficiaries of the dairy programme 
were members. 
I remember that Mario Green, the social worker, once referred to Rafael, the 
President, and Nicolás, the Vice-President of the Association, as 'volatile' communal 
leaders. He commented that they were dedicated and cooperative all right, but they 
tended to act as spoilt children when they did not receive enough attention from him or 
from the other front-line workers. Mario argued that they would only take initiatives if 
they received the full support of the IDA. For instance, if something had to be arranged 
in San José, they would expect to travel there in one of the institute's cars. 
Rafael and Nicolás, like most other gatekeepers, were not fully dedicated to farming, 
nor had they ever been so. Rafael was a small trucker and Nicolás earned an income as 
a cattle trader.1 6 Rafael was listed in the pineapple programme but soon opted out. 
Nicolás, the vice-president, became a beneficiary of this programme, but he later 
became a nuisance to the técnico Samuel Lozano when it appeared that he was 
neglecting his pineapple plot. 
The Association was short-lived though, and by 1986 it had stopped functioning. 
A gloomy cost-benefit analysis was made of milk production by the Credit Fund. In 
short, the advice was to forget the idea and the Association stopped functioning. 
Nevertheless the Board remained in place, ready to undertake any new promising 
activity. After the failure of the animal husbandry programme all but two of the twelve 
founders of the Association became beneficiaries of the chili programme. However, the 
gatekeepers were a minority of the 30 or so beneficiaries of the chili programme. 
The chili programme was followed by other promising agricultural programmes 
such as those of pineapple and maracuya (passion fruit). In the case of the chili 
programme already some rudimentary forms of farmers production organisation existed. 
1eThe third member of the Association's Board owned a tinshop in San José, the fourth ran a bar in 
Pocora, and the fifth was an assistant to a lawyer in Guâpiles. The other two had left the settlement. 
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whole families) on the 
the peak periods. Decisions 
were also taken within the 
would receive more per unit 
fluctuations in daily income 
Developing modes of local cooperation: the chili programme 
Chili is a very labour intensive crop during the harvesting period. In order to distribute 
efficiently the work load it was decided to allot sections of the cultivated chili to 
particular persons/families. In this way the owner could ma <e sure that the plants were 
well preserved and that all ripe chilis were picked. Miguel had learnt this method of 
assigning responsibility per area to groups (in this case 
plantations. On his farm three entire families worked during 
concerned with the level of payment to the labourers 
committee. A pay system was devised in which labourers 
in periods when production was not very high. In this way 
would not be so great. 
Using the idiom of the solidarista unions17 in the plantations he would tell the 
labourers that they were also responsible for the health of the chili plants as these 
provided both the owner and themselves with an income. At one moment the kilo price 
of chili was increased by 25 cents, and it was decided w thin the committee to pass 
this on to the labourers. Miguel, then, was proud to observe that a single labourer 
would usually earn more than 400 colones (about 7 dollars) and that in some cases 
when a whole family was working they could earn in one day enough to pay for a 
week's food (the work was easy to do even for children of 8 years, Miguel argued). 
Never before had landless people from the communal centre had the opportunity to 
earn so much money in Neguev. 
The committee of chili producers was, after the animal husbandry programme, 
the second attempt in the settlement to shape a mode of organization with the purpose 
of coordinating production activities and achieving the necessary unity for negotiating 
with agro-processing companies. Miguel recalls that the chili técnico, Samuel Lozano, 
gladly supported the idea of forming a Chili Producers' Committee in order to negotiate 
with the purchasing company over contracts. It was unique as it epitomized a new 
mode of cooperation between técnicos and farmers. It started in 1987 and it consisted 
of four members. Miguel was the president. Before a meeting with the agro-processing 
company was due, the whole group of chili producers would come together to establish 
a common strategy. Thereafter the Chili Producers' Committee would handle current 
problems with the company. Every three months a few members of the committee 
would travel with Samuel Lozano to Cartago (one of the largest cities on the Central 
Plateau of Costa Rica) to meet the manager of the purchasing company and arrange 
issues regarding transport and payment, new prices, etc. However, the relationship 
with the purchasing company became problematic when it started delaying payments. 
"Solidarista unions were established in the banana plantations with the help of the government and the 
plantation owners, and they aimed at achieving a 'partnership' between employers and labourers. See 
Bourgois (1989) for an excellent account of the role of solidarista unions in fighting independent union 
These became formalized in the case of the new agricultural 
after the conclusion of the 034 Programme, those of pineapple 
significance of this was that a new type of client-officia 
which the capacity to establish strong forms of local production 
was central. Next, I discuss how such a new form of product! 
arose with the chili programme. This is done from the perspective 
had played a major role in it, Miguel Huerta, and who later 
in promoting the reconstitution of the Association. 
programmes established 
and maracuya. The 
interface emerged, one in 
-oriented organization 
ion-oriented organisation 
of one settler who 
Would play an important role 
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Referring to a major confrontation they had with the purchasing company Miguel 
commented, 
"I am against the use of force but one day we had to stop a truck from leaving the 
settlement. Every week the truck would come and at the peak it would load 
between 700 and 800 bags of chili. They had not paid us for weeks. Every time 
the truck came they would tell us that next week they would deliver the cheques. 
Altogether they owed us three quarters of a million. Meanwhile we had to pay the 
labourers who complained that they could no longer get credit from the pulperias. 
That day, then, we decided not to let the truck leave and it helped because within 
a day someone came from Cartago with the cheques". 
Later, however, the delay in payments became a habit, and a number of people who 
according to Miguel had little knowledge about how to negotiate, became more and 
more agressive in their impatience, going as far as to accuse the committee leaders of 
being conformists (in other words traitors). It was his task then to calm them down and 
explain to them that it was easier to press their claims through dialogue, instead of 
engaging into UPAGRA-style actions. In reality the company had serious cash problems 
as they had lost one container shipped abroad. It was evident that it could not handle 
the large amount of chili delivered. Nevertheless the company continued buying, even 
until the middle of 1988. 
It is interesting to dwell a little longer on the background and attitudes of Miguel 
as it tells us something about those farmers who, though critical of UPAGRA, were not 
engaged in gatekeeping practices. 
A 'non-loyalist' farmer 
Miguel Huerta clearly belonged to a different coterie than the founding members of the 
Association. This was evidenced by the fact that, though a cattleowner, he had almost 
no relationship with Felipe Gonzales, the veterinary official. Another feature that 
differentiated him from this group is that he played no role in the IDA's attempts to 
eliminate UPAGRA. 
At the same time he was proud to be considered a "good", responsible and hard-
working farmer. He shared the old Association's members dislike of UPAGRA politics, 
but was highly critical of their attempts to improve their position through their 
relationship with the institution. In this regard he was an exponent of a group of well-
regarded settlers who where active in community affairs, but who had established 
working instead of gatekeeping relationships with functionaries. As we will see, his 
relationship with Samuel Lozano was particularly characteristic of his mode of 
operating. 
His attitude vis-a-vis the institution can be illustrated in the reply he gave to a 
former UPAGRA leader (Pennycot) who urged him not to repay the debts he had with 
the Credit Fund after the success of the chili programme, "l.said to him that when I 
went to the Credit Fund's office I did so freely and in full knowledge of the risks of the 
new programme. The IDA did not entice me to enter the programme with false 
pretexts. So, why should I let myself be influenced by those who urge me not to repay 
the debt"? 
Miguel, a former plantation worker and overseer, had been influenced by the 
Christian Democrat corporatist philosophy of the solidarista movement in the 
plantations which stressed the benefits of solidarity between employer and employed in 
expanding production and improving the working and family conditions of the labourers. 
Accomodation as a strategy 153 
In Miguel's view a radical organization like U PAG RA could only lead to counter-
productive strife between the interests of the institutions and that of smallholders. 
Thus, he was in favour of establishing new modes of organization in the settlement. 
His sense of communal responsibility was reflected in his being a member of 
various communal organizations like the educational board. He had participated in two 
courses on credit administration. However, he did not give that as a proof of his special 
relationship with the IDA. He resented other settlers accusing him of being an IDA 
favourite. In this respect he argued, 
"Many people here think that by choosing me to participate in these courses I was 
favoured by the IDA. They do not understand that one major aim of the course 
was that I, in turn, should train other settlers here in Neguev. But no one 
responded to my initiatives to pass on the knowledge. Those who claim that I am 
close to the institution do not realize that I might have been trained to help them. I 
see it as my obligation to give advice to people". 
He was also rather critical of institutional performance. When discussing the quality of 
extension Miguel lamented that there was no pressure on técnicos to do their work, 
there was no supervision. If they acted with responsibility it was only because of 
personal commitment. He commented, 
"Often técnicos complain that they cannot do their work because of lack of 
transport. That may be so in some cases but I do not believe it is a major factor. 
Often you see five or six of them driving all over the settlement without getting 
out of the car. To become a técnico some have been studying for years and years. 
But they apparently keep their knowledge to themselves". 
This attitude towards the IDA differed strongly from that of the gatekeepers. This 
reflected also in a number of differences Miguel had with them. 
Miguel Huerta's productionist approach 
Miguel had a controversy with Rafael, the President of the Association's Board, over 
the kind of projects the Association should promote. Rafael had been planning to 
establish a fruit packing plant in Milano with funds which were originally earmarked for 
a milk-cooling plant. The Association would then take care of the packing and transport 
of the pineapple and maracuya. The profits would be used to capitalize the Association. 
The members of the Crop Committees, however, were not so charmed with this plan. 
Miguel, in fact, was totally opposed to this arrangement, which he considered as 
exploitative and beneficial to those within the Association who did not grow 
pineapples, like Rafael himself. Furthermore, Miguel was worried about the kind of 
'projects' promoted by the old Association members. He suspected that the money 
raised by these projects would be used in a way which would benefit only a restricted 
group of people. Another project he was suspicious of was that of purchasing a truck, 
since he was afraid that this would become a source of income for particular members 
of the board. Miguel Huerta, then, had a double loyalty, first towards the committee of 
pineapple producers and second to the Association. At the same time Miguel was 
convinced that it was important to separate production issues from the problems of the 
community. For, he feared that the Association would become a debating club in which 
lazy and irresponsible settlers could give vent to their frustrations. However, this was 
not the opinion of all the beneficiaries of the new crop programmes who had become 
members of the Association. 
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Summarizing this section, we see the emergence of a new set of views on issues 
of local organisation among non-radical farmers. At the same time a new strategy for 
dealing with the IDA arose which, contrary to gatekeeping practices, was intended to 
curtail entrenched forms of bureaucratic clientelism, in this way establishing a more 
independent relationship with the bureaucracy. Next I will discuss the attempts to 
revitalize the Association in the face of the necessity to create local forms of 
organisation in line with the new state policy of agricultura de cambio. 
6.6 The Attempts to Reconstitute the Association 
The new programmes which were established in the settlement in the course of 1987-
88 were not funded by the IDA Credit Fund, but by state-owned banks. Hence, the 
beneficiaries of new programmes had to comply with regulations different from the 
IDA'S. In contrast to the IDA'S extension and credit delivery policy the new state 
agricultural policy of agricultura de cambio required that beneficiaries should organise in 
groups in order to facilitate the delivery of credit. Since the Association was the only 
farmers organisation in Neguev that had legal recognition, it seemed logical that new 
loans would henceforth be channeled through it. Yet, the Association was not the only 
organization which could represent the interests of beneficiaries, since each 
programme had a Crop Committee which had been set up in order to coordinate work 
activities. One task at hand, then, was to incorporate the various Crop Committees 
within the Association in order to gain access to bank credits in future. 
As argued, towards the end of the 034 Programme attempts were made by 
beneficiaries and the técnico Samuel Lozano to establish local forms of production-
oriented organisation. This also meant that the client-official interface changed from 
one in which the individual relationship between técnico and beneficiary stood central 
to one in which beneficiaries and técnico cooperated within a Crop Committee. 
However, this did not mean the demise of existing patterns of bureaucratic clientelism. 
The Association, still dominated by a group of ex-loyalists and gatekeepers became 
important as a means for channeling resources. At the same time it turned into the 
arena of struggle between the gatekeepers who were interested in continuing existing 
patterns of bureaucratic clientelism and those others who wanted to convert the 
Association into the major arena for decision-making concerning organisation for 
production and related community issues. 
The reconstitution of the Association 
In order to restructure the Association a number of meetings were organized in the 
second half of 1987 which were badly attended. Since there were complaints that no 
settlers outside the Milano sector were represented in the Association, the President of 
the Board organized a series of meetings in the most distant sectors of Neguev -
Bellavista, El Peje and El Silencio. Attendance at these information meetings was very 
low, and in El Peje only two settlers showed up. For Rafael, the Association's 
President, this was a proof of the traditional attitude of settlers outside Milano. 
In September of 1987, a meeting was organized to announce the new objectives 
of the Association. This meeting, held in Milano, was the best attended, with more 
than 20 persons. Three members of the old board were present as well as Mario Green, 
the social worker, and two extensionists, Samuel Lozano and Gabriel Rodriguez, and a 
majority of beneficiaries of the maracuya and pineapple programmes. In two short 
speeches Rafael and Nicolas, the president and the vice president, stressed the need 
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for unity and reported conversations they had held in San Jose with bank functionaries 
where it was stressed that in the future only organized groups such as associations, 
cooperatives, etc. would receive credit. This change in policy, they argued, required a 
totally novel mode of relationship with the state. It was then decided that all members 
of the pineapple (11) and maracuya (30) programmes should become members of the 
Association and make a contribution of a thousand colones (fifeen dollars) which would 
be deducted from the loans to be received. 
Rafael also argued that the Association's objective was that of fostering 
production and thus not meant to be a communal organization. In response to criticisms 
of the limited appeal of the Association outside Milano, he argued that soon settlers in 
the other sectors would become convinced that the Association was the only road to 
economic improvement. In addition, he emphasized that membership of the Association 
would be closed to 'undesirable' elements. For that reason every new member should 
be recommended by two current members. Rafael also stressed that their task now 
was to reform the Association by incorporating new members, but that it was 
necessary to start with those who had already participated in the IDA's production 
programmes. One major point of disagreement at this meeting was whether a new 
board should be elected. Rafael and Nicolas reacted vehemently against such a 
proposal. They argued that they had always been at the forefront of the Association. 
Moreover, their terms would end six months later, and they saw no reason to resign at 
that moment. Yet, there were two positions in the board that had to be filled and 
elections were planned for the next meeting.1 8 Interestingly the meeting ended with a 
hommage to Samuel Lozano for his commitment to the farmers and his success with 
the chili programme. He was made an honorary member of the Association. 
A few months later Rafael stopped attending the meetings himself and, after 
being reprimanded several times by the other members of the Board, he was forced to 
resign. In fact, he was too busy at the time, since besides trucking he had taken oyer a 
bar in a different settlement. He had no time left to spend on the Association. 
Subsequently, pressure was exercised by the members of the new crop programmes on 
Miguel Huerta to become President. In march 1988 Miguel Huerta was elected 
President. 
The Association as an arena of struggle 
The relationship between the beneficiaries of the new crop programmes and the IDA 
front-line workers was still characterized by a kind of client-official interface which put 
much emphasis on the organizing role of the técnico. This was expressed in the 
decision which was made by the Board of the Association that in the future a guided 
extension system should be followed for all programmes18, a decision to which Miguel 
subscribed. 
However, the guided extension system was a source of anger for a wide range of 
settlers, not only radical ones but also beneficiaries of the new programmes. In their 
view this system gave too much power to the técnico, with the result that the 
1 8As a sort of concession one member of the maracuya and one of the pineapple programme were 
elected at this later meeting. 
1sThe workings of a guided extension system was once explained to me by Rafael, 'The técnico 
determines the average amount of inputs that will be needed, with a view to limiting the use of credit. 
Then he takes care of buying the amount agreed and distributes it himself. The settler only receives cash 
for paying labour costs. This minimizes opportunities for directing credit to alternative purposes". 
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beneficiary became too dependent upon him. They argued that if Samuel Lozano's chili 
programme had been a success it was because most decisions had been by both the 
extensionist and the farmers in the Chili Producers' Committee. The issue, then, was 
that decision-making should be made within the Association, it was argued that this 
should hold not only for technical issues but also for more substantial topics, such as 
the choice of crops and the negotiation strategy that should be followed with agro-
export companies. And there were those who thought that issues which had to do with 
community infrastructure should also become a major topic of debate within the 
Association. 
Miguel also had to deal with a situation in which open doubts were expressed as 
to the practicality of making a distinction between community and production issues, 
as Rafael and Nicolás - the former President and the vice-president of the Association -
were continuously doing. After all if the bridges were not repaired the crops could not 
be taken to market. And, as many argued, it should be the task of the Association to 
deal with all these problems. Yet, both the Settlement Head and accommodative 
settlers such as Miguel himself were opposed to an expanded task-definition of the 
Association. For, if indebted and 'troublesome' settlers started participating in 
community activities via the Association it would not take long until they demanded 
that the Association make steps to improve their eligibility for credit. Indeed, this would 
amount to an invitation to UPAGRA to 'infiltrate' the Association and to demand an 
overall renegotiation of the debts. In fact, the views of some beneficiaries of the new 
crop programmes were not so distant from those of UPAGRA people. Let us now 
inquire into their discourse as it provided farmers with a language for expressing 
dissent and frustration. 
The view of an Upagrista 
Porfirio Gutiérrez was one of the UPAGRA leaders who expressed his doubts about the 
capacity of the Association to defend the interests of the beneficiaries. 
In his view the only manner to improve the lot of the peasants was by the 
development of autonomous forms of peasant organization. Thus he did not believe in a 
close relationship between the Association and the IDA. In his view this was a 
straitjacket for manipulating the necessities of the community. He definitely had a very 
distinct view of local organization which, in brief, should be based on enhancing the 
farmers' autonomy in their dealings with external actors such as state institutions, 
agribusiness enterprises, and political parties. Thus he was convinced that the fate of 
organizations such as the Association would not be resolved by any técnico, not even 
by the most honest one, but by the capacity of the settlers to organize themselves and 
demonstrate that viable livelihood alternatives are possible. 
Porfirio argued that farmer's organization also had to address the political aspects 
of the production problem. He often pointed to the fact that peasants in the area were 
always producing the non-profitable crops. Rhetorically he posed the question in the 
following terms, 
"Have you ever seen peasant producers grow really profitable crops such as 
ornamental plants, or macadamia? You see here people from the entire world who 
with credits and subsidies from the government establish thriving enterprises in no 
time, Americans, Germans, Italians, Colombians, but not Costa Rican peasants. 
Agricultura de cambio is an invention aimed at offering more investment 
possibilities to these people. All new export opportunities by-pass us". 
He was not opposed to cooperation with institutions such as the IDA, but cooperation 
should, in his view, be based on responsibility and mutual respect. 'Organisation', 
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'accountability' and 'solidarity' were recurrent key-words when he gave his opinion in a 
meeting. He would argue, then, that credit from any institute should not be accepted 
without the latter assuming the full responsibility for extension and the result of the 
technological package in the field. This implied that the farmers should have the 
autonomy to criticize the institute they were working with. Another demand that he 
always put forward in conversations with farmers was that contracts should be signed 
only between farmers' groups and companies or institutes, and not with individual 
farmers, since only organized groups can exercise enough control and discipline. In 
addition, he argued that only through community solidarity and a combative attitude 
was it possible to resolve problems with state institutions. He would not grow tired to 
repeat that it should be the job of farmers' organizations, such as the Association, to 
press state institutions such as the IDA to honour its promises. 
In fact, the views of Upagristas such as Porfirio Gutierrez influenced the debate 
within the Association. 
Towards reshaping institution-client relations 
Before examining the further attempts to reshape the Association it may be useful to 
summarize the argument up to now. 
It has been argued so far that the Association, formed to serve the interests of a 
group of animal husbandry programme beneficiaries, was reconstituted through an 
alliance between a group of gatekeepers and the técnico Samuel Lozano to obtain 
funding for the establishment of new production programmes. The beneficiaries of the 
agricultural programmes (pineapple and maracuya) Samuel Lozano was promoting 
became new members of the Association. The founding members of the Association 
got preferential access to these programmes, but not all enrolled in them. Two different 
accommodation strategies were represented in the efforts to renew the Association; 
the gatekeeping strategy of the old cattle-owners and the autonomous strategy of 
members of the new agricultural programmes. 
The técnico Samuel Lozano had silently supported the latter group. He had had a 
number of discussions with the former president, Rafael, about the lack of short and 
medium range targets. His criticism was directed at the fact that decisions were made 
and actions undertaken on an ad-hoc basis, without the Association being able to offer 
a response to concrete problems at the level of the whole settlement. 
Next we will see how Miguel Huerta, the new president of the Association, 
attempts to enhance the autonomy of the Association by establishing a tactical 
distance from the IDA, with a view to making it attractive to the members of the new 
agricultural programme. This, in short, would imply that a shift had to occur from 
enrolling front-line workers to enrolling fellow settlers, something the gatekeepers had 
done little to accomplish. Thus, with the introduction of the new system of extension 
by groups and the necessity to carve out a larger space of autonomy, Miguel Huerta 
embarked on a series of activities directed at increasing the level of legitimacy of the 
Association towards the wider community. 
Initiatives taken by the new President of the Association's Board 
In taking up the presidency Miguel vowed that his major challenge would be the 
reorganization of the communal store which was run by the Association. It appeared 
that the store had been losing money because it was being used as a source of 
employment for the vice-president of the Association. 
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Another major task that he thought the Association should take on was that of 
pressing for the distribution of full legal titles by the IDA. This, in his view, was the 
largest challenge, for the titles they held were of limited value since they were subject 
to a mortgage of 20 years and settlers were not entitled to sell the land during that 
period. He believed that only when settlers were entitled to cancel the land debt in one 
payment, and hence acquire the right to sell or rent out the land without any 
interference by the institution, would they attain the necessary independence from the 
institution. The IDA, however, feared that if settlers received full titles over the land, 
under circumstances of relative poverty, many settlers might sell to outsiders, leading 
to the expansion of a new form of latifundism within the settlement sector. 
Furthermore, extending full titles implied that control over the settlement sector was 
lost. 
I spoke to Miguel Huerta a few months after he had been elected president. He 
was rather positive on various counts. First, concerning the communal store he was 
able to improve the situation in a short period of time. When he took over the 
presidency there was a compounded debt of 270,000 colones ($3,500) which had 
been reduced to only 40,000 colones ($500). There was also progress in securing 
funds for the packing plant. And they had been negotiating with Fernando Campos, the 
Regional Director, over the handing out of full titles. Fernando had committed himself 
to searching for a solution by consulting with the IDA'S legal department in San Jose. 
A few weeks later Miguel had not received any notice about the issue. 
Subsequently, he and another member of the Association's Board travelled to San 
Jose. They were told at the IDA's headquarters that the maps for the registry (pianos) 
were ready and that it was up to the Regional Director to start with the adjudication 
process. Miguel then started to doubt whether a real commitment existed on the part 
of the Regional Director to make headway in adjudicating land titles and to reach an 
agreement with farmers as to the price that would be asked for the land. This Miguel 
considered typical of Fernando Campos' reluctance to negotiate with any group of 
farmers whatsoever. In his view, the policy of the regional office was silly as it meant 
rejecting the opportunity to deal with a group of peaceful and 'democratic' farmers. 
Indeed, if UPAGRA members should decide to occupy the institution's offices - as the 
FENAC peasant union did in the El Indio settlement - the IDA administration would 
realize that they had lost a precious opportunity to resolve the issue. Certainly, a vast 
majority within the Association would have been happy to agree on a price of 4,000 
colones ($50) per hectare (a price which had been rejected by the FENAC in El Indio) 
provided they obtained full title immediately. 
The further evolution of the Association, then, was largely shaped by its 
relationship with the production programmes and the attempts to press the IDA to 
release full land titles. Both issues had practical significance, yet progress in their 
attainment also had symbolic meaning as it provided proof of the capacity of the 
Association to take an autonomous stand towards the IDA while following the new 
government development policy. Concerning the strategy to follow, Miguel agreed with 
Rafael that the UPAGRA line only led to conflicts with the government and distracted 
from real production oriented development, making it more difficult to attract state 
funds to the settlement. Thus he feared that an increased influence of this union would 
have negative effects on investment possibilities and, hence, on the value of land. 
He started working on the establishment of a Social Welfare Subcommittee. It 
was his view that the Association should have a social role within the community, 
otherwise people would only be interested in its ability to offer external resources. This 
only promoted clientelism and apathy. One indication of this was that the latest 
meeting was attended by no more than 17 persons. One concrete problem that this 
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Social Welfare Subcommittee was to resolve was that of the bridges. There were 25 in 
Neguev and all were defective. Yet, no one took the initiative to repair them. In 
Miguel's view part of the blame was the IDA'S as "they don't do anything themselves 
and they don't let others do it". It was the Regional Office's new policy not to become 
Involved in communal tasks anymore. Yet, because the settlements came officially 
under the auspices of the IDA, they were not eligible for municipal support (in this case 
Siquirres). For this they would have to pay the local authority taxes, but to be able to 
do so they needed 'full titles', otherwise the cost for the improvements of roads and 
bridges would not be reflected in an increase in the value of the land. Meanwhile 
UPAGRA leaders were holding meetings in which the issue of the titles were discussed. 
Miguel found that the IDA was handling the social situation in the settlement in a 
quite irresponsible way and feared that UPAGRA would decide at a given moment to 
step up action, for instance by occupying the IDA offices. His overall assessment of the 
Association became rather negative. He had his doubts as to the sense of investing 
time and energy in it. He had much more confidence in the committee of pineapple 
producers of which he also was the president. He considered that it was the lesson 
they drew from the chili programme that there should be a sense of common purpose 
and active participation in all phases of production; the negotiations with the agro-
export companies, the resolution of practical problems regarding techniques and labour 
coordination, etc. 
In the last resort, he argued, if the Association did not work well he would 
consider withdrawing with the whole group of pineapple producers and join a 
cooperative of an adjacent village, called Coopegermania which was oriented to 
pineapple production. The advantage of such a step would be that the (political) 
intricacies of dealing both with community and productive issues could be bypassed. 
Joining Coopegermania would entail that both issues could be neatly separated. 
Disillusionment with the Association 
A month later Miguel had grown even more skeptical. He complained that most board 
members were not attending the weekly meetings. Eventually, only himself and one 
other member were dealing with the daily affairs. They were even signing letters and 
taking decisions without being able to consult the others, something which was 
officially against the Association's rules. The store's administration was again in a 
mess. Nicolas Jimenez, who besides being vice-president was also the paid store-
keeper, would not take the initiative to hold a periodic inventory. Deficits were running 
high again. Then Rafael decided to lower Nicolas salary by half. Nicolas, then, after 
accusing Miguel of trying to lay the blame for the deficits of the Association on him, 
resigned. Miguel tried to keep the peace by assuring him that no one put in doubt his 
integrity and commitment. Yet, it was difficult for Miguel to understand how the store 
could have been losing so much money. 
Neither was the Social Welfare Committee working. Various groups from the sectors 
approached him to ask the Association for help with the construction of roads, bridges 
and other communal projects. He explained to them that he, on a personal basis, was 
ready to help in so far as he was involved as a member of the community in such 
activities. However, he made it clear that he was not entitled to commit funds from the 
Association for other projects than those approved by the general assembly. Yet, as he 
was intent on showing that the Association cared for the community he saw himself 
acting as an intermediary between these groups and the institution. 
He had also been inquiring in San José as to progress on the establishment of 
telephones and electricity to the settlement. Even in this respect he criticized the 
former leaders. They would go to San José for projects they were particularly 
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interested in but they showed no interest in long term communal projects. 
Nevertheless, they would charge the Association expenses for their trips. Neither had 
they been accountable to a wider group. This way of operating had been, according to 
Miguel Huerta, a liability for the credibility of the Association as an organization 
oriented to the development of the whole community. 
This situation was increasingly frustrating for Miguel. He claimed that it was the 
first time he had worked in an Association, and the experience had been far from 
positive. The settlers expected it to accomplish everything without actively 
participating. Also, the Crop Committee members who had been elected in the 
Association lost interest after they noticed they could get little out of the Association. 
Only those who had a long relationship with the IDA remained involved. And 
unfortunately they worked primarily on their own behalf and neglected other activities 
and projects which could benefit other sectors, or even the entire community. 
In view of these experiences Miguel decided to resign. It gave him much more 
satisfaction to work within the Committee of Pineapple Producers. The last blow for 
the Association was the withdrawal of its honorary member, Samuel Lozano. This 
occured after a conflict following a visit of the Minister of Agriculture. Characteristically 
Miguel Huerta sided with Samuel in the conflict, detailed below. 
Epilogue: The resignation of Samuel Lozano as honorary member of the Association 
Samuel resigned as honorary member following a visit by the Minister of Agriculture to 
the Neguev settlement. This incident is interesting as it showed the fragility of the 
alliance between the técnico and the Association and the difficulties entailed in 
promoting its independence from the IDA. 
The new Minister of Agriculture came to the Atlantic zone invited by the Regional 
Director of the Ministry. He was interested in new agricultural projects in which 
peasant/farmers were involved. The programme included speeches at the local 
agricultural service centre (the CAC) in Guácimo and a tour around Neguev to see the 
new programmes. In Guácimo the vice-president of the Association gave a short 
speech in which he stressed that the new agricultural programmes in Neguev had been 
set up by the Association independently of the IDA. In this way Nicolás Jiménez, the 
vice-president of the Association and one of the remaining 'gatekeepers' in the 
Association's board claimed the credit for the progress achieved. 
What happened next was an enormous confusion with regard to which plots the 
Minister should be taken to and by whom. Thus the técnico of the pejibaye (peach 
palm) programme (one of the few old programmes that was not a failure) decided to 
take him to see the plot of the large Villegas family2 0 which entirely specialized in this 
crop. The Association leaders did not like this and interpreted it as a serious form of 
interference with their programme. After all pejibaye was not one of the new 
programmes being promoted by the Association. Moreover, the Villegas were not 
members of the Association and had never shown any interest in joining. 
Consequently, Nicolás Jiménez became angry and said so to the técnicos right 
after the Minister's visit, causing a very unpleasant situation for the técnicos. In a 
^The Villegas family was mentioned in Chapter 3 as the only one which conformed to the model of the 
client as entrepreneurial farmer. They were a two generation family and owned altogether 6 parcels. They 
had become, on their own initiative, the most successful growers of pejibaye (peach palm) by themselves 
developing productiontechniques and maintaining contacts with an agro-processing company in San José. 
In fact, the extensionist in charge of this crop acquired much of his knowledge from them and according to 
the administration they attested to the 'fact' that individual farmers were able to use credit in a productive 
way without having toengage in paternalist relations with técnicos. Furthermore, they were the motor 
behind pejibaye production in the El Peje sector as they gave advice to other producers. 
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similar vein a few members of the Association decided to write a letter of complaint to 
the Regional Office in the name of the Association. 
As a result of the incident and the letter of the Association Samuel decided to 
resign. He was very disillusioned by their "immature reaction" and fully supported his 
companion, the pejibaye técnico. Samuel then wrote a letter to the Association 
explaining his decision. He argued that the pejibaye técnico had as much right as he, to 
choose a few good plots to show the Minister. Moreover, he pointed out that the 
Minister had not been invited by the Association but by the Regional Director of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. In addition he considered that Nicolás Jiménez had not been 
honest when he had commented in his speech that the new programmes were being 
promoted without the intervention of the IDA. After all he himself was an IDA 
extensionist. This was the end of Samuel's involvement in the Association. 
6.7 Summary and Conclusions 
IDA intervention in Neguev gave rise to practices of gatekeeping encompassing a set of 
activities oriented to securing preferential access to institutional resources by settlers 
who lacked experience in, and knowledge of, local farming and who therefore came to 
rely to a large extent on institutional credit and technology. Gatekeepers attained 
preferential anne^sJ)yLjCCJivJnning bureaucratsjofjtheir willingno<8<» ^ ^ h i ' i t y to develop 
a farming style which c,onfQjrmad--to~# the farmer as a rural 
entrepreneur^ln reality, however, they were not committed to long-term agricultural 
activities in view of their involvement in non-farming activities, such as trading.21 It 
was argued that gatekeepjngjed to.Jjjkjnd of client-official interface which can be 
characterized as -6uSlajLtcr«tin cl i a n tqlism 1 f " » a g w i t h i n t h i * e n n t n v f t h a t 
Association of Small Producers was formed. 
The Association was formed in 1985 by a group of beneficiaries of the animal 
husbandry programme who had participated in the IDA'S attempts to reduce the role of 
UPAGRA in Neguev. It aimed to improve the marketing of milk at a time when it had 
become apparent that the animal husbandry programme was in serious trouble. Local 
forms of organisation were a source of worry to Pernando Campos, as he feared that 
they would become the arenas in which clientelist types of relationships between the 
IDA and settlers could surface, and in which extension and training activities were 
targetted at individual farmers. Clientelism, however, survived in the face-to-face 
relationships between settlers and front-line workers. It was not surprising, then, that 
the Association was captured by a group of loyalists who readily engaged in 
gatekeeping practices. 
As the outcome of the animal husbandry programme was a disaster the 
Association stopped functioning. Due to a shift from an integrated rural development 
approach to a policy oriented to supporting organised groups of farmers, attempts were 
"Gatekeepers, then, can be defined as individuals who are able to limit other beneficiaries' access to 
the institution by becoming their spokesmen. As IDA loyalists who participated on the side of the IDA in 
the struggle against UPAGRA they acquired special access to institutional resources. As recognized 
"translators" of settlers' needs and of their life circumstances they gained a say in the delimitation of the 
criteria and procedures for resource distribution. As co-implementors they argued that they were helping to 
improve efficiency, while devising organizational forms which in reality were most suited to themselves. In 
the process they became highly skilled in projecting an image of themselves which conformed to 'the 
model of the client' held by the front-line workers (see chapter 3). 'Gatekeeping', thus, is an accomodation 
strategy which is predicated upon a clientelist relationship with IDA officials. 
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made in 1987 to reconstruct the Association. The social composition of the members 
had changed, due to the success of the chili programme and the positive perspectives 
of other agricultural programmes. The beneficiaries of these programmes lacked the 
prerogatives of the gatekeepers as they had not played a pivotal role in the struggle 
against UPAGRA. Miguel Huerta, the new President of the Association and active 
member in the committees of the new agricultural programmes, then, made attempts to 
establish a new kind of 'non-clientelist' relationship with IDA officials. This ocurred in 
the context of the closure of the 034 Programme. 
In order to force a shift within the Association from a clientelist relationship to a 
more autonomous relationship with the state, Miguel Huerta had to broaden the social 
base of the Association to make it more numerous and representative. But in order to 
increase its attractiveness to a wider group of settlers he had first to tackle a number 
of 'social issues'. This, however, proved to be difficult for two reasons. First, because 
of the relentless criticism on the part of 'radical' settlers who were skilled in using the 
discourse of community, which made these attempts less convincing. And second, 
because of the unwillingness of the IDA to accept a new type client-official entailing a 
larger degree of autonomy - for fear that Upagristas could infiltrate it - undercut the 
legitimacy of the Association. 
Indeed, Miguel Huerta depended heavily on the técnico Samuel Lozano for 
achieving the much sought-after restructuring of the Association. When the attempt 
failed, they both continued their work in the production programmes. Problems related 
to community organisation were simply postponed and for the time being left to radical 
groups. At the same time, Miguel Huerta was operating on two fronts; besides the 
Association he was busy in the Pineapple Producers' Committee. In other words, if 
reconstituting the relationship with the IDA in an autonomous way did not succeed, he 
had an alternative by pursuing his organisational work in the Crop Committees. 
In consequence the gatekeepers' practices of keeping apart the discourse of 
agricultural modernization and that of community by segregating the latter and labeling 
it as potentially subversive, were not outrightly questioned. Doing so would have run 
counter to Miguel Huerta's way of working the system, as it would have entailed 
addressing a number of issues which had to do with the conflictive character of IDA 
intervention. Miguel, obviously, did not do so, as this implied politizicing the issue of 
access to state services in such a way that possibilities were opened for UPAGRA. 
Therefore, he chose not to use the discourse of community in order to enlarge the 
Association. Such a strategy, in short, did not conform to his way of perceiving the 
problems of Neguev. 
It was argued in Chapter 5 that an intervention-coping strategy consists of a way 
of talking about interests; practical knowledge about how to deal with the state; and 
practices of enrolment. Regarding the first point it was asserted that interests are 
discursive means which are formulated in relation to specific problems and struggles. 
Moreover, it was argued that such a discursive formulation of 'interests' occurs 
through the localization of discourse. Finally, I distinguished three discourses which are 
recurrent in the Atlantic zone: that of agricultural modernization, community and 
democracy/citizenship. 
Thus in the case of Neguev we see that the discourses of agricultural 
modernization and community prevail in struggles concerning attempts to establish and 
develop local modes of organisation, in this particular case the Association. The 
discourse of democracy/citizenship plays a role as a background topic in the social 
interfaces between the different groups of settlers and officials, but is not 'localized' in 
such a way as to become a discursive weapon in the struggles and negotiations in 
Neguev. For one thing, in Neguev, the 'productionist' discourse of agricultural 
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modernization was central to the relationship with the state. Themes such as that of 
increasing the efficiency of credit delivery by working with groups of organised farmers 
were readily taken over by all those linked to the Association and to the new 
production programmes. On the other hand, the community discourse was almost 
wholly the property of UPAGRA, so much so that raising 'social issues' was interpreted 
as tantamount to inviting subversive elements to undermine the Association from 
within. 
Concluding, it can be said that the attempts to reconstitute the Association were 
averted because the discourses of agricultural modernization and community remained 
split. 
1978: - UPAGRA invades the Neguev hacienda. 
- Squatters' Committee is formed and squatters are evicted three 
times 
- After squatters are taken to prison in Limon UPAGRA organises march 
to San - José in order to force the IDA to purchase the Neguev 
1979: - SPPAL invades Milano grasslands after an agreement is reached 
between the IDA and UPAGRA 
- Settlers' Committee is formed by IDA agraristas and bank credit is 
distributed 
- A pool of loyalists is created by the agraristas 
1980: - Incident over maize marketing centre takes place in Milano 
- UPAGRA leaders are accused of terrorist activities 
1981: - Coordination Committee meant to normalize the relationship between 
the settlers and the IDA is formed after investigation of a 
Parliamentary Commission 
1982: - UPAGRA leaves Coordination Committee 
- Agricultural Development Programmes are initiated and credit is 
distributed on a large scale, UPAGRA loses support 
1983: - Fernando Campos Is appointed Head of the Settlement 
- Coordination Committee stops functioning 
1985: - Association of Small Producers is formed 
- UPAGRA urges not to repay debts 
1986: - Association is discontinued 
1987: - Chili Committee is established as the last Agricultural Activity 
financed by the 034 Programme 
- End of the 034 Programme, The Neguev becomes a regional office and 
Fernando Campos becomes Regional Director 
- Policy of agricultura de cambio is introduced 
- UPAGRA forms a committee for the renegotiation of the debts 
- Attempts to reconstitute the Association 
July-August: Meetings in the settlement sectors are organised 
September: Reconstitution meeting Association is held, the old 
Board remains 
1988: - Miguel Huerta is elected President of the Association in March 
- Social Welfare Subcommittee is formed 
- Miguel Huerta resigns in September 
Table 6.3 Chronology of events in the Neguev: 1978 - 1988 
CHAPTER 7 
RESISTANCE AS AN INTERVENTION-COPING STRATEGY 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I aim to examine a different type of intervention-coping strategy: that of 
resistance to a highly authoritarian style of intervention. I do so by showing how a 
group of radical settlers in one sector of the Tierragrande Settlement (called 
Macadamia) actively engage in forms of resistance against the new style of intervention 
introduced by the 034 Programme. Intervention in the Tierragrande Settlement differed 
markedly from Neguev, where large amounts of resources were provided in a highly 
concentrated way. Tierragrande had been invaded in 1979 by the SPPAL Peasant 
Union. By 1987 the settlement had a long experience in dealing with state institutions. 
In the present and following chapter the discourse of democracy/citizenship is 
central. This discourse prevails in the frontier areas of the Atlantic zone as it is 
fundamental in settlers' attempts to attract state resources. At the same time the state 
ensures the political allegiance of frontier communities through the establishment of 
infrastructure and the provision of services. 
In discussing resistance as an intervention-coping strategy I pay more attention 
than in previous chapters to the actual practices of negotiation and confrontation by 
which various actors - front-line workers and administrators and settlers - are able to 
adapt the discourses of 'community' and 'citizenship' to their own local situations. 
Thus, we will see that the local meaning which was attributed to notions such as 
'community', 'progress' and 'democracy', certainly differed from the meaning given to 
such abstract notions by the IDA front-line administrators. 
Before starting with the case study I will give a short description of the area and 
an account of the circumstances in which Tierragrande became a case study. 
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Figure 7.1 Schematic map of the Tierragrande settlement 
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7.2 The Regional and Institutional Context 
The Tierragrande settlement comprises a long fringe of territory to the south-west of 
the railroad from Guäpiles to Pocora, bordering the forest reserve. It was a hacienda 
before the invasion, but the legal ownership status was never clear. Neither was it ever 
used for agricultural purposes. An American entrepreneur, owner of one of the major 
sawmills in the Atlantic zone, bought it at the beginning of the 70's with the intention 
of exploiting the timber. For that purpose he had cleared part of the forest, making it 
possible for a helicopter to land and a house to be built. 
The invasion of Tierragrande took place during a period in which the population of 
villages in the lowlands (such as Pocora) was substantially increasing due to the 
expansion of the plantation economy. In the beginning of the seventies the adjoining 
Florida settlement was invaded. A few years later several other haciendas followed, 
among them that of Tierragrande. These invasions were organised from the lowland 
village of Pocora. Although leftist peasant unions actively supported these invasions, it 
is clear, at least in the case of Pocora-initiated invasions, that the initiative came from 
local people in Pocora. They sought advise from lawyers related to the Communist 
Party only after the squatting started. Later some became involved in leftist politics. 
The Tierragrande hacienda was not invaded at one go. First, in 1973, the sector 
called Tierragrande-Pocora which was nearest to the railway was invaded, while 
Tierragrande-Macadamia and Tierragrande-lsleta followed in 1975. 1 In this chapter I 
concentrate on Macadamia and in chapter 8 on La Isleta. 
Tierragrande-Macadamia was occupied by a squatters' committee in which 
landless labourers from various parts of the Atlantic zone participated. In contrast with 
the other sectors of Tierragrande, the squatters' committee endured as the main form 
of local organisation. It also maintained a close relationship with the Communist party 
through the FENAC peasant union (formerly called SPPAL). 
The sector of Tierragrande-Macadamia comprises a small part of the whole 
settlement, with less than 40 plots. At the moment that the IDA started showing more 
interest in this settlement only a minority of the plot owners lived there. No familiy 
could live off what the land produced. Most would work on the lowland plantations or 
on cattle ranches, and would travel to Tierragrande at the weekend. Few lived 
permanently on the settlement. Those who did, earned an income by working on the 
plots of those who worked outside, or had sons who supported them financially. There 
were also a few single or divorced men who had very few needs and who actually had 
chosen for a quiet life in the frontier instead of the hard life of the plantations. A 
number of settlers, though, had planted good plots with coffee in expectation of the 
new road that was to be built by the IDA. So far, however, the costs of transporting 
the beans to the lowlands were so high that coffee was not yet profitable enough to 
maintain a family. 
'These invasions were organized by five local leaders, two belonging to the Unidad party, one to the 
Liberation party, one connected to a plantation union and one who was then a high-school student, Mario 
Green, the same IDA social worker of earlier chapters, who did not yet belong to any party. Two of the 
local leaders, the Menéndez brothers, belonged to a locally well-known family from Pocora. Later they 
became involved in leftist politics through a third brother who at the time was union leader in the southern 
plantations of La Estrella and who would later become an MP for the Costa Rican Communist Party, 
Vanguardia Popular. It is interesting to note that in 1979 the Menéndez brothers organised the invasion of 
the Milano grasslands in the Neguev settlement as leaders of the SPPAL union. 
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Intervention in Macadamia: the Institutional Point of View 
My interest in the Macadamia sector of the Tierragrande settlement was aroused by an 
official's accounts of the "problematic" nature of this area. This was in the end of 
1987 when the Neguev office was turned into a regional office and service was 
expanded to surrounding settlements. In adopting the policy of agricultura de cambio 
incentives were provided to organised groups of entrepreneurial farmers. At the same 
time a regional development programme was being designed which included 
infrastructural works, credit, extension and titling and in which various agencies would 
participate under the coordination of the Ministry of Planning.2 One objective of this 
regional programme was that of opening up hitherto inaccesible frontier areas in order 
to integrate them into the regional economy. The major objective, then, was the 
creation of the necessary conditions for productive development, and one of these 
conditions concerned the imposition of a legal order in frontier areas. Tierragrande-
Macadamia, in this context, was definitely viewed as the most problematic settlement 
due to the persisting influence of a leftist union there. The 'communists', I was told, 
were represented there by a particularly vicious and malicious leader who regarded the 
settlement sector as his personal domain. At the same time, I can remember the 
enthusiasm the Regional Director, Fernando Campos, and the Interim-Head, Hugo Paz, 
displayed when talking about their attempts to counter communist activities in the 
settlement to rescue its population for "democracy and prosperity". 
The general atmosphere in which intervention by the Neguev Regional Office took 
place was highly influenced by the occupation by settlers in 1987 of the offices of 
another settlement belonging to the 034 programme. El Indio, by the same peasant 
union which was active in Macadamia. The occupation of the El Indio offices had the 
support of a large sector of that settlement population, producing not a small amount 
of embarassment to the IDA. Indeed, the negotiations between this organization and 
the IDA were widely publicized in the national press. This situation convinced Fernando 
Campos, the Regional Director of Neguev, of the necessity to intervene in similar 
potential 'pockets of subversion'. 
The incident which prompted the decision to intervene in Macadamia was a 
request for help from a group of settlers who claimed that they wanted to become 
independent from the FENAC union. They complained that this union held them in a 
state of serfdom, and that they were not allowed to apply for the new development 
programmes announced by the government. Hence, they urged the IDA to stop leftist 
intimidation and to establish a legal order in the settlement. In February 1988, after a 
few 'preparatory meetings' characterized by a marked presence of IDA functionaries 
and numerous promises of support in various fields of development activity, a new 
"democratic" committee was elected. This democratic committee was intended to 
replace the existing 'red committee', which so far had been the only form of local 
organisation in Macadamia. 
The extended case study that follows concentrates on a series of encounters 
which took place in the course of two visits to Tierragrande-Macadamia with IDA 
officials. I have chosen these encounters since they throw light on how the discourses 
of democracy and community aquire a specific, local, meaning through practices of 
intervention and intervention-coping. The main actors in these encounters are a number 
*This Regional Development Programme was financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (BID) 
and started in 1988. 
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of officials of the Neguev Regional Office, the leftist leader of the 'red committee, 
Diego Casas, and the spokesman of the pro-IDA or 'democratic' committee, Jose. 
7.3 First Visit to Tierragrande-Macadamia 
On my first visit I was accompanied by Mario, the Neguev social worker. The road was, 
even by local standards, extremely bad, with rough climbs in some stretches and foot-
deep mud on others. Although the distance is not more than 10 kilometers from the 
secondary road it took us more than an hour to get there. After passing the three iron 
gates at the entrance to Macadamia (as it is commonly called), a road turns left. A few 
hundred meters further there were two houses on the left and in front I saw a 
clearance with a school and behind it the Big house. The clearance was intended to be 
the future centro de población, village square. As yet, there was only a football field. 
The large house I was told by Mario had been constructed by the gringos, the 
Americans, who formerly owned the hacienda Tierragrande. Nowadays it was used as 
a shop and meeting place for the community. There were a few women selling drinks 
made of pineapple. Mario thought that is was a turno (a party organised with the aim of 
of gathering money for a specific communal project). 
In front of the large house there was a gathering of people. We got out of the car 
and made our way towards them. The communist leader, Diego Casas waited for us 
and greeted us politely. Mario introduced me as a sociologist who in cooperation with 
the IDA was undertaking a study of social conditions in peasant settlements in the 
Atlantic zone. I corrected him remarking that I had no official relationship to the IDA 
and that it was neither my intention to spare the IDA of critique. Mario then confirmed 
my remarks and added, 
"We are very flexible and neither do we fear constructive critique. Pedro wants to 
undertake a comparative study between Neguev, a settlement in the lowlands 
which has received much help from international agencies and these settlements 
which have received up to now almost no support. The truth is that not all settlers 
there have improved their situation (salieron adelante), some even owe large 
amounts to the Credit Fund. Thus Pedro is interested in examining why some 
people in settlements where there has been relatively little institutional support 
have been able to establish viable farms in an independent way". 
I remember being surprised by how lucidly the social worker was able to translate to 
this community leader the research problematic I was accustomed to expound to 
functionaries, while at the same time using my presence in order to demonstrate that 
the institution, and he himself, did not fear constructive and rational criticism. 
Subsequently Diego suggested we go inside so that we could talk in a more relaxed 
environment. Inside there were some 5-6 persons, all men. One older man was 
cooking. I noticed that the walls were covered with pictures of women in bathing suits 
posing before landscapes in Hungary, Checoslovakia and the Soviet Union; apparently 
cut out from propaganda magazines. On the table lay a book on the history of Peru. In 
response to my interest in this book he remarked that he was very interested in the 
history of the Incas, and their socialist system. 
After a short introductory chat Mario started explaining the necessity for a united 
committee to be established on behalf of the community. He argued. 
Resistance as a strategy 169 
"I tell everyone that I do not mind who are the leaders and with whom I will have 
to deal. But I definitely consider that one condition for the organization of the 
community is that it be united and for that reason there should be only one 
committee. Nowadays, with the new Regional Project for the Development of the 
Atlantic Zone, with the construction of the new roads many new possibilities are 
surfacing. Thus, in order not to lose these opportunities ft is necessary to 
demonstrate to the institutions that the community is united, that it supports the 
leaders and that they have the capacity to channel the resources offered". 
And he proposed that the 'red' committee be disbanded and that they all unite around 
the newly chosen 'democratic' committee. They could then propose that a new 
committee be elected in which all positions in the settlement were represented, "as 
long as a maj'ority of the settlers agrees". After listening to Mario's account Diego 
started a long monologue, 
"I agree with you that it is necessary to have a united community with a 
combative organization. In fact, we haven't been struggling for anything else 
during the 13 years that the settlement has existed. The road and the school, even 
if they look very primitive have cost us a lot of suffering. We have been building 
the road by bits with the help of the municipality and of the Rojas. How many 
times we went to the IDA to ask that you deliver your promises, by groups of 10 
in order to be listened to. And if I may say the truth, for I am someone who likes 
to talk openly, the IDA is the agency that.has done the least for us. Since the 
settlement exists we have been isolated from the institutions and from the market. 
Up to now we have had only expenses and no gains. Furthermore, this settlement 
has come into being thanks to an invasion, otherwise we would not have the land. 
Thus we have little to be grateful to the IDA for". 
To my ears Diego talked vernacular. Sometimes it was difficult for me to understand 
him. He was serious but not overly aggressive. He continued relating how a few years 
ago the Executive President and others who formed part of the Executive Board had 
arrived in tierragrande. They had promised them diesel and a tractor (chapulín) for 
improving a few roads, and zinc for the school. On that occasion formal agreements 
were signed. Diego commented that he still had copies of the documents. Yet they had 
not received anything of what had been promised, except for the diesel. 
"And, if one reminds them about it they say that you are a problematic person, 
that you are a liar. I know that at the IDA they see us as unruly and they think that 
we do not want to cooperate, but that is not true". 
In order to prove his point he gave the example of the delivery of legal titles, which 
they had boycotted some time ago. He argued that if they did so it was because they 
wanted a few things to be clarified, among other things whether they would have free 
access to bank credit with those provisional titles. For, "we fear that such a 
(provisional) title will tie us even more to the IDA". 3 
*The problem in fact concerned the usefulness of a provisional title issued by IDA. Although these were 
indispensable for gaining access to bank credit, Tierragrande settlers had not been willing to accept IDA'S 
conditions for the distribution of titles since they did not agree with the costs imputed by the institution. 
They were asked to pay 2, 000 colones per ha. with an annual interest rate of 8%. This amounted to 
60,000 colones ($1,000 dollars) for a parcel of 30 hectares. That was in his opinion far too much in view 
of the fact that no settler derived a sufficient monetary income from the parcel. In this way predominantly 
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He then argued that they were ready to work with anyone wrio 
them, and he stressed that the only institutions which had helped 
municipality and the CNP (the marketing board). At the same time hi 
that cooperation with institutions should be based on a political understanding 
interests. 
wanted to help 
them were the 
gave his opinion 
of their 
"We do not mind to go to any MP, of any political party, to ask for support. At the 
same time, I belong myself to an organization with a clear political perspective. But 
this is a personal matter. Yet, it is my opinion that without a clear political position 
we wouldn't have achieved anything, without political consciousness we would 
have been divided. Without education there is no organization and without 
organization there is no progress". 
Mario, now had his eyes closed. Diego at a given moment asked him, not without some 
sarcasm in his voice, whether he was too bored to listen. Mario, showing that he was 
well aware of the situation answered that he was listening intently, and that this was 
his way of concentrating himself. (I then had the impression that Diego was conscious 
that he was scoring points in my eyes, and that he was enjoying the situation). He 
continued. 
"We see now that the IDA has come here and has been making all kind of 
promises, like Santa Claus. Suddenly you show interest in finishing the road, 
extending credit, building houses, etc. But the result up to now is that the 
community is divided and disorganized. We used to have a very strong association 
but since the IDA arrived and this 'ghost committee' [comité fantasma)* was 
created only conflicts have thrived". 
And he then referred to a problem that had arisen between one of the oldest settlers 
and the president of the 'ghost committee'. He argued that the real reason for this 
division stemmed from the fact that the IDA's current regional administration had 
decided to give preference to one sector of the population over the others in building 
roads, neglecting others who needed the roads as badly. In fact, a small group in the 
settlement wanted to divert the original road scheme as designed by the engineers, so 
that they would benefit from most of the road. And he challenged us to analyze closely 
the composition of this 'ghost committee', for according to him most of the members 
of this commmittee belonged to this same small group. He remarked, "thus you see 
that these leaders do not resolve problems, they create them". Regarding this 
committee's constitution he asserted, 
"This ghost committee has been established in a very dubious way. It is composed 
of people who do not live in the settlement and others who do not even own a 
non-residents with speculator/ interests would benefit as they could easily pay the yearly installments as 
well as the labour required in communal duties. Yet, it was the locals who had to perform these duties. 
The issue was also one of justice, as they argued that in return for the purchase of the land, the IDA 
should provide services. On the other hand they were prepared to pay that amount if the interest rate was 
lowered to 6% and if access to credit was improved. In addition, they demanded that the title given to 
them should be a generally recognized legal document and not a provisional IDA title. 
'From now on I will refer to the IDA-supported commitee or the 'democratic committee as Mario calls 
it, by Diego's name for it, i.e. the 'ghost committee'. The old squatter's committee will be referred to as 
the 'red committee'. 
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plot. Most of them are persons who bought plots while living outside and fear they 
might lose them. Look, we are not going to take the plots away from them, but 
neither are we going to promise to adjudicate them in their favour in return for their 
votes. Moreover, the assembly in the school in which the committee was 
constituted was not legal, as the settlers were not notified at home as the law 
demands". 
And he claimed that he, for one, had not been invited. He went to the election because 
he was by chance around, and participated in the voting, although most inhabitants of 
the settlement were not present. He regretted having done so, since, 
"I learnt that a number of irregularities took place. For example, when I left the 
school I saw that one tall black functionary was commenting to another official 
that some votes were being counted for three. The other answered that ft was all 
right, that there were good reasons for doing so". 
Diego, furthermore, asserted that in spite of this fraud he got 16 vote's (out of 40) for 
the post of secretary. And he continued accounting for this accusation of electoral 
manipulation in terms of the lifeworlds of the functionaries, 
"Sure I understand that functionaries have to earn their salary and that they were 
expected to commit these actions by their superiors. But they should understand 
that the peasant's livelihood conditions are very different from that of the 
functionaries. For one thing, peasants have to work hard on the land before 
obtaining an income". 
At that moment Mario interrupted him in order to make the point thalt he was totally 
sure that there were no irregularities in the voting procedure and thatlhe should know 
that because he himself monitored the whole process. If Diego had detected any 
irregularities why did he refrain from giving notice of it, as was his democratic right and 
even obligation. The only way in which they might have influenced the outcome was 
by taking some people who worked in the lowlands but had a plot in the settlement in 
order to participate in the elections. This was hardly an offence since they had the legal 
right to vote in the assembly. Regarding the invitations he argued that he had 
distributed them to various settlers living in the different sections in the settlement. He 
did not deliver them himself as it would have cost him too much time. 
Diego then laughed and answered that he understood the constraints under which 
he had to work and that he considered that it was part of the game that the IDA 
showed preferences for some people over others. But this should not work at the 
expense of the unity in the community. In addition he argued that in this 'ghost 
committee' only three of the 5 members were living in the settlement, and this was 
against the rules. He also made it clear that he knew everything that was discussed in 
these meetings, for there were members who were already dissatisfied with it and who 
were thinking of joining him again. 
Mario, still very calm, responded that he did not mind who was elected by the 
community. "The IDA is ready to work with anyone, as long as they ere elected in a 
democratic way". Diego answered that he agreed with that view and that they were 
ready at any moment to coordinate with the IDA. What they could not accept was that 
they would come and start threatening the people with putting them in jail. The only 
effect this had was the division of the community and that was also unfavourable for 
the IDA as well. In fact, in this way expectations were created which the institution 
could not fulfil. Then Mario made a sort of proposal, 
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"If it is true that only 3 committee officials are working then a new committee 
should be elected. The "fiscal" could request that a new meeting be convened in 
order to discuss this issue. In this way a new committee could be elected 
representing all groups". 
Diego replied emphatically no. They already had a committee (the 'red committee') that 
was functioning well with the support of a vast majority of the settlers. It would be 
dishonest to dismantle this committee. For, they were already recognized by the 
community association of Pocora (a sort of regional cooperative) and the National 
Community Development Association (DINADECO). Recently they had been invited to 
participate in a seminar organized by JAPDEVA (the Port Authority in charge of 
Development of the Atlantic Zone) in Limon. A committee, he argued, entailed a lot of 
work and a lot of sacrifice for the community. The 'ghost committee', so far as he was 
aware, had so far undertaken nothing. "They would probably complain that going to 
Limon or San José to arrange something would cost them a working day, and on top of 
that demand that their costs be fully paid. The members of the legitimate committee, in 
turn, would never complain about the time lost. They would see it as an investment for 
the benefit of the community". And he asserted that if he invested all the efforts he 
expended for the community on his own farm, which he had neglected, he could have 
developed 10 farms. In concluding, he argued that the most honest thing for the IDA to 
do was to recognize their committee. 
Mario was growing a little restless, but let Diego finish his account. He retorted 
that it was not proper to dismantle a committee that had been democratically elected, 
that would only weaken the community. Then he recalled that he had an appointment 
with the newly elected committee and he proposed that in the meanwhile I have a talk 
with the peasant leader. The peasant leader then set out to tell me about the origins of 
the settlement, about the organizational support they had received from the FENAC and 
its regional branch in Guépiles, during the invasion which had taken place 13 years 
ago.6 When they invaded it, he recalled, the gringos were felling trees which were 
transported over the river to a sawmill north of Siquirres. The workers would come 
there by helicopter and would stay in the Big House. For the rest no infrastructure 
existed. Until now, he remarked, there had been almost no interest in them on the part 
of the IDA. Only lately, since the administrative responsibility over the area had shifted 
to the Neguev Regional Office, IDA officials started to arrive in larger numbers. This, 
however, was a breach of an agreement reached a few years ago with the Central 
Offices of the IDA which entailed that they be left in peace. 
On the other hand, their relationship with the Rojas family, the owners of the 
neighbouring Bremen hacienda had always been excellent. They had helped his 
committee a lot financially. One reason for that was that they were viewed as potential 
land-invadors. He remarked, "When we ask them for help they react telling us that they 
are not a public institution and that we should go to the Siquirres municipality or to the 
IDA. Yet, they do not fail to contribute to our projects. On the other hand they also 
profit from them. The road for example is also to their benefit". In addition they would 
form groups to work in the hacienda, an arrangement which was beneficial for both 
^Originally Diego came from a colony near Guépiles which was founded at the beginning of the 
century. At a young age he sought employment at a plantation were he became a member of a leftist 
union. Through this union he became involved in the invasion. Later he became the local representative of 
the communist peasant union. He was divorced, since "maintaining a family in those circumstances was 
very difficult". 
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parties; the hacienda profited from a cheap labour force and the settlers derived a badly 
needed monetary income. 
Such investments as the road involved much sacrifice, he argued. The more as 
there were so few sources of income up there. For that reason they designed a sort of 
tax for all land transactions, which should be used for further projects. After all, the 
increase of the value of land was due to the work of all the settlers and they should 
benefit from the profits made by those who sold the land. This money, in turn, 
contributed to various projects, such as the school and for the maintenance of the 
roads, as well as communal activities, etc. He resented therefore that the IDA chiefs 
were portraying him as a speculator and the local peasant union as a communist 
organisation. In fact, he argued that soon they would receive the legal proof that they 
were affiliated to the Development Association of Pocora. Then he could accuse the 
IDA before the judge of obstruction of a legal communal organisation. 
At that point I told Diego that I was interested in attending the! meeting of the 
new committee. I explained to him that it was my method to talk with all sectors of the 
community in order to gather the various points of view. Diego then commented that 
this was a very good way of understanding the reality of a community. The IDA in 
contrast was not ready to listen to them. We shook hands and Diego invited me to stay 
a few days with him so that I could see the reality of the settlement from a different 
perspective from that of IDA officials. After accepting eagerly this invitation I left for 
the other meeting. 
The democratic or 'ghost' committee meets \ 
In the school the president of the 'ghost' committee, José, was leading the committee 
meeting, standing in front of a blackboard, setting up an agenda for the coming weeks. 
Some 12 persons were present. He was evidently happy to see that the social worker 
was present. 
Mario was in an irritable mood, and commented that the conversation he had just 
had with Diego had sowed some worries in him. He asked José whether it was true 
that only 3 members of the committee were active. José replied that that was a lie. 
Out of the five, four were present, only one, was not present, and that because he was 
in Pocora and was active on behalf of the committee6. Mario then answered that he 
was glad to hear that, for if two of the five officials were not active a new general 
assembly would have to be convened to elect a new committee. Then he asked how 
many people were behind them, for it worried him that Diego said that bnly à few were 
attending their meetings. Pepe, one of the leaders answered that out of the 49 who 
supported the committee from the beginning no one had changed allegiance. 
Mario was glad to hear that. The only thing he could recommend was that they 
make more efforts to expand the group, adding, 
"It was indeed difficult to appraise how many supporters each committee had at thé time. When I went 
to the settlement with an official most people would present themselves as supporters Of the democratic 
committee. When I went on my own, reality proved to be more complex. People then Would express their 
hope that IDA would rapidly resolve the most pressing problems of the settlements, without any mention 
of allegiance to the democratic leaders. Out of the six members of the democratic comjnittee three 
expected to acquire personal gain from it, whether by gaining title over disputed plots or having the road 
redesigned. Two members had stable jobs in the lowlands and feared that IDA would dispossess them 
from their plots for not having residence in the settlement. Hence, they chose to take a position in the 
democratic committee. The president. Hector, on the other hand, had a personal conflict with Juan 
Hernandez. 
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"The more you are, the easier it will be to get recognized by people within and 
outside the settlement. I have said to Diego that, though I have given you advice, 
I respect the democratic rules and that I will work with the group that represents 
most people. I definitely prefer to work with you because you have been elected 
democratically. Diego accused me of having manipulated the results of the 
assembly and of electoral fraud. I must say that I do not have anything personally 
against him and that I am ready to coordinate with whoever represents the 
majority, but I very much dislike his insinuations. I do no like to deal with people 
who mock with the truth". 
Javier, an older settler, then commented, 
"But you know how Diego is, he has always been giving orders around here thanks 
to these tactics. You should not give it any importance". 
After the meeting ended José approached Mario, commenting that he sensed he was 
behaving strangely towards him. He inquired, "Mario, I know that you are angry with 
me (encabronado). Please tell me what is happening. Maybe I have done something 
wrong. After all I still have a lot to learn". Mario, somewhat annoyed answered that 
there was no problem at all. He was just very hurried because he had to attend a party 
seminar in Guâpiles, but added that Diego (the communist leader) had confused him 
telling him that the leaders of the association were not working, and that they were 
even not living in the settlement. José remarked then that he was comforted to hear 
that there was nothing personal between them. He added that he would appreciate 
Mario's complete honesty to him should personal irritation arise. 
It is expedient here to add a short note on José. He came originally from Turrialba 
where his father owns a well-known popular restaurant. He came to the Atlantic zone 
to work on a road construction programme which included the road from the motorway 
to the entrance of Tierragrande. While he was living in the village of Iroquois near 
Pocora he married the daughter of an ex-squatter, who had sold his land in 
Tierragrande-Macadamia but who still had a son and a brother there. Thanks to their 
help José was given the opportunity to buy a plot in the settlement. He soon became 
an intimate friend of Diego and one of the local representatives of the peasant union. 
He was the only settler with a car and in this way he helped many. In addition the car 
permitted him to establish a store in the Big House. 
I add this account of the way José was recruited because it is to some extent 
typical for the way most settlers who did not participate in the invasion got access to 
land in Tierragrande-Macadamia. In effect, two other members of the 'ghost' 
committee had occupied important posts in the squatters' red committee, and had used 
their previous contacts with leftist union and party leaders to gain access to land. 
But let us continue with the visit. We left the school and set off for the car 
passing the women who were selling food and fruit-juice. A football game was in 
progress by the red committee against a team of the neighbouring sector of La Isleta. 
Mario approached the women and made a few jokes about the current situation, and 
asked them what they thought about the different committees. One of the women 
answered that she did not go any more to the meetings of either of them, "as they do 
not do anything more than fight". Then Mario suggested to them jokingly that they 
form their own independent committee. 
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Discussion: Mario's assessment of the situation 
On our way back we discussed the situation. Mario assessed that Jose's committee 
had been losing ground and that some of the most respected settlers had distanced 
themselves from it. He thought Diego was much more clever than Jose in his dealings 
with the community. 'He has much more experience and works hajrder'. However, 
Mario then commented that he had one fault, and that was that he was a liar; telling 
people around that he had manipulated the elections at the general assembly. He did 
not like that sort of person and pledged to teach him not to be a liar, "I will cut his 
relations with all the institutions", he said. "I have more resources than he has, and he 
has not the support of a party with national prominence. I am a militant of the party in 
power". We also talked about José. According to Mario his authority as a leader was 
stained by a personal rivalry with Diego which made it look as if he was more 
interested in revenge than in the community. He stressed the need to have capable and 
convincing leaders, who would not derive their legitimacy from fighting against 
someone but from fighting on behalf of an ideal. 
Mario also argued that it was a bad thing to mix personal problems with conflicts 
over local organisation. The point, he asserted, was that José's wife was a picara, by 
which he meant that she was open to the advances of men. I myself had already heard 
from different sources that Diego had a relationship with her and that probably this was 
the source of the enmity between him and José. They used to be great friends and 
political allies. They would go to Pocora and Guépiles and party for days. José used his 
friendship with Diego to establish a shop in the Big House, where Diego was living. As 
the distance between the Big House and José's plot was quite large Jqsé would spend 
the night there. Yet, while José was in the shop, Diego would go to his plot to visit his 
wife. The moment that José learnt that, he declared war on Diego. In Mario's view 
conflicts over women should not be mixed with struggles concerning communal 
organization7. 
Analysis 
So far we see the common problems Mario becomes involved in when doing his job as 
an IDA official. He becomes entangled in the dynamics of local conflicts in the frontier; 
conflicts which as usual display a mixture of principled and personal enmity. As we 
saw in previous chapters Mario was quite good at handling such issues, given his 
detailed knowledge of the social life' of this frontier area and his participation in local 
politics. It is not surprising then that he is ready to negotiate in order to overcome the 
division of the community into two opposing groups. And in doing so he assumes that 
he can negotiate from a position of superiority. But Mario encountered a total 
unwillingness on the part of the communist leader, Diego, to negotiate, even though he 
went quite far in his proposal to find a way to end the division of thé community. In 
effect, Mario in doing so is negotiating the authority of the state, something which his 
superiors, who as we will see combined an authoritarian attitude (with a lack of 
knowledge of the complex dynamics of local organisation in the frontier, would not 
approve of. This willingness to negotiate, however, proves to be his weak point as 
7lt must be stressed that this was the men's (somewhat sexist) view of the problem between Diego, 
José and his wife. I was never able to get the latter's point of view, or more generally that of other 
women in Tierragrande. I 
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Diego adopts a rather principled - in Mario's view rigid - attitude. Indeed the stakes are 
becoming high and the conflict between the two acquires a personal character. 
Diego is skilled in using the discourse of 'community' and 'progress' in defending 
his views. In doing so he is able to point to the inability of the state to fulfill its 
obligations. He rhetorically argues that as a community they had to take over a series 
of tasks which the state should have undertaken. Thus it was the community that took 
the initiative for resolving the most stringent problems of the settlers, the road. And 
this was only possible by establishing their own organisational forms and holding to a 
determinate political ideology. The IDA, he argued, should not come to tell them what 
they should do, and even less after the latest divisionary tactic of changing the course 
of a road in order to gain the allegiance of small group of settlers. Thus he argued that 
the IDA should stop manipulating the settlers of Tierragrande and recognize the 
legimitate peasant union there. He was optimistic as he could count on the support of 
FENAC as well as on a series of contacts with institutions which had been established 
over the years. 
We also see that the new development committee - Diego's 'ghost' committee -
is not able to project itself as the legitimate representative of the settlement by 
establishing an independent position from the IDA, something which worries Mario. 
Yet, at the same time, the lack of local organisation in the settlement is resented by a 
large group, if not by the majority, something that is shown by the reaction of the 
women who are preparing the turno, to the communal rivalry. 
In concluding, it can be said that a number of conflicts within the community 
which have been triggered off by the willingness of a particular group to get rid of the 
radical leader acquires a highly ideological character, in which issues concerning the 
rights and obligations of citizens in the frontier vis-£-vis the state become central. 
Underlying this alliance between settlers and the IDA were conflicts of a personal 
character as well as the new expectations generated by the IDA'S new style of 
intervention. 
Next, I will examine another event in which an attempt is made to 'normalize' the 
situation of 'lawlessness' in the frontier. What was special in this attempt was that 
Fernando Campos, the Regional Director of the Atlantic zone, and Hugo Paz, the 
Interim-Head of the Neguev Settlement themselves played an important role in the 
endeavour. We will see that in the process they deploy an intervention ideology which 
appears to be quite unsuitable for the everyday requirements of exercising social 
control in the frontier. 
7.4 Chasing Communists in the Frontier 
A visit was planned for the following month with the purpose of organizing activities in 
cooperation with the 'ghost' committee. This visit was also intended to show their 
support to the leaders of this committee. Two cars full of extensionists left for the 
settlement. I travelled in the first, driven by Hugo Paz. On our way there we 
intermittently met settlers coming from Macadamia and heading to the lowlands. Each 
time we made a courtesy stop and a small exchange of information followed. They 
seemed very interested in the improvements the IDA was going to introduce and the 
promised opening of new credit facilities. Hugo Paz would then make it clear that in the 
future bank credit would only be available in the settlements with the written approval 
of the line-extensionist and the Regional Director. He argued that this policy had been 
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introduced with the purpose of improving the technical criteria of credit delivery and 
avoiding credit diversion. This, in effect, was a warning to the settlers that in future all 
relationships with state agencies would take place through the IDA's regional office. 
Arriving at the settlement at about 10.30 a.m. we found a group of settlers 
waiting for us at the crossroads. We all shook hands. There were same 15 persons, 
among them José, the secretary of the 'ghost' committee and his wife. José welcomed 
us and then started to talk about how it was necessary for the IDA to intervene in the 
settlement, and with a "firm" hand. He talked about the subjection of the settlers to 
the communists under the leadership of Diego, who behaved as if there were no law in 
the settlement. A list of accusations followed. Diego, he declared had peen negotiating 
with land, evicting people who did not conform to his ideology or attend the meetings 
of the union. Luckily, the IDA had now come to liberate them from this ideology. He 
added that he was not against communism, he himself used to have sympathies in that 
direction. But, he argued, communism in the Atlantic zone had lately become 
undemocratic. 
There were various settlers present who attested to the veracity of these 
accusations by claiming that they themselves had been cheated by Diego. Some had 
scraps of paper which had been given as purchasing accounts. Favio, for example, a 
settler who bought a plot from the union gave an account of the whole procedure. He 
recalled that he was introduced to the members of the red committee and that they 
voted in his favour. Then he paid an amount to Diego. The owner of the plot received a 
few thousand colones less than he had paid Diego. He asserted that there was no 
formal account of the way in which this money had been administered. He was not the 
only one who complained about the chorizos (corrupt practices), committed by Diego. 
A woman told of how she had paid a large amount for a plot, when the former owner 
had in fact abandoned it without claiming the improvements on the land. 
Hugo Paz became the more enthusiastic with each accusation. He made 
comments in the direction of Moisés one of which was "well, now we have a lot of 
legal proof, at least to throw him out of the settlement; We may even file a suit against 
him for fraud and send him to jail". Moisés, the agrarista, looked less enthusiastic and 
more serious than ever. After this the discussion became more technical. Various 
groups were formed, one around Hugo Paz and Moisés, one around Mario Green and a 
few around the other officials. Moisés deployed the Tierragrande map and together 
with Hugo Paz and office-holders of the 'ghost' committee they started to study the 
legal situation of various plots and to discuss the situation of the road. José explained 
that the problem was that the road that had been laid out by the IDA'S engineers 
through a swamp and a river. There was an alternative road which crossed the plot of a 
settler called Agustin. Recently, however, he and José, who has two school-aged-boys, 
had quarelled and the former would no longer permit his plot to be trespassed. José 
noted that "now when the river rises my children have to pass on their way to school 
with the water up to the level of their bellies". Not only José's family was affected. 
There were also some 12 other families who in the present situation were virtually 
without road communications. The solution they proposed was that the road be 
diverted so as to cross partly Agustin's and partly José's plot. He stressed that there 
was a broad consensus in the settlement that this was the best solution. José, himself, 
was ready to comply with this alternative. 
Hugo Paz listened attentively and thereafter made a few questions about the 
location of the other farms up in the mountain. José answered that they agreed with 
his proposal. Then Hugo Paz, discussed the case with Moisés and remarked that he 
saw no problem to change the course of the road, as there were legal provisions which 
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entitled the institution to confiscate for communal purposes the fringes of a farm's land 
for road construction. Moisés simply assented. Then a few specific cases of plots were 
discussed. 
Mario, in the meantime, sat down to chat and joke with a group of settlers. His 
style was very relaxed and he seemed to enjoy the gathering. At a given moment he 
started to explain to them that they should become more independent from the 
institutions, also from the IDA. For that purpose he used the following example. 
"Imagine that I lean my head on your stomach and I look at you. Your features will 
be indistinguishable and I will have a distorted view of your physical make-up. 
Moreover, I will be watching you from below whereas you will be looking at me 
from a higher position. Yet if I stand at a few meters distance from you I will be 
able to see you in a more proportioned way, I will be able to observe you as a 
totality. You will seem not so frightening as I watch you at the same eye-level and 
it will be easier to study your gestures better. The same holds for the way you look 
at the IDA, for it is important to take some distance and assess the institution's 
advantages and disadvantages in a more independent way. You will have to learn 
how to submit requests and negotiate with institutions such as JAPDEVA, MAG, 
etc. Now with this new project of development of the Atlantic zone a lot of 
opportunities will become available. I can help you with a number of tasks, such as 
editing letters, putting you in contact with important people from agencies or 
political parties, but it is you who will have to take initiatives. 
Concerning the legal recognition of Diego's committee by the development association 
of Pocora he commented that he had been talking to some people of the Pocora 
municipality. Apparently Diego had some support there from a few "personeros" 
(elected members of the municipality). According to Mario these people were mostly 
interested in negotiating votes for the next elections. And since he himself was a 
'personero' he had convened a meeting in order to force a decision to remove them. He 
added that he had more reasons for asking the resignation of those personeros, but he 
would use this particular case to demonstrate that they were placing their own 
interests before that of the party". In this way he had wanted to prevent the red 
committee from being recognized instead of the democratic one8. 
We were waiting for Fernando Campos, the IDA's Regional Director, to come. It 
was already noon and the officials went to search for food in the houses of settlers 
they knew. Some of the functionaries, among them James, Mario and me, went to the 
house of Agustín to see whether there was lunch. The fact that we went to his house 
was telling for the complexity of inter-personal relations in this settlement. Agustin was 
a well-known character with an extensive knowledge of the whole area, and it was 
known that he used his knowledge and network at the frontier to help - often in bad 
faith - squatters establish themselves, thereby earning an additional income. He was 
also a guard on the Bremen hacienda and we met him always on his horse, on our way 
to Macadamia. He was a protege of the Rojas family and it was rumoured that he was 
a natural son of Carlos Rojas, who bought the Bremen hacienda in the fifties. Initially 
Agustin had sided with neighbour José in his conflict with Diego. Shortly afterwards. 
"On another occasion Mario explained to me that there were two persons in the communal association 
of Pocora, his village, whom he wanted expelled "because of their opportunism". According to him 
everything they did was in order to launch their career within the Liberation party. One of them was a 
brother-in-law of his. Their intention, he argued, was to secure the support of the local communist leaders 
in the association by helping Diego in return. This was absolutely against the political code. 
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however, a vehement conflict erupted between them both. Agustín accused José of 
behaving in an authoritarian and bossy way and proceeded to put fences between their 
properties, thus denying José direct access to his farm. According to Agustín, José 
then broke down the fence and threatened his life. Agustín then went to Pocora and 
denounced him at the police station. As he once remarked to me, "If I am killed at least 
they will know who did it". It was not clear what the role of Diego was in this conflict 
but it certainly diminished José's chance to become a legitimate community leader. In 
fact, it gave him a volatile and conflictive image. 
When we got back the same group of settlers were waiting. They had been 
joined by a few older women. It struck me that most functionaries were sitting in the 
cars. Hugo Paz was talking to some settlers. At a given moment Hugo decided to give 
a speech before leaving, stating that, "It looks as though the ingeniero Fernando 
Campos had not been able to make it despite his clear commitment to come. He had an 
important meeting this morning", he said, "and as you know these meetings have a 
beginning but no end". He went on to say a few words on his behalf. 
"To begin with I would like to congratulate you on the task that you have fulfilled. 
You have already reached the middle of the road and you should know how much 
we value your efforts. We are aware of the difficulty of making a living in a place 
where law has not yet arrived, subject to the fancies of elements pursuing 
particular non-democratic interests. You will see that you will surmount these 
difficulties with the help of the legal institutions which represent the legitimate will 
of the Costa Rican people. But the road is not easy and probably you will have to 
pass a number of obstacles. The law is slow but when it arrives the law is 
effective. Everyone who goes against the law will have to suffer the 
consequences. For my part I do not have anything to say to Diego. He is a settler 
like any other, with the same rights and responsibilities". 
And he continued, 
"It will be our legal department which will determine whether the things that have 
ocurred here until the establishment of the democratic committee are legal or not. I 
think they are not legal but it is their duty to evaluate that. We can say that in this 
settlement we have entered a new phase. Up to last year disorder and illegality 
were widespread. This year everything will be different, for the moment has 
arrived to create the lawful conditions for ensuring the development of the 
settlement and an improvement in the welfare of its families. You know that now 
you will be entitled to receive bank credit. For that purpose you will need a 
recommendation signed by the head of the settlement and the extensionist in 
charge of the respective crop or activity. Naturally we will give such a 
recommendation only to elements with a progressive mentality, with whom we 
know that we can work. Naturally the troublesome characters (problemáticos) will 
not get such a recommendation. I would also like you to understand that we do 
not only work for a salary but that we also have a work spirit (mística de trabajo). 
We also want to contribute to the peasant's well being". 
Unfortunately the extensionists could not show assent as they were chatting in the 
cars. Finally Hugo finished his speech with the following words, "I would like to tell you 
that the donkey is walking and that you should take care that he keeps on walking". At 
that moment one of the settlers, Favio, who was well-known for his directness, 
interrupted him. 
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"We appreciate very much what you are doing for us, for life for most of us has 
not been easy. But what we need is quick results, for as long as there is no road 
we cannot market our products. Thus I would not agree with you that the donkey 
is already walking. For it has to carry too heavy a load. What we need is not a 
donkey but a four-wheel drive vehicle like the ones you drive". 
The people started to laugh. Hugo Paz responded, 
"You should not think that we do not worry about the circumstances in which you 
live. But you should understand that everything takes time. You are not the only 
settlement that needs roads, credit and extension. This is a natural process in the 
life of a settlement. First the conditions of law and order must be established in 
order to set out to develop the settlement". 
At that moment a confusing situation arose. One woman settler who lived in the 
lowlands complained that it was impossible to work if squatters [precaristas) could at 
any moment occupy your plot. She urged the IDA to take immediate and effective 
action. Hugo responded that in such a case it was important to notify the regional 
office immediately in order to facilitate the eviction of the squatters by the police. As a 
land reform institution they were not entitled to evict squatters. 
At this moment a settler on horse-back came by announcing that Fernando was 
on his way. The group continued discussing issues related to the squatters 
(precarismo). There was much hilarity when a woman who started to complain about a 
settler who was very troublesome [problemático) and promoted squatters' invasions in 
adjacent plots was told by another woman, "but doña María, this man is your own 
uncle". Doña Marfa then responded, "well, your brother is also helping squatters on his 
side of the settlement, isn't he?" 
When Fernando, the Regional Director, arrived he first made his way to Mario 
Green to gather information. Subsequently he took a place before the group besides 
Hugo Paz and asked Moisés to join them. Moisés then explained a few things to him. 
Mario, I noticed, went to the cars where the extensionists were sitting and remained 
there the rest of the time. Hugo then made a brief, public summary of the situation in 
terms of the struggle against the communists. Fernando then started to congratulate 
the people for their courage in fighting against these "elements" who had been 
terrorizing them for so long. He then inquired whether there was legal proof, in the 
form of documents, accounts, bills, etc. in order to instigate legal action against Diego. 
Hugo Paz answered that there was plenty and that Moisés had a long list of the crimes 
concerning commerce with land. Fernando reacted with, "Send them to the legal 
department (of the IDA) so that they can start the normal procedure. We will also ask 
for the invalidation of his plot". 
Various persons started to complain about Diego and the squatters he had been 
putting in their plots. They urged the IDA Regional Director to show that he could stop 
the communists. Fernando then stated, 
"I understand very well your situation. The methods these persons use are those of 
the banana plantations where they incite violence by means of strikes and when 
serious incidents take place they stand back and wash their hands. It is common 
there that someone who does not want to follow the orders of the union is beaten 
down. I see that you would like to administer justice yourself, but you should avoid 
that by all means, for we want to establish a state of law, of order. The 
communists would like you to do that so that they can fish in troubled water. The 
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first thing you should do in the case of irregularities is to notify the agrarista, in 
this case Moisés. 
In the meantime Fernando made some comments to Moisés and Hugo, signalling that it 
was most probable that Diego would come to know immediately after that meeting 
what had been discussed there. Hugo, then, interrupted the meeting and commented, 
"We know that there are persons who tell Diego everything that is discussed here. 
He is cognizant of everything that your committee agrees upon or what is agreed 
with us". 
Fernando then took over and started to explain to the people that they were 
experiencing a crucial stage in the development of the settlement. Thus he argued, 
"These situations are quite common to us. I have seen it in dozens of settlements. 
We understand very well the experiences you are living through. In every 
settlement, as in other areas of life, we see a good side and a bad side. You are 
the good side of this settlement and they (the communists) the bad one. It is a 
shame that our democratic system must be so slow. In San José, for example, you 
see that a thief is already released a few hours after he has been caught. 
Democracy shows its weaknes but ultimately it always wins. Here we do not live 
under Sandinismo, we do not live under an oppresive communist regime. What you 
should do is comply with our indications and persevere. That is the only way to 
end the chaos, injustice and disorder. Only united we will be able to surmount this 
situation. I have had much experience with this process. Generally it takes 5 years 
until a state of order is consolidated". 
He continued, 
"The next stage after consolidating law and order which is also a very difficult one 
is that of converting the settlers into agricultural entrepreneurs. That is only 
possible after a process of natural selection. You should not think that we choose 
the good or the bad settlers. No, that is a process which nature itself takes care 
of. The best settlers survive and the bad ones are forced to sell their farms. For, 
the truth is that the majority of you have not been more than labourers, with the 
exception of José, and that because of his family background". 
Hugo agreed and added, 
"It is a whole learning process to become an entrepreneurial farmer, something you 
cannot achieve in one day. That requires a change of mentality. A necessary 
condition is that you follow the recommendations of the técnicos and, in addition, 
that you show initiative". 
Various settlers agreed and similar examples were discussed. At that moment José 
asked for the floor, 
"I completely agree with Don Hugo Paz and with the ingeniero Fernando Campos in 
that ft is necessary to create order here. I myself can say that I am an object of 
persecution by Diego and his henchmen. We know that he does not operate alone 
but that they receive expert advice from union experts who come here regularly. 
They confer in the casona, which, following their tradition, they call the union 
house. Since I broke with Diego and chose for the democratic path they have been 
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committing all kinds of chicaneries against me (toda clase de jugadas). The last one 
was to close the way (referring to the conflict over the road with Agustín). This 
has also been harmful to 16 other families. Yet this has been only one in a series 
of hostilities. They also poured sugar into the motor of my car, they have rooted 
out cocoa from my orchard and they also have damaged me in a very personal 
way, and in a very well-planned way. In addition a case was filed against me by 
Agustín for threatening him. I have witnesses who can declare that there are no 
legal grounds for that. Thus, in return I have filed a suit against Agustín because of 
slander. I have had problems with this individual before and I know that he is quite 
a problemático. That should be taken into account at the moment of distributing 
the titles". 
And he continued, 
"They have also filed a suit against me for selling liquor. It is true that I sold liquor 
(guaro) in small quantities in the Big House, but I did it because otherwise the shop 
(pulpería) I established there would not have been profitable. With the car I have 
saved the lives of various persons, also of people who nowadays I count as my 
enemies, by taking them to the clinic. As you see this situation has been quite 
unpleasant for me. Diego is doing everything to get rid of me". 
Fernando then intervened and remarked, 
"It is people like you we need. You can count on our support. But you should be 
conscious that everything must take place through legal channels. For violence has 
to be responded to with justice, otherwise chaos emerges". 
José reacted, 
"I think you are right and for this reason it is important that strong action be taken, 
a signal that convinces the doubtful settlers and Diego that you are ready to 
support us". 
Fernando answered that they could not do more than they were already doing since 
they had to see to many other settlements, some of them much larger. 
The atmosphere was growing tense. José was trying to draw a statement of 
strong commitment from the Regional Director. But apparently not everyone agreed 
with the course the meeting was taking. One older settler remarked that he would have 
been happy if those friends of his who were allied to Diego had been present at the 
meeting so that they would have become convinced of the strong support the IDA was 
giving them. Then, a settler called Osvaldo asked for the right to talk, 
"Some moments ago Don Hugo Paz insinuated that someone was passing 
information to Diego. I would like to declare here that in spite of the fact that 
Diego has been a good friend of mine and still is, I am not the type of person to 
act as a spy. When I talk to him I do not discuss with him what has been agreed in 
the committee meetings. The fact that it was Diego who proposed me for the post 
of controller (fiscal) does not mean that I am a puppet of his. I do not agree with 
most of what Diego did the last time. For that reason I was ready to take office in 
the new committee. It is true that I am a communist, yet, that is not.a reason for 
agreeing with Diego's behaviour. I believe in democratic communism". 
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Some people around me were growing quite uncomfortable. Hugo Paz reacted by 
saying that he had not been referring to anyone in particular, "if it were so I would 
have told you personally. But if there are persons who have doubts about you, so prove 
the opposite". One settler, then, remarked that Osvaldo was the committee's controller 
not because Diego had proposed him for that office but because the community 
assembly had chosen him for that post democratically. Fernando, for his part, 
observed, that it was totally natural that people discuss communal issues. Only in that 
way can other people, less involved in communal organizations, become cognizant of 
what was going on. After all the committee is not a secret organization. Most 
important in his view was that there be no ópen confrontation in the community. In his 
opinion Osvaldo had no need to fear anything. Osvaldo then added, 
"Although I have also my communist way of thinking, like Diego, I do not agree 
with the way he has been acting lately. Yet, I believe that Diego has also done 
very good things for the community and that personally he is a very fine man". 
At this juncture various persons agreed. A woman said that a distinction should be 
made between Diego the leader and Diego the neighbour {vecino). As a person he is "a 
beauty", unfortunately he is in error. The other women, even the one who complained 
so much about the squatters agreed. Fernando then added, 
"This is a democratic country and everyone has the right to sympathize with 
whatever political party he or she wishes, as long as the democratic rules are 
followed. Hopefully Diego will change so that the settlement can become united in 
its search for progress". 
Finally José thanked the functionaries for their cooperation and started again to talk 
about the road. Fernando interrupted him rather harshly and noted, "you have already 
talked about that before". The meeting ended. We shook hands with the settlers and 
walked towards the cars. Fernando asked Moisés to return with him in his car. Later 
Mario approached me and commented, 
"This José still needs much experience to become a good leader. Diego will eat 
him alive. The committee is not working well. They have not yet filled out the legal 
documents necessary for becoming recognized by DINADECO (the national 
community service). I can help them to write letters and put them in contact with 
important persons, but they themselves have to send them". 
Analysis 
The encounter highlights a contradiction between the style of operation of front line 
workers such as Mario, the social worker, and Moisés, the agrarista, and that of the 
front-line administrators, Hugo and Fernando. The latter's operational style exhibited a 
mixture of paternalism and authoritarianism. For one thing, they showed a lack of real 
interest in the dynamics of local conflict and organisation, shown by Fernando's 
Darwinistic theory of settlement evolution and his educational views on the 'real' 
agrarian entrepreneurs. The problem of poverty and marginality in the frontier was 
openly explained by him the result of a 'natural selection process' both at the 
settlement and personal level. There was no mention in his account of the legitimate 
complaints of the settlers of having been neglected for so many years by the state. 
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Hugo was even more naive, as both the agrarista and the social worker9 would 
later contend. Moisés considered it to be impossible to oust Diego on the basis of the 
existing evidence - a few scraps of paper - which in his view had little legal value 
whatsoever and he made it clear to me that he resented that Hugo would not draw on 
his experiences and deal with leftist organisations through political negotiation. He had 
once suggested to Hugo that in his view the best way to 'neutralize' Diego was by 
seeking a political agreement with the FENAC at a central level, by demanding from 
them that they would force Diego to comply with the 'ghost' committee, and the IDA, 
in return, would not persecute Diego. Hugo's reaction was that negotiation would be 
superfluous since the 'legal system' was strong enough to deal with corruption. Yet, 
Moisés had never been able to successfully evict a settler from this settlement. 
The social Darwinism and formal legalism of Hugo and Fernando, however, 
contrasted with the discourse on 'citizenship', 'democracy' and 'progress' that 
permeated their statements. This became clear to both settlers and the officials present 
when Favio demanded more commitment from the IDA, and by Osvaldo who demanded 
that his political views be respected and that he should not be treated as a spy. In 
effect, the lack of subtlety in dealing with the local dynamics of conflict caused a tense 
situation at the end of which the participants made it clear that they rejected a witch 
hunt against Diego and his allies. Yet this does not mean that Fernando was not 
aware of the drawbacks of such a course of action. He made a step backwards when 
confronted with the statements of personal support for Diego. In fact, the great loser of 
this encounter was José who did not get the unconditional and full support he 
expected. His repeated requests for permanent IDA intervention and punishment of 
Diego could then only appear as a source of division. 
Concluding, the operational style of the IDA administrators like Hugo and 
Fernando, made it difficult for front-line workers to continue their work since they 
exacerbated local conflict, and they increased the vulnerability of pro-IDA leaders of 
being accused of creating divisions in the community. In effect, it was the front-line 
r workers who realized the limits of this confrontationalist style best, as they saw that 
the IDA would lose its credibility if it was not able to impose its authority fully. It must 
be noted that underlying this difference between the administrators' and the front-line 
workers' attitude was the differing role that the ideology of intervention played in their 
operational styles. Whereas it was clear to the front-line workers that the ideology of 
intervention had to be adapted to the particular circumstances of local client-official 
interfaces, the administrators held to it in an unmodified way in their interaction with 
settlers in the 'field' domain. 
Next, we will see how local conflict was expressed through a series of actions 
from both sides. 
'Indeed, Mario Green expressed his unhapiness by distancing himself from the whole event by taking a 
place in the car together with the other officials. One must bear in mind that, as a participant in the 
invasion of Tierragrande, Mario knew the history, personalities and struggles of the settlement too well. 
Moisés, by contrast, maintained a strict bureaucratic attitude. 
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7.5 Organizing Resistance: The Land Invasions 
This meeting proved to be somewhat disappointing for the regional administration. 
Fernando, for one, was of the opinion that a lot of work still had to be done in order to 
'normalize' the situation in Tierragrande. In his view settlers there were still under the 
ideological influence of the leftist union, while leaders like José expected that the 
institution would resolve all their problems. At the same time he considered it not 
worthwhile to keep spending so much time and manpower on a small settlement, 
especially now that the regional office had to project itself towards a large number of 
settlements each with its own specific problems. Thus it was decided that the social 
worker and the agrarista should carry out the work of 'education'. To that effect they 
would visit the settlement in turns, each every week. 
The situation, however, became more complicated when notice came that a 
number of invasions had taken place in Tierragrande-Macadamia, particularly on the 
plots of four members of the 'ghost' committee who happened at the time not to be in 
the settlement. José came to the regional office and accused Diego of having organized 
the invasions as a provocation to prove that the IDA was not capable of carrying out its 
promise to eradicate his influence. 
In a few visits I undertook to the settlement the situation appeared to be quite 
confused indeed. The Mercedes banana plantation near Pocora closed with the result 
that many workers lost their jobs, thus increasing the demand for land. Diego assured 
me that he had no active participation in the planning and implementation of the 
invasions. Yet, it was quite implausible that the invasions took place without his 
consent. Diego adopted a rather comfortable position. He claimed that he was neither 
in favour nor against these invasions. It was an issue between the plot-owners and the 
squatters. The problem was due to the fact that these owners did not live on their 
farms and therefore contributed little to community activities. It was not clear to him 
what the attitudes of the squatters were, but he had already had contact with them 
and had told them that his position would depend on their ability to convince the 
community of their willingness to become responsible members of it. At the same time 
he argued that they had to reach a good agreement with the former owner. 
The squatters appeared to be a mixed lot. Among them were young families who 
built a shack on plots of land which were definitely abandoned, but there were also 
characters with the reputation for invading farms in order to sell them at a profit. The 
frontier, it must be noted, attracts people for many motives. Some are looking to settle 
and create a future for themselves and their families, while others are seeking a retreat 
from society and their problems. Many are specialized in clearing land, and after having 
sown grass for cattle, put fences and built a small house they sell the 'farm' and go on 
to another frontier place were they can start anew. Then there were those who were 
only interested in land as an object of speculation, who after invading land would seek 
to negotiate its sale and do the same elsewhere. 
One important effect these invasions produced was that all absentee owners 
returned to the settlement, including those who had not been invaded. As expected 
they organized themselves around the 'ghost' committee and started putting pressure 
on the regional office to show their strength and support them by ousting the invadors. 
In effect, Moisés took action to evict them, but with little success as it seemed almost 
impossible to prevent the same squatters from occupying the plot again the very same 
day, provided they had the support of other settlers who were ready to testify on their 
behalf. This had already been experienced in the case of a young settler who had 
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actually lost a legal suit filed against him by the legal owner but who, on the initiative 
of a large group was resettled. Subsequently the case was reopened, and the settler 
won occupancy rights by the mere fact that he still remained on the plot. Given this 
precedent and the fact that not only Diego but also José and others in Macadamia had 
in the past been involved in organising invasions, Moisés realized that it seemed rather 
improbable that legal action, swift or otherwise, could be enforced if the squatter could 
muster a degree of communal support. 
In effect, Diego was able to prove his point: without the clear support of the 
community little could be accomplished. The struggle then would be won by the party 
most entitled to talk in the name of the community, not by those having the capacity to 
enforce the law with the help of an intervening party. Diego very aptly utilized this 
argument in a meeting of the red committee convened to discuss the new 
developments. 
In this meeting, after giving a speech on the need for communal solidarity and 
unity, he referred to the 'new settlers' whom he welcomed and asked to cooperate 
with the community. And he asserted that it was important that the settlers live within 
the community. As he argued, 
"with these new compañeros we'll have more strength for initiating new 
productive projects. (Then he started to list a few agricultural production plans and 
made some remarks about the organization). Also thanks to these friends who 
come here to live with their families the school will not be closed for lack of 
children. We should welcome these families who need land and who are ready to 
make the necessary sacrifices in order to make it productive". 
Yet a week later, two of the four squatters left without, to my knowledge, good 
reason, indicating that there had been some sort of negotiation between Diego and the 
owners of the plots. (In effect, one of these plots belonged to José). 
Given the IDA'S incapacity to intervene in favour of the 'ghost' committee by 
evicting the squatters, José organized a counter-move. He proceeded to invade a 
number of plots belonging to members of the red committee. Also Diego's plot was 
invaded. This invasion, however, did not have the expected results. 
Diego's plot was invaded one day when he was in Guápiles. When returning he 
had a long conversation with the squatter and apparently he was able to convince him 
that he had been deceived and that he would never obtain the necessary support of the 
community. After a few days, then, the squatter moved into another abandoned plot. A 
second squatter invaded the plot of a settler who had converted to evangelism and 
who had left the settlement for the lowlands in order to dedicate himself to the church. 
He was known as a dedicated community member, yet after talking to Diego he 
decided to strike an arrangement with the squatter. A third squatter who had a long 
history of participating in invasions (among them that of Neguév) and was known as a 
troublesome character - a drinker and quarreler - moved to the village square when he 
noticed that he would not obtain much help from other settlers. Eventually he left the 
settlement when Diego assured him that his chances to obtain a legal title were nil. 
It was apparent by then that Diego was regaining the initiative. The IDA 
administration was not showing the same eagerness as before to 'normalize' the 
situation in Tierragrande-Macadamia, and people were starting to feel that a number of 
communal works were not being carried out. The road, for example, had never been so 
bad since the day it was constructed. The school committee had organized a tumo 
recently in order to collect funds for repairing the school. Neither José nor the other 
members of the 'ghost' committee participated in the organization. (In fact, they did 
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not even go). Diego, by contrast, contributed both his labour and money, thereby 
working together with people who had turned against him. In effect, I was present in 
this turno when one of the settlers who had accused Diego most vehemently in public 
of being corrupt (Javier), attempted a rapprochement with him with a view to 
reconstituting the old committee. 
77ie 'ghost' committee changes strategy 
Every year José went back to his home-town of Turrialba for a few months to help his 
father with the coffee harvest. This provided the 'ghost' committee with a good 
opportunity to change its leader. Before José left it was decided that Chepe Gamboa 
would deputise for him while he was away. Chepe had a finca on a fringe of land 
between the settlement and the national forest reserve, which he and others claimed 
did not yet belong to the forest reserve. He presented himself as a representative of a 
powerful group of land entrepreneurs who had fincas on this fringe. Chepe was rather 
open in demonstrating his interest in working for the 'ghost' committee, arguing that 
although he was not formally a settler he had good reasons to be involved in the affairs 
of the settlement. He explicitly stated that he was interested in the extension of the 
road upwards. This he said would also benefit the settlers as it would stimulate the 
growth of a village. In addition he made it clear that he could make an important 
contribution to the committee due to his close relationships to the Rojas family (he and 
his brother had worked for them for the best part of their lives) and through his close 
friendships with politicians in Guâcimo. Thus he started to talk about the need to take 
political action in order to press the IDA to take action. 
In a last meeting of the 'ghost' committee that I attended, together with Mario 
Green, it became apparent that the members had lost faith in the IDA. In fact they 
reproached Mario and the institution bitterly for not having carried out the promises 
made. Mario, then, had to take recourse to his usual tactics of deflecting criticism. 
In conclusion, the committee gave up all pretensions to being a representative of 
the whole community and became a loose alliance of differing groups with different 
interests for putting pressure on the bureaucratic system in order to achieve specific 
goals by way of political negotiation. 
7.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this last section I will discuss how Diego accounted for the whole confrontation 
between his committee and the IDA. Once I drove him to Guâpiles after having spent a 
few days in the Big House. Having had a few drinks in a bar he demonstrated an 
unusual openness in his assessment of the whole situation. So far he had always 
expressed himself in ideological terms and had been very careful not to criticize anyone 
on personal grounds, whether his rivals within the settlement or the functionaries. 
According to him the leaders of the 'ghost' committee lacked skills. José, for 
example, had never been able to gain the trust and appreciation of the community. He 
had just behaved like a boss. Several settlers, simple and uneducated people had felt 
deeply insulted by him. Neither had he been able to gain the trust of the Rojas. 
With regard to Mario, the social worker, he argued that Mario had believed that 
he could destroy his red committee but he had been mistaken. He argued that he had a 
big advantage over him, 
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"I still think and talk like a "peasant" and Mario does not. Functionaries usually 
have finished high school and maybe one or two years of higher education. I have 
finished high-school, and in addition I am still a peasant. I know how to speak as a 
peasant, whereas Mario talks like a functionary". 
He argued that one central element in his strategy of resistance had been to 
deliberately neglect all communal activities in the settlement - such as the maintenance 
of the road, the school, etc. - after the formation of the 'ghost' committee, as well as 
the relationships with other state agencies and institutions. He knew that those 
characters such as José did not have the commitment and experience to do that kind 
of work properly. Thus JAPDEVA and other institutions refused to deal with two 
committees which were representing at the same time one community. Previously they 
received help from the World Food Programme. This support had been discontinued 
after José had called them and told them to channel the food through him instead of 
through the existing communal organization. They grew suspicious and stopped the 
delivery. In short, José and his allies had not been able to establish relationships of 
trust with officials, not to mention setting up their own network within the institutions. 
However, he argued that his ability to resist was not so much based on his 
knowledge of the personal characteristics of his rivals but on a political analysis of the 
IDA. As he put it, 
"A lot of ignorant peasants have let themselves be deceived by them, but I know 
that the IDA has no money. These new projects are not being financed by the IDA 
but by international agencies, and the IDA has not the right to decide about the 
distribution of these funds. On the other hand, the IDA is a political institution with 
a political function, and it has a special relationship with the government party. 
Thus before every election a lot of negotiations become possible". 
He also argued that in view of the coming elections the IDA's officials would be forced 
to negotiate, for "they could not permit losing the votes of the peasants". These 
negotiations, he explained, were conducted in a global way and were related to the 
commitment of the leftist opposition groups not to disrupt the electoral processes by 
marches, invasions, etc. which could embarass the party in power. Related to this, 
ambitious politicians were ready to "buy" leftist votes by establishing alliances with 
them. In fact, he argued that he had very good relationships with the local politicians of 
the two most important parties. 
From Diego's point of view the Regional Office of the IDA had broken an 
important rule, that which prohibited the institution of forming committees. In addition 
he argued that they had indulged in political persecution by taking position against the 
FENAC. He made that clear to the Executive President during a meeting he and other 
FENAC representatives had had some time ago. According to him the IDA'S Executive 
President had expressed his concern about this and promised an investigation. 
7.7 Conclusion 
How did this case of intervention in the frontier finish? Fernando Campos, the Regional 
Director concluded that Tierragrande had still a long path to go before it was pacified. 
Accordingly Tierragrande was assigned a low priority. It was decided that the social 
worker and the agrarista would take turns in continuing the neutralization process. 
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However, it is not surprising that they did not feel much enthusiasm for doing so, and 
after a few visits they ceased to show up. 
Thus the IDA'S attempt to marginalize Diego proved to be much more difficult 
than expected, and for several reasons. To begin with, they exacerbated contradictions 
and potential divisions within the community, with the result that a great deal of 
tension was generated in the everyday life of a relatively small group of settlers. 
Furthermore, IDA intervention proved to be weak due to the contradictions apparent 
between the ideology of intervention, as displayed in the paternalism and related 
theories on the development of an entrepreneurial spirit - and the operational styles of 
the front-line workers who had to deal with the local dynamics of communal conflict. 
Finally, the strategy of resistance and confrontation followed by Diego proved to be 
highly successful as it showed up the weakness of the IDA and its dependence on local 
negotiations. 
In presenting a case study in which the interplay of intervention and intervention-
coping stands central, an attempt was made to gain further insight into the 
contradictory social meanings which emerged in the course of a set of negotiations and 
confrontations between a radical leader and the IDA. In this way an attempt was made 
to further problematize the concept of intervention, deconstructing it in order to show 
that 'intervention' and 'intervention-coping', instead of being an objective process, are 
social constructions shaped by the clashes between different sets of social actors. 
Such clashes, I argued, can be studied by examining how, and in relation to which 
struggles, they endow with local meaning discourses of democracy and community. 
In conclusion; in this chapter resistance as one of several intervention-coping 
strategies was discussed. Concerning the conceptual framework proposed for analysing 
such strategies the following can be said: Diego, the communist leader, made a clever 
use of the knowledge accumulated in the settlement regarding how to deal with 
government institutions and bureaucrats. This practical knowledge was harnessed by a 
radical world-view which encouraged adopting a critical attitude towards state 
intervention. This world-view provided a language through which the discourses of 
'community' and 'democracy' were given local meaning. Through the involvement with 
a leftist peasant union which had important political connections at the national level 
Diego and his compañeros could draw upon a social network and modes of collective 
activity which facilitated access to key resources while maintaining a degree of local 
autonomy, and which provided the social basis for practices of enrolment. Enrolment 
here, and in contrast with the former chapter, entailed resisting the IDA'S attempts of 
introducing a new mode of institution-client relations. To that end the discourses of 
democracy and community were deployed so as to politicize such relationships. To that 
end existing relations with high-leading IDA functionaries (e.g. the Executive President 
and the Board) were used. 
CHAPTER 8 
MANIPULATION AS 
AN INTERVENTION-COPING STRATEGY 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the third and last strategy of intervention-coping, that of 
manipulation, by analysing how the discourse of democracy is deployed in order to 
mobilize people and attract resources. The chapter focuses on a water-provision or 
aqueduct project initiated by settlers of a locality that was part of the old Tierragrande 
hacienda and covers an area close to the mountain forest fringe lying at 1,500 metres, 
referred to as La Isleta and an area at a lower attitude called Las Delicias. After an 
outline of the local context, the inauguration of the project is described so as to show 
how the discourse of 'democracy' is put to work in these distant frontier areas. 
Second, a number of critical events surrounding the construction of the aqueduct are 
discussed. In the last two sections of the chapter the history of the project is analysed 
from the point of view of two main social actors who were involved in the project, a 
social worker of the Aqueduct and Sewage Institute and a preacher/entrepreneur. The 
third section relates how the project became a success thanks to a tactical alliance 
between them; the social worker was able to secure the involvement of the institution, 
in spite of the increasing doubts of his superiors concerning the viability of the project, 
and the preacher developed a social network in order to attract additional resources. 
Special attention is paid to how this preacher/entrepreneur develops skills for mobilizing 
local people and attracting institutional resources without getting committed to any 
institutional or political project. It is thereby shown that in the process of enroling a 
variety of actors in the aqueduct project he is able to create a reputation as an able 
organiser and negotiator, as a spokesman of poor settlers in the frontier, and last but 
not least, to pursue his own entrepreneurial aspirations. 
This chapter, then, focuses on how social actors, such as the preacher, utilize a 
discourse of 'democracy and citizenship' in order to expand their social networks within 
the bureaucracy. 
How Tierragrande-La isleta became a case study 
Before proceeding let me relate how I came to hear about the particular problems of 
this area. Once, on my way to the neighbouring settlement sector of Tierragrande-
Macadamia with a bunch of officials, the conversation turned to the subject of Ignacio, 
the preacher who had played a special role in the construction of the aqueduct in La 
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Isleta/Las Delicias. Mario Green, the social worker, observed that this preacher at the 
time was busy in building a reputation within the village of Pocora where he had 
recently moved. Yet, he already had something of a reputation since his nick-name was 
the "the preacher from the waist and up". The reason for this was that the preacher, 
once pursued a young and very beautiful girl who attended his church. He made many 
efforts to seduce her, yet, she did not want to surrender. She once confided her 
problem to a girl-friend of hers who advised her to make it clear to him that as a 
preacher he was committing a grave sin. So she did. The preacher, then, answered to 
her, "my love, I should have told you that I am only a preacher from the waist and up". 
Since then he was called behind his back "the preacher from the waist and up". 
Villagers used to make fun of him by worrying about his waist when inquiring about his 
health. For me this anecdote was not only amusing but intriguing as I came to know 
more about La Isleta. 
The relationship between the Neguev Regional Office and La Isleta/Las Delicias 
was a complex one. In the beginning the front-line workers and Fernando Campos 
would refer to the settlers of these localities as model beneficiaries, poor settlers who 
had been able to construct an aqueduct with a minimum of state resources. Reference 
was made to their peaceful character and their admirable capacity to work together. 
Later, in the course of the IDA's involvement with them the image changed. It appeared 
that serious problems between various groups of settlers existed. The most vocal 
leader, the preacher Ignacio, started to claim all kinds of resources and services from 
the IDA, such as the use of a truck for the transport of sand to La Isleta, the extension 
of land titles to settlers, etc. Ignacio, in addition, could be rather nasty to particular 
front-line workers when they did not deliver the services he expected from them. Thus 
at a given moment he started to spread the rumour that the agrarista was corrupt, that 
the IDA social worker was only interested in working with political friends, that the 
técnicos were a bunch of lazy characters, that the Regional Director of the IDA was not 
willing to keep his promises, etc. 
It was not surprising, therefore, that the officials' image of La Isleta/Las Delicias 
as a peaceful and unproblematic locality changed radically. Evidence was produced by 
the agrarista for the fact that a sector of the population. Las Delicias, wanted to 
separate and form their own settlement and that Ignacio, the preacher, had been 
practically expelled from Las Delicias by his rivals. Fernando Campos, the IDA Regional 
Director, on one of the last conversations we had, pointed out to me the difficulties of 
working with settlers belonging to religious sects due to their tendency to neglect their 
farms, and their proclivity to be manipulated by doubtful characters. 
The local and historical context 
La Isleta-Tierragrande, as mentioned, is located at the fringes of the mountain forest. It 
neighbours on the younger Las Delicias settlement sector, which lies at a lower altitude 
and closer to the lowlands. With the construction of a road upwards which traverses 
both settlements, the settlements became geographically closely connected, so much 
that La Isleta became an extension of Las Delicias. Before the construction of the road. 
La Isleta could only be reached through the neigbouring Macadamia settlement. There 
are no physical boundaries between La Isleta and Las Delicias, except that the former 
lies further up the road. In fact, the IDA stopped making a formal distinction between 
them, especially when the officials learned that both localities shared one aqueduct. 
The whole area was denominated by them La Isleta. 
Yet, important differences exist between La Isleta and las Delicias. Las Delicias is 
larger and consists of fifty plots, to La Isleta's thirty, and it is more populated. Due to 
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its vicinity to the lowlands, agriculture in Las Delicias is more profitable. In addition 
many settlers there work on neighbouring haciendas and thus are not forced to search 
for work in the plantations in the lowlands. La Isleta, in contrast, makes a depopulated 
impression as many settlers visit their plots only at weekends or on holidays. Of the 30 
plots only 12 are inhabited for large parts of the year, whereas in Las Delicias this is 
the case for the majority of the plots. 
In La Isleta the majority of the settlers are evangelicals of the same denomination 
as Ignacio, their preacher, whereas in Las Delicias half of the population consists of 
catholics, and the evangelicals there, belong to a different church from that of Ignacio. 
It is also known that many settlers in Las Delicias have leftist sympathies. In addition, 
the localities have quite different histories. 
La Isleta was settled spontaneously from 1973 onwards as part of the 
colonisation of the forests that was then taking place. This was independent of the 
peasant union that organized most of the invasions in the area, though in the beginning 
there had been a strong union presence through one of the first settlers, Cristóbal, a 
member of the communist peasant union (FENAC) who, with the support of the union, 
undertook the job of parcelization and distribution of plots. Later this settler converted 
to protestantism and severed all links with the union. From then on, he became very 
committed to disseminating the Word of God all over the area. 
Las Delicias, on the other hand, was part of the huge Bremen hacienda and was 
sold to the IDA by the owners, the influential Rojas family, to be distributed to 
squatters who had invaded a neighbouring hacienda called La Foresta. By giving 
squatters of La Foresta plots in Las Delicias, a protracted conflict which was acquiring 
dangerous political proportions (one of the owners was an important politician within 
the Liberación party) came to an end. This conflict had lasted for more than two years 
and the squatters had been evicted several times by the police and their huts set on 
fire. This experience created a strong bond between the leading squatters who 
'sustained the struggle' during the whole period. 
These Foresta invasion leaders had had a long history as banana plantation 
workers and were ideologically influenced by leftist unions. They could count on the 
organizational and legal support of leftist organisations such as FENAC and UPAGRA, 
yet they were not attached to any of these unions. They had always played an 
important role in communal organizations in Las Delicias, and initially also in the 
aqueduct project. Lately, however, they had been losing ground in the community, as 
they were considered by many as too radical and too conflictive. Furthermore one of 
them, Báltazar, who had taken the initiative for the aqueduct project had seriously 
damaged his reputation as a dedicated and hard-working local leader by spending the 
monies of the community in bars during his official trips to the lowlands and San José. 
Báltazar, a teetotaller at home appeared not to be able to resist the temptation of liquor 
when leaving the settlement. In fact, Ignacio, the preacher of La Isleta made clever use 
of this situation to promote himself as the only leader who was able to negotiate with 
state institutions in a responsible way. 
This background information helps to understand the apparent cleavages between 
the people from 'above' (La Isleta) and those from 'below' (Las Delicias), between the 
'democrats' and the 'communists', between the catholics and the evangelicals. 
It was suggested that the aqueduct project was a local initiative. In fact, it was a 
response to the increasing difficulties to get water for the houses, especially in Las 
Delicias. Las Delicias and La Isleta are separated from other settlements and farms by 
two deep seated rivers. After the road came many settlers in las Delicias moved their 
houses towards it, and it then became quite laborious to get water, the more so as the 
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road lies higher than the river. In La Isleta the lack of drinking water was less of a 
problem as various streams criss-cross the settlement. 
An additional reason for establishing an aqueduct was the fear that due to the 
deforestation of the area the lower reaches of the rivers would not be a sufficient 
source of water. This was already the case after a few days of dry weather. Thus it 
was thought that water sources uphill, in La Isleta, should be sought for provision in 
the future. 
8.2 The Inauguration of the Aqueduct 
The inauguration of the aqueduct besides being my first encounter with the community 
at large was an important event. It provided an opportunity for studying how characters 
such as Ignacio created an image of these distant and poor frontier settlement areas 
and of himself, as law-abiding and religious farmers who were only able to resist the 
communist ideology through an alliance with the state, and of how the discourse of 
democracy was employed by intermediaries such as Ignacio, by institutional managers 
and by local politicians. 
The inauguration was organized by Ignacio, the evangelical preacher, and 
president of the communal aqueduct project. It was done with style and was meant to 
become a major event. He had invited various leading persons personally and showed 
much pride in saying that one of the two major Presidential candidates of the Liberación 
party would be present. Also, both the MP's for Limon were invited as well as local 
politicians and leaders of the communal associations of the municipalities of Pocora and 
Guácimo, the Regional Directors of government agencies and Line Ministries and two of 
the Rojas brothers (the owners of the Bremen hacienda). To me this sounded very far-
reaching and implausible, given the fact that La Isleta and Las Delicias are small 
settlements far-out in the frontier, difficult to reach and with a highly uncomfortable 
road. Ignacio involved many persons in the organization of the ceremony, within and 
outside the community (I for example became a driver for that day). Food was prepared 
by women from the community, all of them belonging to his religious congregation. 
When I arrived at the school where the ceremony of inauguration was going to 
take place at 12'o clock, most of the guests had arrived. Among them were Orlando 
Avendaño, MP for Liberación accompanied by his two assistants, a few municipal and 
cooperative local leaders of the same party, Fernando Campos, the Regional Director of 
the IDA, the Regional Directors of the Ministry of Transport, the engineer of the 
aqueduct agency (AyA) in charge of this project, the priest of Guácimo and various 
local supporters of the Liberación party. The potential presidential candidate himself 
was absent, but had sent his excuses via the MP. Also absent were the Rojas family 
(who paid for the pigs slaughtered for the meal and for part of the drink), and the 
General Manager of the IDA, Don Roberto Arcos. 
The first to speak was Ignacio, the preacher, who in a large and eloquent speech 
thanked god, the institutions, the politicians and the unity of the community for the 
accomplishment of the project. He spoke about the difficulties they had had to 
surmount to conquer nature, to persuade "our skeptical brothers" of the feasibility of 
the project, to overcome all sorts of "coordination" problems with the institutions and 
local authorities. When talking about the latter he specially thanked the AyA and the 
MP Avendaño for their involvement with the community. He also thanked a whole array 
of institutions (the CNP, the Ministry of Labour, etc.) for their help. Regarding the IDA 
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he remarked that although the settlement came under its jurisdiction it was the 
institution that had contributed least. However, he added that now with the dynamic 
leadership of the ingeniero Fernando Campos they expected more interest on their part. 
Three things struck me about the speech. First, he used a religious-military 
metaphor for "development", with explicit reference to the crusades by speaking about 
the faith in progress, the struggle for appropriating the local natural resources and need 
to act as a united army with a unity of purpose. Second, when he spoke about the 
community he did it in general, 'ideological' terms. Thus, he did not mention the 
various committees, the work-groups, neither the role of other leaders. In fact, it 
seemed as if he saw himself as the embodiment of the community. Third, his 
demeanour was not the usual one of a peasant who publicly thanks the institutions for 
something given to them. On the contrary, the project was portrayed by him as the 
joint accomplishment of the community and the institution. Hence, he took it as one of 
his tasks to assess the contributions of the various agencies and authorities. In truth, 
this was the first time that I saw Ignacio in action, employing a language of 
responsibility in which the rights and obligations of state officials and those of settlers 
were discussed. Indeed, this was the way he gave significance to the discourse of 
democracy in the frontier. 
Next, the MP Avendafio gave a long and emotional pep-talk in which he referred 
to the 'peasant's' spirit of sacrifice, the expected integration of this area to the central 
plateau and the capital city as a result of the construction of the new motorway from 
San José to Guâpiles and the extension of secondary roads. Then he talked about his 
role as a member of parliament to promote the development of every village, not 
because of political interests but because of his loyalty to the people who chose him, 
and his patriotic interest. Finally he painted a rather idyllic picture of the future of this 
area as a wealthy coffee producing area. He also praised Ignacio as an excellent and 
progressive representative of the community. 
Finally the AyA engineer in charge of the project spoke. He talked about the 
satisfaction it gave to inaugurate an aqueduct like that one, which had offered so many 
technical difficulties in a rather inaccessible area. In this connection he also mentioned 
the special role of Ignacio as an intermediary [enlace) between the institution and the 
village. Finally, he spoke about the requirement that the project's beneficiaries pay the 
monthly maintenance dues. He also emphasized the communities' obligation to 
preserve the water-springs and not to indulge in any form of deforestation. N e x t 
the aqueduct was formally inaugurated. The anthem was sung and afterwards the 
catholic priest enacted the official inauguration. Subsequently, he gave a short speech, 
during which he touched on two themes. First he voiced his concern about 
deforestation and the consequences it had for erosion and water-supplies in the 
lowland villages. He emphasized the need to think within a long-term perspective. And, 
second, he talked about the need to overcome religious differences in order to achieve 
the necessary unity for realizing the development of the area. Thus he remarked, "I 
know there are people from various religions here. My intention here is to thank God, 
not to suggest a particular view of how he should be served". In this way he made 
clear that his presence should not be interpreted as an attempt to divide the community 
by supporting one segment of the community against another one. It struck me that 
Ignacio was absent during the formal inauguration of the aqueduct by the catholic 
priest. He had made his way to the women who were cooking and kept busy 
rearranging the chairs and tables for the meal. 
The tables had been reserved for the guests (among whom I was classified) and 
we were served by the women. Ignacio made sure that everyone was treated well. I 
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sat next to the Regional Director of the IDA. We started to compare Macadamia to La 
Isleta. He argued that the latter had the luck that it could count on someone like Ignacio 
who made so many efforts to maintain constructive relations with the institutions. He 
remarked that insofar as they had dealt with him the experience had been quite 
positive. He emphasized that Ignacio was not pursuing any political goals, and even 
less those of a divisionary kind, in contrast to Diego Casas, the communist leader from 
Macadamia, "who lived off forced contributions from the community and received 
training and counselling from people trained in Cuba". 
The discourse of democracy and the everyday conflicts of the project 
This event is interesting as we see a particular way of talking about 'development' in 
the frontier, in terms of an alliance between people and the state. Mention was made 
to the usual themes: the necessity of local cooperation, of a good relationship between 
settlers and the regional politicians, the necessity to overcome petty local conflicts and 
unite behind the larger objective of creating development. Yet, this way of talking 
about development as the outcome of a relationship between settlers and the state 
concealed a number of conflicts which had taken place between settlers and 
institutions, and among settlers themselves. Thus it appeared that Ignacio had been 
able to exclude other major participants in the project from the attribution of honour. It 
did not take long before I confronted an image of the aqueduct project which was very 
different from that which came across during the ceremony, as a conflictive if not 
traumatic experience. 
After the meal I approached two settlers who had participated in the aqueduct 
project from its inception, Pablo, an evangelical, and Adolfo, a catholic who was the 
catechist in Las Delicias. They had been the leaders of two of the four working groups 
that had been formed. As we talked about the relations between the various groups 
they were ready to discuss the various conflicts which surrounded the implementation 
of the aqueduct project. Yet, they said they were proud of the fact that, in contrast 
with other settlements, cooperation between evangelicals and catholics had been 
possible there. 
As I expressed my surprise about the fact that Ignacio, at the ceremony, had 
received all the honours for the completion of the aqueduct, and that other leaders had 
not been mentioned during the ceremony, Adolfo and Pablo claimed that there had 
been only two good leaders, who could not get along with each other. These were 
Ignacio and Báltazar. Since the latter could not accept that all the honours should go to 
Ignacio, he was not present at the ceremony. He had quarelled with Ignacio the day 
before about the way the inauguration was to be organized. Anyway, Báltazar was 
discredited because he had diverted too much money from the committee. 
Furthermore, Adolfo gave his personal opinion of Ignacio, 
"It should be recognized that without him the aqueduct would not have been 
completed. He is very dedicated and does not rest until he has reached his aims. 
Many people criticize him, but the real reason for that is envy. It is true that he is 
not a cultivator. No one has seen him with a spade in his hand. But the truth Is 
that if I or another compañero is sent to an institution to arrange something we are 
not taken seriously. Ignacio with his voice and his massive appearance cannot be 
ignored. He just would plant his leg behind the door and no one would stop him 
until he has finished his story. We could not do something like that as peasants, 
we are better at doing physical work." 
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This statement struck me as odd later when I learned that Adolfo had been one of the 
main opponents of Ignacio during the implementation of the project, questioning him for 
the fact that he did not contribute labour. 
At the same time Adolfo and Pablo agreed that the history of the project had 
been very different from the way Ignacio had portrayed it in his speech. For example 
the aqueduct had never been an affair of the whole community since a large group did 
not participate in a significant way. The reason for this was that there was a lack of 
faith by many, not only in its feasibility but also in the way it was managed. At 
present, these people felt left out as there was a whole discussion going on regarding 
the conditions under which people could be connected to the aqueduct. Also the idea 
that Ignacio was a communal leader in both settlements was in their opinion wrong. 
Although he was respected in Las Delicias he was not taken seriously by most. They 
agreed that he was only considered as a legitimate leader by the settlers of La Isleta. In 
short, his wider reputation as a representative of La Isleta/Las Delicias was based on 
his ability to attract funds for this particular project. 
Moreover, as I was told later, Ignacio was quite a controversial character, not 
least because of his role in relation to the aqueduct. Thus, out of the many springs 
available for feeding the aqueduct with water, the one that was chosen was on the 
largest of his two plots, the one that was located outside the settlement on the forest 
reserve, where it is prohibited to farm. But the integration of this area in the settlement 
area through the aqueduct, in fact, made it easier for entrepreneurs such as Lorenzo to 
lay legal claim to the land. Furthermore, it appeared later that this spring had not the 
capacity to supply water to Las Delicias - which lies lower - after a few days without 
rain, as the spring would dry up. For that reason it became necessary, halfway the 
construction of the aqueduct, to search for another spring which would increase water 
supply. 
Conflictive issues surrounding the aqueduct project 
After probing further into the history of the aqueduct project the following points of 
conflict came to the fore. It was already mentioned that the aqueduct responded to a 
need of the settlers from Las Delicias, more than those from La Isleta. However, the 
participation of the settlers from La Isleta proved to be critical to the project, as water 
springs were sought and founded at the higher reaches of this settlement. But there 
had been lingering doubts on the part of settlers in Las Delicias about the choice of 
water springs in La Isleta, and precisely in a plot belonging to Ignacio. The suspicion 
existed that Ignacio had bribed the técnico from the Rural Aqueduct Programme to 
choose that spring as the most suited. For one thing, Ignacio had certainly 
accompanied him during his examination of the various springs in the area. No attempts 
were made to find a spring closer to Las Delicias. The choice for a faraway spring 
implied that the participation of settlers in both Las Delicias and La Isleta was needed. 
So far little cooperation existed between the two settlements. The evangelicals in La 
Isleta had the reputation of being reluctant to work with people of a different religious 
persuasion. But, one thing was clear, Ignacio in his capacity of local preacher was able 
to mobilize them. This gave Ignacio an enormous influence in the further 
implementation of the project. As noted, the settlers from La Isleta were poorer than 
those from Las Delicias. Some worked on plantations in the lowlands, others lived in 
poverty on their plots. In contrast, many settlers in Las Delicias had the possibility to 
find work in neighbouring haciendas which was easier than walking the 12 kilometers 
uphill to the spring and back everyday, which they had to do when working on the 
aqueduct project. Thus many paid settlers in La Isleta to do their part of the work. For 
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the latter this was a very advantageous situation. For the settlers in Las Delicias it was 
a costly one. In addition, Ignacio was able to lay claim to food from the World Food 
Programme for them, and for some time, he was able to get help by establishing a 
connection with a Public Works Programme that paid (low) wages to poor people who 
worked on communal infrastructural projects. In this way he could ensure the 
participation of the settlers of La Isleta. 
But the project became a source of discontent and frustration to settlers in Las 
Delicias who had to spend, in their eyes, a disproportionate amount of energy and 
money on it. For the settlers in La Isleta, in contrast, the project was a welcome source 
of wages and food under circumstances in which few alternatives existed. 
The relationship with the Aqueduct and Sewage Institution (AyA) was also very 
tiresome. The spring chosen was located in a very inaccessible place, in the midst of 
rocky soils where it was very difficult to dig. The engineer of the Aqueduct Institution 
insisted that a specific depth had to be reached for laying the tubes, but every 
additional centimeter was for the participants a huge task. Several times conflicts arose 
between the engineer and settlers over the technical requirements of the project. 
A few participants of the aqueduct project from Las Delicias, inspired by Adolfo, 
started to exert pressure on the AyA to start searching for a different water spring, one 
that was nearer to their settlement. This idea was totally opposed by Ignacio and the 
social worker of the AyA who had been involved in the project from the beginning, 
although for different reasons as we will see. Ignacio responded to accusations that he 
was only interested in benefitting from the project by renouncing his offices on the 
Aqueduct Implementation Committee, but he also convinced the officers of the World 
food Programme not to deliver food to the settlement. As a result the project came to a 
standstill and he was asked to return to the implementation committee. 
There was another crisis when it appeared that the water spring chosen would 
dry up if it failed to rain for a few days. Then, almost when the project was finished, 
another spring was sought and found, this time on the lower part of La isleta, not far 
from Las Delicias. A new connection was built to that spring, with the result that water 
supply to Las Delicias and the lower parts of La Isleta became more constant. 
But this became another source of conflict as some project participants in Las 
Delicias, again under the inspiration of Adolfo, proposed to divide the aqueduct in two. 
According to this plan Las Delicias would be serviced by the new spring whereas La 
Isleta would receive water from the older one. Adolfo argued that this was a necessary 
step as the settlers from La Isleta refused to participate in the maintenance committee 
and to pay the maintenance tax 1. Again Ignacio and Juan Manuel, the AyA social 
worker, had to intervene as this entailed that the first aqueduct would be neglected and 
would soon deteriorate beyond repair. Ignacio had to convene a meeting in La Isleta to 
explain to the settlers there that if they did not pay the tax all the work of the aqueduct 
would get lost. Interestingly, Ignacio and Juan Manuel received the support from the 
leftist, marginalized, leaders of Las Delicias who argued that the aqueduct should 
remain undivided since it was the product of the hard work of both settlements. 
In conclusion, the aqueduct project was not an undisputed success as conflicts 
remained after its completion. Indeed, everytime that it was thought that the first 
spring was not delivering enough water the AyA social worker was called to the 
settlement and made responsible for it. 
1ln fact, many closed the connection with the aqueduct and went to the river with buckets to fetch 
water. In this way they could avoid paying the taxes. 
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8.3 Creating Space for Maneouvre: The AyA Social Worker 
The aqueduct project, by now, seemed rather puzzling to me. I had the impression that 
it had not resulted in the higher level of community unity that everyone, the IDA 
officials in charge of community development as well as many settlers, thought was a 
precondition for local development. Apparently the community was as divided as ever 
and the only clear winner appeared to be a preacher who had been successful in 
improving his reputation as a moderate fighter for the welfare of poor people in the 
frontier and a capable intermediary. He had also extended the project to a plot in the 
forest that he wanted to appropriate. One person who helped me greatly to gain further 
insight into the history of the project and the communal dynamics that surrounded it 
was the social worker of the rural aqueduct programme of the AyA, Juan Manuel2. 
Juan Manuel was a communicative person and, what for me was more important, 
he had a very special interest in the project of La Isleta and he liked to talk about it. In 
our first interview, he commented, "La Isleta has been for us a very special project, a 
project that many of us experienced as a headache. However, for me it was a very 
important one, for I learned a lot about how to deal with such communities and with 
the institution". 
The project had unique characteristics. First, it had been set up in a more sparsely 
settled area than they had expected it to be. Second, the community was a very poor 
one, with no agricultural production for the market, and consequently, it lacked 
resources. The rule is that the community provides some of the resources for the 
project, at least the labour, local material like sand and food and shelter for the foreman 
in charge of the work (maestro de obras). Third, as a forest reserve the place was 
actually not suited to agriculture. Fourth, the settlement had serious problems related to 
community organization. "When I came first to the settlement, said Juan Manuel, "the 
situation was so bad that the people from the lower area did not want to cooperate 
with those from the upper end, for they saw themselves as belonging to different 
settlements. I told them that the difference between the communities was only a 
semantic issue and I suggested that they choose a common name". 
He also argued that there was a lack of communal identity as people came from 
all over the country and there was a presence of various evangelical sects. But despite 
this La Isleta had tremendous luck, for they got priority over other communities with 
more resources. The reason for this was purely conjunctural, he argued. On top of all 
this there was Ignacio, whom Juan Manuel considered "a necessary evil" (un mat 
necesario). To my surprise, he did not consider this a bad project, neither for the 
institution nor for the community. Replying to my suggestion that the project had not 
led to more effective modes of local organisation in La Isleta/Las Delicias he asserted, 
"I do not have the impression that community organisation is weak, on the 
contrary. Anyway, that is not the issue. The experience has led to the emergence 
of many young and dedicated leaders, good organizers, and that is for a 
community crucial. This project has given them a lot of self-respect. It is natural 
*lt is the task of such workers to evaluate the organizational conditions for the construction of 
aqueaducts. In addition they have to assist the communities to establish construction and maintenance 
committees, and to train clients on the legal and financial obligations of the committees (taxes, etc). 
Finally they have to raise consciousness concerning environmental issues. 
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that conflicts arise between people in a community, but these are mostly inter-
personal problems. The project has changed the outlook of these people". 
Thus, he pinpointed that over the same period the school was finished and that the 
work on the road had continued. Juan Manuel recalls how the project was initiated, 
"Ignacio one day appeared in my office in San José together with one of the 
leaders of Las Delicias. He claimed that so many kilometres of trenches had been 
dug for water-tubes and that they only needed the tubes and a foreman to finish 
the aqueduct. We were amazed, never before had we got such an offer. They had 
been digging a lot but in reality not nearly as much as they told us. Moreover, the 
largest part had to be straightened and deepened". 
And they did have an amazing piece of luck. At about that time there was a shift in the 
institution's management. As in every institution, the new Chief Engineer of the 
Department of Rural Aqueducts, where Juan Manuel worked, wanted to prove that he 
could improve the efficiency of the programme. It had been 80% of what had been 
planned and he wanted to show that 120% was possible. Within that context the 
project seemed extremely attractive. It was decided to accord it priority over all other 
approved projects. Normally it would have taken at least a year just to have a project 
approved. 
However, the community leaders had been passing incorrect information. 
According to Ignacio they had enough resources and labour, but they only had the 
commitment of a few institutions. Yet, Juan Manuel argued that in Costa Rica it is 
almost impossible to get hold of these resources on time, when the community really 
needs them. As he put it, 
"In fact, they deceived us. At the inception of a project a base-study is made by 
functionaries from the technical division. They examine the mineralogical, 
hydrological situation, and gather data on the size of the population, living 
conditions, etc. The report of the study revealed that in the upper end alone, 30 
families were living. In reality not even 12 were living there, and most of them not 
even the whole year round. The técnico who undertook the study was misguided 
by Ignacio. Probably he did not want to make the effort to visit all the plots, so he 
did not check the veracity of Ignacio's claims". 
Juan Manuel recognized that he carried part of the blame. According to the procedure 
the social worker can stop a project if the community is not considered to be 
organizationally mature for such a project. But as Juan Manuel asserted, "I have lived in 
Siquirres for a large part of my youth and I love the Atlantic region. I know that the 
image that exists of people there being backward and lazy is wrong. Thus I wanted to 
give them a chance". 
On his first encounter with the community he already realized that there were 
serious communal problems. It had been agreed that the meeting would be at the upper 
end, in La Isleta, but upon arriving he learned that one of the leaders of the lower side, 
Adolfo, had convinced the people from his sector to hold the meeting in Las Delicias. 
Well, remarked Juan Manuel "my experience with communities is that if you lose the 
first battle you will lose the last. So I told them that if the meeting was not in La Isleta 
there would be no project at all". In short, some leaders from below did not want to 
have anything to do with those above. Both groups accused each other of being lazy 
and of not really living on the farms. Yet, for Juan Manuel it was obvious that the 
communities had to work together, for all the springs were located in La Isleta and 
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most of the available labour was in Las Delicias. In addition, he stressed that the work 
on the aqueduct was almost inhuman. The blocks, pipes and bags of sand had to be 
carried on the shoulders. The project's schedule had been calculated with 60 men in 
mind. However, there were never more than 40. At times there were no more than 25. 
That was the period that the project entered its worst crisis. At'that moment in time, it 
was the settlers from the higher community. La Isleta, who carried the burden. Juan 
Manuel asserts, 
"The error was mine as I had overestimated the possibilities of the community. I 
reckoned that when the project gained impetus more people would join. This 
occured, but later, and less rapidly than I had expected. On various occasions 
when I realized that it was advancing too slowly I seriously considered suspending 
ft. For ft is highly inefficient to have a foreman and machinery working at low 
capacity. But, I knew that such a measure would demoralize them too much". 
At one moment he convened a meeting with the entire community to discuss the 
problem. There he proposed that the people sign a document declaring that they 
committed themselves to finish the project. That document had two functions. First it 
served as a justification towards his chief for continuing the projects. And, second, he 
could use it as a means of (moral) pressure against the community. Yet, the document 
itself had no legal value whatsoever. Meanwhile his relationship with the chief 
engineer, which up to then had been excellent, had cooled down. During evaluation 
meetings in which social workers and engineers participated, Juan Manuel was accused 
of identifying too closely with local communities to the detriment of the institution. In 
short, they were giving him the blame for the apparent failure of the project. Regarding 
these clashes he recalls, 
"I was able to bring in a lot of important arguments in the sense that it is not 
always possible to predict the organizational capacity of a community. I came with 
a lot of examples of other, richer, communities, which had nevertheless proved to 
be problematic. Moreover, I brought evidence that neither is technical knowledge 
infallible". 
The latter was a good argument because from a given moment doubts arose on the 
part of both the institution and the settlers over the carrying capacity of the spring 
chosen. The técnicos insisted that the measurements were right and that shortages of 
water were due to extremely long dry periods and changes in the geological structure, 
etc. Juan Manuel remarked that one advantage he had in those discussions was that he 
knew much more about local conditions. His strategy, meanwhile, was to concentrate 
on other, larger and more promising projects in order to recover his reputation as a 
valuable functionary. 
At the same time he continued to help the community by other means. From a 
colleague he learnt about a new programme of public works, set up by the Ministry of 
Public Works in cooperation with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to combat 
unemployment among workers. The wages were very low but in La Isleta/Delicias 
people had no cash income. Thus a programme originally intended for areas with strong 
differences in seasonal labour-demand, was funnelled to Isleta/Delicias. Together with 
Ignacio he arranged for trucks to be sent in by the IDA, to continue the food deliveries 
of the World Food Programme, etc. He also paid visits to local politicians to ask for 
contributions. In that respect, he asserts, Ignacio was very valuable for he established 
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important connections with politicians from the Liberación party. He described Ignacio 
as 
"someone with a strong character and very intelligent. He does a lot for the 
community, handles a lot of information and is very skillful in the way he operates. 
But everything he does he combines with his personal interests. People recognize 
his abilities but everyone knows that he is not an altruist*.3 
Within the settlement, however, there was a deepening conflict between Ignacio and 
Adolfo. The latter was always questioning why he did not work in the fields, why was 
a spring sought in his plot and suggesting that he was only working for his own 
benefit. Moreover, the engineering capabilities of the institution were put in doubt when 
the spring started to empty in dry periods. Juan Manuel comments, 
"In the meetings I supported Ignacio, though never publicly. Not because I liked his 
working style but because he knew how to fix things and had a lot of relevant 
information. For example, he always knew where the tractors of JAPDEVA were, 
which agencies could probably provide help at a given moment. It was to my 
advantage that he was in control of the organization. What is more important, he 
controls the people from higher up, from La Isleta". 
His alliance with Ignacio was tactical. He did not support him in his efforts to increase 
his power within the community. He was well aware that Ignacio manipulated 
information, and people. In the beginning Ignacio would make regular comments to the 
effect that some of the leaders in Las Delicias were communists, but as Juan Manuel 
did not react he stopped doing that. 
Also Juan Manuel recalled that some time ago Ignacio had offered to construct an 
aqueduct from another nearby village called La Perla, located midway between La Isleta 
and Guácimo, to Ignacio's house in Guácimo. Ignacio guaranteed that he could provide 
the labour from the evangelical villagers. Such a proposal, Juan Manuel argued, was 
rather advantageous for him, for in this way they could lay many kilometres of pipes 
and service various communities. He was seriously considering it, for he considered 
that Ignacio was a good person to work with. The only problem was, how to avoid 
playing his game? And he added, "For that reason I consider Ignacio a necessary evil". 
8.4 Enrolment in Practice: The Case of the Preacher 
In this book I attempt to develop a notion of strategy which corresponds more to the 
idea of agency, of the ability of social actors to take a stand vis-a-vis a conflictive 
problematic (such as state intervention) with a view of manipulating it, accommodating 
to it, or resisting it. Such a strategy might, depending on the situation, be generated by 
local knowledge, or it might be more or less the result of a search for new social forms. 
The latter, I think is the case in frontier areas such as Las DeliciaS and La Isleta were 
3lgnacio was also known as a notorious womanizer. Many settlers suspected he was after their 
daughters and wives. 
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the force of 'tradition' appears to be less strong that in other more established places. 
It is in such contexts that a manipulative strategy for dealing with the state thrives. 
It has been argued that a strategy for dealing with the state includes, besides 
practical knowledge and the development of a particular way of talking about interests, 
the ability to ensure the commitment of other social actors for a particular project, 
cause or goal. This ability I have designated enrolment. Accordingly in the remainder of 
the chapter I focus on how Ignacio becomes the spokesman of people in the frontier by 
1 . developing a way of talking about the interests of settlers and 2. developing 
practices of enroling people by drawing upon and expanding a variety of social 
networks. 
In presenting a life history of Ignacio I focus on how he mobilizes people, works 
on his reputation and establishes networks with a view to consciously penetrating the 
bureaucracy. I draw on several lengthy conversations and taped interviews I had with 
Ignacio in the settlements, in his church and while driving him to government offices in 
the Atlantic Zone and San José. Although the perpective is his, I try to place some 
issues within a broader context. 
Ignach's arrival in La Isleta 
Ignacio arrived in the Atlantic Zone in 1980. He was in search of a farm in the 
neighborhood of Guâpiles. For that purpose he visited a few friends, evangelicals like 
himself, from his home-region, Nicoya-Guanacaste, expecting that they would orient 
him a little. In spite of their help he did not succeed as most farms were too expensive. 
Consequently he decided to return to San José. In the bus station a man approached 
him enquiring whether he was interested in buying land. Ignacio explained that he had 
been looking for a farm that would not be in the lowlands as he dreaded the 
inundations. This man had a cheap farm on the slopes of the mountains in 
Tierragrande-lsleta. Ignacio stayed in Guâpiles and the next day went to see the 
location. He liked it and bought it. 
Ignacio had been working as a salesman in San José, but for reasons which are 
not clear to me he resigned. He was living off his savings. His 'only' responsibility at 
the moment he came to the Atlantic Zone was his church in Desamparados (a suburb in 
San José). His motive for going into farming was a very common one in Costa Rica; 
that of leaving to his children some property in the form of land suitable for cultivation. 
He was not devoid of means as his previous wife had left him a few rented houses. His 
idea was that he wanted to start a new life and do as his grandfather had done, who 
had had to struggle hard to build up a small capital.4 
Some days later he took his wife to see the land. They walked all day to her 
despair. On arriving they met a young couple, Joaqufn Azofeifa and his pregnant wife. 
It appeared that they had arrived the day before and were on their way back to buy 
some household implements and farming tools. Ignacio asked him then to stay a few 
days and help him to sow beans in return for cash. Joaqufn immediately agreed. 
Joaqufn had already converted to evangelism and would become a close friend and 
supporter. In those times there were only three families living in La Isleta. Most of the 
settlers were single men, living a simple and lonely life. Agriculture was practised for 
self-consumption. Besides beans and tubers, some sugar cane and maize was grown. 
4lgnacio,however, was viewed by other people as someone with a peasant background. His dark 
complexion showed that he came from the impoverished region of Guanacaste. Although he was verbally 
very skilled and he was well-versed in the use of biblical language he made the same kind of grammatical 
errors typical of common peasant idiom. 
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Initially, however, there was little contact between the communities as there was no 
path connecting them. People would reach the place through the neighbouring 
settlement of Los Linos. 
On seeing that the area was very sparsely inhabited Ignacio made efforts to 
recruit some families as new "vecinos" (neighbours). Thus, he persuaded two more 
evangelical families from San José to move to the area. Of these two new settlers one 
would become, according to Ignacio, very important for the development of the 
community, thanks to his organizational abilities. After living 5 years in the settlement 
he sold his farm at a profit and left for San José to provide his children with better 
educational opportunities. 
Ignacio recalls that on one occasion the communist union leader of Tierragrande-
Macadamia, Diego Casas, visited him attempting to convince him to participate in his 
peasant union. He made it clear to him that he did not sympathize with that sort of 
movement and that his goals, as an evangelical, and as a man of peace, were different 
ones. From then on, he argues, there was little communication between the two 
sectors. 
Thus, instead of working through political organizations for attracting state 
resources, they set up a "chain of buyers and sellers" of plots with the aim of 
attracting as many valuable elements for the community as possible. In this way, a 
policy of settler's selection was developed by which many "old" settlers sold and many 
new ones arrived. Consequently, only five of the original settlers out of twenty stayed. 
Plot owners who did not live in the settlement and who did not contribute to communal 
works by providing labour or money, were "advised" to sell to prospective settlers. 
Ignacio himself acted as an intermediary in the purchase of plots. As he asserts, 
"We had a policy of selection targeting people who were not conformists but had a 
strong drive for development. There were on the settlement many people, some 
very good neighbours, but without projects, without incentives. Hence we 
proceeded to talk to them, discretely and as subtly as possible, in order not to 
offend them, to suggest to them that it was better that they sell and look for a job. 
That way we succeeded in persuading a lot to leave". 
One of the first new owners was a doctor called Allen. As he would not qualify before 
the IDA, someone else was registered as the official owner. This person was very 
cooperative and contributed by giving a lot of money to the community. Sometimes he 
would participate in the meetings. Unfortunately, he was offered a job in a clinic in the 
U.S.A. and left. Also an agronomist from a banana plantation, who by chance came to 
the area to hunt, was offered a plot. This man gave the settlers a lot of agronomic 
recommendations about which crops to grow. For that purpose he made various soil 
studies. In addition a plot was sold to a lawyer who, according to Ignacio, later would 
become governor in Nicoya-Guanacaste, (Ignacio's place of origin). "It was always our 
intention to attract influential people", said Ignacio, "who could help us overcome 
ongoing problems in the community and set up new projects". 
However, unlike Tierragrande-Macadamia (see Chapter 7), where the union 
followed a policy against land speculation, no tax was levied on the purchase of plots. 
In respect to this Ignacio argued, 
"We would never do something like that. The people who left were entitled to 
receive the full amount a buyer was ready to pay. Some of these had been living 
here for years and had contributed to the construction of the road under very 
difficult circumstances. So, we helped them to get the highest possible price. That 
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was also in our interest as it demonstrated that communal projects increased the 
value of the plots". 
Thus, Ignacio and his allies stimulated the emergence of a land market as an incentive 
to owners to contribute to communal projects. 
The history of the communal organizations 
Although Ignacio was actively involved in communal affairs he was not a leading 
member of the first "development committee". His continuous absence made it difficult 
for him to attend the meetings. The committee had been set up jointly with another 
sector of the Tierragrande settlement, Los Lirios. That was before Ignacio arrived. The 
president was a preacher from that place and its first settler. Ignacio was fiscal or 
controller of the committee. Soon, however, there were problems as the preacher from 
Los Lirios wanted to channel all available resources to his sector. The joint committee 
fell apart due to a conflict over a tractor which was made available by JAPDEVA and 
which was put to work in Los Lirios. From then on it was decided that La Isleta would 
operate autonomously. 
Subsequently, a second committee was established. However, there were 
problems within the committee of a personal type between Ignacio, who was soon 
voted vice-president, and the committee's president. Ignacio, who was now living with 
his wife in the settlement, recalls how this man, Anastasio G6mez, "a man of low 
education and bad manners, who never before had worked in a committee 
whatsoever", started to operate in a very unpleasant way against him. Ignacio, then, 
decided to retreat from the committee and "let him do his job". According to Ignacio, 
Anastasio G6mez was not very successful because of his "bad style". He quarelled 
with various functionaries and therefore the institutions closed their doors to the 
committee. However, I learnt that the problem with the G6mez family, had a particular 
background. To begin with, they were the only catholics remaining there, since many 
other families had been converted by the preachers (the leader of Los Lirios and 
Ignacio) and new evangelical families settled. Second, there was a conflict over land in 
which both Ignacio and Anastasio Gomez were involved. Anastasio G6mez had arrived 
at the settlement on a shareholding agreement with an absentee owner. 
Around the same time Ignacio had arranged for the sale of a plot to a man called 
Sileski, a functionary of ICE, the Costa Rican Electricity Company. In view of the fact 
that the Gomez family had insufficient land, an arrangement was struck between 
Sileski, also an absentee owner, and Anastasio Gomez in which it was stipulated that 
Sileski would cede half of his plot in return for the clearing of the whole farm. Some 
time later Anastasio G6mez disavowed the agreement arguing that he had never 
received the promised help (in food, seed and tools). This was a rather annoying turn 
for Ignacio who had hoped to accelerate the establishment of electricity by having a 
representative of the institution in the community. In addition, Ignacio argued, that 
Sileski was an engineer who contributed much to the community through money and 
was always ready to use his influence. 
Soon afterwards, this second committee was terminated, and a new one was 
formed with the participation of Ignacio and some of the leaders of Las Delicias. One of 
Ignacio's first tasks was to negotiate the supply of petrol for the motor saws needed to 
finish the building of a mountain pathway connecting Las Delicias with La Isleta. This 
path shortened the distance to the main road considerably. This proved a very hard job 
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which was carried out by only 10 settlers. Ignacio coordinated the project, thus laying 
the basis for a reputation as an able leader.5 
Establishing a wider reputation 
All this time Ignacio was busy establishing relationships within the local municipalities. 
In 1986 he moved to a house outside Guacimo in front of the road leading to the 
Tierragrande settlement. The position of that house would prove highly strategic since 
functionaries dealing with La Isleta would pass by his house to discuss things with him, 
and then decide whether it was worth while to undertake the trip. Also from there he 
could take all necessary bureaucratic steps. He was soon considered the representative 
for the various sectors of this and other settlements and villages by various 
functionaries. 
His reputation, as representative of La Isleta and other frontier communities, was 
established during a conflict between the rural communities and the municipality over 
the right to exploit timber. The history was the following: the municipality had decided 
not to extend more permits for transporting timber from the settlements to the 
sawmills. This permit is extended on condition that the earnings will be spent on 
communal projects (roads). In addition, the forestry service of the Ministry of 
Agriculture undertakes a study before extending a second permit for exploiting timber 
on a plot. (This is done in order to avoid the deforestation of river-beds and slopes). 
By this drastic measure the municipalities were trying to stop the alarming pace 
of deforestation in that area. So the communities were informed. This caused much 
alarm among settlers as timber is the first commodity they can exploit while clearing 
their land for agriculture. In addition timber exploitation provides the community with 
an important resource for road-building. The communities saw this measure as a very 
arbitrary one which, in their view, amounted to a check on their development. 
Moreover, they reacted with indignation to the prospect of watching the timber from 
clearing their land rot on their plots. 
Ignacio played an important role in this conflict by presenting himself as the 
spokesman of the communities. At a meeting, with massive participation by settlers, 
which took place in the municipality, he voiced the cc mmunities' concerns and argued, 
with much verbal skill, that since the permits had already been signed it was illegal not 
to confirm them. Thereafter a delegation, headed by gnacio, went to the office of the 
Ministry of Agriculture in Siquirres. And, after consulting with the central offices the 
decision was taken to revoke the measure. This was considered an important success 
for the communities, since it created a precedent for hem. According to Ignacio, since 
then, he had been considered by the municipalities as the legitimate representative for 
that area. Henceforth, among other things, he was put in control of the distribution of 
food by the World Food Programme. 
Establishing networks within institutions 
His experiences with state agencies and ministries was rather different. In fact, when 
he bought the plot he did not know that it was located on an IDA settlement. At the 
time he only vaguely knew about its existence. This changed, however, as establishing 
a relationship with this institution proved crucial, not only for acquiring a legal title but 
T h e president of the former committee, Anastasio Gómez, argues that he and his sons provided most 
labour and that his motor saw was damaged. He became very frustrated when noticing that Ignacio got all 
the honours, while nobody showed any interest in paying for the repair of the motor saw. After that he 
retreated from any form of communal cooperation. 
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also for gaining access to a number of state services (bank credit on easy terms). He 
set about doing this while he was still living in San José. One important contact he 
made was the Head of the Department of Titling, Alfredo Villegas (who came from the 
same area in Guanacaste). He dealt with problems relating to the issue of titles in the 
community directly with him. He claims they established a personal friendship. 
Ignacio approached the IDA by presenting himself as an evangelical, a Christian, 
"a man of God, of peace and mindful of the truth". As he states, 
"When there is a problem I insist on talking to the people who can help me. To 
that effect I investigate who takes the decisions. Sometimes, when I come into a 
waiting room I am referred to a subordinate. In that case I tell the secretary no, I 
came to talk seriously, I need solutions, I need more than to be listened to, for I 
represent an entire community. If the secretary says that the Chief is not available 
I ask her when he will be and if that is not today I tell her that I will return as many 
times as necessary to meet him. In this way I always succeed in obtaining an 
appointment. 
He used not to deal with IDA'S Regional Office, which previously was located in 
Bataan, because of their "negligence". He would go directly to the headquarters in San 
José. Little by little he started opening doors. But, the most important encounter he 
had was the first one, with the previous Executive President, Don Antonio Salgado. He 
recalls that when he went to his office the secretary told him that he could only talk 
with the President after officialy applying for an audience. Ignacio replied that he did 
not mind waiting and that he had family in San José he could stay with if necessary. If 
needed he could wait until closing hours. As the secretary observed that don Antonio 
had no fixed programme Ignacio answered that he would wait until he came out of his 
room. However, as he suspected that Don Antonio could leave through a back door he 
inquired which car was his and waited for him there. Ignacio describes his conversation 
with the Executive President of the IDA as follows, 
"I needed to talk to him about the road. They had machines and tractors, often idle 
or in need of repair because of bad maintenance, but we needed these, because 
we had to produce to live. Later, before closing time someone approached the car. 
He asked me who I was. I answered that I was the person needing to talk to Don 
Antonio Salgado. He said, I am Antonio Salgado. I told him that I had to talk to 
him, no matter where, there on the sidewalk or in his office, wherever he 
preferred. Then he invited me to enter his office. There I explained to him the 
problem, that we were building a road, the first one, and that we needed a tractor 
and petrol. We would provide the labour and take charge of other costs. So, if he 
could give us the tractor we would finish that road. He consulted the head of road 
construction who informed him that there was no tractor available in the Atlantic 
zone. Thus he offered to supply the diesel. He said, my friend I cannot provide a 
tractor but be confident that you will get as much petrol as you need. Before 
leaving I asked Don Antonio Salgado for a signed declaration that he committed 
himself to provide the petrol before a specific date. That way, I explained to him, it 
would become easier to arrange a tractor from JAPDEVA. 
After much pressure they got a tractor from JAPDEVA. Also they received additional 
petrol from the IDA, from the MOPT and from JAPDEVA. Thus they had a large surplus 
of petrol. 
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"I thought that we had to be responsible in the use of resources and I went to the 
IDA and spoke to the Head of the Infrastructural Department, Misael Barva. I told 
him that since we did not need all the petrol we would return ft, so that another 
community could make use of it. He was amazed and said to me that it was the 
first time this had happened to him. Usually every settlement was demanding and 
demanding without ever seeking cooperation with others. Afterwards I had a very 
good relationship with this man, who by the way also comes from Guanacaste. 
From that moment onwards, he says, | he received much support from the central 
departments of the IDA. When possible they would lend a truck for transporting sand, 
etc. His relationship with Don Antonio Salgado proved to be decisive for the 
construction of the road. Once Ignacio met him in the institution and Don Antonio 
Salgado told him that soon a few functionaries of the World Bank would come to 
discuss the establishment of projects in the Atlantic zone. He said to Ignacio that they 
might be able to do something for his settlement. Ignacio immediately showed interest 
and it was agreed that these functionaries would visit La Isleta in their trip to the 
Atlantic zone. But, they did not reach La Isleta as the road was too bad. Then, 
according to Ignacio they promised to help with specially adapted technology and with 
the road. So far, they had been given no notice about the former but the construction 
of the road had been budgetted for. 
However, they did not wait until the money was released before again working 
on the road. They got a tractor from JAPDEVA again, three times one from the MPT 
(the Ministry of Public Works), and once one from the CNP (the marketing board). 
Ignacio claims that he himself arranged the necessary construction plans, for which he 
got help from the engineer in the settlement. In addition he arranged for the documents 
required by the municipality. He was congratulated by JAPDEVA for the neat way it 
had been done. 
Previous experiences with community struggles 
Ignacio was able to build upon his prior experience with local authorities. He already 
had some experience in community work in San José since 1974. In the locality where 
he lived. Desamparados, there were many streets without sewers or gutters. He 
worked outside the existing local organizations. That led to a conflict between his 
church group and the local Development Association whose president complained that 
the Municipality was providing his group more material than their Association. Ignacio's 
answer was that the reason why they had taken over was that the Association had not 
been able to put the people to work. Finally, a decision was taken to set up joint 
working groups on Sundays for laying the gutters. Although the conflict continued they 
were, according to him, successful in most of their goals, like asphalting the road. 
Also, in 1978 he bought a few properties in San José, one of them on the border 
of the city where there was no street, nor sewers. In fact he was not able to buy it 
legally. Ignacio took a risk and again began to fight with the municipality. He did so by 
advocating the demands and needs of other vecinos (neighbours). With the help of a 
lawyer he had his, and other squatter's plots, measured and registered in the Land 
Registry Office. Later, in the Atlantic zone, in Guácimo, he would follow the same 
strategy. 
So far we see that an important tactic in Ignacio's operation style consists of 
taking advantage of divisions in communal organizations and institutions to negotiate 
new arrangements which are favourable to the group of people he, at the moment, 
happens to represent. Ignacio, in fact, works with people who are not incorporated into 
the corporativist administrative system, and is very skilled in voicing their needs: in 
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developing a language for talking about their interests. At the same time he sets out to 
cultivate a wide social network within institutions, local political arenas, etc. His 
greatest asset is his capacity to put people - whether settlers or bureaucrats - to work, 
to enrol them within his projects. As I argue next, this is his basis of power. 
Networks and Ignacio's social bases of power 
When talking of evangelical churches in the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica we should 
differentiate between the churches established by the black population forming part of 
the Jamaican religious tradition, and the recent, revivalist and charismatic sects. One 
could argue that many members of these sects belong to the poorer and less influential 
sectors of the community. They also include secretaries, teachers and low-level 
bureaucrats. Yet, I never met political characters or middle-level functionaries, or staff 
employees of banana companies, belonging to these churches. One impression I had of 
people belonging to Ignacio's new church in Pocora (on the lowlands) was its 
egalitarianism and the modesty of its members. The church itself was in the process of 
being built, the labour provided by church members. It was not much more than a row 
of benches in front of a table under a thatched roof. 
One common theme in the conversation between evangelicals, and in the 
preaching of Ignacio, was the struggle against the "vices of the devil". These were 
among others drinking, smoking and sex outside marriage. Ignacio told me various 
stories about people who got into trouble because of alcoholism and converted to the 
church. Although these people would often take up again liquor for periods, the church 
provided the much needed support and social control to overcome the vice. 
Also, within these church groups knowledge about each others' personal 
problems, social conditions, skills and economic opportunities circulates. Furthermore, 
through the church close bonds are created between people, of an emotional and 
supportive type, leading to the formation of a moral community. This moral community, 
although egalitarian in ideology and outlook is rather diversified in terms of social and 
occupational background (which can vary a lot in a colonization area), property (land, 
houses), sex, organizational experience, etc. Furthermore, the church displays an 
internal service hierarchy depending on length of membership and degree of 
commitment. In this way socio-emotional involvement in the church and respect for its 
rules are rewarded by a considerable degree of prestige and a good reputation. 
Though I did not investigate the subject I heard of many cases of cooperative 
behaviour and special trust relationships. And whatever else, the church provides 
people with organizational resources based on the potentiality to mobilize people, 
influence, and material resources; thus supplying the 'raw material' for the constitution 
of social networks. 
Ignacio would play an important role as an intermediary in the enactment of such 
a church-based social network. He passed on information about members who wanted 
to sell or purchase land, about available jobs and of people in need of money. If asked, 
he would give his opinion about the reputation of a particular member or would pass 
information about the readiness of a widow to lend money, etc. Such functions of 
intermediation not only occured within the local range but also involved members of 
other churches affiliated all over the zone. 
In fact, as we have seen, Ignacio was highly skilled in utilizing social networks; 
the recruitment policy in the settlements being the most obvious one. Also on our trips 
Ignacio would point out to me many people, members of his church who were active as 
small cattle traders, traders in land. Sometimes he would tell me about the quick 
transactions he made buying and selling (often timber), while making a rapid profit. 
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Within the church community in the Atlantic zone Ignacio was considered as 
someone who had skills in dealing with food and water programmes. His reputation as 
a defender of communal rights helped him to get a position as preacher in Pocora, the 
latest village he has moved to. Again, he did not move to the centre but to the border 
of the village were houses do not have water and electricity, where he established his 
church. Indeed, one of his first initiatives, there, was a programme for the construction 
of an aqueduct in the outskirts of Pocora. 
8.5 Conclusion 
In reflecting upon Ignacio and the social worker, Juan Manuel, it strikes us that they 
have something in common, Ignacio by dealing with state institutions, and Juan Manuel 
with peasant communities have developed a large body of relevant knowledge that 
helps them to lay out a style of operation, helping them to sort out concrete, everyday 
problems that hinder the progress of a project. By becoming committed to the aqueduct 
they developed a pragmatic understanding, or practical knowledge, of what the 
interests of the "community", of the "institution", and of themselves were. In the case 
of Ignacio, thanks to this project, his reputation as the representative of the poor was 
established, and he developed a very rare type of expertise regarding aqueduct 
projects. In addition we see that he skilfully made use of his previous experiences in 
dealing with state institutions and his position as a preacher to strengthen his position 
within the community. Juan Manuel accepted this project as a challenge in an effort to 
develop ways to combine his tasks with the provision of a crucial service to distant, 
resourceless communities. The moment that he is accused of identifying too much with 
the "peasants", he reacts by arguing that like technical knowledge, social knowledge is 
only applicable when a good understanding is attained of local conditions. In the 
process Ignacio and Juan Manuel strike a tactical alliance to gain access to the 
resources needed to finish the project. 
They were quite successful in that respect. Thanks to the help of Juan Manuel 
and by deploying an anti-communist discourse of 'citizenship', and suggesting that he 
controls a large population of poor, but peaceful people (and votes), Ignacio gains 
access to scarce institutional resources. However, the capacity to use those resources 
required him to coordinate their use, in the right combinations at the right moment. Yet, 
he was only able to draw directly upon a relatively small number of settlers (13 out of 
30-40). Accordingly, he had to convince his rivals, and other settlers who were 
suspicious of him, that only by following his style of operation was it possible to 
terminate the project. 
On the other hand, Juan Manuel used various means (threats of stopping the 
project, the letter), to induce the settlers to continue the \)vork at a juncture in which 
most participants were doubting the sense of it, while putting at risk his own reputation 
within the institution. 
Success, however, had not the same meaning for all fjhe actors. It is clear that all 
the participants saw the project as their accomplishment 
However, the old leftist leaders, despite their commitment, 
and were proud of it. 
lost part of their reputation 
as Ignacio was able to monopolize the relations with outside agencies. Ignacio was 
successful in projecting himself at the inauguration as the 
Yet, although people respected him he never became 
'brain" behind the project, 
an undisputed leader in 
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Isleta/Delicias. He chose to move to a larger place, Pocora, where he could pursue his 
involvement in local organisations with his activities as a preacher. 
The old leaders, and with them a majority of the participants, had mixed feelings 
concerning Juan Manuel. They never saw him as someone committed to the 
community and resented his close relationship to Ignacio. Doubts persisted about the 
choice of the spring in Ignacio's plot, and of its water-bearing capacity. Even 
nowadays, there are still plans to divide the project. However, as Baltazar, one of the 
leftist communal leaders once commented, 
"Progress is not like a party, what counts is not whether we quarrel and call names 
to each other; what counts is what we can leave to our children. We have learnt a 
lot from this project. It has shown us that through cooperation we can do 
everything. It is a common accomplishment and for that reason I am opposed to its 
division". 
In the discussion I argued that in order to gain a fuller understanding of how 
intervention is appropriated by settlers it is necessary to examine how social actors 
develop ways for talking about local interests, as well as how they use practical 
knowledge as to the functioning of the bureaucracy, while developing their capacity to 
enrol a diversity of social actors. 
The chapter has shown that this capacity to enrol people is not merely based on 
persuasion, or on the use of a particular discourse. It entails participating in and 
expanding social networks within differing socio-institutional settings. Thus, we see 
that Ignacio finds ways to mobilize settlers in La Isleta, he is also able to establish 
strong personal relationships with officials in a variety of institutions. At the same time 
his enrolment skills are strongly related to his ability to coordinate the use of resources, 
an ability which requires a practical knowledge about how state agencies allocate 
resources. 
Such an approach to studying how farmers deal with the state, I think, sheds 
light on the heterogeneity of the frontier. Thus, given the differential access to 
resources, given the existence of different world-views and given the prevalence of an 
authority structure whose basic legitimacy is seldom contested (the state), people in 
frontier settlements develop a diversity of ways for dealing with the state. Such 
strategies of intervention-coping include among others accommodation to evolving 
forms of state intervention or, conversely, active resistance. In this chapter I attempted 
to show that, depending on the dynamics of the local situation, other ways of 
establishing a connection with the state are possible. Thus manipulation as a strategy 
was described as a way of representing the interests of 'poor', 'marginalized' people in 
the frontier, and practical knowledge about gaining access to and coordinating the use 
of resources, with a view to creating a situation in which a project can be pursued only 
by following one, and only one particular path. As we saw Ignacio became quite skilled 
in the art of enroling people. 
CHAPTER 9 
SOME NOTES FOR A SOCIOLOGY OF INTERVENTION 
9.1 Introduction 
In the course of this work an effort has been made to develop a practice-oriented 
methodology for studying state-peasant relations - as manifested in encounters 
between peasants and the bureaucracy - which takes account of both the contradictory 
effects of state intervention and the socially constructed character of farmers' 
strategies for dealing with state agencies. In the first part of the book the genealogy 
and effects of a particular ideology of intervention was investigated, by focusing on 
rival institutional projects, on the deployment of a model of the client and on how front-
line workers develop styles of operation. In the second pari: of the book the idea that 
farmers develop strategies for coping with intervention was developed by focusing on a 
diversity of social practices farmers engage in when dealing with state activity. In doing 
so intervention and intervention-coping were treated as the outcome of social practices 
and strategies actors develop when involved in a series of sfuggles and negotiations. 
One question that remains, though, is how can a detailed analysis of practices of 
intervention and intervention-coping help us to develop theoretical insights relating to 
wider debates on 'development' thinking. This is a highly the oretical theme upon which 
I touch only schematically, for the reason that 'development thinking' is underpinned by 
a number of, often implicit, assumptions concerning the 'role of the state' and the 
nature and significance of 'development' in relation to rmodernity.'1 It would go 
beyond the scope of this book to discuss these assumptions, but the following 
comments are in place. It would not be a gross exaggeration to divide development 
thinking two main bodies of literature. First, a positivist, modernization, tradition which 
aspires to theoretical generalization and prediction, and which prevails in the planning 
and policy literature. Second, a critical, neo-marxist and political economy tradition 
which sets out to analyse development processes in terms of the conflicting social 
interests of collective actors (classes), or, in a more structural 
structural contradictions arising within a (dominant) mode 
noted that in spite of the differences in epistemology (empiricist or not) and theoretical 
objectives both traditions rely upon a conception of the 
vein, in terms 
of production. It must 
of 
be 
state implying that states 
'There is a fledgleling discussion on this theme between those who believe that the project of 
modernity has not yet been completed (Giddens 1990; Habermas 1987) and those, like Lyotard (1984), 
who celebrate the post-modern condition (see for an interesting review of the whole debate Dews 1990). 
212 Chapter 9 
represent the general interests of society or the particular ones of a collectivity, class, 
system or 'mode'; in short, that they play a principal role in the reproduction of a social 
system. Similarly, both traditions in development thinking hold to a realist conception of 
social process, as manifesting a logic of its own, and accordingly determining, 
constraining or shaping the actions of people. Development as a social process, then, is 
viewed as having a reality of its own, with a telos, or implicit objective. One result of 
such a realist conception of social process as applied to the study of the state is that a 
clear demarcation is made between the state and civil society, to the detriment of the 
study of localized relationships between sets of actors holding to different social and 
institutional projects (Migdal, 1988; see Skocpol, 1985, for a research agenda based on 
a state-centred perspective; and Arce, Villareal and de Vries, forthcoming, for a critique 
of state-centred approaches). 
The analysis in this book has eschewed sociological realism in respect to notions 
of the state and social process. The view of the state adopted has been a Foucauldian 
one (1971), inasmuch it is not conceived of as an entity with a comprehensive or 
unified rationality.2 Instead I have focussed on patterns of authority as manifested in 
manager's institutional projects, in localized practices of social control, in rationalities 
and ideologies of institutional functioning and attendant ways of conceiving of the 
targets of state activity (as beneficiaries, clients), as implied in the concept of 
institution-client relations. Accordingly, the analysis has not been focussed on what the 
state does to peasants and vice-versa, but on how particular conceptions of 
institutional-client, or state-peasant, relations are constructed, appropriated and 
transformed by a variety of social actors. The aim was that of analysing how modes of 
action, practices of social control and strategies for dealing with intervention emerge; 
not as the outcome of a logic of state action, but as the result of a set of struggles 
between a number of actors wielding different forms of power. 
In the remainder of this chapter the various theoretical and ethnographic 
arguments are pulled together. First, the ethnographic argument will be summarized. 
Second, I lay out the rationale for not choosing other theoretical approaches which at 
first sight might have seemed relevant to a study of state-peasant relations. Third, a 
few theoretical issues central to a sociology of intervention and intervention-
appropriation are further elaborated. Four, I compare my approach with others which 
also draw upon post-structuralist thinking. 
9.2 Summarizing the Argument 
The 034 programme I focussed on aimed to introduce modern and efficient modes of 
coordination and decision making procedures. The USAID planners held the view that in 
order to break the prevailing institutional (political) culture it was necessary to introduce 
a modern kind of non-political type of institution-beneficiary relationship. The current 
practice up to then was that each department in the capital city would send its 
personnel to the field. In view of the large autonomy of the departments and sections 
and the political rationale of so many activities this led to clientelistic relationships 
between political entrepreneurs in the institution and groups of beneficiaries in 
2Foucault's work on governmentality has given rise to interesting research on state intervention in the 
area of economics, law, health, etc. See the book edited by Burchell, Gordon and Miller (1991) which has 
been aptly named the Foucault effect. 
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of fissiparious tendencies 
endured. In short, politics 
settlements all over the country. As a result a multiplicity 
prevailed within the IDA and conflicting (political) loyalties 
permeated all institutional activity. 
Drawing upon a particular model of the client whiih was introduced by the 
USAID planners which conceived of the beneficiary as a cliont who has to be provided 
with a comprehensive package of services in order to become an entrepreneurial 
farmer, Don Roberto, the Project Implementation Manager of the IDA, set out to 
establish an institutional project geared to carrying through a strict separation between 
policy, including political management, and implementation. According to this 
the regional level, and the 
the activities of the central 
responsible regional offices 
pline with regard to the 
institutional project implementation should be organized at 
regional directors should be the pivotal figures coordinating 
departments. Hence, Don Roberto Arcos argued that through regional decentralization 
more control over the settlement area and a better grip on trie colonization problematic 
would be attained. In his view only by creating strong and 
was it possible to foster the sort of institutional disc i 
management of resources that could stop the prevaling practice of politicians using the 
institution as an electoral instrument and a vaca lechera {a C D W to milk). 
Don Roberto's institutional project was confronted with a series of vested 
interests which were opposed to his scheme of regional decentralization. The result 
was that he became engaged in a longlasting struggle with a broad coalition of 
department heads and bureaucrats with political ambitions. This struggle was 
underpinned by the enduring persistence of two other institutional projects, each with a 
distinct conception of the role of the IDA within the existing Costa Rican institutional 
system, a conception of the interrelation between the problem of landlessness and 
national 'development, and a particular view of the farmer as a beneficiary. In short, 
the IDA's functioning was analysed in terms of compelition within the following 
institutional projects: an anti-interventionist, a populi st/incorporationist and a 
transformationalist one. It was also argued, drawing upon :he work of Shifter (1983, 
1986), that these conflicting projects drew upon differing interpretations of the 
historical project of Liberación Nacional, the political party which lies at the cradle of 
most institutions in Costa Rica. 
The conclusion of Chapter 2 was that a focus on institutional projects provided 
an alternative way for understanding the functioning of the IDA, but threw little light on 
the actual dynamics of intervention. This was apparent in the incongruity between the 
world of policy and management and the world of the I O C Í I I bureaucracy. And it was 
argued that it was at the level of implementation that intervention practices and 
ideologies were fashioned. Examining the latter entailed studying the knowledge 
interfaces between the local bureaucracy and IDA beneficiaries. 
Focusing on implementation interfaces 
As argued throughout this book there was a hidden agenda behind the 034 programme, 
which can also be viewed as an attempt in the late 1970s to control a situation in the 
Atlantic zone of Costa Rica which was perceived by the stare and USAID as explosive. 
In Chapter 3, I discussed the administrative process in, and around, the regional office 
of Neguev. It was shown that the contingent and fragmented nature of the local 
administration provided the context in which settlers were 
"cases" by the officials. In this chapter a particular, bureaucratic, way of talking about 
settlers was examined which was imbued with stereotyped images of them as 'lazy', 
'conservative' and in need of education. In the administrative domain, settlers were 
treated in a uniform way and in accordance with common bureaucratic procedures. 
labelled and processed as 
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while little interest was paid to their particular situations. In addition, social interaction 
between front-line workers was characterized by little effective solidarity and the 
prevalence of 'petty' issues such as complaints over allowances, gossip, etc., in their 
thinking, while conformity to what I called a given ideology of intervention, 
encompassing a set of beliefs concerning the 'nature of the farmer' and labelling and 
legitimization practices, seemed to be the rule. One thing was sure, a 'taboo' prevailed 
on addressing major issues which had to do with the problems and contradictions of 
state intervention. It was also argued that the ideology of intervention was shaped 
through the local appropriation and transformation of the model of the client developed 
by USAID planners into a model of the 'undeserving client'. 
However, limiting the research to the administrative domain would have led to an 
analysis in terms of labelling practices and the alienated attitude of front-line workers 
as suggested by Lipsky (1980). When I started accompanying field workers to the field 
I encountered a very different reality from that of the administrative setting: that of 
very personalized relationships between the officials and the settlers taking place in the 
informal context of the latter's farms. Thus chapter 4 discussed what I designated the 
client-official interface in which I encountered a reality which was rather different from 
that of the settlement office. In the field, in contrast to the administrative domain, the 
front-line workers were subjected to the unrelenting criticisms of clients, while at the 
same time having to ensure the settlers' compliance with programme requirements. By 
focusing on the client-official interface in the field domain it was possible to view how 
front-line workers were exposed to two different kinds of pressures: those of 
accommodative settlers who employed an idiom of clientelism, and those of radical 
settlers who doubted their honesty and capabilities. The result was that front-line 
workers were often forced to negotiate their legitimacy as state bureaucrats, while 
being confronted with the contradictions and limitations of state intervention. This 
ocurred when they were involved in local problems which were related to wider policy 
and political issues. It must be said that some front-line workers were more committed 
than others to the fate of their clients, and this was reflected in their differing 
operational styles. Some front-line workers, such as the agraristas, were ready to 
internalize the ideology of intervention in such a way that they became the life-
embodiment of the state. This, it was argued, was not a logical concomitant of the 
ideology of state intervention but the result of a process of accommodation by such 
front-line workers. On the other hand, the contingencies of dealing with "unruly 
peasants" offered other front-line workers, such as Mario Green (the social worker) and 
the técnico Samuel Lozano a high degree of discretion which they could employ for 
developing ways of dealing with settlers which were in accordance with the broader 
set of pressures and commitments that impinged upon their bureaucratic functioning. 
It appeared, then, that administrative labelling practices were not capable of 
obscuring the political nature of implementation. Thus we saw in Chapter 4 that front-
line workers were impelled to draw upon modes of legitimization when dealing with 
farmers in the personalized context of the farmer's farms. The irony of the whole story 
is that the attempt to restructure institution-client relations along non-clientelistic lines 
led to the resurgence of a new mode of dependency by settlers on functionaries. Thus 
the previous form of political clientelism gave way to bureaucratic clientelism. Neither 
was the relationship between the IDA and the settlers depoliticized. Instead a new kind 
of politics, one which revolved around the power of intervention emerged. 
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Appropriating state intervention 
As suggested, massive state intervention in Neguev was not successful in imposing a 
standardized mode of institution-client relations. In Neguev as in Tierragrande, the other 
settlement where I did research and which experienced a less massive form of 
intervention, it was possible to distinguish several opposing factions among the settler 
population. There were settlers who, for differing reasons, were ready to accommodate 
to IDA intervention, radicals who were highly suspicious o1 the depoliticizing goals of 
state intervention, and individuals who were highly skilled in taking advantage of 
conflicts at the interface of community and bureaucracy. It was argued that peasant 
strategies for dealing with state intervention can exhibit a variety of forms which range 
from 'opportunistic' forms of accommodation (gatekeeping!, to endeavours to create 
tactical distance from the IDA (autonomy-enhancement), to open resistance and 
manipulation. 
In Chapter 6 the Asociation of Small Producers of Neguev was described and it 
was concluded that in spite of the support and commit nent of IDA through one 
tecnico, Samuel Lozano, it was not able to build a broaJ basis among the settler 
population and thus become a representative organisation. One principal reason for this 
was that it was torn apart by two rival conceptions or how to deal with state 
intervention. Thus there were those loyalists, some of whom became the gatekeepers, 
who developed ways of maintaining their preferential access to state personnel, while 
holding to key functions in the farmer's association. Then thsre were more independent 
settlers who attempted to reshape the farmer's association us a more independent tool 
for negotiation with the state over credit conditions, etc. 
In applying the concept of intervention-coping in its threefold dissagregation (talk 
of interests, practical knowledge and enrolment practices) it was concluded that 
autonomy-enhancement as a strategy was not successful in the Milano sector due to 
the reluctance of the new president, Miguel Huerta, to draw upon the discourse of 
community in his struggles for reshaping the Association. Such a discourse of 
community, so far, had been shaped by radical Upagristn settlers in their struggle 
against the authoritarian and marginalizing effects of the 034 programme. Hence, 
talking about community issues was associated with attempts to politicize the 
relationship with IDA. 
Miguel Huerta was not able to convince the new beneficiaries of the new 
agricultural development programmes of the centrality of trie Association, due to his 
unwillingness to address, within the context of the Association, a number of basic 
organisational questions which had to do with the lack of local organisation for 
maintaining and improving the existing community infrastxicture. Due to a lack of 
commitment by the other members of the Association's board a number of pressing 
issues concerning the distribution of titles, the reparation of bridges, etc. were not 
tackled, hence giving the opportunity to radical settlers to question the effectiveness of 
the Association as a representative of all producers. In short, the strategy of autonomy-
enhancement was not successful in Milano due to the failue to develop a meaningful 
language of interests which could justify the necessity of establishing a more 
independent relationship with a variety of state agencies (thus not only IDA) in line with 
the new agricultural policy of agricultura de cambio. This entailed developing the 
capacity to enrol potential beneficiaries in the Association who had a different (often 
conflictive) history with the IDA. This in turn implied that a space for public debate be 
opened in which state policy could become the subject of criticisms by unsatisfied 
members. Such a politicization of the Association was inacseptable to Miguel Huerta. 
Unsuccessful enrolment, then, was predicated on the political dangers for basically 
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accommodative farmers of establishing a link between the discourse of community and 
that of agricultural modernization. 
Chapters 7 and 8 contained two case studies taking place in different sectors of 
the neighbouring Tierragrande settlement. In Chapter 7 'resistance' as a strategy for 
dealing with intervention was studied by focusing on how the Neguev officials set off, 
under the resolute leadership of the regional manager, to 'conquer the frontier' from the 
communists. They confronted a peasant leader, Diego Casas, who had strong 
connections with a leftist peasant union, the FENAC. As the news spread around of a 
large regional development programme, a few former partners of the communist 
peasant leader struck an alliance with the regional office with the purpose of 
influencing the future implementation of the programme in the settlement (especially in 
regard to the design of the road and the distribution of land ownership titles). However, 
in spite of all the promises made, IDA was not able to enforce a new mode of local 
organisation which had the support of the whole settlement. Diego Casas, skillfully 
exploiting IDA'S administrators contradictions in their discourse of 
democracy/citizenship, left the responsibility of local organisation to the rival 
development committee and, after predicting (rightly) that without the involvement of 
his own committee local organisation would collapse, he was able to regain the 
initiative.3 In this chapter it was possible to view how discursive practices of 
'democracy' and 'community' are deployed in local negotiations. 
In chapter 8 practices of enrolment were the focal point of analysis. The chapter, 
therefore, did not focus so much on discourse but on how enrolment is accomplished 
by a charismatic preacher, Ignacio, in competition with other community leaders. The 
case study discussed a water provision project in which Ignacio played a central role. In 
drawing upon upon the idioms of anti-communism, peaceful evangelism and progress 
he was able to attract state resources to the settlement community, while furthering 
his own entrepreneurial aspirations. Furthermore, by establishing a tactical alliance with 
Juan Manuel, the social worker of the rural acqueduct agency, he was able to gain 
control of the aqueduct project, and by drawing upon a complex social network - one 
he had been working on since his arrival in the Atlantic zone - he was able to play a 
pivotal role in the project. Indeed, Ignacio developed a rare knowledge about the 
workings of the 'development' bureaucracy and the predicament of poor settlers in the 
frontier. He became specialized in fostering local projects while combining his own 
personal interests and that of particular - not all - sectors of the community and the 
state bureaucracy. In this way a manipulative strategy of intervention-coping was 
constructed based on the ability to accomplish numerous practical tasks while closing 
off alternative courses of action. 
''Yet, ft must be noted that these were not the only practices for dealing with the state in the Neguev 
and Tierragrande settlements. There were also individuals who developed highly effective ways for 
penetrating the bureaucracy by meddling in political conflicts within the administration and establishing 
conjunctural alliances with different factions at different points in time for personal purposes. Finally, there 
was a large group of evangelicals who, to different degrees, were able to secure a level of autonomy by 
drawing upon their own social networks for exploring alternative modes of access to important resources 
such as credit, land, etc. Furthermore, by keeping aside from the conflictive arenas over state intervention 
without questioning the legitimacy of the state they were able to diminish their vulnerability to worldly 
powers. These practices for dealing with the state have not been discussed in the thesis for lack of space. 
Some notes for a sociology of intervention 217 
9.3 Alternative Approaches to State-Peasant Relations 
It is possible to single out four distinctive analytical perspectives on state-peasant 
relations which are pertinent for the case of the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica: the moral 
economy, the articulation of modes of production, the conmoditization approach and 
the Weberian institutionalization approach. In these approaches the role of the state in 
the reproduction of peasant smallholder production, its destruction, or its subsumption 
to a capitalist mode of production stand central. Underlying each approach are a set of 
assumptions regarding 1) the definition of a petty commodity form of production, a 
of a set of institutional 
reproduction (such as the 
the process of capitalist 
on moral patron-client ties 
peasant way of life, or a peasant rationality in terms 
arrangements which are presumed to be central to its 
peasant household, and a diversity of social forms regulating the distribution and 
exchange of land, labour, produce, monetary and other resources), and 2) assumptions 
regarding the role of 'peasant' forms of production in 
accumulation. 
It is not my intention here to go into a detailed analysis of these approaches and 
their underlying assumptions. Instead I lay out how the research strategies suggested 
by these perspectives differed from the approach I chose. 
The moral economy perspective (James Scott 1976, 
within a moral economy contexts. Wolf 1957 on closed corporate communities, see 
also Roseberry 1989 and Mitchell 1990 for two recent critiques of the moral economy 
thesis) seemed at the beginning of the research relevant, 
clientelistic relationships between state officials and settlors/beneficiaries in which a 
moral discourse of rights and obligations played an important role. As argued in Chapter 
1 , holding to such a perspective would have suggested that bureaucrats and 
beneficiaries shared the same cultural framework. However, although the backgrounds 
and life style of most front-line workers did not differ markedly from those of the 
farmers, it appeared that social interaction within the administrative process was 
underwritten by a distinct ideology of intervention. As argued in Chapter 3 and 4, this 
ideology served to sustain a sharp distinction between admi listrative life and the reality 
of peasant life, by generating particular views on agricultural 'development' coupled 
with a model of the client. 
The articulation of modes of production approach (Meillasoux 1972, Taylor, 
1979, Deere and de Janvry 1979; Foweraker 1981) has shown that so-called peasants 
in various parts of the world have of old been involved n capitalist forms (mining, 
plantation agriculture) and it therefore posits that the peasant economy cannot be 
understood without taking into consideration its "articulation" with capitalist modes. In 
the context of the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica this approach reminded me of theoretical 
questions concerning the interlocking dynamics of the plantation and the settlement 
sectors, thereby suggesting a particular conceptualization or the role of the state in the 
reproduction of this dynamic. However, I was interestec in analysing practices of 
intervention and intervention-coping and in documenting hew farmers and bureaucrats 
accord meaning to state intervention so as to construct strategies for accomodating to, 
resisting or manipulating state intervention, rather than studying abstract processes of 
capitalist penetration and their interrelationship with specifb types of peasant Struggle 
and ideology. 
The commoditization approach (Bernstein 1979,1986; Friedmann 1980; 
Goodman and Redclift 1985; Long 1986; Mac Ewen Scott 1986) has made an 
important contribution to the conceptualization of the reproduction of small-scale 
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farms/enterprises by inquiring into the determination of a form of production by the 
interplay of the social forms in which production is organised (intra- and inter-household 
cooperation) and the wider dynamics of the regional, national and global economy. In 
this way differing types of social differentiation can be studied empirically. 
Yet, in doing so, this approach pays little attention to actors' strategies and 
discourse and thereby a view arises of 'commoditization' as a relentless process in 
which the agency of abstract forces is given theoretical primacy. This, in conjunction 
with the tendency to reduce the significance of socio-cultural and political activity to 
their function in these wider processes, impedes a good understanding of organizational 
forms in terms of social practice.4 
Lastly, the Weberian institutionalization approach (Benvenuti and Mommaas 
1985; van der Ploeg 1985) analyzes peasant involvement in modem or capitalist forms 
of economic and political activity as the result of their incorporation within wider legal, 
institutional and technological structures. Though differing in their analysis of the 
precise mechanisms and consequences of such processes, the Weberian rationalization 
approach accords major causal significance to forms of administrative centralization and 
technological standardization (see Benvenuti 1975). 6 Such approaches, although 
according more importance to state-initiated processes than to the role of social 
classes, are similar to the political economy perspective, inasmuch as they accord 
explanatory primacy to external factors impinging upon farmers' lives. 
My assessment of the usefulness of these theories can be summarized as follows. 
When viewed from a distance it seems plausible that conflictive state-peasant relations 
originate in some generalized disaffection, disrupting a local balance of rights and 
obligations as implied in the moral economy approach. Yet when one studies rural 
conflict in more detail, one tends to reject such a Durkheimian view, and the 
understanding of the contradictory interests of the various social categories seems to 
be crucial. One then starts inquiring into the underlying 'structural' reasons for such 
contradictions. Structural approaches such as commoditization and the articulation of 
modes of production appear valid. Yet, when one studies conflict 'on the ground' it 
appears that an analysis in terms of structural contradiction is not capable of throwing 
light on the diverging commitments and modes of action which peasants display in a 
diversity of local struggles. It appears that farmers' social interests cannot be logically 
derived from some theory of peasant economy or collective action. It therefore seems 
more pertinent to focus on how (groups of) farmers, themselves, discursively formulate 
4Gavin Smith (1990), as an exception, attempts to introduce issues of cultural construction and 
consciousness when analysing state-peasant relations from a commoditization perspective. He thereby 
focusses on the interplay between local struggles over access to land and larger processes of capitalist 
expansion. However, the analysis seems to me not wholly convincing inasmuch as a dichotomous image is 
put forward of local actors struggling against the abstract agency of a capitalist system. In addition, such 
an approach entails seeing state action as an epiphenomenon of capitalism. This, in my view, obscures the 
dynamics of situated forms of state-peasant relations. In contrast, I argue that it is important to develop a 
set of concepts enabling us to make sense of the social practices by which state officials attempt to exert 
social control over farmers, and the various strategies peasants deploy in resisting or appropriating state 
intervention. 
"See van der Ploeg (1986; 1989) for a less deterministic analysis which shares the same theoretical 
preoccupations. Benvenuti (1985) has since changed his overly pessimistic views. The point I want to 
make, however, is that there is a great difference between a perspective which focusses on some process 
of rationalization and one which inquires into how local actors adopt, transform and appropriate rationality 
models and discourses which serve to sustain hegemonic relationships, by engaging in local struggles. 
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This, in fact, is a different 
an expression of the 
Such an 
models by showing that no 
their interests within the context of local struggles.6 
research strategy from that of explaining rural conflict 
underlying structural contradictions of an agrarian structure. 
A practice-oriented approach (Bourdieu 1977) which centres on how farmers 
strategically engage in practices of negotiation and accommodation with bureaucrats 
appears then to offer a fruitful alternative to structuralist approaches, 
approach helps us to criticize managerialist intervention 
objective and predictive knowledge about 'local processes' can be developed, for the 
reason that practices of negotiation and accommodation play a decisive, if not 
'disorganising', role in the way in which planned intervention works out. Thus, one 
major argument in this book is that development intervention encompasses a variety of 
practices and strategies which are not reducible to the schematas and assumptions 
contained in interventionist planning models. Instead, a practice-oriented approach to 
state intervention entails studying how the resources and meanings of intervention are 
appropriated by its targets, eventually leading to the emergence of strategies of 
intervention-coping. 
But, what are the implications of such an approach for an understanding of 
peasant political activity? 
State-peasant relations and diversity 
It is my argument that taking a discourse-centred construbtivist approach has distinct 
implications for our understanding of collective action 
movements. Throughout the book I refer to state-peasant relations in the plural and not 
as a single, sui generis phenomenon separated from other areas of the actors' social 
life. It is not that I deny that peasant movements might, at certain points in time, 
acquire a dynamics of their own, and that they may play an important role in shaping 
the identities of peasant farmers in whole regions. But, I do contend that in order to 
avoid reifying the concept of peasant movements we havo to focus on the myriad of 
diffuse and often contradictory practices by which farmers negotiate the authority of 
the state. 
Thus it is argued that peasant movements and related forms of more or less 
organised collective action are ultimately based upon a diversity of localized types of 
state-peasant relations. That makes peasant political activity so rich, but also so 
equivocal. The problem of peasant organisations in areas such as the Atlantic Zone of 
Costa Rica, then, is not that peasants are difficult to mobilize due to a lack of 'class 
consciousness', but that they themselves display too many initiatives. In effect, it can 
be argued that the multiplicity of peasant strategic activity presents major problems to 
peasant organisations fostering organised forms of collective action. This, in fact, is the 
predicament of organisations such as UPAGRA which bocome confronted with the 
difficulties of having to deal with a multiplicity of strategies which farmers develop for 
appropriating intervention. 
Hence peasant political activity cannot be dissociated from the farmers' own 
attempts to construct their own patterns of farm, household and other types of 
organisation (see Long 1984b; Long and van der Ploeg 18 89). Accordingly, struggles 
over access to land, credit, extension, etc. can only be understood within the context 
"See Hindess (1986) on how interests are discursively constructed. As he puts it, "To say that 
interests are formulated is to insist on a further set of questions concerning the conceptual or discursive 
conditions necessary for certain reasons to be formulated at all. It is only if the appropriate reasons can be 
formulated that particular interests can be effective elements of social lif s" (p.119). 
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of farmers' attempts to attract and manage resources by creating their own 
'development projects'. This is not to say that such projects embody the fundamental 
interests of an essentialized peasant class. On the contrary, local projects become the 
focus of conflicting pressures and demands put forward by groups - often coalitions -
of actors. Such projects and attendant organisational forms, in effect, were more than 
mere efforts to unite farmers in order to attain concrete and material goals. They were 
not only means to attract scarce resources, but also ways to deal with particular 
problematic issues concerning local cooperation for community or production purposes 
and, as we saw in the various case studies, they evolved as arenas of struggle in which 
various views and interests clashed. Furthermore such projects and organisational 
efforts acquired a strategic meaning to the participants which went beyond their 
material significance. Indeed, the Association of Small Producers in Neguev, the road in 
Macadamia, and the aqueduct in La Isleta became the focal points of a set of struggles 
in which state officials and various groups of accommodative and critical farmers 
confronted each other. We saw that these, in some cases quite dramatic experiences 
generated strategies for appropriating intervention, which played a crucial role in the 
relations between farmers and bureaucrats. 
Taking account of diversity in state-peasant relations entails giving precedence to 
the dynamics of farmers' organisational forms as against viewing diversity as effects of 
larger processes of state incorporation or socio-economic differentiation. This, in fact, 
required a determined way of dealing with the state, not as an apparatus which can be 
conquered, smashed and reconstructed, but as a set of organisations engaged in a 
variety of development and administrative practices. Thus, in constructing strategies 
for dealing with state intervention, farmers had to recognize: 1) the different faces of 
the state as manifested through inter-agency conflict, and the existence of differing 
operational styles within a single institution, and 2) the contradictions underlying the 
prevailing ideology of state intervention. 
This approach, I think, precludes a view of peasant political activity in general 
terms of resistance. Next I discuss how an emphasis on development activity as arenas 
of struggle, together with a focus on the strategic character of state-peasant relations, 
differs from a perspective which focuses on everyday resistance'. 
Critique of the 'Everyday Forms of Resistance'perspective 
Of late a number of works have appeared discussing state-peasant relations within an 
analytical framework of resistance. The genre has been introduced by James Scott in 
his fine work "Weapons of the Weak" (1985), who in transcending the moral economy 
view of peasant economy undertakes an analysis of peasant strategies from a 
phenomenological perspective; that is by taking into account the role of actor's 
symbolic interactions and interpretations in the evolution of struggles following the 
introduction of modern technology (High Yielding Rice Varieties in combination with 
mechanical harvesting). Scott focuses on peasants' resistance against the attempts of 
farming elites to change the existing balance of rights and obligations regulating access 
to labour and land, with a view to rearranging social relations of production in line with 
modern technology, and in so doing he is able to provide a fascinating view of the skill 
with which 'the rural poor' are able to draw upon existing moral bonds in order to 
thwart such attempts. 
One important advantage of this new perspective over former approaches of the 
moral economy type is that it introduces agency within the account. By showing that 
"poor peasants" are capable of devising and applying a myriad of tactics deriving from 
everyday knowledge geared to subverting the effectiveness of a new capitalist rural 
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order the image of the peasants shifts from that of a reactive class into that of 
purposeful social actors engaged in an active symbolic struggle and capable of drawing 
on existing relations of reciprocity in order to propose their own livelihood projects. In 
this way the image of 'peasant traditionality' as proposed in his previous work on The 
Moral Economy of The Peasant (1976), is revised. In addition, by discussing Gramscian 
and Luckacsian concepts of hegemony, Scott's perspective proposes an interesting 
explanation for the seemingly unorganized and informal nature of peasant political 
activity. Scott thereby argues that given the embededness of peasant politics in 
communal social relations, it is for them much more advantageous to 'work the 
system' than engage in confrontational politics. Underlying this thesis rests a strong 
view of peasant political consciousness, which does not manifest itself in open political 
conflict but within the struggle over the legitimacy of the mora) order. Thus Scott 
suggests that peasants have a good understanding of thoir livelihood conditions as a 
subordinated and exploited class, yet this insight does not lead to revolutionary action 
due to the difficulty of coordinating collective struggles in 
aim to impose a new order. As argued, this organizational 
dispersion and fragmentary nature of acts of 'resistance' 
as it provides them with the opportunity to shift class corrflict to the realm of ordinary 
events and situations. 
Yet, I think that this approach has some inherent limitations, due to a number of 
pressupositions it makes regarding the nature of the peasa ltry and its relationship with 
the state. Thus there is a tendency to portray peasants as embodying fundamental 
social interests, which are presumed to constitute them as distinct from other social 
categories, such as urban dwellers, large landowners, bureaucrats, etc. At a theoretical 
level, it can be argued that essentialist conceptions of the peasantry as displaying a 
unified form of consciousness is the result of, in my view, an inconsistent combination 
of a phenomenological approach to peasant politics and a oolitical economy approach.7 
Indeed, I think that a search for some general theory of resistance grounded in some 
essentialist conception of peasants can only lead to a profusion of rather simplistic 
accounts.8 It is my argument that we cannot understand peasant forms of political 
action, without analysing the history of the relationship 
within the context of such local histories can we understand why farmers resist, 
undermine, appropriate or accommodate to state activity. 
everyday contexts with the 
drawback deriving from the 
s advantageous to peasants 
'See for an interesting discussion of essentialism as used in orientalist 
"In the Costa Rican case this line of thought has been adopted by Leslie 
attempts to establish a theory of non-violent peasant collective action tr rough 
a positive contribution to their societies and improve their own welfare" 
political action emerges that eventually fits with the best of all worlds, 
definition labelled as the legitimate and accepted representatives of 'peasants 
the struggle for legitimacy in which peasant organizations are involved 
groups of smallholders, in mutual competition with the state. Second, 
contradictions between smallholders, owing to their differential involverrient 
activities, and the associated variation in types of relationships built wittji 
and functionaries. As I conducted research in one of the areas in which 
gathered, I was able to document the various arenas of struggle in which 
gave rise to particular modes of local politics characterized by competitie n 
different groups of settlers. This difference in approach, it must be mentioned 
methodology which questions essentializing and reifying discourses of 
discourse Inden (1991, p.2). 
Anderson (1990) who 
which "peasants can make 
(pp.89). Here an image of peasant 
[first, peasant organizations are by 
There is no mention about 
winning the support of different 
absolutely no attention is paid to the 
in socio-economic and political 
a set of state institutions, NGO's 
ler field-research material was 
settlers are involved and which 
and contradiction between 
is due to a different 
peasants as 'historical' agents. 
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Conversely, focusing on differentiated forms of state activity implies paying 
special attention to policies, programmes, and projects which are made possible 
through a variety of modes of interinstitutional coordination, rather than viewing the 
state as some monolithic apparatus. Such bundles of state activity, in effect, have their 
own histories and trajectories, and these are largely shaped through the relationship 
with beneficiaries. Central in my approach, then, is not an analysis grounded in some 
view of the interests of the farmers vis-è-vis the interests of the state. Instead I 
attempt to analyse how bureaucrats define the interests of the state in terms of a set 
of experiences with particular groups of beneficiaries. What is important then is not 
how the state defends or imposes its interests upon farmers, but how a variety of -
often contradictory - definitions are produced within this relationship, or interface. 
Thus by taking account of the differential capacity of (groups of) farmers to 
shape their relationship with the state bureaucracy it is possible to account for types of 
peasant political activity which differ radically from 'resistance', such as fairly 
opportunistic ways of appropriating state intervention as in the case of gatekeepers 
strategies, or strategies which, in a manipulative vein, are directed to establishing 
effective modes of local organisation by taking advantage of local divisions, if not 
creating them. 
Having said this, it is possible to criticize the idea that peasant resistance is about 
undermining a social order which is basically inimical to the interests of smallholders by 
displaying forms of tactical compliance (p.324-25). The notion of compliance conveys 
the idea that the hegemonic order of the state is accepted as legitimate. Yet, we see in 
the case studies that state legitimation is itself the subject of quite open struggles. As 
we saw in chapter 4 front-line workers themselves are forced to negotiate the authority 
of the state when dealing with farmers. 
Thus, the characters described in this work - the gatekeepers, the communist 
Diego Casas and the preacher Ignacio - are, rather than subverting a social order, 
engaging in strategies for attracting state resources, by accomodating to certain forms 
of state intervention while resisting others. The intervention-coping strategies described 
in the case studies were distinctively activist. It was not a question of 'working the 
system' but that of developing capacities for dealing with bureaucrats, often to the 
detriment of other farmers. Resistance in relation to state intervention, in this view, 
cannot be seen as a universal analytical category, but rather as a strategy particular 
farmers deploy for dealing with particular types of bureaucratic connections. 
9.4 Policyspeak and the Ideology of Intervention 
In the course of the book it was argued that an intervention ideology arises through the 
local adaptation and transformation of particular conceptions of development and 
associated institutional views of how beneficiaries should be approached. In Chapter 5 
a notion of social social strategy was put forward as brought about through the 
localization of a variety of discourses, those of democracy/citizenship, community and 
agricultural modernization. It was also argued that strategies include skills of enrolment 
and practical knowledge of how to deal with state intervention. In avoiding an 
intentionalist or functionalist conception of social strategy a choice was made for a 
practice-oriented approach. The question I wish to address here is how does an 
approach which focusses on discursive practices differ from other phenomenological or 
social constructivist approaches? 
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The pitfalls of a social constructivist analv si s 
The question could be phrased as follows 
and empiricist intervention models? Or 
implications of an approach which focusCs 
What contribution can a social constructivist 
analysis8 make to a theoretical u n d e r s t a n d i n g of state intervention and its 
appropriation by farmers, that goes beyonc deconstructing structuralist state theories 
in other words, what are the theoretical 
on social practice while rejecting positivist 
notions of replicability? Indeed, social constructivism has been much critiziced for its 
inability to bring into the analysis broader issues concerning power relations that 
transcend the situated social contexts in which individuals interact, and thus has been 
labelled voluntaristic. 
For one thing, it must be conceded tr at social constructivism has not been very 
good in tackling questions regarding how those social contexts are being influenced and 
manipulated by social actors remaining outs de of them. Yet, in my view, this does not 
yet mean that we should introduce objedivistic notions of 'structure', as determining, 
shaping or underlying situated social practices. It is enough to recognize that the 
actions of actors - such as institutional managers - who operate within some sorts of 
social contexts, do impinge on that of ctrer actors - such as settlers - in different 
contexts, without having to assume a fixed power-hierarchy between them, or some 
principle of sociological causality or determination. This is not to say that power plays 
no role in the actions of of USAID planners, IDA managers. Regional Directors and 
Settlement Heads, yet the power they puncrtedly wield cannot be understood in terms 
of their capacity to impose their wills, but in 
the effects of the social practices they are 
managers are able to 'prove' that that whi ah 
of so called power-holders to impose their 
given set of problems by developing spec if i 
terms of their ability to secure control over 
Bngaged in, even though these effects are 
often very different from what they set out o achieve. In other words, as long as state 
that which lies outside their control is secondary to the 'real' obstacles to development, 
can they claim that they exercise power. F>< wer, then, does not reside in the capacity 
and dealing with them, in short, by engaging in the production and deployment of a 
discourse of development.10 
I o f "By social constructivism I understand a range
and ethnomethodology and hermeneutics, that take 
social world as meaningful. In this view, social institut 
not seen as culturally 'given', but as the outcome o1 
1 0My view on the interrelations between discourse, 
conducted in the sociology of science (Law 1986, 
deconstruct the power of science. The question they 
explain the success of science', but 'how is science 
by enroling a variety of actors (not only human actors, 
actor-network, translating their interests and finally 
but think of themselves, or define themselves, in teitms 
frameworks' proposed by science'. It is argued by 
power of 'science' lies in these social processes of 
of knowledge that is intrinsically superior to other fc|rms 
analysed as a cultural system whereby a particular 
power of religion, has been replaced in modem timet 
authoritative representation of 'progress', 'development' 
knowledge is not universal and 'true' knowledge, 
knowledge. 
but 
is under their control is determinant, while 
projects, but in their ability to deal with a 
c ways for conceptualizing such problems 
subjectivistic approaches, such as phenomenology 
at interest in studying how social actors construct the 
ons, cultural artefacts and organisational forms are 
tljie accomplishments of members, 
power and knowledge draw heavily upon work 
L|atij>ur 1986, Callon 1986), which sets out to 
tut forward is not the classical one of 'how do we 
capable to transform the social and the natural world 
J but also elements of nature and thought) within an 
sroducing passive agents who cannot do anything else 
of the categories, concepts and explanatory 
new approach to the study of science, that the 
translation' and 'enrolment', and not in its being a kind 
of non-scientific knowledge. Science, then, is 
k|ind of authority is enforced; what previously was the 
by the power of those who have the key to the 
etc. In short, they set out to show that scientific 
the outcome of a particular conjunction of power and 
this i 
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This, in short, requires us to go beyond social constructivism and to inquire into the 
relationship between bureaucratic power and development discourse. Next, before 
discussing three concepts which might be useful for a sociology of intervention - those 
of development discourse, intervention ideology and intervention-coping strategy -1 will 
outline the different ways in which I use the notion of discourse in relation to 
interpretation and power in the book. 
Discourse and power 
In Chapter 1 , four different possible ways of using the concept of 'discourse' were 
distinguished: 1) As a way of identifying the patterns by which a public debate unfolds, 
2) As referring to the various accounts and interpretations which are available to the 
researcher when working out a case study or situational analysis, 3) As a particular 
conjuncture between power and knowledge, and 4) As a particular kind of practice by 
which a particular problematic is made intelligible and manageable within a policy 
context. 
To begin with, discourse can refer to the ways in which a public debate unfolds. 
This definition did not play an important role in the book, except when analysing some 
public event (the inauguration of the aqueduct in Tierragrande). For the rest, an actor 
oriented approach was used which set out to document who says what, in what 
context and in relation to which problems. 
The second definition of discourse relates to the intricacies involved in 
interpreting the accounts of our informants, that is of representing them within our 
evolving narrative. In this regard a discourse oriented approach has advantages as it 
does not work with pre-conceived theoretical frameworks which are imposed upon the 
field materials. The actor's own interpretations of events and situations play an 
important role in the analysis. This is not to say that we do not apply analytical 
concepts, but that these are chosen and discarded to the degree to which they help to 
develop the text. We see here that a process of negotiation takes place between 
different kinds of thinking and intepreting: the everyday one of the 'field', expressing a 
'dialogue' between researcher and researched, and the analytical one of the academy. 
So far it can be said that the first and second uses of 'discourse' pertain to the 
language paradigm (Bernstein 1983). The third and fourth build upon a post-
structuralist conception of power. 
Policyspeak 
The third conception of discourse has to do with a codified way of representing a 
particular problematic which is embodied in forms of state activity. This is the 
Foucaultian conception of discourse where the link is made between knowledge and 
power. In this view, discourse is far more consequential than mere 'interpretation', as it 
Although in developing the conceptual framework of intervention-coping strategies I have been 
inspired by this research agenda my approach is different. The aim has not been that of showing how 
'development discourse' is capable to produce passive agents who in conforming to its diagnosis, access 
structures and elegibility procedures become subjects ready to enter a 'therapeutic relationship' (Wood 
1985) with authority-holders. In fact, the ethnography in this book provides so much evidence for the 
contrary thesis, that the power of intervention is very often succesfully undermined. For that reason I set 
out to develop an analytical framework by which it was possible to study how 'powerless' actors are able 
to undermine the power of the state through strategies of intervention-coping. 
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is seen as constituting an objective mode of knowledge, which in association with 
particular forms of social control leads to the creation of subjectivities. Here discourse 
has a degree of facticity. Thus it can be analysed by studying, say, medical textbooks 
in order to document the genealogy of the concepts and practices of healing and its 
relation to the rise of particular institutional forms, say the clinic. This conception of 
discourse was not used in this book, yet it underpins the fourth way in which discourse 
has been used. 
Four, discourse can be seen as the kinds of discursive practice by which linkages 
are made between a given set of issues (agricultural innovation, the struggle over land, 
and issues of governability) so as to construct a problematic (say agricultural 
development policy). Through such a problematic a way of conceptualizing peasants as 
'traditional', or the organization of access to institutional services, or the 
implementation of policy, is forged. By making such links a way of speaking about, say, 
agricultural development policy is created. Discursive practice, then, is not only the 
deployment of particular arguments or representations of reality, but the creation of a 
particular way of dealing with and conceptualizing what are basically very different 
problems, by establishing connections between them. Here we find that the notion of 
discursive practice is related to Foucault's concept of power, since it can be shown 
that the kinds of conceptual linkages policy-speak makes is related to the needs of 
exercizing control of planners. In short, policy-speak (Apthorpe 1986;1986) creates 
problematics by bestowing a particular logic, that of the planners, on different sets of 
issues. In this way a kind of mechanistic thinking is forged which we can find in 
operation when, for instance, peasants are classified into four categories (allegiant and 
alienated activists, allegiant and alienated apathetics in the 034 programme inception 
paper). 
Indeed, we saw in Chapter 3 that by drawing upon a historical representation of 
Costa Rica as a country without fundamental social contradictions until the advent of 
capitalism it is possible to portray the major problems of 'development' as an 
institutional a-political issue, that is in terms of the government's capacity to distribute 
land to landless peasants. In this way it becomes possible to conceptualize the agrarian 
question in terms of administrative efficiency while denying the existence of a diversity 
of state-peasant relationships, let alone their political history. Accordingly, all types of 
peasant politics which question the nature of Costa Rican democracy and its economic 
model are conceptualized as a potential threat to the survival of 'democracy' in Costa 
Rica. This historical representation of state-peasant relations makes it possible to forge 
a strategy of institutional modernization in which the beneficiary is conceptualized as a 
client who has to be encouraged to follow the steps of his presumed yeoman 
forebears, that is, to become an entrepreneurial farmer. Farmers who deviate from this 
model of the democratic, 'white', yeoman farmer, in turn can be labelled troublesome. 
Policyspeak, thus, has distinct effects on 'beneficiaries', through the invention of 
models which are incorporated in development programmes and projects. Yet, it was 
argued in the case of the 034 Programme, that policyspeak, as manifested in the model 
of the 'client', was not capable of concealing the conflictive and political character of 
planned intervention at the level of implementation. 
An example: policyspeak and agricultura de cambio 
Policyspeak can be seen at work in the case of the agricultural development policy of 
agricultura de cambio, as applied in the Atlantic zone. Thus we obtain a particular, in 
fact in logical terms, arbitrary connection between the following problems, 
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a) The necessity to curtail maize production given PL480 wheat coming from USA aid, 
made available thanks to wheat overproduction in the USA. 
b) The necessity to combat increasing rural discontent as manifested in land invasions 
and other forms of squatting, etc. 
c) The necessity to shift to an export-oriented policy under pressure of the World Bank, 
the IMP, USAID, etc. 
The solution to these problems is found in the introduction of new agricultural 
technologies and the creation of incentives for 'innovative farmers'. However, the fact 
that the problem does? not lie in a lack of access to technology but in the 
monopolization of export opportunities by entrepreneurs linked to the political system, 
the fact that squatters are only allowed to invade the worst lands while excellent land 
is used for cattle grazing, the fact that the plantations create disabled people which are 
disposed of without pensions, etc., are silenced. 
In effect, the discourse of agricultural modernization in Costa Rica creates a 
problematic which excludes these facts, while establishing connections between a 
variety of issues. These connections are constructed in such a way that they contain 
'escape hatches' or explanations for failure in case the policy fails to achieve what it 
sets out to achieve. In this way agricultura de cambio is naturalized so as to acquire a 
degree of inevitability, and the impression is created that no other policy was possible 
given the circumstances. At the same time policyspeak is institutionalized in 
programmes, modes of inter-institutional cooperation, reseach agendas etc. 
Thus as agricultura de cambio becomes part of a zone of inevitability (see Shaffer 
1984), it is presented as a question of instilling the right mentality, the right incentives, 
the right technology, the right connection with export markets; in short, the right 
implementation of policy. In case of failure, then, the problem becomes 'the human 
factor'; the farmer who was not ready for the technology, the incentives which were 
not well applied, the technology which was not timely transferred. The policy, plan or 
programme did not fail but its implementation did. In other words policyspeak is never 
wrong since it creates its own problematic, as well as the rationalizations for 
accounting for possible failures. 
Policyspeak, then, is not simply a mystification for it creates a distinct reality, 
that of public policy. If it is not able to relate to the realities of the farmers, of 
implementation, it is able to relate to the world it creates, by constructing problematics 
which become embodied in programmes, modes of eligibility, IRDP's. In the process, a 
number of 'facts' are spirited away and questions disregarded, such as the fact that 
technological innovations most often are introduced by farmers themselves. 
Yet, as argued above, the world of policyspeak is but one segment of the wider 
reality of intervention. 
The multiple meanings of development: the ideology of intervention 
However, this book focused for the largest part on the world 'beyond' policyspeak. It is 
clear in this book that actions undertaken at the policy level as to the design and 
implementation of the integrated rural development project, had enormous 
consequences for the everyday-life of farmers in distant settlements. It was also argued 
that it is more interesting to view such actions within the context of power struggles 
between managers holding to differing institutional projects, than as responding to 
some model (or ideology) of development. State intervention, in this account, does not 
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appear as a linear process in which state managers exert their power over 
settler/beneficiaries in line with any conscious or unconscious logic. 
It was also shown that state intervention exhibited its own local dynamics as 
manifested in the transformation of a particular model of the beneficiary, viewed as a 
client, and in a variety of strategies of intervention-coping. The model of the client, 
which was introduced by USAID planners, was deployed by the front-line 
administrators as an instrument for accomplishing social control, and led front-line 
workers to fashion styles of operation for dealing with settlers who were labelled as 
recalcitrant, uncooperative, and opportunistic, through practices of labelling and 
legitimization. 
It is important to emphasize that the ideology of intervention was not imposed 
from the top onto the thinking of the front-line workers and administrators responsible 
for programme implementation. What it did, however, was to bring together different 
worlds of experience and forms of socio-political commitment: that of front-line 
workers, administrators and institutional managers. In effect, it provided various actors 
operating within institutional worlds a common language for talking about and 
assessing intervention problems. 
An ideology of intervention, then, is not false in the sense that it clouds the 
thinking of the actors drawing upon it. It derives its power from its usefulness for 
accomplishing particular bureaucratic tasks, even when the actors themselves are 
constantly confronted with the fact that they are simplifications, if not caricatures, of a 
more complex reality, and that their application is restricted to specific settings.11 
When talking about intervention ideologies, then, we should ask by whom are they 
used, in what settings (in the administrative setting, or the field), against whom and for 
what purposes are they deployed. And, finally, how do farmers deal with them? 
As argued in chapters 3 and 4 an intervention ideology is not simply false or 
untrue. Instead we can better view it as a set of discursive practices geared to reaching 
specific localized effects. It was shown that a particular model of the client, which was 
underscored by a distinctive reading of Costa Rican, history was transformed at the 
level of implementation in a model of the undeserving client which, in turn, played a 
central role in the development of labelling practices. The model of the undeserving 
client was put to different uses by different actors: by planners it was a solution for 
institutional inefficiency, for the General Manager it was a mode of increasing 
implementation efficiency, for the Regional Director it served as a legitimization for a 
new mode of exercising social control. For the front-line workers it became an element 
of an ideology of intervention which was instrumental in 1) rationalizing failure, 2) 
protecting front-line workers from 'troublesome' farmers, 3) providing a guideline for 
selecting 'cooperative' settlers, 4) providing easy explanations to complex issues, and 
5) legitimizing the current state of affairs. 
One major theoretical topic for a sociology of intervention is that of analysing the 
longer term effects a particular type of intervention might has on the functioning of the 
local bureaucracy. Thus it can be argued for the case of the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica 
that, although the 034 IRDP became a failure, a particular way of relating to 
beneficiaries remained which was based on a model of the 'undeserving client'. Indeed, 
"Thus Eagleton (1990) warns of overestimating the success of ideology which as he argues is no 
'seamless whole'. For, "if its impulse is to identify and homogenize, it is nevertheless scarred and 
disarticulated by its relational character; by the conflicting interests among which it must ceaselessly 
negotiate (222)". 
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one effect of the intervention ideology generated by the 034 IRDP was that previous 
forms of political clientelism were supplanted by forms of bureaucratic clientelism. 
This is not to say that beneficiaries were effectively incorporated into the 
institutional system, nor that politics were eliminated from the 'bureaucratic 
connection'. Instead a different relationship with the state was established in which 
front-line worker had to carry the burden of having to defend the face of the state, that 
is to legitimize state activity in the face of the contradictions of state intervention. In 
effect, politics was displaced to the social interfaces between bureaucracy and 
beneficiaries, and the result was the resurgence of clientelism in a new guise, as 
bureaucratic clientelism. 
Discursive practice and intervention-coping strategies 
An important theme in this book has been how farmers/beneficiaries develop capacities 
to deal with bureaucrats by enroling them within their own projects or by undermining 
their authority. This implied that they had to master the language of 'development' as 
deployed in the bureaucratic domain. Thus I distinquished three different kinds of 
discursive practice which had an institutional referent and were related to three 
problematics; that of 1) community, 2) agricultural modernization, and 3) citizenship 
and democracy. 
These three kinds of discursive practice in Costa Rica are prevalent in dealing 
with the problematic of 'development', for reasons which have much to do with the 
country's specific socio-institutional history. Thus the extent of the population's access 
to institutional services in Costa Rica is remarkably high. At the same time the two-
party political system associated with recurrent change of regime, and the central role 
which party politics plays in institutional life, offers ample opportunities to organised 
groups to engage in political negotiations with state agencies. 
These types of discursive practice referred to a set of issues which were shared 
by both the state officials and local actors: communal services and infrastructure; 
production; interest representation. These discourses entailed ways of getting access to 
resources by shaping relationships with state institutions (education, credit, legal 
protection, land, etc.). The relevant institutions in this regard were 1) local authorities, 
and community organisations, 2) agricultural development projects, banks, extension 
services, but also regional institutions (JAPDEVA), and 3) the organisations (political 
parties) composing the political and legal system. 
Farmer's discursive practices and practical knowledge 
It was also argued that farmers in dealing with state intervention had to develop a 
capacity to master these discourses, which meant developing practical knowledge 
about how local authorities, the banking system, extension services, marketing boards, 
etc. function, and how the political system operates, with a view to gaining access to 
resources, while attempting to fashion their relationships with state institutions. 
Farmer's discursive practices, thus, were by definition not institutionally located. They 
entailed among other things a 'localization' of the discourses discussed above. 
Localization was defined as the practice of connecting such discourses with the local 
reality of 'community', production and political interest articulation. Concrete and 
pragmatic meaning was given to discourse by relating it to local initiatives, failures, etc. 
It must be stressed, however, that farmer's discursive practices did not take place In a 
void. They were deployed within particular arenas of struggle: projects, types of local 
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organisation, etc. They dealt with concrete issues of how, why and to what purposes 
to approach or avoid a particular state agency, functionary, or politician. 
Strategies and enrolment 
The strategic localization of discourses of community, agricultural modernization and 
democracy in the frontier was not enough for the construction of strategies for 
appropriating intervention. After all it would be not only simplistic but plainly wrong to 
argue that strategies are successful due to the rhetorical skills of particular individuals. 
We saw this in the case of Neguev where a group of radical leaders were able to 
continuously question intervention by undermining the authority of the state, yet they 
were not particularly successful in mobilizing enough settlers to become a direct threat 
to the prevailing mode of state intervention. 
Enrolment practices then involved the following types of activities: 1) that of 
convincing, persuading and mobilizing people towards the attainment of a specific goal, 
cause or project, and 2) that of making themselves indispensable as the 'translator' of 
the interests of some group of people vis-á-vis the bureaucracy. Indeed people such as 
Ignacio were highly skilled in such enrolment practices. 
Thus we see that one central element in the success of a particular strategy for 
appropriating intervention was the capacity of some actors to enrol a variety of actors 
in particular projects. Indeed, it can be argued that the success of a particular strategy 
for appropriating intervention was equivalent to successful enrolment. And successful 
enrolment entailed the capacity to negotiate alliances with a variety of actors so as to 
make possible a particular project, or to foil that of one's opponents. 
In short, successful enrolment entailed that alternative rival strategies were made 
impossible, or invalidated, as a logic of action was established which corresponded to 
one, and only one, particular way of conceptualizing a set of problems which have to 
do with local 'development'. 
The following can be said of the strategies beneficiaries developed in order to 
deal with intervention. The gatekeepers in Neguev were able to establish an alliance 
with front-line workers while presenting themselves as loyal beneficiaries who were 
ready to combat a communist ideology which was alien to the interests of peaceful 
Costa Rican peasants. The 'communist' Diego Casas in Macadamia set out to show to 
the community that, since IDA bureaucrats acted according to political interests which 
were contrary to those of the peasants, IDA intervention could only lead to local 
division and organizational disruption. Ignacio in La Isleta was able to make himself 
indispensable in the completion of the aqueduct project by presenting himself to his 
fellow settlers as the only local leader with undisputed access to state agencies, and to 
bureaucrats as the legitimate representative of poor peasants in the frontier. 
The only strategy which was not successful, that of establishing tactical distance 
in Neguev, was due to the inability of accommodative beneficiaries to develop a way of 
talking about the interests of farmers as different from, and possible contradictory to, 
those of the state. 
Next I compare my aproach with others which draw upon post-structuralist 
notions of power as developed by Foucault and which concentrate on the power 
effects of planned intervention. 
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9.5 The Unruly Strike Back: The Issue of Agency 
In brief, post-structuralism conceptualizes the power of the state in terms of modes and 
techniques of subjection and 'normalization', by which people are transformed into 
state-subjects and eventually transmuted into docile bodies, or passive agents. Such 
techniques and strategies of subjection may consist of institutionalized practices of 
classification by which people are ascribed a subjectivity in terms of the categories 
used in particular institutions (the 'patient' in the clinic, the 'poor' in the security 
system, etc.) or through the micro-practices of disciplinary power by which the state is 
able to gain control of people's bodies while making the actual workings of power 
invisible (Foucault 1982, 1986). 1 2 
Comparisons with a post-structuralist approach 
Ferguson (1990), for instance, adopts such a perspective when studying a World-Bank 
funded Integrated Rural Development Programme in Lesotho. He shows that through 
the deployment of a development discourse a particular representation of the 
'development problematic' is produced which has nothing to do with the 'reality' of 
Lesotho, and even blatantly contradicts mainstream academic discourse. Yet, Ferguson 
argues, that this simplified understanding of the 'development problematic' is not 
accidental as it underpins actual practices of intervention as in the case of the IRDP 
project he studied. Such projects, he argues, have distinctive 'instrument-effects' in 
practice, namely the expansion of state power and the depoliticization of planned 
intervention. The notion of 'instrument-effect' is borrowed by Ferguson from Foucault's 
discussion of prison reform. In short, the instrument-effect of the prison, as a 
correctional institution, lies in the fact that it does not lead to the rehabilitation of 
transgressors but, on the contrary, to the constitution of delinquency as a mode of 
subjectivity disconnected from its social origins. Prison reform, then, appears to be an 
element within a set of techniques of exercising social control, a part of a strategy for 
"taming 'popular illegalities' and transforming the political fact of illegality into the 
quasi-medical one of pathological 'delinquency'" (p. 19). As Ferguson puts it, 
"The prison, Foucault shows, was created as a correctional institution. It was 
intended to imprint on the inmates the qualities of good citizenship: to make 
criminals into honest, hard working, law abiding individuals, who could return to a 
'normal' place in society.... But it is obvious upon inspection, according to 
Foucault, that prisons do not in fact 'reform' criminals; that, on the contrary, they 
make nearly impossible that return to 'normality' that they have always claimed to 
produce, and that, instead of eliminating criminality, they seem rather to produce 
and intensify it within a well-defined strata of 'delinquents'" (Ferguson 1990;19). 
12Thus Foucault (1986), in criticizing the current notion of what he designates juridical power, as 
power deriving from the souvereign, puts forward a notion of disciplinary power which is embodied in 
state practices of social control. He illustrates the transition from the first type of power to the second by 
comparing the practice of public torture in the classical age with the rise of the prison in the modem age. 
In the prison, punishment is secluded from the public arena and consequently the exercise of power is 
made invisible (1977). 
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Ferguson applies the notion of 'instrument-effect' to account for the the paradox that 
development failures are so readily replicated. An 'instrument-effect', then, is the 
unintended, yet strategically coherent effect of planned intervention which comes 
about through the deployment of what he calls 'the development apparatus'. In his 
view it is not accidental that planned intervention leads so often to failure. Indeed, 
failure is a logical concomitant of planned intervention.13 
In this perspective, the development apparatus is a machine for reinforcing and 
expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state power, which as he argues, "incidentally 
takes 'poverty' at its point of entry", while depoliticizing the relationship between 
people and the state (p.255). Ferguson argues that this two-fold character of the 
'instrument-effect' - the expansion of the bureaucratic state through the depoliticization 
of its workings - "end up forming [a] kind of strategically coherent or intelligible 
whole... : the anti-politics machine". As he claims, 
"while we have seen that 'development' projects ... may end up working to 
expand the power of the state, and while they claim to address the problems of 
poverty and deprivation, in neither guise does the 'development' industry allow its 
role to be formulated as a political one. By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a 
technical problem, and by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of 
powerless and oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of 'development' is 
the principal means through which the question of poverty is de-politicized in the 
world today" (256). 
This approach provides a highly suggestive explanation why so many development 
projects, after having first been evaluated as failures are, after a few years, promoted 
as successes, as it is argued that the success of planned intervention lies in the 
capacity of the state to expand its power. Yet, as I argue next, this view tells us little 
about how local actors come to grips with the 'development apparatus'. For, if we hold 
to Foucaults analogy of the prison in studying the 'power-effects' of planned 
intervention, we have to show that the subjects of development are transformed into 
marginal characters, and that they, in their relationship with the state, can conceive of 
themselves only in such terms, as 'deviants'. If this is not the case, then, it is 
important to inquire into the social practices by which farmers engage with the state; 
practices which, as argued in this book, might range from accomodation to resistance 
and manipulation. 
The 034 programme and its instrument-effects 
In applying these concepts to the 034 integrated rural development programme, I 
studied, it can be argued that the instrument effects of the 034 programme were the 
introduction of a novel type of institution-client relationship, one in which labelling as a 
mode of social control, and depoliticization played an important role. Indeed, although 
the whole idea of integrated rural development was eventually given up as it clearly 
appeared to lead to failure, the effect of the project was that a new way of dealling 
with settlers was introduced which conceptualized them as (undeserving) clients and 
which made it easier to deploy a highly authoritarian and disciplinarian set of practices. 
13Thus he argues, "... Because 'failed' development projects can so successfully help to accomplish 
important tasks behind the backs of the most sincere participants, it does become less mysterious why 
'failed' development projects should end up being replicated again and again. It is perhaps reasonable to 
suggest that it may even be because development projects turn out to have such uses, even if they are in 
some sense unforeseen, that they continue to attract so much interest and support" (p.256). 
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Yet there are problems with such an analysis because it suggests a degree of 
determinism and unilinearity which the evidence does not bear. To begin with, 'failure' 
in the case of the Neguev settlement, was not accepted as a natural and thus inevitable 
fact. Front-line workers and administrators drew upon an ideology of intervention to 
rationalize failure, yet their actions were constantly being contested by various groups 
of settlers. Indeed, the critical and radical discourse of radical settlers became part of 
all farmers' thinking, in fact it always was a sort of 'critical discourse' that farmers of 
different persuasion could draw upon. The result of the programme was definitely not 
depoliticization, for it led to a different type of politics: that of state legitimization. 
On the other hand, planners and managers were not naive, they were aware of 
the political character of intervention, of the necessity to control a 'difficult' social 
situation. Politics could be concealed at the level of documents, even within the 
domains of the institution and local administration, but not in encounters between 
bureaucrats and 'clients', the client-official interface. 
Second, it appeared impossible to transform 'unruly clients' into ideal 
beneficiaries. For that reason local administrators had to draw upon a social darwinist 
theory of settlement development. At the same time the new intervention ideology led 
to a variety of intervention-coping strategies (accommodation, resistance, 
manipulation), with as a result the emergence of differing kinds of institution-client 
relationships. The IDA was not able to impose its own definition of interests upon the 
settlers, let alone a standardized and depolitiziced type of institution-client relationship. 
Third, no coherent institutional apparatus evolved. As shown in Chapter 2 
institutional rivalry remained and depoliticization at the institutional level was not 
accomplished. The question is whether this could ever have been achieved. The 
institution, thus, evolved as an arena in which different projects competed without any 
of them acquiring hegemony. In effect, each project led to particular sets of practices 
which reflected upon institution-client relationships in differing areas of the country. 
In conclusion, it can be argued that a new mode of social control, which included 
labelling and a social darwinist intervention ideology, was introduced. Yet, as the cases 
of Diego Casas and Ignacio show it appeared impossible to impose such novel forms 
without engaging in forms of local negotiation with local actors. Neither was there any 
evidence that this model would be any more successful than the previous 'paternalist' 
one. It has been shown that 'labelling' and the model of the client as a practice of 
social control in places such as Neguev replaced previous forms of 'paternalism' 
through which settlers maintained strong relationships with officials in the central 
departments in San José. Yet, as Chapter 6 shows, when discussing the practices of 
gatekeepers, the attempts to introduce a new, non-clientelist mode of institution-client 
relationship, led to the rise of novel forms of bureaucratic clientelism. 
The development apparatus and agency 
In my view, post-structuralist thought is very valuable as it teaches us to be suspicious 
about development discourse, about its tendency to make invisible what in fact are 
ways of deploying power. In this respect the work of authors such as Ferguson is 
important. Yet, I think that portraying 'the development apparatus' in a quasi-
conspiratorial way, as the source of evil is an analytical strategy which adds little to our 
understanding of the contingencies of localized struggles between bureaucrats and 
beneficiaries. Furthermore, I think that instead of searching for different sites where 
'resistance' or forms of 'alternative development' might be engendered outside the 
world of development as Ferguson (279-288) suggests, it is more fruitful to analyse 
how various actors appropriate the discourse of development and develop strategies 
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which have more bearing upon the complexities of their local struggles than that of 
some abstract 'apparatus'. This requires that we develop a strong notion of agency. 
The 'development apparatus', of which the 034 IRD Programme formed part, is 
not a monolithic, nor coherent whole. If it has a degree of coherence and intelligibility it 
is at the level of 'policy discourse', and not necessarily at the level of actual practice. 
What is important, then, is to inquire into how agency is produced in different fields, 
arenas or patterns of social relationships, as an outcome of struggle between different 
groups holding to differing commitments and understandings. In following this path we 
might show that the 'development apparatus' is neither a benign enterprise as argued 
by its apologists, nor a frightful machine as portrayed by post-structuralists such as 
Ferguson. Instead it becomes an arena in which multiple and contrasting social 
meanings and forms of agency are produced. 
9.6 Final Remarks 
I agree with authors such as James Ferguson (1990), Bernard Shaffer (1985) and 
Raymond Apthorpe (1986), that an important point of critique is that of showing how 
'policyspeak' or 'dev-speak' constructs categories, labels and classificatory schemes 
which are instrumental in subordinating people to bureaucratic power.14J3evelopment 
discourse reduces a great diversity of farmers with different backgrounds, aspirations 
and commitments into a category p* 'r^^-^wjio^^eLthexuaoeiieq^raqitionaL_D00r._ 
indigent, etc. Such, a discursive construction of the 'development problematic' has 
more to do with practices of governability than with the real life of smallholders, small 
merchants, plantation workers, leaders of peasant unions, etc. A paramount task, then. 
Js to study the bureaucratic practices bv which these categories- labels and schemes 
am ftnnstnifttarL 
In proposing a methodology for studying how development intervention is 
appropriated by its 'targets', 'clients', beneficiaries, or by the 'rural poor', I think that 
we should be suspicious of modes of legitimation of the development business which 
derives its justification by the following kind of argument: Despite all failures and 
deceptions, despite all cynicism we might encounter, development is a good thing, and 
if you do not believe in it you are a skeptic, you do not believe in human solidarity. 
Instead, I prefer to take the view that the discourse of development is part of the 
problem, as it is inscribed in wider bureaucratic attempts to transform people first into 
clients, and then into docile state-subjects. The point, then, is that of analysing the 
degree of success of such attempts. Thus, I think t h a . t_th c "' c i n r ? n l f t f l r n r V n n t a g f l S in_ 
viewing 'development' as an arena of struggle in which 'beneficiaries' are able to 
negotiate the authority of the state. As for this book, the outcome of the analysis is 
clear: the new mode of intervention "which emerged through the 034 programme lacked 
the consistency, intelligibility and coherence of the instrument-effects analysed by 
James Ferguson. Instead, farmers were able to take advantage of the contradictions 
and limitations of state planned intervention. 
Central in my approach, then, is how differing forms of aoencv are constructed 
within different relationships rSetween authority^holders and 'people'. Thus for experts, 
jagency entaTIFthTrignt to 'represent' other people such as peasants and recipients of 
"In a different context authors such as Said (1978) and Fabian (1983) have shown how a particular 
representation of 'the other' is produced through academic practice. 
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state service as 'traditional', rationally risk-averse, marqinali7«fi »r n x p l n i t a d . For front-
line workers, it means the capacity to create room for manoeuvre by increasing 
discretion while negotiating the extent to which they are accountable to superiors or 
the beneficiaries. Finally, agency means to farmers the capability to choose not to 
become recipients of state services, to confront the authorities or to accommodate to 
them, or conversely to penetrate and manipulate state bureaucracies. 
Appendix 
A short note on state-peasant relations in 
the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica 
Here an outline is presented of the broader economic and political context of state-
peasant relations in Costa Rica. This is followed by a summary discussion of the history 
of UPAGRA, the Union of Small Agricultural Producers of the Atlantic zone. 
The socio-economic context 
With changes in the world economy in the 1970s the prevailing import-substitution 
policy in Costa Rica became more and more difficult to sustain, and was forced to 
compete with the increasing popularity of the ascendant neo-liberal global economic 
discourse. In short, the oil shocks of the 1970s, increased interest rates, the decline in 
trade and the collapse of the Central American Common Market due to political turmoil 
in the region, formed a formidable threat to the hitherto remarkably success -in terms 
of sustained social peace - of the reformist development strategy. Indeed, the impact of 
the economic crisis of 1980-82, during the period of Carazo (1978-1982), was 
unprecedented: GNP declined by 10 per cent, national income fell by 22 per cent and 
per capita income was reduced by 25 per cent (Vunderink 1990:6). In consequence, 
Costa Rica became overly dependent on financial donors in confronting the economic 
crisis. 
Still, thanks to its geopolitical location, Costa Rica was able to benefit from the 
special interest the USA had in its socio-economic performance. Indeed, the latter set 
out, through USAID and by utilizing its influence in international finance organisations, 
to impose upon Costa Rica a neo-liberal economic model consistent with its new 
conception of political and economic relations within the region. In effect, the collapse 
of the economy in the beginning of the eighties was prevented by a dramatic increase 
in USA financial aid, to the extent that Costa Rica became the second highest recipient 
of USA aid per capita in the world, after Israel (Sanders 1986; Crosby 1987 quoted in 
Vunderink). As most analysts agree, the improvement in economic performance was 
due to this massive influx of foreign aid rather than to the new economic orientation, 
making the social costs of structural adjustment more bearable. However, as Vunderink 
argues, this economic success was not only artificial, it also "reduced the number of 
economic policy alternatives that could have been considered in Costa Rica in the 
1980s".(9) Accordingly, the policy of structural adjustment involved a whole 
reorganisation of the economy, and especially the agricultural sector, making it more 
dependent on export production. 
At the same time development organisations such as USAID embarked 
unabashedly upon a policy of intervening in the internal affairs of Costa Rica, aimed at 
transforming the institutional environment with a view to making it more responsive to 
the new development strategy propounded. The 034 Programme I concentrated on, in 
fact, was an early effort at institutional modernization, and as we will see, institutional 
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reform at the IDA acquired a dynamic of its own as it became the arena of struggles of 
various bureaucratic factions. 
The policy context: agricultura de cambio 
The neo-liberal economic model supported by international financial organizations 
entailed the curtailing of a number of state programmes benefitting peasant farmers. In 
view of the major concern with comparative advantage and the reorientation of the 
economy to international markets, the budgets of state agencies involved in the 
agricultural sector were cut and their programmes reoriented towards stimulating 
export production. A major initiative to involve smallholders in the new agrarian 
strategy, the policy of agricultura de cambio (transformational agriculture), was 
undertaken by the Arias administration (1986-1990). Its major aim was that of 
promoting non-traditional export products, while increasing the productivity of 
traditional crops. In effect, this programme was directed to terminating subsidies on 
crops such as corn and beans, major cash crops for cultivators in the lowlands. Up to 
then, it had been the task of the marketing board, the Consejo Nacional de Producción, 
the marketing board, to purchase grains at fair prices, which were then sold to 
consumers at below market value, in this way subsidizing both producers and 
consumers. Since these subsidies contributed to the public sector deficit, the Ministry 
of Agriculture, under pressure from the Central Bank, decided to support the increased 
importation of basic grains, through the PL 480 Programme, in order to satisfy the 
demands of the internal market. In addition, priority in credit delivery was accorded to 
export crops rather than given to basic grain producers and the role of the national 
marketing board (the CNP) was considerably curtailed. 
The new policy of agricultura de cambio entailed that smallholders be encouraged 
to shift from traditional crops - maize - to non-traditional export crops, such as tubers, 
pejivalle, maracuya, pineapple, etc. Credit was to be extended only for such crops to 
groups of farmers who were willing to adopt modern technologies, and who had 
established marketing arrangements with export companies. This, in fact, meant 
breaking with the previous policies of extending credit to individual farmers for maize or 
other crops, which, in turn, were purchased by the CNP, the marketing board. The 
idea, therefore, was that henceforth institutions should extend credit and extension 
only to 'progressive' farmers, who were willing to create forms of local organisation 
dovetailed to the new agricultural policy. 
The policy of agricultura de cambio, in association with the termination of the 
034 Programme, had a decisive impact on the relationship between the IDA and its 
beneficiaries in the Neguev settlement. So far credit and extension were provided on an 
individual basis to beneficiaries, while a deep distrust existed on the part of the IDA 
Regional Office against independent modes of local organisation. However, with the 
new policy of agricultura de cambio local organisation for production purposes became 
a condition for farmers for obtaining credit. We will see in Chapter VI that the 
endeavour to create such modes of effective local organisation in Neguev gave rise to a 
struggle between competing groups of settlers. 
The history of UPAGRA 
At the end of the seventies, the Unión de Pequeños Agricultores del Atlántico, 
UPAGRA, came into being as a peasant organisation which aimed to defend the rights 
of smallholders in the northern part of the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica. After a number 
of rather spectacular actions - including producers' strikes, marches, blockades and 
occupations of government offices, in which higher prices for products such as maize 
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and cassava and better marketing conditions were demanded, UPAGRA realized that a 
major obstacle for the 'peasant class' in the Atlantic zone remained access to land. 
UPAGRA drew its support from peasant colonists in the area of Guacimo-Guapiles, who 
had settled in the area with state support. These colonists had settled in areas - often 
called colonias - surrounding the railway, which had not been suitable for large-scale 
banana production. Before the collapse of the plantation economy in the thirties, they 
had dedicated themselves to small-scale banana and cocoa production and thereafter, 
with some support from the state marketing board (the CNP), had specialized in the 
production of maize - and to a lesser degree tubers - for the national market. In the 
seventies, the renewed expansion of the plantation economy led to land scarcity, which 
became an impediment for the aspirations of farmers' sons to become smallholders 
themselves. Hence UPAGRA embarked on the invasion of one of the largest 'haciendas' 
in the Atlantic Zone, that of Neguev, in what would be experienced by the state as a 
direct threat to its authority. 
Although the invasion itself was a success the whole event was experienced as 
too exacting for those involved in it. Furthermore, as a result of it the relationship 
between UPAGRA and state institutions became highly strained. Thus UPAGRA 
changed its policy towards one of supporting the landed, while providing legal advice -
and occasionally organisational support - to landless squatter groups. This emphasis on 
production problems - as against the land problem - led UPAGRA to search for 
cooperation with other farmers' unions, even those which they accused of being 
instruments of the state in their more radical period. One reason for this was that, as 
the agrarian crisis reached its peak at the end of the eighties, UPAGRA found itself less 
and less able to win concessions, even for the landed. This led to internal divisions in 
the organisation, and eventually to the desertion of some of the oldest end most 
dedicated leaders, as the current leadership was accused of becoming more and more 
estranged from the most needy of its constituents (the landless) while at the same time 
losing its capacity to defend the fate of the landed. 
Despite this, UPAGRA has persisted in its efforts to be accepted as a legitimate 
and democratic peasant union within the existing political framework, while contesting 
the current agricultural policy. In keeping with this strategy it has been prepared to 
strike broad alliances with a variety of producers' organisations, some of them linked to 
strong entrepreneurial interests (as in the case of the rice producers of Guanacaste). 
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Abstract 
State-peasant relations in this book are studied by focussing on the strategies which 
farmers and bureaucrats deploy in a colonisation area of the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica 
in order to deal with forms of state intervention which include programmes, projects 
and other instruments of state policy. Existing studies of state intervention can be 
divided in two categories. First, there are works that view intervention as a policy 
activity and that pay little attention to the political role of intervention as an arena in 
which farmers and bureaucrats interact. And, second, there are studies which view 
state intervention as an instrument in the service of capitalist expansion, thus operating 
at the cost of the autonomy of smallholders. 
My approach differs from these works inasmuch as it attempts to study interven-
tion by focussing on the negotiation practices of bureaucrats and farmers. Central in 
the analysis, then, are not the formal intentions of a project or a programme. Neither 
are efforts made to uncover the 'hidden objectives' of intervention. Instead, I have 
undertaken a detailed analysis of how bureaucrats develop 'practices of intervention' 
including the labelling and classification of farmers, and of how farmers appropriate the 
resources and meanings of intervention in their dealings with state institutions. State 
intervention, in this perspective, has different consequences for different social actors, 
and pressuposes the existence of conflicting interests. 
The question which this dissertation addresses can be phrased as follows: What 
kinds of intervention practices do exist, and what can we say about the role of the 
state bureaucracy in agrarian development? And, on the other hand, how does state 
intervention shape the strategies farmers deploy in order to deal with the state 
bureaucracy? 
The research addresses these issues by studying attempts by bureaucrats to 
transform farmers into clients in two settlements in the 'frontier'. 'Development' was 
defined by programme planners in a technical and apolitical way. The attempted 
transformation of farmers/settlers into clients went together with different kinds of 
labelling and classification practices which had effect in the administrative domain, but 
not in the process of service delivery. It appeared, then, that farmers developed 
strategies in order to appropriate, resist or manipulate intervention. 
The findings of this research are of interest for students of intervention as well as 
for practitioners involved in development projects. It is argued that more attention 
should be payed to the politics of intervention. Notions of success and failure, 
therefore, should be viewed within the context of the interests, commitments and 
aspirations of a variety of actors such as policymakers, front-line workers and farmers. 
Samenvatting 
In dit boek worden staat-boeren relaties bestudeerd door aandacht te schenken aan de 
strategieën die boeren en burokraten in een kolonisatiegebied in de Atlantische zone 
van Costa Rica ontwikkelen om met vormen van staatsinterventie (zoals programma's, 
projecten en andere instrumenten van overheidsbeleid) om te gaan. 
Bestaande studies naar staatsinterventie kunnen in twee kategorieen verdeeld worden. 
Enerzijds zijn er studies die interventie zien als een bestuurlijke aktiviteit en weinig 
aandacht schenken aan de politieke betekenis van interventie als een arena waarin 
boeren en staatsfunctionarissen interakteren. Anderzijds zijn er studies die interventie 
beschouwen als een instrument om kapitalistische expansie te stimuleren, meestal ten 
koste van de autonomie van kleine boeren. Staatsinterventie wordt in deze visie gezien 
als een middel om boeren te inkorporeren in formele staatsverbanden. Mijn benadering 
verschilt van deze studies in die zin dat ze poogt interventie te bestuderen door naar de 
onderhandelingspraktijken van burokraten en boeren te kijken. Als uitgangspunt voor de 
analyse van interventie in de landbouw worden dus niet de formele intenties van een 
projekt of programma genomen. Ook wordt er niet gepoogd de 'verborgen doeleinden' 
van interventie op te sporen. Wel heb ik gedetailleerd bestudeerd hoe burokraten 
'praktijken van interventie' tot stand brengen door boeren te 'labellen' en te 
klassificeren en anderzijds hoe boeren zich interventie toeeigenen in hun 
onderhandelingen met de staat. Staats interventie in deze visie heeft verschillende 
gevolgen voor de verschillende aktoren, en gaat gepaard met het bestaan van 
tegenstrijdige belangen. 
De vraag die dit promotie-onderzoek beantwoordt, luidt: Wat zijn de verschillende 
praktijken die staat interventie tot stand brengt? Hoe gaan boeren en burokraten ermee 
om, en wat kunnen we derhalve zeggen over de rol van de staatburokraties in 
agrarische ontwikkeling? Anderzijds, welke rol speelt interventie in de strategieën van 
boeren? 
Het antwoord op deze vraag is als volgt. Door middel van een geintegreerd ruraal 
ontwikkelingsprogramma in de Atlantische Zone van Costa Rica werd gepoogd boeren 
kolonisten om te vormen tot kliënten. 'Ontwikkeling', werd in dit perspektief 
gedefinieerd als een 'technische' a-politieke zaak. De gepoogde transformatie van 
boeren-kolonisten tot kliënten bracht allerlei klassificatie en 'labelling' praktijken met 
zich mee, die effect hadden in de administratieve kontekst. Deze bleken echter niet te 
werken in de onderhandelingspraktijken tijdens het proces van dienstverlening. Het 
bleek daarentegen dat boeren verschillende strategieën ontwikkelden om zich de 
interventie toe te eigenen, te weerstaan of te manipuleren. 
De bevindingen van dit onderzoek kunnen van belang zijn voor mensen die 
betrokken zijn bij het ontwikkelingsdenken in het algemeen en bij 
ontwikkelingsprojekten in het bijzonder. Er wordt gesteld dat meer aandacht besteed 
moet worden aan de politieke aspekten van staatsinterventie. Begrippen zoals success 
en mislukking van interventie zouden dan beschouwd moeten worden in de kontekst 
van de verschillende belangen, aspiraties en verplichtingen van de verschillende groepen 
aktoren betrokken by interventie (beleidsmakers, 'front-line workers', en boeren). 
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Het proefschrift bestaat uit twee gedeelten. In hoofstuk 1 t/m 4 worden 
interventiepraktijken behandeld. Van hoofdstuk 6 t/m 9 worden drie verschillende 
'intervention-coping' strategieën behandeld die boeren ontwikkelen om met 
staatsinterventie om te gaan. In hoofdstuk 5 worden een aantal theoretische 
benaderingen van lokale administratie en landbouwbeleid behandeld die een kritisch 
standpunt innemen tegenover de aard en doelstellingen van interventie. 
Hoofdstuk 1 schetst het onderzoeksprobleem en de metodologie die gehanteerd wordt 
aan de hand van een aantal ervaringen die ik had met functionarissen van het 
landhervormingsinstituut, IDA. Ook worden de centrale analytische koncepten en de 
regionale kontext behandeld. 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt een institutionele analyse van het IDA gegeven in termen 
van de concurrentie tussen drie verschillende institutionele projekten: de anti-
interventionistische, de populistische en de geintegreerde. Deze projekten 
onderscheidden zich in hun opvattingen over de rol van het IDA in 
landbouwontwikkeling en de wijze waarop boeren moeten worden benaderd. 
Doorslaggevend bij de opkomst van het derde institutionele projekt - de geintegreerde -
was de rol van de Amerikaanse ontwikkelingsorganisatie USAID door middel van de 
financiering van het 034 programma. Dit programma wordt beschreven als een poging 
om de efficiëntie van het IDA te verbeteren door een kliënt-gerichte benadering te 
introduceren. Dit gebeurde middels de invoering van doelmatige administratieve 
methoden en het geintegreerd ruraal ontwikkelingsmodel. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt het effect van het 034 programma bestudeerd op de lokale 
administratie van de Neguev nederzetting. In tegenstelling tot het beoogde in de 
projektdokumenten blijkt dienstverlening op een nogal ongeorganiseerde en 
ongemotiveerde wijze plaats te vinden. We zien dat in het geval van functionarissen de 
invoering van doelmatige administratieve procedures tot een grote mate van 
vervreemding van de boerenwerkelijkheid leidt. Dit uit zich in een afstandelijke omgang 
met boeren en de neiging om hen de schuld te geven van de problemen rondom 
projektimplementatie. In dit hoofdstuk wordt een verband gelegd tussen het 'model van 
de klient' zoals gehanteerd door de ontwerpers van het 034 programma en lokale 
praktijken van sociale controle die tot doel hebben de invloed van onafhankelijke 
boerenorganisaties uit te bannen. Er wordt gesteld dat dit model van de klient 
omgevormd wordt tot een instrument van 'labelling'. Het gevolg is het ontstaan van 
een ideologie van interventie waarmee de fouten en contradicties van het 034 
programma worden verdoezeld en die het mogelijk maakt voor de functionarissen om 
hun autoriteit over de boeren te legitimeren. 
In hoofdstuk 4 worden drie 'stijlen van opereren' van functionarissen behandelt: 
de organisatorische benadering van de voorlichter, de administratieve benadering van 
de juridische assistent, en de politieke benadering van de sociaal werker. Door de 
verschillen in stijlen van opereren te bestuderen wordt het mogelijk om te analyseren 
hoe functionarissen de ideologie van interventie in hun lokale leefwerelden 
internaliseren. Het belang van deze analyse is dat het Iaat zien dat interventie 
verschillende betekenissen krijgt in de strategieën van degenen die belast worden met 
de uitvoering van projekten en programma's. Interventie wordt dus niet gezien als de 
empirische uitwerking van een Weberiaanse burokratische rationaliteit of een 
Marxistische ekonomische logika, maar in termen van hoe lokale aktoren prakijken van 
interventie konstrueren en daaraan betekenis geven. 
Hoofdstuk 5 heeft een brugfunctie. Een aantal theoretische onderwerpen en 
koncepten, die reeds aan de orde zijn geweest - 'labelling', 'interfaces', 'access' -
wordt op een kritische manier uitgediept, met als doel het ontwerpen van een 
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analytisch raamwerk om de strategieën te bestuderen die boeren ontwikkelen om zich 
aan staatsinterventie aan te passen, om die te weerstaan of te manipuleren. Daarbij 
wordt gekozen voor een metodologie die gericht is op de interpretatie en analyse van 
diskursieve praktijken. Diskursieve praktijken houden het vermogen in van sociale 
aktoren om bepaalde thema's, argumenten en rethorische vormen te gebruiken in 
onderhandelingen met de staat. 
Hoofdstuk 6 behandelt de geschiedenis van de invasie van het Neguev landgoed 
door de UPAGRA boerenorganisatie. Deze invasie werd gevolgd door intensieve vormen 
van staatsinterventie die eerst gericht waren op de politieke bestrijding van UPAGRA en 
daarna op de vorming van een toegewijde klientele. Toegang tot land en krediet, zoals 
die georganiseerd wordt door IDA functionarissen, is cruciaal in deze strijd. Ook wordt 
de opkomst van een groep van bemiddelaars, de 'gatekeepers' beschreven, die hun 
bijzondere positie als de 'lievelingen van het IDA' ontlenen aan het feit dat zij zich 
konformeren aan diens beleid. De aanpassingsstrategie van de 'gatekeepers' vormt 
echter een beletsel voor het tot stand brengen van lokale vormen van organisatie 
wanneer deze nodig worden in verband met het einde van het 034 programma. 
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt interventie in Tierragrande-Macadamia behandeld, een 
nederzetting die sterke relaties onderhoudt met een linkse boerenorganisatie (FENAC). 
De regionale leiding van het IDA probeert gebruik te maken van de interne verdeeldheid 
die ontstaat in de gemeenschap wanneer plannen worden ontwikkeld om een weg aan 
te leggen. We zien dat een vermenging plaats vindt tussen persoonlijke belangen, 
aspiraties en rivaliteiten van een kleine groep van kolonisten. De poging van de 
regionale leiding van het IDA in de Atlantische zone mislukt echter wanneer Diego 
Casas, de linkse boerenleider, weet aan te tonen dat IDA niet in staat is om oplossingen 
te vinden voor een aantal organisatorische problemen. Hij is in staat om de thema's van 
lokale organisatie en solidariteit handig uit te spelen in zijn relatie met het IDA en zijn 
rivalen in de nederzetting. 
In hoofdstuk 8 komt manipulatie als een strategie aan de orde door een 
waterleidingprojekt in de aangrenzende nederzetting van Tierragrande-la Isleta door te 
lichten. Dit projekt ontwikkelt zich als een belangrijke arena van onderhandeling tussen 
vertegenwoordigers van het waterleidinginstituut en verchillende groepen boeren binnen 
de nederzetting. Een bijzondere rol wordt gespeeld door Ignacio, een dominee die zeer 
bedreven is in het combineren van zijn persoonlijke (financiële) aspiraties, en die van de 
gemeenschap. Om zijn doel te bereiken gaat Ignacio een alliantie aan met de sociale 
werker van het waterleidinginstituut, die weliswaar overtuigd is van diens 
organisatorische kwaliteiten maar hem niet helemaal vertrouwt. Ignacio speelt een 
kundig spel dat gekenmerkt wordt door een mengsel van bluf, intimidatie en een zeer 
sterk vermogen om te overtuigen, niet in het minst door het gebruik van godsdienst om 
mensen aan zich te binden. Tegelijkertijd wordt hij steeds meer als een probleemgeval 
gezien door functionarissen van het IDA. Meer gevreesd dan geliefd maar alom 
bewonderd voor zijn daadkracht is hij in staat om alle eer voor het projekt naar zich toe 
te halen, de relaties met de staat te monopoliseren en een aantal belangrijke aktoren in 
de gemeenschap en daarbuiten in zijn projekt in te lijven. Deze 'case study' biedt ons de 
mogelijkheid om te analyseren hoe interventie een rol krijgt binnen de individuele en 
groeps strategieën van lokale aktoren. 
In hoofdstuk 9, wordt een samenvatting gepresenteerd van het argument van het boek 
alsmede de conclusies. Ook worden een aantal alternatieve benaderingen voor de studie 
van staat-boeren relaties kritisch behandeld. Tenslotte worden een aantal theoretische 
elementen aangedragen voor een sociologie van interventie. 
Resumen 
Este libro estudia relaciones estado-campesinado a través de un enfoque sobre las 
estrategias desplegadas por campesinos y burócratas para tratar con formas de 
intervención tales como programas, proyectos y otros instrumentos de política estatal. 
En concreto, esta tesis trata sobre la implementación de un programa de desarrollo rural 
integrado en un área de colonización en la zona atlántica de Costa Rica. En la literatura 
sobre intervención estatal se pueden encontrar dos corrientes. Por un lado existen 
trabajos que conceptualizan la intervención como una actividad administrativa, 
prestando poca atención al significado político de la intervención como una arena en la 
que interactuan funcionarios públicos y beneficiarios. Por el otro lado existe toda una 
gama de estudios que ven la intervención como un instrumento al servicio de la 
expansión del capital, un proceso que supuestamente ocurre a costa de la autonomía de 
los pequeños agricultores. Dentro de esta última perspectiva, la intervención se concibe 
como un instrumento de incorporación de agricultores dentro del aparato administrativo 
estatal. Mi acercamiento se diferencia de este tipo de estudios en el sentido de que se 
intenta estudiar el proceso de intervención a través de la investigación de las prácticas 
de negociación entre burócratas y agricultores. Es decir, no se tpman las intenciones 
formales de un projecto o de un programa como punto de partida. Tampoco se intenta 
buscar los 'objetivos escondidos' de la intervención. En cambio, el estudio está 
enfocado hacia la manera en la cual los burócratas llevan a cabo prácticas de interven-
ción a través de la clasificación y 'etiquetamiento' de agricultores; asi como en la forma 
en que estos últimos se apropian la intervención en sus negociaciones con el estado. 
Según ésta perspectiva, la intervención estatal tiene diferentes consecuencias para los 
diversos actores sociales e implica la existencia de intereses opuestos. 
Las preguntas que esta tesis trata de responder son las siguientes. ¿Cuáles son 
las diversas prácticas que conforman la intervención estatal? ¿Cómo usan los agriculto-
res y burócratas estas prácticas y, por lo tanto, qué tanto podemos decir sobre el papel 
del estado en el desarrollo agrícola? Por otro lado, qué papel juega la intervención en las 
estrategias de los agricultores? 
La respuesta a estas preguntas es la siquiente: A través de un programa de 
desarrollo rural integrado en la zona atlántica de Costa Rica se intentó transformar a 
colonos en clientes. Dentro de este programa el concepto de desarrollo fué definido 
como un problema técnico y apolítico. Este intento de transformación de campesinos-
colonos en clientes trajo consigo una serie de prácticas de clasificación y de etiqueta-
miento. Estas prácticas, sin embargo, no resultaron ser muy efectivas durante el 
proceso de prestación de servicios. El presente estudio aporta evidencia para demostrar 
que los agricultores desarrollaron diferentes estrategias para apropiarse, resistir o 
manipular la intervención del estado. 
Los resultados de este estudio pueden ser de utilidad para todos aquellos 
interesados en problemas de desarrollo y, en particular, para aquellos que trabajan para 
proyectos de desarrollo. Se plantea que se debe prestar mas atención a los aspectos 
políticos de la intervención estatal y que conceptos como éxito y fracaso de la interven-
ción adquieren significados específicos dentro del contexto de los intereses, compromi-
sos y aspiraciones de los diferentes grupos de actores (planificadores, administradores, 
técnicos responsables de la implementación, agricultores). 
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La tesis consiste de dos partes. Del capítulo 1 hasta 4 se discuten las prácticas de 
intervención. En los capítulos 6 a 9 se analizan tres estrategias diferentes desplegadas por los 
agricultores para hacerle frente a la intervención. En el capítulo 5 se esbozan unas cuantas 
aproximaciones teóricas sobre administración local y políticas agrarias que critican el carácter 
y los objetivos de la intervención estatal. 
A partir de unas cuantas experiencias que tuve con funcionarios del Instituto de 
Desarrollo Agrario, el IDA, el primer capítulo traza la problemática de investigación y la 
metodología utilizada. Además, se presentan los conceptos analíticos centrales y el contexto 
regional. El segundo capítulo contiene un análisis institucional del IDA en términos de la 
competencia entre tres diferentes proyectos institucionales: el anti-intervencionista, el 
populista y el integral. Estos proyectos se diferencian en sus criterios sobre el papel del IDA 
en el desarrollo agrario de la nación y en sus concepciones sobre la manera más efectiva de 
tratar al los agricultores. En el desarrollo del tercer proyecto institucional - el integrado - la 
agencia de desarrollo de los Estados Unidos (USAID) tuvo un papel decisivo a través del 
financiamiento del programa 034. Se puede describir este programa como un intento para 
aumentar la eficiencia del IDA por medio de la introducción de un modelo de prestación de 
servicios en el que se conceptualiza al agricultor como un cliente. Esto ocurrió a través de la 
introducción de métodos administrativos eficaces y del modelo de desarrollo rural integral. 
En el tercer capítulo se estudian ios efectos del programa 034 sobre la administración 
local del asentamiento Neguev. Al contrario de lo que se esperaba, el prestamiento de 
servicios se llevó a cabo de una forma bastante desorganizada y desmotivada. Así, por 
ejemplo, vemos que en el caso de los funcionarios la introducción de procedimientos 
administrativos eficaces conlleva a un desconocimiento de la realidad campesina, lo que se 
manifiesta en una relación distanciada con los agricultores, así como en la tendencia de culpar 
a estos por los problemas que se suscitaron durante la implementación del proyecto. En este 
capítulo se hace una conexión entre 'el modelo del cliente' diseñado por los planificadores del 
programa 034 y las prácticas institucionales de control social que tienen como fin erradicar 
la influencia de organizaciones campesinas independientes. Se plantea que el 'modelo del 
cliente' es transformado en un 'modelo de clasificación y etiquetamiento. El resultado es la 
creación de una ideología de intervención por medio de la cual los errores y las contradicciones 
del programa 034 son desdibujadas, lo cual que permite a los funcionarios justificar su 
autoridad ante los parceleros. 
En el cuarto capítulo se discuten los estilos de operación de tres funcionarios 
diferentes: el estilo organizativo del extensionista, el estilo jurídico del asistente legal y el estilo 
político del trabajador social. Por medio del examen de los diferentes estilos de operación se 
analiza la internalización de la ideología de intervención en los mundos de vida de diferentes 
funcionarios. La importancia de este análisis radica en el hecho de que muestra que 
intervención estatal adquiere un significado concreto en el contexto de los estilos de operación 
de todos aquellos responsable de la implementación de proyectos y programas. La 
intervención, por lo tanto, no se conceptualiza como el efecto empírico de alguna racionalidad 
weberiana o de una lógica económica marxista, sino en términos de la capacidad de los 
actores sociales para construir prácticas de intervención y de darles a estos un significado 
propio. 
El quinto capítulo tiene una función de 'puente'. En él se examinan de manera crítica 
algunos temas y conceptos teóricos que se introdujeron en los capítulos anteriores - tales 
como etiquetamiento, 'interface', acceso - a fin de diseñar un marco analítico que permita 
investigar las estrategias desplegadas por los agricultores para acomodarse, resistir or 
manipular la intervención estatal. Para tal propósito se opta por una metodología que posibilite 
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la interpretación y el análisis de prácticas discursivas, prácticas discursivas que permiten a los 
actores sociales usar temas, argumentos y formas retóricas específicas en sus relaciones con 
el estado. 
En el sexto capítulo se discute la historia de la invasión de la hacienda Neguev por la 
organización campesina UPAGRA. Como respuesta a esta invasión el estado desplegó formas 
intensivas de intervención que inicialmente se dirigieron a erradicar la influencia de UPAGRA 
y posteriormente a la formación de una clientela de agricultores. El uso político del acceso a 
la tierra y el crédito que funcionarios del IDA hicieron fueron cruciales en esta lucha. Además, 
se examina la aparición de un grupo de intermediarios denominados 'gatekeepers', que deben 
su posición de 'favoritos del IDA' al hecho de que se han adaptado a las políticas de la 
institución. Sin embargo, la estrategia de acomodamiento de estos intermediarios se convierte 
en un impedimento para la creación de formas locales de organización en el momento en que 
los primeros son considerados como necesarios al finalizar el programa 034. 
En el séptimo capítulo se estudia la intervención institucional en Tierragrande 
Macadamia, un asentamiento que mantiene relaciones estrechas con una organización 
campesina de izquierda (FENAC). La oficina regional del IDA intenta utilizar las divisiones que 
se presentan en el asentamiento después que se da conocer el plan.de construcción de un 
camino. Vemos aquí que se da un enredo entre los intereses personales, las rivalidades y las 
aspiraciones de liderazgo de un pequeño grupo de colonistas. Los intentos de los 
administradores regionales del IDA en la zona atlántica de neutralizar a los 'comunistas' 
fracasan en el momento que Diego Casas, el lider campesino de izquierda, es capaz de probar 
a la comunidad que el IDA no tiene la perseverancia necesaria para encontrarle solución a una 
serie de problemas organizativos. Este dirigente campesino demuestra gran habilidad en la 
utilización estratégica de los temas de organización local y solidaridad en su relación con el 
IDA y con sus rivales dentro del asentamiento. 
En el octavo capítulo se discute una estrategia de manipulación por medio de la historia 
de un proyecto de acueductos en el asentamiento contiguo a Tierragrande-La Isleta. Este 
proyecto aparece como una importante arena de negociación entre representantes del Instituto 
de Acueductos y Alcantarillado (AyA) y diversos grupos de campesinos dentro del 
asentamiento. Un papel preponderante dentro de este proyecto es el que juega Ignacio, un 
pastor evangélico muy diestro para combinar sus aspiraciones personales y financieras con 
los 'intereses' de la comunidad. Para alcanzar su objetivo, Ignacio entabla una alianza con el 
trabajador social del AyA quien, a pesar de estar convencido de los talentos organizativos del 
primero no le tiene mucha confianza. Ignacio juega un papel hábil que consiste en una mezcla 
de jactancia e intimidación, así como en una gran capacidad de convencimiento. (La religión 
es un elemento importante en sus prácticas de creación de adeptos). Ignacio, quien es más 
temido que querido pero quien se gana la admiración de todos por su energía y resolución, es 
capaz de atribuirse los honores del proyecto, de monopolizar las relaciones con el estado y de 
enlistar una serie de actores dentro y fuera del asentamiento para la consecución de su propio 
proyecto personal. Este estudio de caso nos ofrece la posibilidad de analizar cómo la 
intervención estatal adquiere un significado específico dentro de las estrategias individuales 
y de grupo de los actores sociales. 
En el noveno y último capítulo aparece un resumen del argumento del libro y se 
presentan las conclusiones. También se presenta una discusión crítica de algunas 
aproximaciones alternativas para el estudio de las relaciones estado-campesino. Finalmente, 
se aportan algunos elementos para una sociología de la intervención. 
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